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STUDIES 

MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC 

1775-1865 



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THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO 
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 

LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 

TORONTO 



STUDIES 

MILITAEY AND DIPLOMATIC 

1775-1865 



BY 

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
1911 

All rights reserved, 



•/^^/ 



COPTEIGHT, 1911, 

By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. 



Set up and electrotypcd. Published October, igu. 









\> 



J. 8. Gushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. 
Korwood, Mass., U.S.A. 



©CI.A207318 



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CONTENTS 

PAGE 

MILITARY STUDIES: 

The Battle of Buxkek Hill 1 

Battle of Long Island 22 

Washington and Cavalry 59 

The Revolutionary Campaign of 1777 114 

The Battle of New Orleans 174 

The Ethics of Secession 203 

Some Phases of the Civil War 232 

Lee's Centennial 291 

DIPLOMATIC STUDIES: 

An Historical Residuum 344 

Queen Victoria and the Civil War 375 

INDEX 415 



STUDIES: MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC 



THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL^ 

In Carlyle's Life of Frederick the Great there is an account 
of a curious conversation in December, 1745, between 
Frederick and D'Arget, the secretary of Valori, at that junc- 
ture the French ambassador at Berlin. It was at the close of 
the Second Silesian War, from which Frederick, then only 
thirty-three years of age, had emerged victorious ; thenceforth 
to be till he died the leading figure in European political action. 
He was just entering on the eleven years of more or less 
broken peace which preceded the Seven Years' War. D'Ar- 
get, at the instance of Valori, had suggested some grand 
political combinations in which Frederick was to figure as 
the ''Pacificator of Europe." The king listened to him, 
and then replied: ''It is too dangerous a part for playing. 
A reverse brings me to the verge of ruin : I know too well 
the mood I was in last time I left Berlin ever to expose my- 
self to it again ! If luck had been against me there, I saw 
myself a monarch without a throne; ... A bad game 
that; ... I am not in alarm about the Austrians. . . . 
They dread my army ; the luck that I have. ... I would 
not henceforth attack a cat except to defend myself." And 
so, says Carlyle, Frederick "seems to have little pride in his 
'Five Victories'; or hides it well . . . and at times acknowl- 

^ The American Historical Review, Vol. I, 401 (April, 1896). 

B 1 



2 MILITARY STUDIES 

edges, in a fine sincere way, the omnipotence of Luck in 
matters of War." ^ 

On the 14th of October, 1895, the centenary of the death 
of Colonel William Prescott, who commanded in the redoubt 
at Bunker Hill, was commemorated at Boston, and Dr. 
William Everett then delivered an address marked by a high 
order of eloquence and much reflection. A month later, 
on the 13th of November, there was unveiled at Hartford, 
Conn., a bronze statue of Colonel Thomas Knowlton, of 
Ashford, the gallant officer who commanded the Connecticut 
troops which covered Prescott's left, and whose death a year 
later at Harlem Heights was not the least of the grievous 
losses sustained by the American army in the disastrous 
New York campaign of 1776. These events, and the 
addresses they called forth, revived the memory of two of 
the most interesting and important military operations in the 
struggle for American Independence, in both of which, also, 
''the omnipotence of Luck in matters of War" made itself 
felt in a way not to be overlooked. 

And first of Bunker Hill. The affair of the 17th of June, 
1775, on the peninsula of Charlestown, opposite Boston, 
affords, indeed, one of the most singular examples on record 
of what might be called the "balancing of blunders" between 
opposing sides, and of the accidental inuring of all those 
blunders to the advantage of one side. So far as the Ameri- 
can, or what we call the patriot cause, was concerned, the 
operation ought to have resulted in irretrievable disaster, 
for on no correct military principle could it be defended ; 
and yet, owing to the superior capacity for blundering of 
the British commanders, the movement was in its actual 
results a brilliant success ; and, indeed, could hardly have 

1 Carlyle, Frederick II, Book XV, Chap. XV ; Works (Sterling Ed.), 
Vol. IX, 17-21, 37. 



THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL 3 

been made more so had the Americans controlled for that 
occasion the movements of both sides, and so issued orders 
to their opponents. Looking over the accounts of that 
battle and examining the ground upon which it was fought, 
it is difficult to understand how the Americans could know- 
ingly have put themselves in such an untenable position; 
much more how the British should so utterly have failed 
to take advantage of the mistakes of their inexperienced 
antagonists. 

In 1775 Charlestown, including Breed's Hill, was a pen- 
insula of limited size and hilly formation, connected with the 
mainland by a single narrow causeway, which was, at times 
of sufficiently high tide, itself overflowed. When, therefore, 
on the night of the 16th-17th of June, Colonel Prescott led 
his force across the causeway, and established it upon Breed's 
Hni, he put himself and those who followed him in a trap 
where, with an enemy having complete control of the sea, 
and so commanding his rear and both flanks, it was merely 
necessary to snap the door and hold him, utterly powerless 
either to escape or to resist. He had literally thrust his 
head into the Lion's mouth. 

Consequently, when the guns of their ships woke up the 
British officers in Boston on the morning of the 17th of June, 
had there been any, even a moderate, degree of military 
capacity in their commander, he would have ejaculated his 
fervent thanks to Heaven that his enemy had thus delivered 
himself into his hands ; and proceeded incontinently to 
''bag" him. To do this, it was only necessary for him to 
move a sufficient detachment around by water to the cause- 
way connecting Charlestown with the mainland, seize it 
securely under cover of the fire of his ships and floating 
batteries, there establish himself, and quietly wait a few 
hours for the enemy to come down to surrender, or come out 



4 MILITARY STUDIES 

to be killed. To bring this result about he might not have 
been compelled to fire a single gun; for his enemy had not 
even placed himself upon the summit of Bunker Hill, which 
overlooked and commanded Charlestown Neck, but had 
absolutely moved forward to the lower summit of Breed's 
Hill, between Bunker Hill and Boston, from which point, 
with a powerful and well-equipped enemy in undisputed 
control of the water, he would have been unable to escape 
and powerless to annoy. His position would have been 
much that of a rat when the door of a trap is securely sprung 
behind it. The only alternative to an ignominious sur- 
render would have been a general engagement on open 
ground ; for, with his line of communication cut off, unable 
to advance, unable to retreat, and unable even to strike or 
worry his adversary, between whom and himself he had 
interposed Bunker Hill, the only course open to Prescott 
would have been the hurried abandonment of his redoubt; 
and a scramble to get possession of the summit of Bunker 
Hill. Had he succeeded in doing that, the patriot army 
would still have been hopelessly cut in two, and mere star- 
vation would within twenty-four hours have compelled the 
Americans to choose between surrender and an almost hope- 
less aggressive movement. In case of a general engagement, 
the patriots, a mere mob, must attack a well-armed and 
disciplined opponent, on ground of his own selection and 
protected by the guns of a fleet. Such an engagement, under 
the circumstances then existing, could, in all human prob- 
ability, have had but one result. The patriot forces must 
have been routed and dispersed ; for, hardly more than a 
partially armed militia muster, they were without organiza- 
tion or discipline, only inadequately supplied with weapons, 
artillery, or munitions, and, except on Breed's Hill, unpro- 
tected even by field works. 



THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL 5 

The untenable position into which the patriots had got 
themselves, and the course to pursue in dealing with them, 
were, from a military point of view, so obvious that, in the 
council of war that morning held in Boston, the proper 
military movement was at once urged, it is said, by a major- 
ity of the British officers with Clinton at their head. In- 
stead of following it, a sufficient force of British was sent 
across to Charlestown, landed directly in the face of their 
enemy, and proceeded to take the American intrenchments 
by assault ; finally, after great loss, doing so, and absolutely 
driving the rat out of the trap, of which the British com- 
mander had left the door wide open. A more singular 
exhibition of apparently unconscious temerity on one side, 
and professional military incapacity on the other, it would 
be difficult to imagine. 

Under these circumstances, it becomes somewhat curious 
to consider the actuating causes of the operations on that 
day. Who was responsible for what occurred ? 

It is sometimes asserted that, so far as the Americans were 
concerned, their object was to force the fight with a view to 
firing the colonial heart, and that the result entirely justified 
the calculation. This may be true. Nevertheless, on the 
other side, it is apparent that, unless the American com- 
manders calculated with absolute certainty upon the utter 
incapacity of their opponents, by the precise move then 
made they placed the cause which they had at heart in most 
imminent jeopardy, and came dangerously near quenching 
the so-called fire in the colonial heart in a sickening 
drench of blood, spilled in defeat; for if, instead of attacking 
the American line in front exactly at the point where it was 
prepared for attack and braced to resist, the British had 
operated by sea and land in their rear, it is difficult to see 
what could have saved the patriot cause from a complete 



6 MILITARY STUDIES 

collapse. If Colonel Prescott and his detachment had been 
obliged to surrender, and on the evening of June 17 had been 
ignominiously marched prisoners into Boston, it would only 
have remained for Gage, by a vigorous movement next day 
from Charlestown in the direction of Cambridge, distant an 
hour's march, to have dispersed the now demoralized patriot 
army and made any further organized armed resistance 
practically impossible. Even numerically the forces were 
very nearly equal. Beside the ships of war. General Gage 
could muster 8000 effectives operating on interior lines ; 
while, with a force nominally 16,000 strong. General Ward 
could probably never have put 10,000 men in action. A 
general engagement was the one result the British com- 
mander ought on every consideration to have sought to 
bring about; while the American officers knew perfectly 
well that for a general engagement they were prepared in 
no single respect. Yet the occupation of Bunker Hill by 
the patriot forces meant, if met by the British with any 
degree of military skOl, an immediate general engagement. 
It is quite out of the question to suppose that those who 
assumed to guide the patriot operations could have meas- 
ured this risk, and then knowingly taken it. There are 
limits to any amount of rashness, except that of ignorance. 
While the course which should have been pursued by the 
British commander was apparent, the theory on which the 
patriots acted is, thus, more difficult to explain. The 
movement on the night of June 16 had been decided upon 
at a council of civilians and military officers held that day 
at Cambridge. More than a month before, a joint committee 
of the council of war and the committee of safety had, 
after careful consideration of the ground, recommended the 
construction of a strong redoubt on Bunker HUl. At the 
same time, however, provision was to be made for apparently 



THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL 7 

a simultaneous occupation of Winter, Prospect and Plowed 
Hills on the other, or land, side of Charlestown Neck. This 
plan of operations is intelligible. If, at the same time that 
Bunker Hill was occupied. Prospect, Winter and Plowed 
Hills also had been occupied, the patriot army would have 
commanded Charlestown Neck, and, by preventing a land- 
ing there and driving away the floating batteries, could have 
kept communication open between their army and the 
advanced and isolated force in occupation of the heights on 
the Charlestown peninsula. To do this successfully implied, 
it is true, the control of a body of artillery and munitions 
far in excess of what the provincial force had ; but stUl, 
from a military point of view, the plan was well conceived 
and, if successfully carried out, would have compelled an 
immediate evacuation of Boston by the British. 

But, had this line of operation been pursued, it would 
have been quite needless to occupy Breed's Hill at the out- 
set; seeing that Breed's Hill was immediately in front of 
Bunker HOI and thirty-five feet lower, so that artillery 
posted on Bunker Hill commanded it completely. It 
could accordingly have been occupied at any time when a 
force in firm possession of Bunker HUl was ready to advance 
and take it. 

If such was the general plan of operations under which 
Colonel Prescott's movement of the 16th of June was or- 
dered, the next question is, — Who was responsible for its 
partial execution, and consequent failure? Its success 
involved two things : first, the seizing of Bunker Hill ; and, 
secondly, and at the same time, the erection of works upon 
Prospect, Winter, and Plowed Hills, or the high ground at 
the base of those hUls commanding Charlestown Neck and 
the adjacent water. It is impossible to ascertain conclu- 
sively whether any one was then in command of the left wing 



8 MILITARY STUDIES 

of the provincial army. If any one, it was Putnam. At the 
council of war he had strenuously advocated the forward 
movement to Bunker Hill ; and, it is said, the same evening 
discussed with Knowlton, at the quarters of the latter, the 
reasons and details of the step. Knowlton was a natural 
soldier, and he at once, the same authority asserts, pointed 
out to the far from clear-headed Connecticut farmer meta- 
morphosed into a general, that, if the proposed move was 
made, the enemy under cover of his floating batteries could 
land troops at the Neck, cutting off both reinforcements and 
retreat; that the approaches and flanks of the position 
could be enfiladed from the shipping; and, finally, that 
Gage could, by a judicious disposal of the land and naval 
forces at his command, compel the American force on the 
peninsula to surrender from mere starvation.^ 

This excellent advice, if really given, seems to have been 
thrown away on Putnam, who during the following day was 
most active in all parts of the field, and appears to have been 
recognized in a way as the general officer in command of the 
entire field of operations, while unquestionably Colonel 
Prescott was in immediate charge of the detachment on 
Bunker Hill. He occupied the position of a brigadier- 
general whose command was in action; while Putnam held 
in vague unmilitary fashion, the position of chief of 
the grand division with which Prescott's command for the 
time being co-operated. Certainly, on the night succeeding 
the engagement. General Putnam was active in holding and 
fortifying Prospect Hill, and was then practically recognized 
as in a sort of irresponsible command of the left wing of 
Ward's army. If, therefore, any one was to blame for the 
failure to carry out that essential part of the original plan 

Historical Address of P. Henry Woodward at the Knowlton Cere- 
monial, p. 20. 



THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL 9 

of operations which included the fortification of the ground 
commanding Charlestown Neck from the land side, it was 
Putnam. 

But the truth probably is that no one was responsible. 
The lack of organization in the patriot army was then such 
that no distinctive and recognized officer was in charge of 
the left wing. Prescott had his orders direct from the head- 
quarters at Cambridge ; and the other officers with separate 
New Hampshire or Connecticut commands seem throughout 
what occurred to have taken orders, or declined to take 
them, pretty much as they saw fit. 

It is, however, useless to venture surmises on this head. 
The essential fact is that Prescott was ordered to march 
across Charlestown Neck and to occupy Bunker Hill; and 
did so, leaving his rear wholly unprotected. After that, 
on his own responsibility, he exposed himself to great addi- 
tional risk by advancing from the summit of Bunker Hill, 
from which he overlooked both Breed's Hill, in his front, and 
his single line of retreat across Charlestown Neck in his rear, 
to the lower summit before him, at which point he was help- 
lessly in the trap, unless his opponent, by coming at him in 
front, drove him bodily out of the hole in which he had put 
himself. His opponent did just that ! 

It was well for the patriot cause that both Gage and Howe 
outranked Clinton that day. When, in the morning, with 
the eye of a soldier, Clinton urged Gage to pay no attention 
to the patriot front, but to seize the causeway in its rear. 
Gage seems to have replied that to do so was not in accord- 
ance with correct military principles, as, by such a move- 
ment, his force engaged might be placed between two 
divisions of the enemy. In other words, the movement 
suggested might bring on the very thing he should most 
have sought to bring on, — a general engagement under 



10 MILITARY STUDIES 

cover of liis ships. But this was not his real reason for 
acting as he did. Gage was, in fact, that not uncommon 
type of soldier familiarly known in military parlance as a 
"butt-head." As such, he, as a matter of course, fell into 
the dangerous error of underestimating his opponent ; and, 
while he could urge an abstractly correct military principle, 
he had not the capacity to judge whether it had any applica- 
tion to the facts before him. So much for laboring with 
Gage in the morning. 

But Clinton on that occasion seems to have had a hard 
time of it. Having failed to inspire Gage with a certain 
degree of intelligence in the early hours of the day, he, in its 
later hours, tried his hand on Howe. When, at last, about 
four o'clock of the long June afternoon, with several hours 
of daylight still before him, Howe stormed the redoubt and 
drove Prescott's little force out of it and in pell-mell flight 
over Bunker Hill and across the causeway to the hills be- 
yond, Clinton, again with the eye of a soldier to the situa- 
tion, urged his superior in command to follow up his advan- 
tage, cross the causeway, and, then and there, smite and 
spare not. 

The thing was perfectly practicable. The confusion in 
the patriot ranks was complete. In vain had Putnam 
tried to hold his own men, and rally the fugitives from the 
redoubt, in the partially finished works on Bunker Hill. 
He had been simply swept away in the panic rout. On the 
land side of Charlestown Neck the patriots had no works 
thrown up behind which they might hope to rally. Cam- 
bridge and headquarters were only two miles away. They 
had challenged the blow; and the blow was impending. 
Fortunately for the patriots and the patriot cause, Howe, 
and not Clinton, was now in immediate command of the 
king's troops. Howe, though personally brave, and really 



THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL 11 

capable as a tactician, was sluggish of temperament. Sub- 
sequently, and when, succeeding Gage, he was in chief 
command, though personally popular with his associates, 
the lack of aggressive energy he uniformly evinced in the 
hour of victory, was with the more soldierly among them 
ground not only of comment but of outspoken complaint. 
On June 17, this deficiency stood Ward and Putnam in 
good stead. Howe wholly failed to avail himself of the 
opportunity Clinton then saw and pointed out to him. 

The singular thing, however, in all these operations, as 
already pointed out, is that, from beginning to end, if the 
patriot army had been commanded by a military genius of 
the highest order, and gifted with absolute prescience, — 
having, moreover, the power to issue commands to both 
sides, — he could not, so far as the Americans were con- 
cerned, have bettered the course of events. The whole 
purpose of the move was to forestall the proposed opera- 
tions of the British, who planned on the 18th, only a day 
later, to occupy Bunker Hill and Dorchester Heights, pre- 
liminary to an advance on the patriot lines at Cambridge. 
It was intended to draw their fire. If, in doing this, Prescott 
had, in obedience to his orders, and as technically he un- 
questionably should have done, contented himself with 
seizing Bunker Hill and there intrenching, it can hardly be 
questioned that the British would then have landed on 
Charlestown Neck, immediately in his rear, and forced him 
to retreat precipitately as the alternative to surrender. 
His very reckless audacity in moving forward to Breed's 
Hill led to their attacking him squarely in front. 

Had Prescott directed the assaulting column, he would 
have ordered it to do just that. But his good fortune did 
not stop here. Twice he repulsed the attacking force, in- 
flicting terrible loss upon it ; and this is his great claim for 



12 MILITARY STUDIES 

credit on that memorable day. Preseott was evidently a 
fighter. He showed this by his forward midnight move 
from Bunker to Breed's Hill; and he showed it still more 
by the way in which he kept a levy of raw ploughmen steady 
there during the trying hours that preceded conflict; and 
then, in face of the advancing line of regulars, made them 
hold their fire until he gave the word. This was superb, — 
it deserves unstinted praise. Again, the luck of the Ameri- 
cans soared in the ascendant. Under the exact conditions 
in which they then found themselves, they had chanced on 
the right man in the right place, — and it was one chance 
in a thousand. 

And then followed yet more good luck, — indeed, a 
crowning stroke. Twice did Preseott repulse his enemy. 
Had he done so a third time, he would have won a victory, 
held his position, and, the next day, in all human probability, 
the force which relieved him would have been compelled to 
surrender, because of properly conducted operations in its 
rear under cover of the British fleet. For it is impossible 
to suppose that Clinton's advice would not then have been 
followed ; and had it been followed, with Clinton in charge 
of the operations in the field, a result not unusual in warfare 
would no doubt have been witnessed, — the temporary and 
partial success of one day would have been converted into 
the irretrievable disaster of the succeeding day. It was so 
with Napoleon himself at Ligny and Waterloo. 

Fortunately for Preseott and the patriot cause, the am- 
munition within the Bunker Hill redoubt was pretty much 
consumed before the third assault was made; and so his 
adversaries drove the patriot commander out of his trap 
and into the arms of his own friends. In spite of himself 
Preseott was saved from ultimate disaster. Yet, curiously 
enough, he does not even then seem to have realized his 



THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL 13 

luck; for, instead of going back to the headquarters of 
General Ward, as well he might have gone, in a towering 
rage over the incompetence which had put him and his 
command in such a position, without reason or support — 
a position from which he had'escaped only by a chance in a 
thousand, — in place of taking this view of the matter, he 
actually offered, if a fresh force 1500 strong was put under 
his command, to recross Charlestown Neck and recapture 
Bunker Hill the next day, — in other words, to go back 
into the trap from which the stupidity of his opponents 
had forcibly driven him! 

The original plan of operations matured by the Cambridge 
council, including as it did the simultaneous occupation of 
both Prospect and Bunker Hills, was, therefore, bold, well- 
conceived, calculated to produce the results desired, and 
entirely practicable; assuming always that the patriot 
army had the necessary artillery and ammunition to equip 
and defend the works it was proposed to construct. Such 
was not the case ; but, doubtless, under the circumstances, 
something had to be risked. 

This plan, thoroughly good as a mere plan, was, however, 
executed in part only, and in such a way as to expose the 
provincial army and cause to disaster of the worst kind. 
And yet, through the chances of war, — the pure luck of 
the patriots, — every oversight of which they were guilty, 
evory blunder they committed, worked to their advantage, 
and contributed to the success of their operations ! They 
completely drew the British fire and forestalled the con- 
templated offensive operations, throwing the enemy on the 
defensive; they inspired the American militia with confi- 
dence in themselves, filling them Vv^ith an aggressive spirit; 
they fired the continental ardor; and, finally, the force 
engaged was extricated from a false and impossible position, 



14 MILITARY STUDIES 

after inflicting severe punishment on its opponents. For 
that particular occasion and under the circumstances, 
Cromwell or Frederick or Napoleon in command would 
probably have accomplished less; for, with the means at 
disposal, they never would have dared to take such risks, 
nor would they ever have thrust themselves into such an 
utterly untenable position. 

To penetrate the mind and plan of an opponent — to 
pluck out the heart of his counsel and to make dispositions 
accordingly — has ever been dwelt upon as one of the 
chief attributes of the highest military genius, — Hannibal, 
Caesar, Gustavus, Marlborough, Frederick, Napoleon, all 
possessed it in a noticeable degree. Possibly, General Ward 
and Colonel Prescott may instinctively have acted in obe- 
dience to this rarest military quality on the 16th and 17th 
of June, 1775. If so, they certainly developed a capacity 
for which the world has not since given them credit; and 
the immediate results justified to the fullest extent their 
apparently almost childlike reliance on the combined pro- 
fessional incapacity and British bull-headedness of General 
Thomas Gage. Fourteen months later, as will hereafter be 
seen. Ward's more famous successor got himself and his 
army into a position on Long Island scarcely less false and 
difficult than Prescott's at Bunker Hill.^ He, also, was then 
saved from irretrievable disaster through sheer good luck, 
happily combined with his opponent's incompetence. In 
this case, however. Fortune did not, as at Bunker HUl, 
positively shower its favors on the patriot cause. 

Yet in one respect the battle of Bunker Hill was, in 
reality, epochal. Prescott did not occupy Breed's Hill and 
begin to throw up his intrenchments until nearly midnight 
on the 16th-17th of June. Thus his men had but about four 

1 Infra, 28-35. 



THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL 15 

hours in which to work before the break of day disclosed their 
whereabouts. Yet when, less than twelve hours later, the 
British stormed the field-works, they were amazed at their 
extent and completeness, and could not believe that they 
had all been thrown up in a single summer's night. It was 
something new in warfare. 

There can be few things more instructive and suggestive, 
from a military point of view, than a visit to the battle-fields 
of Waterloo and Sedan, passing rapidly from the former 
to the latter. To one whose impressions of active warfare 
and military field methods are drawn from campaigns in 
Virginia, now thirty years ago, it is not easy, while surveying 
the scenes of the battles of 1815 and 1870, to understand 
what the English in the one case and the French in the other 
were doing in the hours which preceded the engagements. 
In the Virginia campaigns nothing was of more ordinary 
observation than the strength and perfect character of 
the intrenchments which both armies habitually threw up. 
Such skill in the alignment and construction of these works 
did the common rank and file of the armies acquire, that a 
few hours always sufficed to transform an ordinary bivouac 
into a well-protected camp. In the case of Waterloo, the 
Duke of Wellington had days and even weeks before selected 
it as his battle ground ; he had even caused a topographical 
survey to be made of it; he arrived there from Quatre 
Bras twenty hours before the battle of Waterloo began ; he 
made all his dispositions at his leisure. Yet not a spadeful 
of dirt seems to have been thrown ; and the next day, while 
his line was exposed to the fury of Napoleon's famous 
artillery, the French cavalry rode unobstructed in and out 
among the English squares. 

It seems to have been the same, more than half a cen- 
tury later, at Sedan. Strategically, the French were there in 



16 MILITARY STUDIES 

almost as false a position as the Americans at Bunker Hill. 
They were in a hole, — rats in a trap. Tactically, their 
position was by no means bad. The ancient fortifications 
of Sedan secured and covered their centre; while their two 
wings were free to operate on the high grounds behind, 
sloping sharply to the river. They occupied the inside of 
a curve, with perfect facilities for the concentration of force 
by interior lines. A better opportunity, so far as the char- 
acter of the ground and country was concerned, for the 
rapid throwing up of intrenchments and field-works could 
not have been desired. As at Waterloo, the facilities were 
everywhere. McMahon's army, when surprised and cor- 
nered in Sedan, was, it is true, on its march to Metz, and all 
was in confusion. But they had twelve hours' notice of 
what was impending, and they fought on the ground on 
which they had slept. Yet, again, not a spadeful of dirt 
seems to have been thrown. What were the French think- 
ing of or doing all those hours? 

Judging by the record of Bunker Hill, and recollections 
of what was habitually done ninety years later in Virginia, 
if an army of either Federals or Confederates, as developed 
in 1865, had held the ground of the British at Waterloo or 
the French at Sedan, the lines and intrenchments which on 
the days of battle would have confronted Napoleon and 
Von Moltke could hardly have failed to give them pause. 
Before those temporary works they would have seen their 
advancing columns melt away, as did Gage at Bunker Hill, 
Pakenham at New Orleans, and Lee at Gettysburg. 

The simple fact seems to have been, that, until the modern 
magazine gun made it an absolute necessity, digging was 
never considered a part of the soldier's training. Indeed, 
it was looked upon as demoralizing. In the same way, the 
art of designing temporary field-works and camp intrench- 



THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL 17 

ments was not regarded as belonging to the regimental 
officers' functions. The famous lines of Torres Vedras 
showed that Wellington knew well how to avail himself of 
defensive works ; but they were laid out on a large scale and 
on scientific principles. Mere temporary field-works and 
improvised protections seem to have been contemptuously 
looked down upon as a branch of irregular warfare or Indian 
fighting. It was something unprofessional; even savoring 
of cowardice. Often, during the War of Secession, old 
West Point graduates, high in rank but somewhat hide- 
bound, might be heard lamenting in the same spirit over 
the ever-growing tendency of the armies to protect them- 
selves by intrenchments wherever they camped. It made 
soldiers afraid of exposure! As the military martinets ex- 
pressed it, they wanted the rank and file ^Ho stand up, 
and fight man-fashion." How often, in those days, was 
that expression used ! Yet their idea of fighting was appar- 
ently that of Wellington at Waterloo, and of McMahon at 
Sedan. At either of those places our veterans of 1865, 
Federals or Confederates, would have protected themselves 
with field-works, though only bayonets were to be had for 
picks, and tin dippers did duty for shovels. 

Putnam, therefore, showed a very profound insight 
when, on the eve of Bunker Hill, he remarked that, as a 
soldier, the Yankee was peculiar. He didn't seem to care 
much, the Connecticut general said, about his head, but he 
was dreadfully afraid of his shins ; cover him half-leg high, 
and you could depend on him to fight. The fact seems to 
be that, as a fighting animal, the Yankee is unquestionably 
observant. Breastworks are in battle handy to the assailed ; 
and he saw at once that breastworks admit of rapid and easy 
construction to men accustomed to the use of shovel and 
pick. Prescott taught that lesson on the 17th of June, 1775. 



18 MILITARY STUDIES 

He did not realize it, and apparently it took almost a century 
for the professional soldier to master the fact thoroughly; 
but those light, temporary earthworks, scientifically thrown 
up on Bunker Hill in the closing hours of a single June night, 
introduced a new element into the defensive tactics of 
the battle-field. Its final demonstration was at Plevna, a 
whole century later. 



The facts in this paper set forth, and the inferences drawn there- 
from, are so obvious that they would naturally suggest themselves 
to an investigator from an examination of any topographical 
map of the Charlestown peninsula, and more forcibly still to one 
familiar with the ground. From a military point of view, they 
were apparent at the time ; and, naturally, have not wholly 
escaped attention since. 

In the Library of the Massachusetts Historical Society there is 
a copy of Israel Mauduit's "Remarks upon Gen. Howe's Account 
of his Proceedings on Long Island" (London, 1778), on the fly leaf 
of which is pasted a clipping from an issue of the London 
Chronicle, of August 3, 1779, containing a communication signed 
with the initials "T. P." The letter was written shortly after the 
reports concerning the Bunker Hill affair reached England, and 
with some knowledge of the locality. Every position taken and 
criticism advanced in the text will be there found set forth as 
something well understood at the time, and which did not admit 
of dispute. In a pamphlet entitled "A View of the Evidence 
Relating to the Conduct of the American War under Sir William 
Howe," are printed certain letters and documents entitled "Fu- 
gitive Pieces," etc. First among these is a letter from Boston, dated 
July 5, 1775, or eighteen days after the battle. It was written ap- 
parently by a British officer then serving under General Gage ; 
and in it the tactics employed by Howe are severely criticised. 
The writer says : " Had we intended to have taken the whole rebel 
army prisoners, we need only have landed in their rear and occupied 
the high ground above Bunker Hill, by this movement we shut 
them up in the Peninsula as in a bag, their rear exposed to the fire 



THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL 19 

of our cannon, and if we pleased our musketry; in short they 
must have surrendered instantly, or been blown to pieces. . . . 
The brave men's [i.e. British] lives were wantonly thrown away. 
Our conductor [Howe] as much murdered them as if he had cut 
their throats himself on Boston Common." See Proceedings of 
Mass. Hist. Soc, 1910, Vol. XLIV, pp. 96-103. In the library 
of Harvard University there is a pamphlet, entitled, " The Com- 
plaint of W. Neil Maclean to the Honorable the Commons of 
Great Britain in Parliament Assembled" (123 pp. 8vo). A 
very rare tract, this was published, apparently, about 1790, and 
is a severe arraignment of Sir William Howe by an officer who 
claims to have been most unjustly treated by him. His allega- 
tions are, accordingly, to be accepted in part only, and as indicat- 
ing views held in British military circles. Speaking of what 
occurred on June 17, Maclean says (p. 26): "He [Howe] began 
... by the fatal attack of Bunker's Hill, where he exposed, to 
certain and inevitable destruction, and as far as depended on him, 
to woeful disgrace and dishonour, such a number of the best troops 
in the whole world ; before the face of an open intrenchment, 
that might have been attacked in the rear from both sides of the 
neck of land on which it was drawn, and carried without risquing 
the life of a single soldier." 

Such were contemporaneous judgments expressed by British 
oJEcers either themselves at the time on the ground or informed 
by participants in the operations ; yet in the extensive subsequent 
historical literature relating to Bunker Hill only here and there 
are passing references to be found to the strategic situation 
and tactical conditions involved ; or the lessons to be derived 
therefrom. They are mentioned, or alluded to, in an incidental 
sort of way, without apparent appreciation of possible con- 
sequences, or reflection upon those on both sides responsible 
for what occurred. As long ago as August, 1789, however, 
Jeremy Belknap wrote : "I have lately been on the ground 
and surveyed it with my own eye, and I think it was a most 
hazardous and imprudent affair on both sides. Our people were 
extremely rash in taking so advanced a post without securing a 
retreat ; and the British were equally rash in attacking them only 
in front, when they could so easily have taken them in the rear." 



20 MILITARY STUDIES 

(Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll. Series 5, Vol. Ill, p. 159). Gordon in his 
history (Vol. II, p. 51) dwells upon the topic, passing a correct 
judgment in the assertion that the British commander ''might 
have entrapped the provincials by landing on the narrowest part 
of Charlestown Neck, under the fire of the floating batteries and 
ships of war." But, of the modern writers, Frothingham scarcely 
alludes to the subject; while Devens, himself a soldier of ex- 
perience, only refers to it incidentally and in a passing way (Cen- 
tennial Anniversary , p. 87). Carrington's criticism (Battles of the 
American Revolution, p. 113) is of the most meagre possible de- 
scription. Bancroft devotes to it three lines. Fiske (The Ameri- 
can Revolution, I, p. 138) states the case briefly, but clearly and 
correctly. 

Perhaps, however, the best purely military criticism is that in 
Stedman's History (Vol. I, 128) . Stedman was not in Boston or 
attached to the British army at the time ; but, subsequently, he 
had access to the most reliable sources of information, and was in 
constant personal intercourse with participants in the affair. He 
also wrote in the light of a wide experience in later operations 
during the same war. Stedman describes the British troops as 
marching up to the assault "in the middle of a hot summer's day, 
incumbered with three days' provisions, their knapsacks on their 
backs, which, together with cartouche-box, ammunition, and fire- 
lock, may be estimated at one hundred and twenty-five pounds 
weight, with a steep hill to ascend, covered with grass reaching to 
their knees, and intersected with the walls and fences of various 
inclosures, and in the face of a hot and well-directed fire . . . 
(from) behind a breastwork, and defended by a redoubt. But, 
whatever credit may be due to the valour of the troops, the plan 
of the attack has been severely censured. 

"Had the Symmetry transport, which drew little water, and 
mounted eighteen nine-pounders, been towed up Mystic channel, 
and been brought to, within musket shot of the left flank, which 
was quite naked ; or one of our covered boats, musket-proof, 
carrying a heavy piece of cannon, been towed close in ; one charge 
on their uncovered flank, it was said, might have dislodged them 
in a moment. It has been also said, that the British troops might 
have been landed in the rear of the provincial intrenchment, and 



THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL 21 

thereby avoided those difficulties and impediments which they 
had to encounter in marching up in front. By such a disposition, 
too, the breast-work of the Americans would have been rendered 
useless, and their whole detachment, being inclosed in the penin- 
sula, must have either surrendered at discretion, or attempted, in 
order to get back to the main land, to cut their way through the 
British line. Further still, it has been said, that the success of the 
day was the less brilliant, from no pursuit being ordered, after the 
provincials had begun to take to flight." 



II 

THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND^ 

''The dilatoriness and stupidity of the enemy saved us/' 
wrote General Charles Lee to Washington in July, 1776, 
immediately after the repulse of the British fleet under Sir 
Peter Parker by the guns of Fort Moultrie on the first 
attempt at the occupation of Charleston, South Carolina. 
The same qualities in those opposed to AVashington, com- 
bined with an almost amazing run of pure luck, saved him 
and the cause of American independence at New York less 
than two months later. Not often has a military force 
on which great results depended found itself in a more 
critical position than did the patriot army then; and 
seldom has any commander so completely in the toils been 
afforded equal opportunities for extrication. 

Analyzed from any thoughtful as well as military point of 
view, it was a strange fiasco that enacted in and about what 
are now the cities of Brooklyn and New York during the 
months of August, September and October, 1776 — a 
fiasco on the part of all responsible for what occurred, 
though very tragic for many of those involved on the Ameri- 
can side. So far as the British were concerned, the failure 
of those in command then to avail themselves of oppor- 

1 The substance of this paper appeared in two articles ; the first printed 
in the American Historical Review, Vol. 1, pp. 650-670, July, 1896; the 
second, in the Proceedings of the Mass. Hist. Soc. Vol. XLIV, pp. 233- 
253, December, 1910. These articles have been re^-nsed and largely re- 
written. Where not given, citations to authorities, etc., can be found by 
reference to the original publications. 

22 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 23 

timities repeatedly offered both is, and at the time was, so 
apparent that the modern tendency is to attribute what 
they did, or failed to do, to secret instructions or, perhaps, 
some tacit understanding; military advantages were, for 
some occult reasons of state, not to be pressed too far, or 
to any decisive result. On the other hand, upon the Ameri- 
can side, not only was a great cause put in extreme jeopardy, 
but, through the unskilful pursuance of a policy altogether 
wrong, many and valuable lives were unnecessarily sacri- 
ficed. 

Major General Howe, afterwards Sir William Howe, 
K. C. B., is, as an historical character, of no great moment, 
and investigators are free to do with him as they may see 
fit ; but that Washington should have then been responsible 
for grave errors of judgment which ought under any rea- 
sonable weighing of probabilities to have ruined the Ameri- 
can cause and deprived the world of one of its immortalities, 
— that he should have involved his army in disaster and 
disgrace through bad judgment and because of frequent 
and long hesitations at a time when quick decision was 
essential, — these are things not readily now to be admitted ; 
nor does the record thus in any way so read in the pages of 
the distinctively American historian. Though manifestly 
not in accord with long-accepted traditions, or, perhaps, 
even with the everlasting fitness of things, such seem, 
however, to be the only inferences fairly to be drawn from 
the evidence in the case, when that evidence is studied in 
a cold and purely critical spirit, uninspired by patriotism, 
and devoid of sympathy for those concerned either on the 
one side or the other. But, so studied, the necessary conclu- 
sion would seem to be that if there was at Bunker Hill gross 
military blundering on both sides, before Brooklyn and on 
Manhattan Island that blundering was on both sides fairly 



24 MILITARY STUDIES 

outdone. The British commander there almost wantonly 
threw away the certainty of a decisive and, probably, a 
final victory; while not even the ''dilatoriness and stupidity 
of the enemy" saved the patriots from disasters and from 
disgrace which in no way, moral or otherwise, could be 
exploited as a victory. 

The course of events leading up to the operations referred 
to were, briefly, as follows. The British evacuated Boston 
on the 16th of March. By those in charge of the patriot 
cause the point at which the next blow would be struck 
could only be surmised ; but New York naturally sug- 
gested itself. Obviously it was the strategic centre of 
the very extensive region in which the war had to be carried 
on ; and, as such, invited attack. From it as a base, and 
from it alone of American Atlantic seaports, could large and 
intricate combined operations, covering all the Provinces, be 
conducted. A movement by the British in that direction 
had naturally been anticipated by the American leaders 
early in 1776, and General Charles Lee was, accordingly, 
detached from the army before Boston, and by order of 
Washington repaired to New York, there to make suitable 
provision against attack. Arriving on the 4th of February, 
he at once took in the difficulties of the situation. '^What 
to do with this city," he wrote to Washington, ''I own, 
puzzles me- It is so encircled with deep navigable water, 
that whoever commands the sea must command the town." 
The command of the sea being manifestly the key of the 
situation, that the British held that key was no less manifest. 

Lee, nevertheless, proceeded to plan such a system of 
defences as seemed practicable ; but, being subsequently as- 
signed by Congress to the command of the Department of 
the South, he left New York on the 7th of March, leaving 
Major General Lord Stirling, as he was called, in temporary 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 25 

charge. Stirling, shortly after, was in his turn superseded 
by General Israel Putnam, under instructions from Wash- 
ington to go on with the preparations for defence in accord- 
ance with Lee's plans. On the 13th of April, Washington 
himself arrived, and assumed command. 

Washington had taken it for granted that, after its evacu- 
ation of Boston in March, 1776, the British armament would 
proceed at once to New York; but, instead of so doing, it 
went to Halifax, there to refit. Not until June 29 did the 
reenforced expedition reach Sandy Hook, inside of which it 
came to anchor; and, landing his army on Staten Island, 
General Howe there awaited the arrival of additional ships 
and still further reenforcements, then shortly looked for, 
under command of his brother. Admiral Lord Howe. These 
appeared in July. 

Washington at that time found himself in command of 
some 9000 so-called effectives, ''2000 of whom were entirely 
destitute of arms." This force was very imperfectly or- 
ganized. Insufficiently armed, clothed and equipped, it 
was largely composed of unreliable militia. Without ade- 
quate artillery, it had no cavalry at all. Of naval support 
there was not even a pretence. How, with such means, to 
defend a place at the command of whoever controlled the 
sea, against a thoroughly equipped and disciplined force twice 
the size of his, and that force supported by a powerful fleet, 
was the problem with which the Commander-in-Chief found 
himself confronted. For two whole months did he study 
his problem doubtless in its every aspect ; and not once in all 
that time does it seem to have occurred to him that it was 
not only insoluble, but that any considerable attempt at 
its solution was fraught with extreme danger. During these 
months he wrote many letters and prepared some formal re- 
ports; but in not one of them does he even suggest that the 



26 MILITARY STUDIES 

course pursued was opposed to his military judgment or based 
on incorrect strategic principles. He never even hints that 
under the pressure of an assumed political necessity he is 
taking what seems to him a dangerous military risk. On 
the contrary, even after the inevitable disaster had befallen 
him, he truthfully and frankly wrote ''Till of late, I had 
no doubt in my own mind of defending this place." 

Yet in the course of this attempt at a defence Washing- 
tion was compelled to violate, and did violate, almost every 
recognized principle of warfare. To defend New York it 
was absolutely necessary to hold the heights of Brooklyn, 
opposite the city; for those heights, as Bunker Hill in the 
case of Boston, commanded New York within easy artillery 
range. But Brooklyn, separated from New York by deep 
navigable water, was on an island. Above New York, on 
both sides east and west, were other wide, navigable water- 
ways, which also had to be covered by defences. Again, if, 
under such conditions, successful resistance was possible, 
it was only possible through holding to a policy of intrench- 
ments. The patriot force should have been kept within the 
strongest line of defence possible to be devised ; and, as at 
Bunker Hill, prepared to resist attack in front, it had to 
trust to the incompetence of its opponents that the attack 
would indeed be in front, and not in rear : but if, perchance, 
the attack should be from the rear, with the enemy in abso- 
lute control of the water, and free to strike when and where 
he pleased, the American army manifestly stood in imminent 
danger of destruction. Precipitate retreat by any route left 
open could alone save it. 

Under these circumstances and conditions, Washington not 
only divided his inadequate army, but when his opponent 
obliged him by attacking just where alone he could hope to 
resist an attack, that is, in full front, instead of awaiting 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 27 

the assault within his lines, as did Prescott at Bunker Hill, 
Washington actually went out to meet it, thus challenging 
the fate which befell him. Finally, even his own excellent 
management, in the hour of disaster he had thus provoked, 
could not have saved the patriot cause from irretrievable 
ruin and himself from hopeless failure and disgrace, had it 
not been combined with almost miraculous good luck, to 
which the ''dilatoriness and stupidity of the enemy" most 
effectively contributed. This, too, at the very juncture 
when those under Howe confidently wrote that the British 
commander would not give his opponent '4ime to breathe, 
but push his successes like a winning gamester." 

Though General Howe had come to anchor inside of Sandy 
Hook June 29, and been joined there by Lord Howe and the 
fleet July 1, it was not until August 22 that active opera- 
tions on Long Island began. During that long interval of 
over seven weeks of the best campaigning weather of the 
whole year, the British army rested quietly in its summer 
camp on Staten Island. On July 12 two English ships, 
respectively of forty and twenty guns, had run by the 
North River defences without sustaining any injury, and 
gone up the Hudson to the Tappan Sea ; where, until August 
18, they lay in apparent perfect security, with awnings 
stretched, sleeping in the summer sunshine. Altogether 
a somewhat contemptuous demonstration of how complete 
was the British command of the sea, and how futile were 
the American efforts to obstruct the navigable channels. 
August 7 thirty transports, under convoy of three frigates, 
put to sea with the design of going around Long Island, and 
so threatening New York from the Sound and East River 
side. The line of American retreat from Brooklyn to the 
mainland was imperilled. All this time the two Howes 
were in daily communication with the royalist governor, 



28 MILITARY STUDIES 

Try on, of New York, who was on board one of the English 
ships-of-war ; and, through other sympathizers on the main- 
land and Long Island, they could get all the information 
they chose to ask for, not only as to localities and roads, but 
in regard to the movements of the patriots. Plentifully 
supplied with provisions, the invaders lacked neither guides 
on the land nor pilots by water. Under these circumstances, 
it was small matter of surprise that, as the weeks dragged 
on, many of Washington's ablest advisers looked on the 
situation with ever increasing uneasiness. They feared 
being entrapped ''on this tongue of land, where," as one of 
them later expressed it, "we ought never to have been." 

Besides the fleet, the British commander had, by the 
middle of August, an army 30,000 strong in a high state 
of efficiency, with a large park of artillery and a small, but 
completely equipped, body of cavalry. Washington at 
the same time had nominally 17,500 men, of whom about 
14,000 were reported fit for duty. With a few pieces of 
artillery, he still had no mounted force. And with such 
means at his command, incredible as it seems, he actually 
thought he could defend a land and water front of nearly 
thirty miles, open to attack front, flank and rear, besides 
being cut in two by a navigable channel both broad and 
deep. His opponent, meanwhile, was obviously free to 
concentrate whatever of force might be necessary for a 
decisive blow at any selected point. Neither did Washing- 
ton indulge in any false confidence in the efficacy of his 
water-batteries to hold in check, at least to a certain degree, 
the enemy's maritime supremacy; on the contrary, as he 
himself wrote a whole month before actual operations against 
him began, he ''had most religiously believed that a vessel 
with a brisk wind and strong tide cannot, unless by a chance 
shot, be stopped by a battery." 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 29 

The interior works at Brooklyn alone called for a force of 
at least 8000 men to hold them with any prospect of success ; 
while the exterior lines before Flatbush required an equal 
number, if the enemy was to be retarded there even for a 
day. In other words, if Howe was, as at Bunker Hill, 
obliging enough to attack full in front, and by land alone, 
the position on Long Island Washington had undertaken 
to defend, seeking no cooperation from the British fleet 
and leaving his opponent's New York rear quite unmolested, 
— even in this case, more than the whole force of the patriot 
army would be needed for the defence of Brooklyn alone. 

At last, everything, after weeks of apparently needless 
procrastination, being in readiness, the Howes determined 
to strike, and on the 22d of August, Sir Henry Clinton, 
with 15,000 men, one regiment of ^cavalry, and forty pieces 
of artillery, crossed over from Staten to Long Island and 
landed, unopposed, at Gravesend. It was now evident 
where the blow by land was to be looked for. Brooklyn 
was the enemy's objective ; or, at least, one of his objectives. 

Why the two Howes decided on this plan of campaign 
is not apparent. Strategically considered, Washington had 
put himself in a position exactly similar to that in which 
Prescott had tactically been placed fourteen months before 
at Bunker Hill. With his opponent in undisputed com- 
mand of navigable surrounding and intersecting waters, he 
was in a trap. The true policy of his opponents would seem 
to have been so to lay their plans as, not to drive him out 
of the trap, but to spring its door, so catching him. This 
they could easily have done, had Howe only learned thor- 
oughly his 17th of June lesson. He had, however, done so 
only in part. He had derived from it, as will presently be 
seen, a wholesome caution as to bull-headed, frontal as- 
saults, but the far-reaching significance of a command of 



30 MILITARY STUDIES 

the sea under certain conditions seems quite to have escaped 
his intellectual grasp, at best limited. Except on this 
assumption, it is still a mystery, why, under cover of the 
overwhelming broadsides of his brother's fleet, Howe did 
not go up the comparatively unobstructed Hudson to 
Bloomingdale, landing about where Sixtieth Street now is, 
three miles above the outskirts of the New York of that 
day ; and then, crossing a strong division of his army to the 
East side, sweep down on Washington, by the Boston road, 
now Third Avenue, forcing him into the East River. To 
counteract such a movement it would have been necessary 
for the Americans precipitately to withdraw their forces 
from the Brooklyn side of the East River, and concentrate 
them at the point of British attack. This movement 
would have consumed much important time ; if, in presence 
of a detachment of the British fleet in the East River, 
practicable at all. The combined British naval and mili- 
tary forces could have effected the manucevre with cer- 
tainty and ease, the broadsides of the fleet then covering 
the Bloomingdale, or Albany road, now Broadway, and 
demoralizing the flank and rear of the patriots just as they 
demoralized and broke the patriot line of battle a fortnight 
later at Kips Bay. The weight of attack being down the 
East side, the patriots would have been between two fires. 
From both the strategic and the tactical points of view the 
movement was so obvious and its success so certain that the 
failure of the Howes to adopt it must forever remain un- 
accountable. They elected, however, to attack Washing- 
ton squarely on his Brooklyn front, with his army cut in 
two by the East River, and his means of communication 
uncovered on the water side. Even that situation was 
bad enough for the patriots; in fact could not have been 
from the purely military point of view much worse or more 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 31 

ill-considered. The door of the Brooklyn trap behind them 
might any day be snapped. 

The difficulties of his situation, not to say its impossi- 
bilities, must, it would seem, now have dawned on Wash- 
ington's mind. As he himself mildly put it,^ making no 
allusion to a hostile fleet, operating in the broad navigable 
waters which on three sides compassed him, the problem 
was '^ to oppose an army of 30,000 experienced veterans 
with about one-third (10,514) the number of raw troops, and 
those scattered some fifteen miles apart." 

Though the British force was transferred across from 
Staten Island to Gravesend August 22, it was not until the 
evening (9 o'clock) of the 26th, or four days later, that a 
forward movement was made. Constant skirmishing had 
meanwhile been going on, and the Americans had thus been 
allowed ample time in which to take the situation in, and 
make preparations accordingly. In the enemy's advance, 
there was no element of surprise. During the earlier stages 
of preparation for defence. General Nathanael Greene had 
been in charge of the Brooklyn wing of the patriot army; 
but he, taken down by a summer fever, had some time 
before been rendered wholly unfit for duty. General 
Sullivan succeeded him in temporary charge. All along, 
Washington and Greene had seen, what indeed was obvious, 
that, with the means at their disposal, a landing of the 
British on Long Island could not be prevented ; but, if 
Brooklyn was once occupied by the enemy. New York 
became untenable. The British in that case would hold 
the heights, and the Americans the town commanded by the 
heights. The problem immediately involved was, there- 
fore, the defence of Brooklyn against an attack from the 
land side, in all probability supported by a simultaneous 
1 Writings (Sparks), IV, 34. 



32 MILITARY STUDIES 

attack on its water front, and the American rear. Greene 
had, accordingly, sought to cover Brooklyn by constructing 
a line of intrenchments and redoubts back of the village 
from Gowanus Cove on the south to Wallabout Bay on the 
north, presenting to an enemy approaching from the south 
and west a front of a little less than a mile in extent, well 
protected by creeks and morasses on either flank, and, at 
its centre, about one mile and a quarter from the landing- 
place of the East River ferry across to New York. From 
these intrenchments to Gravesend, the natural landing- 
place for the British, was some eight miles, while between 
the two, about five miles from Gravesend and three from 
Brooklyn, rose a difficult, heavily wooded ridge, forming a 
natural longitudinal barrier practically passable at three 
points : one close to the bay, the shore road ; the second, 
three miles further inland, in front of Flatbush, being the 
direct and ordinary road between Gravesend and Brooklyn ; 
and the third the Jamaica road, two miles further still to 
the east. Under these circumstances, assuming that they 
were in sufficient force and resolved to hold New York, the 
course to be pursued by the Americans was obvious. As 
soon as the landing of the British at Gravesend was known, 
that is, on August 22, the largest force available ought to 
have been concentrated under cover of the Brooklyn in- 
trenchments, while strong infantry outposts should have 
been put at each of the three passes, the roads beyond being 
constantly watched by mounted patrols. To do this work 
at least 15,000 men, with adequate artillery and cavalry, 
would have been required, a certain mounted force being 
on such extended lines indispensable to safety. The force 
actually there was 5500 infantry, mostly militia, none of 
whom had ever been in battle, with six pieces of light field 
artillery, and no cavalry whatever. 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 33 

Under these circumstances, instead of concentrating 
themselves within the Brooklyn intrenchments when the 
English, after four days of delay, began to advance, the 
Americans actually went out in force to meet them on two 
of the roads, leaving the third, that to Jamaica, not only 
unprotected, but not even watched. The natural result 
followed. Taking advantage of their great preponderance 
in numbers, and excellent information and guidance, the 
British, advancing by three columns, found, to their great 
surprise, the Jamaica road unobstructed, — ^'a route we 
had never dreamed of," as an American officer engaged 
innocently wrote, — and, by means of it, got in the rear of 
the detachments under Stirling and Sullivan, who had been 
either posted or hurried forward to defend the two western, 
and more direct, approaches ; and the practical destruction 
of those detachments followed. Both commanders were 
captured, and more than one-third of the entire force dis- 
posable for the defence of Brooklyn was destroyed. The 
American loss in killed, wounded, and missing was about 
1500, out of a total engaged probably not exceeding 3500. 
Contemporaneous comments are sometimes the best, and it 
would be difficult to improve on those upon this affair 
shortly after jotted down by Captain Stephen Olney of the 
Rhode Island regiment in Stirling's command. They cover 
the case. " At the time, I did not pretend to know or 
examine the generalship of posting Sullivan's and Stirling's 
forces as they were, leaving the forts but poorly manned 
with sick and invalids. It must be on the supposition that 
the enemy would come on the direct road, and if our troops 
were overpowered, they might retreat and defend the fort. 
But the enemy took a circuitous route, and where it was 

said Colonel had neglected to guard, and arrived in 

our rear without notice. Had it been left to the British 



34 MILITARY STUDIES 

generals to make a disposition of our troops, it is a chance 
if they would have made it more advantageous to them- 
selves, and but for their tardiness they might have taken 
our main fort. All that seemed to prevent it was a scare- 
crow row of palisades from the fort to low water in the cove, 
which Major Box had ordered set up that morning." ^ 

It is not putting it too strongly to say that Washington's 
position, as well as that of the American cause, was then 
desperate. The disaster occurred under Washington's eyes 
early in the day ; and before two o'clock the fighting had 
wholly ceased. With an inadequate and demoralized com- 
mand, he found himself isolated from the body of his army, 
such as it was; and, whUe a largely superior force flushed 
with success was marshalled before him, a fairly over- 
whelming naval armament threatened the ferry in his rear. 
In other words, he had got himself and his cause into a 
wholly false position. Again, luck and ''the dilatoriness 
and stupidity of the enemy" saved him. 

The course for Howe to pursue was now manifest. Six 
good hours of daylight remained after the commands of 
Stirling and Sullivan had been demolished. During those 
hours he should have followed up his success, striking at 
once and with all his force at Washington himself. Such 
was the decided opinion at the moment of Howe's subordi- 
nates, while the body of the British army was so flushed by 
victory and absolutely confident of success that it could 
with difficulty be restrained from immediate assault ; on 
the other hand, so thoroughly demoralized were the defeated 
patriots that the general in command of one of the British 
divisions subsequently asserted, ''the very camp women who 
followed his regiment took them prisoners." American 
historians have since asserted, on what authority does not 
1 Battle of Long Inland (Long Island Historical Society), 518. 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 35 

appear, that the British commander was then wise in not 
pressing his advantage, and that Washington '^ courted a 
storm in which he was almost sure to be victorious"; but, 
on the other hand, a general officer, in command of a por- 
tion of the Brooklyn lines, described them at the time as 
''unfinished in several places" and ''so low that the rising 
ground immediately without it would have put it in the 
power of a man at 40 yards Distance to fire under my 
Horse's belly whenever he pleased." To the same effect 
another officer then present afterwards wrote, describing the 
line in front of where he was posted as "low and unfavorable 
for defence," and "commanded by the ground occupied by 
the enemy, who entirely enclosed the whole of our posi- 
tion, at the distance of but a few hundred paces"; and, he 
added, "as to General Howe, I have scarcely a doubt that 
he might have carried the intrenchments at Brooklyn." 
And such works as these it has since been confidently as- 
serted could have been victoriously defended by militia, 
to use Washington's official language, "timid and ready to 
fly from their own shadows." 

At Bunker Hill, Howe had been overconfident ; at Brook- 
lyn he was too cautious. The inference is natural that 
August 27, 1776, he remembered June 17, 1775; and, a 
burnt child, he feared the fire. In any event, after lying for 
hours with his advance within gunshot of Washington's 
lines, which his scouts approached so closely as to report 
that they could be carried almost instantly by assault, and 
which his subordinates begged leave to be allowed to attack 
and fairly "stormed with rage when ordered to retire," — 
after lying here for hours during a summer noon, he declared 
that enough had been done for one day, and, drawing back, 
went into camp. In his official report of these operations 
he stated that in his judgment the works could have been 



36 MILITARY STUDIES 

stormed, and that his soldiers were so eager for the assault 
'Hhat it required repeated orders to prevail on them to 
desist"; but as it was apparent the opposing lines could be 
carried with slight loss by regular approaches, he commanded 
a halt. 

So far ''the dilatoriness of the enemy" had saved Wash- 
ington from total disaster. The element of luck next made 
itself felt in his favor. The British fleet was lying inside 
of Sandy Hook. It was impossible for a moment to suj^pose 
that the numerous ships of the line and frigates there idly 
anchored were not to cooperate with the army in the long- 
planned and carefully prepared operations. They might 
engage the batteries on the North River, and cover a land- 
ing there, taking the enemy in the rear ; or, most fatal move 
of all, they might run the batteries on the East River, and, 
destroying all means of transportation from its Brooklyn 
rear to the New York side, cut the American army hopelessly 
in two. It was now the close of August, and in the region 
of New York the prevailing wind at that season is from the 
southwest. Such a wind may, indeed, almost be counted 
upon ; and unquestionably was counted upon by the British 
commanders in planning their operations. A wind from 
the southwest and a favoring tide would have carried the 
British ships swiftly up the East River, under full sail. 
Chance ordered otherwise. While General Plowe was de- 
stroying the commands of Stirling and Sullivan, and threat- 
ening Washington's entrenchments, a strong northeast wind 
was blowing, against which, and the tide, five ships of 
the line, under command of Sir Peter Parker, in vain en- 
deavored to work into the positions assigned them in the pro- 
gramme. One ship of smaller size alone succeeded in work- 
ing up sufficiently far to open with its guns on the wholly 
inadequate battery the Americans had established at Red 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 37 

Hook, on the western extremitj^ of their Brooklyn lines-, 
and the fire of even this single ship sufficed sadly to injure 
the breastworks, and dismount some of the guns. If this 
was so, the effect of the broadsides of the fleet may be sur- 
mised. That exceptional northeast wind in August was for 
Washington a stroke of luck of the description sometimes 
classified as '^ providential." 

The American historians next lay much stress on the 
sufferings of the patriot army due to the inclemency of an 
August storm, — the wet and cold to which the men were 
subjected, and the privations to which they were compelled 
to submit. Active campaigning is at no season a holiday 
business; and, to those at all familiar with its details, 
alternately monotonous and terrible, it cannot but be open 
to question whether a cold midsummer storm, accompanied 
with mist, or even rain, could well in the latitude of New 
York afford a sufficient excuse for military inactivity, much 
less for demoralization. But whether it could or no, that 
cold, August, northeasterly storm and mist, if it did wet 
and chill the patriot army, also shrouded it and saved it. 
It prevented Admiral Lord Howe from getting between 
Brooklyn and New York ; and it seems to have kept General 
Howe snug in his temporary quarters. 

The most reliable regiments of the patriot army had been 
destroyed on the 27th in the commands of Sullivan and 
Stirling. Thus during the afternoon of the 27th and the 
morning of the 2Sth the position of the patriots was even more 
dangerous than it was forlorn. Militia — wet, cold, hungry, 
and demoralized by a spectacle of defeat — are not to be 
depended on at any hour of the day; least of all in a four- 
o'clock-in-the-morning assault: and had Howe ordered 
Clinton or Cornwallis to carry the works before them by a 
vigorous assault at daybreak of the 28th, there is, our 



38 MILITARY STUDIES 

patriotic historians to the contrary notwithstanding, hardly 
room for reasonable doubt that the course of American 
history would have been other than it has been. It was 
again the ''dilatoriness of the enemy," and not this time the 
intervention of Providence, which saved the cause of inde- 
pendence. 

Washington realized fully the nature of the situation. 
With between seven and eight thousand undisciplined men, 
beaten and demoralized at that, he was cooped up with an 
uncovered rear. Immediate retreat was impossible, and a 
successful resistance hardly to be hoped ; so, like a good and 
vigilant commander, he was in the saddle before break 
of day of the 28th, going the rounds of the works and seek- 
ing to encourage his followers. The morning broke, lower- 
ing and dreary, only to reveal to the patriots the great 
superiority of the force opposed to them. It was a case of 
four to one. Fortunately the enemy did not move. As 
the day advanced they did, indeed, open with their artillery, 
and the usual irregular fire of sharp-shooters went on be- 
tween the lines; but presently a drenching rain set in, by 
which the historians tell us the combatants were 'driven 
into their tents," where they kept themselves untU the latter 
hours of the day. There is almost a touch of humor at this 
point in the narrative, and it is difficult to believe that it is 
one of actual warfare. Yet the career of Washington and 
the cause of American independence actually hung in the 
balance, with an August rain the controlling factor ! But, 
when it came to 'MUatoriness," Sir William Howe always 
proved himself equal to any occasion. 

Presently, while it was still early in the day, the Brooklyn 
situation was in a way and to a certain extent improved by 
the arrival of reenforcements under General Mifflin. This 
addition to the force consisted of three regiments considered 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 39 

as good as any in the army, though so reduced by sick- 
ness and other causes that they numbered all together but 
1300 men. One of those regiments, however, was Glover's 
of Marblehead, mostly sailors and fishermen. Their coming 
was at least opportune ; for, with a wide and swift-flowing 
channel between him and his only possible line of retreat, 
Washington, as the result showed, then stood in quite as 
great need of men who could trim a sail and pull an oar as 
of those who could handle musket or shovel. Mifflin's 
command was marched at once into the weakly defended 
intrenchments on the left of the line, opposite Clinton. 

Now one of the most extraordinary incidents of this 
singularly conducted campaign is said to have occurred. It 
sounds so like a travesty of war that it has to be told in the 
words of the apparently unconscious historian. A dense 
fog was hanging over the bay and island. A group of 
officers, among whom were Mifflin and Reed, Washington's 
adjutant-general, rode out to take a look about. As they 
were on the high ground at the western extremity of the 
lines facing towards Staten Island, a light breeze lifted the 
fog, disclosing to them the British ships of war. The his- 
torian then goes on: "Some movement was apparently 
in agitation. The idea occurred to the reconnoitring party 
that the fleet was preparing, should the wind hold and the 
fog clear away, to come up the bay at the turn of the tide, 
silence the feeble batteries at Red Hook and the city, and 
anchor in the East River. In that case, the army on Long 
Island would be completely surrounded and entrapped. . . . 
Other ships had passed round Long Island, and were at 
Flushing Bay on the Sound. Those might land troops on 
the east side of Harlem River and make themselves masters 
of King's Bridge; that key to Manhattan Island." These 
facts, as military considerations, might, it would seem, for 



40 MILITARY STUDIES 

several days, if not weeks, have been obvious ; but, according 
to the American historians, they would appear to have now 
for the first time dawned on the minds of the reconnoitring 
officers, for, '^ alarmed at this perilous probability, they 
spurred back to headquarters, to urge the immediate with- 
drawal of the army (and) as this might not be acceptable 
advice, Reed, emboldened by his intimacy with the com- 
mander-in-chief, undertook to give it." It is curious to 
consider what the writer meant by the words ''this might 
not be acceptable advice." 

And it is of such material that what is called history is 
fabricated ! This story passed into all the earlier accounts 
of the operations on Long Island, and, though now rejected 
by better authorities,^ is still the popular legend. The hici- 
dent is said to have occurred on the morning of the 29th ; 
the disaster in front of Flatbush had occurred on the 27th ; 
and it is safe to say that not for one moment during the slow 
intervening hours had the direction of the wind and the 
movements of the British fleet been absent from the mind 
not only of Washington, but of every intelligent officer or 
man within the Brooklyn lines. Their fate hung in the 
balance. The reconnoitring party may have ridden down 
to Red Hook in the way described — probably did ride 
down there ; but what those composing it there saw could 
have suggested nothing new either to themselves or to Wash- 
ington. It could only have emphasized the peril of the 
situation, and the necessity of immediately extricating them- 
selves from it — if they could ! 

Up to this point it is not easy to see how military opera- 
tions could have been carried on less skilfully on the side of 
the Americans. Neither the plan of defence, nor the execu- 

1 Bancroft. Note to Chapter V of Epoch Fourth, containing account 
of the retreat from Long Island. 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 41 

tion of that plan, presents points for commendation ; and 
for all that had been done, the record seems to show that 
Washington was responsible. In scope and detail, it was 
his plan ; and he had personally superintended the opera- 
tions involved in it. The resulting situation was to the last 
degree perilous. But it is just situations of this sort which 
bring out great qualities ; and those of Washington were 
now revealed. He showed the mens oequa in arduis! 
Calm in outward aspect and with cool prescient mind, he 
looked the situation in the face, recognized the mistake he 
had made, and prepared to extricate himself from the conse- 
quences of it, if, indeed, extrication was yet possible. The 
chances were immensely against him. The withdrawal of 
the patriot army from Brooklyn, across the East River to 
New York, now accomplished, has commonly been referred 
to, especially b}^ the "standard" American authorities 
as a feat displaying remarkable military capacity on the 
part of Washington. Fiske, for instance, becomes enthu- 
siastic over it as a ''brilliant incident," displaying ''extraor- 
dinary skill." ^ On this point something will presently 
be said. Meanwhile, it cannot be denied that American 
historical writers have availed themselves to the utmost of 
the opportunity thus afforded. As Trevelyan truly ob- 
serves, "it may be doubted whether any great national 
deliverance, since the passage of the Red Sea, has ever been 
more loudly acclaimed, or more adequately celebrated." 
For instance, one, a man himself not without military 
experience, thus dilates upon it: "The retreat from Brook- 
lyn was a signal achievement, characteristic of Washington's 
policy and of the men who withdrew under his guidance 
. . . their Commander-in-Chief had his own plan, as be- 
fore Boston, which he did not reveal to his officers until it 
* American Revolution, I, 211, 212. 



42 MILITARY STUDIES 

was ripe for execution." Early on the morning of August 
29, orders were issued to General Heath, quartermaster- 
general, instructing him '''to impress every craft, on either 
side of New York, that could be kept afloat, and had either 
oars, or sails, or could be furnished with them, and to have 
them all in the East River by dark.' The response to these 
orders was so promptly made that the boats reached the 
foot of Brooklyn Heights just at dusk that afternoon." ^ 

It is almost needless to say that, from any exact military 
point of view, this statement is both inaccurate and mis- 
leading. Yet Trevelyan repeats it and Fiske dilates upon it. 
Washington was not, however, the utter military simpleton 
such ill-considered admiration would indicate. He had not 
put himself and his army into a most dangerous position 
depending wholly, or in chief, on some suddenly improvised 
means of extrication. The order to Heath was, it is true, 
issued, and a certain amount of transportation, undoubtedly 
collected in obedience to it, was concentrated at the ferry ; 
but the bulk of the means of transfer required was already 
at the point where it was needed. For weeks Washington 
had been moving troops, munitions, and supplies across the 
river, — 1300 men, for instance, on the day previous to 
the withdrawal, that following the disastrous Flatbush 
affair. The transportation thus hurriedly gathered together 
was, therefore, merely supplementary. The mass of what 
was required had already long before been provided. 

Our narrative then proceeds as follows : — 

From about nine o'clock until nearly midnight, through wind 
and rain, — company by company, — sometimes grasping hands 
to keep companionship in the dense gloom, — speechless and 
silent, so that no sound should alarm the enemy, — feeling their 
way down the steep steps then leading to Fulton ferry, and feeling 

^ Carrington, Washington the Soldier, 110. 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 43 

their way as they were passed into the waiting water-craft, these 
drenched and weary men took passage for New York. - The wind 
and tide were so violent that even the seamen soldiers of Massa- 
chusetts could not spread a close reefed sail upon a single vessel ; 
and the larger vessels, upon which so much depended, would have 
been swept to the ocean if once intrusted to the current. For 
three hours all the boats that could be thus propelled had to 
depend upon muffled oars. The difficulties of such a trip, on such 
a night, can be realized better by a moment's reflection. There is 
no record of the size of the waves, or of narrow escapes from upset, 
no intimation that there was competition in entering the boats and 
rivalry in choice of place — that each boat-load was landed hastily 
and that the boats themselves were leaky and unsafe ; but any 
person who proposes to himself an imaginary transit over the East 
River under their circumstances, can supply the data he may need 
to appreciate the process.^ 

Re-writing this account for another edition of his work, 
many years later, the same authority modified it in this 
wise : — 

As early as nine o'clock, and within an hour after the "general 
beat to arms," the movement began, — systematically, steadily, 
company by company, as orderly as if marching in their own camp. 
A fearful storm still raged. Drenched and weary, none com- 
plained. It was Washington's orders. Often hand-in-hand, to 
support each other, these men descended the steep, slippery slopes 
to the water's edge, and seated themselves in silence ; while 
increasing wind and rain, with incessant violence, constantly 
threatened to flood, or sink, the miserable flat-boats which were 
to convey them to the city, only a few hundred yards away. And 
thus until midnight. At that hour the wind and tide became so 
violent that no vessel could carry even a closely reefed sail. > The 
larger vessels, in danger of being swept out to sea, had to be held 
fast to shore ; dashing against each other, and with difficulty kept 
afloat. Other boats, with muffled oars, were desperately but 
slowly propelled against the outgoing tide. A few sickly lanterns 

^ Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution (3d ed.), 217. 



44 MILITARY STUDIES 

here and there made movement possible. The invisible presence 
of the Commander-in-Chief seemed to resolve all dangers and 
apparent confusion into some pervasive harmony of purpose 
among officers and men alike, so that neither leaking boats nor 
driving storm availed to disconcert the silent progress of embark- 
ing nearly ten thousand men. 

Just after midnight, both wind and tide changed. The storm 
from the north which had raged thus long, kept the British fleets 
at their anchorage in the lower bay. At last, with the clearing 
of the sky and change of wind, the water became smooth, and the 
craft of all kinds and sizes, loaded to the water's edge, made rapid 
progress. Meanwhile strange to relate, a heavy fog rested over 
the lower bay and island, while the peninsula of New York was 
under clear starlight.^ 

No authorities are referred to for the somewhat highly 
wrought statements here so precisely and positively made. 

The real weather conditions prevailing on the night in 
question are in vain sought for. The author whose work 
has been quoted says that the American and British archives 
and biography are full of contemporaneous data which it 
would require volumes to quote. A fairly careful search, 
on the contrary, discloses no detailed and reliable meteoro- 
logical statement of the conditions hour by hour prevailing 
during the three days of the Brooklyn operations, and, 
more especially, during the night referred to in the foregoing 
extract. 

The elementary and fundamental facts in the case are 
simple enough. Trevelyan says that on the morning of the 
27th, the day of Howe's advance and the battle before 
Brooklyn, "the sun rose with a red and angr}^ glare." A 
summer storm was brewing; and the wind, veering to the 
north from the east, must have been strong, for Lord Howe 
reports that ''the ships could not be worked up to the dis- 

Washington the Soldier (ed. 1898), 111. 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 45 

tance proposed." Though the historians are silent on the 
point, it was, as already suggested, probably a knowledge 
of this fact and the consequent failure of the proposed naval 
cooperation, which caused General Howe to desist from 
following up his early success. Never to follow up a success 
on the field energetically was characteristic with him, — he 
failed so to do at Bunker Hill, on Manhattan Island and in 
New Jersey, and again at Brandywine and during the Valley 
Forge winter; but on Long Island he could hardly have 
helped so doing had he heard his brother's guns in the East 
River. He must then have gone forward, and finished up 
the job. All that day (27th) the storm seems to have been 
gathering. The next day we know it blew and rained ; but 
while the rain apparently halted the work in the trenches 
and kept the soldiers in their huts, the sea was not so rough 
as to interfere with the operations of the ferry, or prevent the 
transfer of one whole brigade of Washington's army from 
the New York side to the Brooklyn lines. The bringing it 
over was an inexplicable mistake; they were simply so 
many more to get back again, or to be made j^risoners when 
the wind worked into the west — to-morrow, perhaps ; 
certainly within a few days. The atmospheric conditions 
this day (28th) seem to have culminated ; for in the afternoon 
'^a great rain and hail storm came on, attended with thunder 
and lightning." By the morning of the 29th the quite 
abnormal conditions had worn themselves out; ''a dense 
fog covered land and sea," consequently there could have 
been no heavy rain nor driving wind. This seems to have 
continued pretty much all that day, necessarily holding 
Lord Howe's ships at their anchorage. Cooperation by 
land and sea was not yet possible; so General Howe waited. 
The succeeding night Washington got away. 

During that night what weather conditions prevailed? 



46 MILITARY STUDIES 

On this interesting topic the historians are curiously at odds 
among themselves. On no single point do they seem to 
agree ; not even on the one astronomically ascertainable 
point, — the age of the moon, and the consequent luminous 
character of the atmosphere. One writer, already cited, 
says it was so pitchy dark that the men had to feel their 
way down to the ferry and into the boats ; another says that 
''during the night the moon shone brightly." But a third 
comes with the assertion that, though it was the night of the 
full moon, these moonlit hours were marked by ''a heavy 
rain and continued adverse wind." According to a fourth 
authority, ''there was a strong wind from the northeast," 
but a "dense fog prevailed"; a most improbable meteoro- 
logical combination, considering that "the atmosphere was 
clear on the New York side of the river." We are then 
informed that the strong "adverse wind" most opportunely 
died away and a "favoring breeze," from the opposite 
direction "sprang up." Not without reason is it declared 
that these somewhat surprising and altogether conflicting 
conditions "seemed almost providential." If they ever 
actually occurred, as is altogether improbable, they were 
distinctly and indisputably providential. Nothing at all 
resembling them is to be found in the prosaic records of the 
modern weather bureau ; the single authenticated precedent 
is biblical. 

Putting aside this fantastic combination — Egyptian 
darkness in a night of the full moon, a dense fog prevailing 
in the face of a driving tempest, a drenching rain on one side 
of a narrow river with a starlit sky on the other, a favoring 
breeze following immediately on the dying away of an ad- 
verse wind — putting all this aside, is it possible to ascer- 
tain the real state of the weather during the night of August 
29-30, 1777? One fact is scientifically demonstrable. It 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 47 

was the night of the full moon/ The two days' storm — 
an August northeaster — had culminated with thunder, 
lightning, and hail on the 28th. The conditions then appar- 
ently prevailed which ordinarily attend the dying out of a 
late summer storm, and which precede a change to season- 
able weather. The day of the 29th was foggy and chill, 
with a light draft of air from the north and east. The 
cooperative movement on the part of Admiral Lord Howe 
was still delayed, inasmuch as ships leaving their anchorage 
drifted, not having a sufficiency of wind to enable them to 
stem the tide; at times the mist lifted, and at times thick- 
ened. Later the night was still, the water quiet, the atmos- 
phere luminous ; a fog settled on the bay towards morning ; 
every atmospheric condition aided the patriots, and, at the 
proper stage of the tide, the boats passed to and fro, favored 
by a light west breeze, and loaded to the gunwale. Not a 
single case of swamping or collision was recorded, or is 
known to have occurred. Not a boat upset; not a life was 
lost. These facts are under the conditions given conclusive 
as to the absence of wdnd, the quietude of the water, and the 
luminous character of the atmosphere. 

That Washington, throughout these trying days, bore 
himself courageously and with great outward calmness in 
presence of imminent danger does not admit of question. 
On the other hand, divested of all gush, patriotism, hero 
worship and rhetoric generally, the cold historical truth 
would seem to be that, aided by a most happy fortuitous 

' This point was, at the request of the writer of the present paper, re- 
ferred for settlement to Professor Pickering of the Harvard University- 
Observatory. Under date of December 5, 1910, Professor Pickering 
replied : — 

"The full moon occurred on August 28, 1776, at 19 h. 59 m. As this is 
Greenwich astronomical time, the corresponding civil date at Greenwich 
was 7 h. 59 m. of the morning of August 29. At Boston the local civil time 
would have been about 4 h. 44 m. earlier." 



48 MILITARY STUDIES 

concurrence of circumstances and the extreme supineness 
of his opponents, he on this occasion, keeping his head 
under wearing conditions and taking advantage of all the 
resources at his command, extricated himself and his army, 
at a most critical juncture, from an inherently false jDosition 
into which neither he nor they ever should have either put 
themselves, or allowed themselves to be put. As respects 
skill, discipline, or careful organization of movement, if they 
were markedly in evidence, the fact nowhere appears in the 
record. That the British commanders, both military and 
naval, made the transfer possible, and facilitated it in every 
conceivable way, is indisputable. They evinced neither 
enterprise nor alertness. No patrol boats lurked in the fog 
which overhung the harbor, veiling their whereabouts from 
the land batteries ; the opposing lines were not pried into 
by inquisitive or adventurous pickets. Even a negro, 
despatched by a female Tory sympathizer, one Mrs. Rapalye, 
to warn the British of the withdrawal in progress, fell into 
the hands of a Hessian picket, who, unable to make anything 
out of what he said to them, retained him till morning.^ "On 
the other hand, that the '^speechless and silent" embarka- 
tion which nothing availed to disconcert was in fact 
marked by much confusion is established on the best 
possible authority — that of Washington himself. It is 
even stated that the lack of discipline was such that men 
absolutely tried to climb over each other's shoulders, the 
sooner to reach the boats. In the matter of transfer the 
boats themselves, meanwhile, were handled by perhaps as 
skilful a lot of men as could anywhere have been found, — 
Glover's regiment of Marblehead fishermen. 

This paper relates merely to the 1776 operations on Long 
Island, and it is not necessary to follow the American army 
^ Irving, Washington, II, 390. 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 49 

through its subsequent unfortunate experiences on the 
adjacent mainland. From a purely military point of view 
the further occupation of New York was, after the British 
got possession of Brooklyn Heights, not only useless, but it 
involved risk of serious disaster. With an enemy in undis- 
puted control of the surrounding waters, the situation was 
one from which it was impossible to escape too soon. Greene 
saw clearly the uselessness as well as danger of the strategic 
situation, and volunteered his advice to Washington, point- 
ing out that "the only eligible plan to oppose the enemy 
successfully, and secure ourselves from disgrace was to 
evacuate Manhattan Island at once " ; adding that, if the 
Americans continued to hold it, '^we must hold it at great 
disadvantage." This was on the 5th of September, and the 
views thus set forth were shared by others who also gave to 
them official expression.^ Among these was John Jay, then 
active and influential as a member of the New York Con- 
vention, the provisional body which had locally assumed 
direction of affairs. Though essentially a civilian. Jay now 
evinced the possession of true military instinct. He took in 
the situation. The policy he outlined and advocated, if 
severe and cruel, was at least efficacious; and it was the 
exact policy followed by Fabius two thousand years before, 
as by Wellington thirty-five years later. Of the former it is 
unnecessary to speak, his method of warfare has passed into 
a proverb ; but Wellington's example is very apposite. 
When, in October, 1810, he found himself confronted by 
Messena at the head of an overwhelmingly superior army, 
he coldly proceeded to devastate all the region the defence of 
which he abandoned, and withdrew within the famous lines 
of Torres Vedras. This very policy then ruthlessly adopted 
and successfully pursued in Portugal, Jay now clearly and 
1 General Scott to John Jay. Jay's Works, I, p. 32. 



50 MILITARY STUDIES 

forcibly outlined for adoption in New York. Writing to 
Edward Rutledge, of the Board of War, and Gouverneur 
Morris, chairman of a special committee, he said : — 

I wish our army well stationed in the Highlands, and all the 
lower country desolated; we might then bid defiance to all the 
further efforts of the enemy in that quarter. Had I been vested 
with absolute power in this State, I have often said, and still think, 
that I would last spring have desolated all Long Island, Staten 
Island, the city and county of New York, and all that part of the 
county of Westchester which lies below the mountains, I would 
then have stationed the main body of the army in the mountains 
on the east, and eight or ten thousand men in the Highlands on 
the west side of the river, I would have directed the river at Fort 
Montgomery, which is nearly at the southern extremity of the 
mountains, to be so shallowed as to afford only depth sufficient 
for an Albany sloop, and all the Southern passes and defiles in the 
mountains to be strongly fortified. . . . According to this plan 
of defence the State would be absolutely impregnable against all 
the world, on the seaside, and would have nothing to fear except 
from the way of the lake. Should the enemy gain the river, 
even below the mountains, I think I foresee that a retreat would 
become necessary, and I can't forbear wishing that a desire of 
saving a few acres may not lead us into difficulties. 

Such a policy as that here outlined would have been truly 
Fabian; that actually adopted was such only in name. As 
Charles Lee at the time impetuously and despairingly wrote 
Washington: ^'For my part, I would have nothing to do 
with the islands to which you have been clinging so perti- 
naciously. I would give Mr. Howe a fee-simple of them." 

'^Mr. Howe's" successor in command, Sir Henry Clinton, 
subsequently held those islands in strategic ''fee simple" 
from after Monmouth (June, 1778) until, three years later, 
Washington broke camp at Tarrytown (August, 1781) to 
march his now solidified army to Yorktown. During those 
three years his tactics had been exactly those outlined and 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 51 

counselled by Jay in 177G, and which at that time Wash- 
ington did not adopt. 

Returning to September, 1776, it was on the 5th of that 
month that Greene from his bed of sickness wrote to Wash- 
ington urging him to adopt a policy similar to that suggested 
to Rutledge by Jay. Three days later Washington, acting 
on the divided opinion of a Council of War, adopted that 
most dangerous thing in military operations, a middle course 
''between abandoning [Manhattan Island] totally and con- 
centrating our whole strength for its defence." His letters 
to Congress reveal a painful state of indecision.^ Alive to 
the difficulties of his situation and conscious of his want of 
experience in military operations on a large scale and of his 
limited theoretical knowledge, there was, as he subsequently 
admitted, at this time ''warfare in my mind and hesitation." 
That this was apparent to those around him is shown by 
the impatient exclamation of Reed in his letter to Lee 
written two months later: "Oh! General, an indecisive 
mind is one of the greatest misfortunes that can befall an 
army; how often have I lamented it this campaign."^ 
The natural result followed. 

Brooklyn was abandoned on the 29th of August; but 
Washington lingered on Manhattan Island with his now 
wholly demoralized army until the 15th of September, 
when his dilatory opponent attacked him, again in leisurely 
fashion. Then followed the shocking affair of Kips Bay, at 
which the same militia who had manned the entrenchments 
at Brooklyn when Howe restrained his men from assaulting 
them, ran away, abandoning their lines at the first indica- 
tions of an attack. As Greene, ten days before, had written 

» See letters to the President of Congress of 2, 8, 11 and 16 September, 
1776, in Sparks, Writings of Washington, Vol. IV, 72, 80, 91. 
^ Life and Correspondence of President Reed, I. 256. 



52 MILITARY STUDIES 

— '4t will be difficult to get such troops to behave with 
proper spirit in time of action, if we should be attacked." 
In point of fact, they scurried off like a pack of frightened 
sheep ; but, this time, it was the lunch hour of the enemy 
which saved the American cause/ That day, under Wash- 
ington's orders, Putnam abandoned New York "leaving 
behind him a large quantity of provisions and military stores, 
and most of the heavy cannon." By pure good luck, com- 
bined once more with "the dilatoriness of the enemy," he 
saved himself and the force under his command from cap- 
ture. This disaster was the natural, and, indeed, logical out- 
come of the attempt to occupy a useless position for more 
than two weeks after it became obviously untenable. It 
is difficult to see why that policy did not involve a serious 
military blunder; and the friendly American historian has 
good cause to ask: "What could be the reason of this 
supineness on the part of Sir William Howe?" The answer 
to this somewhat simple query is perhaps best given in the 
words of a British naval commander then on the spot. His 
amazement and disgust at Howe's methods of warfare found 
expression at the time in bitter irony, and Sir George Collier, 
who commanded the frigate Rainbow, — the single British 
ship which on the 27th of August had worked within range 
of the Red Hook battery, — Sir George Collier wrote : 
"The having to deal with a generous, merciful, forbearing 
enemy, who would take no unfair advantages, must surely 

1 The sober account of these operations reads like a travesty. The 
English military historian of the war remarks with apparent unconscious 
gravity : "As soon as the English had taken possession of New York, 
General Howe, and some other general officers, repaired to the house of a 
Mrs. Murray, with whom they remained in conversation so long, that 
General Putnam, with 3500 men, was enabled to make good his retreat 
to the main body of the American army." (Stedman, I, 207.) The officers 
in question took lunch with Mrs. Murray, and, during the hour devoted 
to lunch, active military operations would seem to have been suspended. 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 53 

have been highly satisfactory to General Washington, and 
he was certainly very deficient in not expressing his grati- 
tude to General Howe for his kind behavior towards him. 
Far from taking the rash resolution of hastily passing over 
the East River after Gates, and crushing at once a frightened, 
trembling enem}'", he generously gave them time to recover 
from their panic, — to throw up fresh works, — to make 
new arrangements, — and to recover from the torpid state 
the rebellion appeared in from its late shock." ^ 

And in truth the simple fact seems to be that, time and 
again, between August 20 and September 20, the errors of 
judgment of the American commander-in-chief exposed his 
army and the cause he had to defend to great and unneces- 
sary peril ; and America owes its liberty and the world 
an immortality to the incapacity, or supineness, of Major- 
General William Howe. 

None the less in narrating these events and describing 
the situation resulting therefrom, one of the most popular 
and widely read of the more recent narrators of the distinc- 
tively American school, finds in them frequent indications 
of Washington's "subtle strategy," and "evidence of mili- 
tary genius such as has seldom been surpassed in the history 
of modem warfare." The term "modern warfare" is some- 
w^hat vague, but it would currently be supposed to include 



^ "But delay is not the only error imputable to the commander-in-chief 
(Howe) in this transaction. It has been mentioned that the American 
army was posted at Haarlem and King's Bridge : Its position at this 
latter place was for the purpose of securing a retreat to the continent, 
should the pressure of affau-s render such a step necessary. Instead, 
therefore, of directing his attention to New York, Sir William Howe, 
(supported by the fleet) ought to have thrown his army round King's 
Bridge, by which means he would have hemmed in the whole American army ; 
and such a step was not at all impracticable when we consider the extent 
of the naval and miUtary resources subservient to his will." — Stedman, 
I, 207-208. 



54 MILITARY STUDIES 

the operations of Frederick as well as those of Napoleon, of 
Moltke and of Sherman, as well as of Lee. 

Returning to the operations on Long Island and the 
errors of strategy into which both Washington and Howe 
there fell, it is interesting to attempt to explain the motives 
which actuated each. In so doing we now have all the facts 
before us, and see our way clearly ; Washington and Howe, 
with only partial information, groped their way in doubt. 

In the first place, what induced Washington, with the 
meagre resources both in men and material at his command, 
to endeavor to hold certain of the islands at the mouth of 
the Hudson against such an armament as he well knew the 
British could then bring to bear? He necessarily aban- 
doned to them Staten Island ; and we now see that the 
attempt to retain a footing on Long Island, and to hold 
Manhattan, was not only hopeless from the start, but in 
reality there was, from a military point of view, nothing to 
be said in its favor. As Lee, who had in March pointed out 
the difficulties, subsequently wrote in September in words 
already quoted: "I would have nothing to do with the 
islands to which you have been clinging so pertinaciously. 
I would give Mr. Howe a fee-simple of them." In this con- 
clusion, charlatan though he was, Lee unquestionably was 
right. 

The campaign of Long Island was in reality Washington's 
first experience of active field movement in which he held 
chief command. That he profited greatly by it was subse- 
quently apparent. He learned through his mistakes; but, 
indisputably, those mistakes were both gross and his. For, 
in doing what he then did, it cannot fairly be claimed that 
the American commander was impelled to a course his 
judgment did not approve by popular insistence and con- 
gressional pressure. These doubtless were great, and had 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 55 

their influence; but, both before and after the well-nigh 
inevitable catastrophe, he put himself on record as believ- 
ing his plan of defence reasonably practicable, and he clung 
to it to the last moment. Nowhere did he point out the 
excessive dangers the plan involved, or enter protest against 
it, or even express a preference for a radically different and 
safer plan. 

Neither can it be claimed that the disaster at Flatbush 
was due to the Ulness of Greene and the incompetence of 
Putnam, who succeeded Greene on the eve of the engage- 
ment. Greene relinquished the active command at Brooklyn 
August 16; and it was on the 22d of August that the 
British landed at Gravesend. Sullivan was then acting in 
Greene's stead. Four days later, on the evening of the 26th, 
Clinton began his forward march, and on the morning of the 
27th he seized the unprotected Jamaica road, and so got in 
the rear of Sullivan and Stirling. On the 24th, Washington 
himself passed the day at Brooklyn, and, not until his return 
to New York in the afternoon of that day did he appoint 
Putnam to take command on the Brooklyn side, at the same 
time giving him, as the result of his (Washington's) personal 
examination of the ground, specific written instructions in 
which he outlined the plan of operations to be pursued, 
especially on the point which led to disaster, — that of 
going out to meet the enemy with the best troops, leav- 
ing only militia in the interior works. ''The militia, or 
the most indifferent troops," he wrote, ''will do for the 
interior works; whilst your best men should at all hazards 
prevent the enemy's passing the woods and approaching 
your works." This, too, though Washington had himself 
that day observed with alarm the confusion and lack of 
cooperation among commands which prevailed on Long 
Island, and knew perfectly that there was no mounted force 



56 MILITARY STUDIES 

there to do outpost work. His idea, as that of Greene, 
seems to have been to inflict severe punishment on the 
enemy in the wooded hills between Gravesend and Brooklyn ; 
and then to have the forces, withdrawn from before the 
enemy, take refuge in the Brooklyn entrenchments. But 
this was a hazardous game to play. To play it suc- 
cessfully required a skilful commander on the spot, an 
efficient staff, cool, well-seasoned troops, and perfect co- 
operation between commands ; and not one of these essen- 
tials, as no one knew better than Washington, did the 
Americans enjoy. 

Take, for instance, the matter of artillery and cavalry. 
To defend with effective results such an extended advance 
line required good outpost work, reliable courier service, 
and adequate, well-handled artillery. Clinton advanced 
with forty field pieces : the entire American equipment 
consisted of six pieces, — one five-and-a-half-inch howit- 
zer, four six-pounders and one three-pounder ! As respects 
cavalry, the case was still worse. 

But if it is curious to observe the influence of Bunker Hill 
and Dorchester Heights on the mind of Washington while 
trying to defend New York, it is at least as curious to notice 
the similar influence of Concord and Fort Moultrie on the 
minds of the two Howes when they planned to attack New 
York. The extreme of rashness had given place to a cau- 
tion as extreme. Yet in his operations on Long Island, 
Sir William Howe made the same mistake which cost him 
so dear at Bunker Hill. Again, instead of attacking his 
enemy full in front and just where he wanted to be attacked, 

— driving him out of the trap in which he had got himself, 

— Howe's effort should have been to operate on Washing- 
ton's rear, seize his lines of retreat, and '^bag" him and his 
army. No better opportunity for so doing could have been 



THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 57 

offered, as was obvious at the time, and has since frequently 
been pointed out. 

So much for the land operations of the British. It was the 
same on the water. On the 28th of June, just two months 
before Flatbush, the squadron under Sir Peter Parker was 
severely repulsed in its attempt on Fort Moultrie. The 
influence of this experience was manifest in the handling of 
the British ships at New York in August. Parker was 
himself in command of the ships which attempted to co- 
operate with General Howe on the 27th of August, and 
failed to work into position. While the Americans seem 
to have felt an inordinate degree of confidence in the effi- 
cacy of their land batteries to resist attack on their sea side, 
the inertness and even timidity of the British naval com- 
manders throughout the operations were most noticeable 
and almost inexplicable. In them there was no indica- 
tion of the great traditions of the British navy. Instead of 
attempting what Blake did at Santa Cruz de Teneriffe in 
1657, and Hawke at Belle Isle in 1739 ; or what Nelson a few 
years later did at Aboukir in 1798, and again at Copenhagen 
in 1801, — all under circumstances of far greater difficulty 
and danger, — instead of attempting any operation of this 
sort, which would then and there have gone far to finish the 
war, the commanders of the British fleet hardly made its 
presence felt. 

That Washington sustained himself and retained the con- 
fidence of the army and of Congress in the face of that series 
of disasters for which he was so largely responsible, is ex- 
traordinary, and stands the highest tribute which could 
have been paid to his character and essential qualities. Yet, 
in spite of what historians have since asserted, his prestige 
at the time was greatly diminished, and his control of the 
situation imperilled. All eyes turned at the moment to 



58 MILITARY STUDIES 

General Charles Lee, just back from Charleston, resplendent 
with the halo of the victory which those who fought the 
guns of Moultrie had won for him ; and won in his despite. 
He was '^hourly expectant" by Washington's demoralized 
army '^as if from Heaven, — with a legion of flaming swords- 
men"; or, as another expressed it, '^The army is con- 
tinually praying most ardently for the arrival of General 
Lee as their Guardian Angel."* Even John Jay wrote to 
Rutledge: ''If General Lee should be at Philadelphia, 
pray hasten his departure — he is much wanted in New 
York." Lee arrived in the midst of disaster, and was un- 
sparing in criticism of the defective strategy which had led 
to it. There was for a time no inconsiderable danger that 
he, the most wretched charlatan of a war not otherwise 
devoid of charlatan-s, might supplant Washington in the 
confidence of the army. He certainly did greatly embarrass 
his superior, and thwart his combinations. But in view of 
what then occurred and has since taken place, it is curious 
to reflect how different the whole course of history would 
have been had "the omnipotence of Luck in matters of 
War" entered a little differently than it did into the events 
of June, 1775, and August, 1776. It is not easy to imagine 
a state of affairs during the nineteenth century in which the 
United States might have continued to be what the Domin- 
ion of Canada now is, and from which the career and memory 
of Washington would have been obliterated. 

1 General Scott to John Jay, September 6, 1776. Correspondence and 
Public Papers of John Jay, 1,'82. 



Ill 

WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY^ 

Yesterday/ the long-delayed equestrian statue of Count 
Casimir Pulaski was with suitable ceremony unveiled at 
Washington. Mortally wounded, October 9, 1779, in an 
assault on the works protecting Savannah, then occupied by 
the British forces, Count Pulaski died two days later. 
Subsequently, by a vote passed by the Continental Congress 
November 29, 1779, the memorial only now unveiled 
was ordered to be erected. Over a hundred and 
thirty years thus elapsed between the providing for this 
memorial and its actual dedication at a central point on 
the main thoroughfare of a city now the capital of a nation, 
the ground covered by which was at the time of Pulaski's 
death quite uninhabited. 

The incident referred to has a peculiar interest in con- 
nection with the present paper ; for, a forgotten historic fact, 
it so chanced that Casimir Pulaski was the first Chief of 
Cavalry in the army of the United States. Commissioned 
by Congress a brigadier-general, September 13, 1777, he 
was immediately afterwards assigned by Washington to the 
general command of what composed the mounted force of 
the patriot army; at that time, though the war was then 
far advanced in its third year of active operations, a quite 
inchoate branch of the service. It thus devolved on a Pole 
and an exile to make the first serious attempt to give form 

1 See infra, p. 109. 2 Wednesday, May 10, 1910. 

59 



60 MILITARY STUDIES 

to a systematic American cavalry organization for actual 
use in practical warfare. Of him and it more will presently 
be said. 

Fifteen years ago I was accidentally led into a somewhat 
careful as well as critical examination of the actual facts of 
two Revolutionary battles, as contradistinguished from the 
accounts thereof contained in our books of history accepted 
as ^'standard/' — the two battles were that at Bunker Hill, 
on the 17th of June, 1775, and that before Brooklyn, N.Y., 
known as the Battle of Long Island, fought August 27 of the 
following year, 177G. In connection with the second of 
these engagements, that on Long Island, my attention was 
particularly drawn to the curious fact, which I did not 
remember ever to have seen noticed, that Washington, in 
the operations he then conducted, had apparently no con- 
ception of the use to be made of cavalry, or mounted men, 
in warfare. His idea of an effective military organization, 
at least for the work then cut out for him to do, appeared 
to be a command consisting of infantry of the line, with a 
suitable artillery contingent. He did not seem at all to 
grasp the idea of some mounted force as an instrument 
essential to ascertaining the whereabouts and movements of 
his opponent, or concealing his own movements; or, if it 
occurred to him, it was in a theoretical way, and not as 
something to assume shape out of material at command, to 
meet a present exigency. 

Those who have undertaken to tell the story of our War 
of Independence have almost without exception been civil- 
ians, men of the library; and it is accordingly in no way 
surprising that in reading their narratives it is constantly 
apparent that, even less than Michael Cassio, had they ever 
" set a squadron in the field" ; nor, consequently, did they 
the ''division of a battle" know in connection with the use 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 61 

therein to be made of the '^squadron." Indeed, if ques- 
tioned on the point, it would probably have become apparent 
that "squadron" was in the minds of not a few of them a 
naval term, and one in no way applicable to military organiza- 
tions. 

This, of course, would not be true of many of the older 
writers; for, in the library of Revolutionary literature, 
besides the so-called standard narratives, we have the 
Memoirs, left by various participants, such as ''Light- 
Horse Harry" Lee, Graydon, Tarleton, and Stedman, all 
of whom were in a way experts from the military point of 
view; though, when they wrote from memory, perhaps 
long after the event, their statements are, of course, open 
to the suspicion which proverbially attaches to evidence 
of that character. It would not, however, be easy at once 
to recall any more recent general historical narrative relating 
to persons or events of the Revolutionary struggle which in- 
dicates on the part of the narrator any direct personal famil- 
iarity with military operations; and, in many of them, the 
absence of that familiarity is almost painfully noticeable. 
John Fiske is a case in point. Not only is his most readable 
work marred and made unreliable by a spirit of adulatory 
and indiscriminating hero-worship wherever Washington is 
concerned, but, while he has composed an interesting story, 
the absence of anything indicative of either military experi- 
ence or strategic instinct is conspicuous. He tells the tale ; 
but he does not understand its details, nor, from the mili- 
tary point of view, their significance. In connection with 
Washington, another instance readUy suggests itself. As a 
contribution to history, and the great literary reputation of 
its author, Irving's Washington naturally recalls Sir Wal- 
ter Scott's Life of Napoleon ; but, in referring to the 
latter, Naj)ier in his Peninsular War does not hesitate to 



62 MILITARY STUDIES 

allude to "that intrepidity of error which characterizes the 
work." 

Recurring, however, to the subject of this paper, there is 
in our distinctive and ''standard" American histories a 
noticeable absence of all reference to the employment of 
cavalry in Washington's strategy and tactics, or rather to 
the failure to develop as a factor therein what may best be 
described as an adequate mounted service. Especially is 
this noticeable to any reader who may chance to have had 
some practical experience in warfare, and most of all to one 
who has seen actual cavalry service. The recently published 
narratives of Sir George Trevelyan and Sydney G. Fisher 
are, it is true, less open to this criticism than those of an 
earlier date; but, judging by our American histories taken 
as a whole, whether scholarly, popular, or school, it never 
seems to have occurred to the writers thereof that in 1776 
and later the seat of warfare in America, especially between 
the Hudson and the Potomac, — the field in which Wash- 
ington conducted his operations, — was one singularly adapted 
to irregular cavalry operations. As the records show, 
it was a region full of horses, while every Virginian and nearly 
every inhabitant of Pennsylvania and the Jerseys was ac- 
customed to the saddle. Then, as later in the Confederacy 
during our War of Secession, people owned their mounts. 
Every farming lad and every son of a farmer was, in a rude 
way, an equestrian ; the doctors made their rounds on horse- 
back ; the lawyers rode the circuits ; in fact the whole social 
and business life of the community was in a more or less 
direct way connected with the saddle and the pillion. The 
horses, also, were of fairly good breed ; and, when brought 
into military use, showed solid powers of endurance, es- 
pecially those raised in Virginia. Under such circum- 
stances, subsequent experience in our own civil troubles 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 63 

should, it would seem, lead the modern critic and student 
of military operations to assume that the patriot force 
would naturally have drifted into that irregular mounted 
service which was so large and picturesque a feature both 
in earlier and later warfare, — not less in the operations 
under Prince Rupert in Cromwell's day than more recently 
in South Africa. 

The omission referred to first becomes noticeable in con- 
nection with the narrative of events in the second year of 
the war, — the operations in and about New York during 
the latter half of 1776. Prior to that time it may safely 
be asserted that warfare as carried on in America had, as 
the unfortunate Braddock found to his cost, been waged 
on principles and by methods neither recognized by Euro- 
pean students nor understood by its professionals. It was 
in every sense of the term distinctly irregular. Carried on 
almost necessarily in heavily wooded regions, it was a 
conflict between individuals, — a struggle in which the 
ranger and rifleman was pitted against the savage or the 
Frenchman. In its operations, except as couriers, the 
mounted man pla3^ed no part. Scouting even was im- 
practicable in a wilderness where an opponent might be 
lurking behind every cover. This held good through all 
the earlier Revolutionary operations from Concord and Lex- 
ington to the transfer of the scene of operations from the 
neighborhood of Boston to that of New York. Paul Revere, 
for instance, was mounted ; but, when arrested in his ride, 
he was acting as a courier. Montgomery and Arnold led 
detachments into Canada, seizing Montreal and threatening 
Quebec ; but their movements, when not by canoe, were 
made through a wilderness, pathless, and for the mounted 
man impracticable. So, from the beginning of American 
civilization down to August, 1776, it may be said generally 



64 MILITARY STUDIES 

that, except as a pack animal or for draft and courier pur- 
poses, the horse found no place in military operations. 
Cavalry was not a recognized branch of the service. Such 
being immemorially the case, in the early months of 1776 
the seat of active Revolutionary warfare was transferred 
from Boston and its immediate neighborhood to the mouth 
of the Hudson. 

As already and elsewhere pointed out,^ it is now, and 
to us, apparent that, to advance the patriot cause, a wholly 
new system of both strategy and tactics had at this juncture 
become advisable. The mouth of the Hudson did not, under 
existing conditions, admit of successful defence. The true 
policy to be pursued was to abandon it to the enemy ; and 
then to draw that enemy away from his base, and into the 
interior, where recourse against him could be had to the 
tactics of Lexington and Concord. Away from New York, 
he would have no strategic objective, and he could be 
harassed day and night, and from behind every tree and 
stone wall. Holding only the ground on which he camped, 
the more country he tried to cover the more vulnerable he 
would have become. 

Under these conditions, not yet developed fully, during 
the early days of July, and seven weeks before Sir William 
Howe showed any signs of activity. Governor Trumbull of 
Connecticut sent a detachment of "light-horse," as they were 
called, to New York. Some four or five hundred in number, 
they were a body of picked men, — as Washington wrote, 
"most of them, if not all, men of reputation and property." 
Yet, on the score of expense, he refused to allow them to 
keep their horses _, and, when they declined to do infantry 
duty, he roughly sent them home, writing to their com- 
mander, 'Hhey can no longer be of use here, where horses 
» Supra, 14-16 ; infra, 122. 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 65 

cannot be brought into action, and I do not care how soon 
they are dismissed." It is not easy to understand how a 
commander of even Washington's experience could under 
the conditions then manifestly confronting him have reached 
such a conclusion, much less have expressed it so bluntly 
and in writing. In the first place, what had he in mind 
when he asserted that his operations were necessarily con- 
ducted 'Svhere horses" could not ''be brought into action" ? 
It is obvious that both New York and Brooklyn then were, 
as they now are, on islands ; but, that fact notwithstanding, 
the field of operations included in those islands afforded 
ample space as well as constant occasion for the employment 
of any arm of the service, — engineers, infantry, artillery or 
cavalry. In the second place, to hold the town of New 
York it was necessary to occupy Brooklyn, and the occupa- 
tion of Brooklyn implied at least a dozen miles of uncovered 
front, or avenues of approach, to be vigilantly guarded and 
unceasingly patrolled. As an historical fact, it was by 
means of one of these avenues of approach to Brooklyn, 
wholly unguarded, — though some four or five miles only to 
the eastward of the direct road from the place where Howe 
landed his army, — that, a little later on, a sufficient detach- 
ment of the British force worked its way by a flanking 
movement to the rear of Washington's outlying right wing, 
and inflicted on it and him crushing disaster. Yet Long 
Island then was full of forage, which afterwards was either 
destroyed or fed the horses of the British cavalry and artil- 
lery ; and so shockingly deficient was the American mounted 
service that on the very day when Clinton turned, in the way 
referred to, the American flank. Heath, the acting quarter- 
master-general of the patriot army, was writing from King's 
Bridge, a few miles away on Manhattan Island, to Mifflin, 
about to cross his command over the East River to Brook- 



66 MILITARY STUDIES 

lyn, — ''We have not a single horse here. I have written 
to the General [Washington] for two or three." ^ To a mili- 
tary critic, the attempt to hold the outer Long Island line 
under such circumstances seems little short of ineptitude. 
General Sullivan, who was in command of that line, and who, 
together with Stirling, his next in command, was captured 
when his flank was turned, afterward claimed that he had all 
along felt uneasy about the Bedford road — that by which 
Howe effected his turning movement — and ''had paid horse- 
men fifty dollars for patrolling [it] by night, while I had 
command, as I had no foot for the purpose." ^ The plain 
inference would seem to be that none of the American com- 
manders, from Washington down, had at this stage of the 
war any understanding of the use and absolute necessity of 
mounted men in field operations. A cavalry patrol fifty 
strong only, on the flank of the American advanced line on 
Brooklyn's right front, and patrolling the approaches, 
might, and probably would, by giving timely notice, have 
saved the commands of Sullivan and Stirling from the dis- 



^ "We suffer here extremely for horses ; not a single one at this Post to 
send on Express. General Mifflin acquaints me that he cannot spare 
either horse or -waggon from that Post. I beg that two or three may be 
ordered here." — Heath to Washington, August 27, 1776, Heath Papers. 
At this very time General Howe's light-horse were pillaging and intimidat- 
ing the inhabitants of Long Island, offering an example of mobihty and 
effectiveness. 

2 Amory, Life of John Sullivan, 28. Stedman says: "This pass the 
enemy had neglected to secure by detachments, on account of its great 
distance. In order to watch it, however, they sent out occasional patroles 
of cavalry : But one of these being intercepted by a British advanced guard, 
the pass was gained without any alarm being communicated to the Ameri- 
cans." — History of the American War, I, 195. The "great distance" in 
this case was a short two miles, and the route the British took to get into 
Sullivan's rear ran, according to the excellent map in Stedman's History, 
just about a half a mile from Sullivan's extreme left flank. That such a 
route should not have been constantly patrolled seems, under the circum- 
stances, simply inexpUcable. 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 67 

aster of August 27; and yet, a few weeks before, the four 
hundred Connecticut mounted men had been sent home by- 
Washington for the reason that cavalry could be of no 
service in military operations conducted ''here, where horses 
cannot be brought into action" ! ^ But, American or British, 
it was all of a piece ; and the whole story of what occurred 
August 27-30, 1776, on Long Island, is on both sides sug- 
gestive only of a badly played game of chess; as the result 
of which the losing party escaped a checkmate only through 
the quite unaccountable procrastination of his opponent on 
land, and the inactivity of that opponent on the water. 

All these happenings, as well as the subsequent transfer of 
the patriot army from Brooklyn across the East River to 
New York, occurred during the closing days of August. 
Four months later the affairs at Trenton and Princeton closed 
the campaign of 1776, and Washington's army went into its 
winter quarters at Morristown. 

For present purposes, it is not necessary even to pass in 
rapid review the incidents of that melancholy campaign or 
its redeeming, and even brilliant, close in the Christmas week 
of 1776. It is sufficient to say that throughout those opera- 
tions, from the ignominious Kip's Bay panic on September 15 
to the splendid closing rally at Princeton on New Year's day, 
1777, there is nowhere any indication of the presence of 
mounted men connected with the patriot army, much less of 
any organized auxiliary cavalry service; nor is it easy to 
see how the necessary courier and orderly work was done. 
Of patrol work, picket duty, and scouting service there was 
no pretence on either side. Indeed, it was to this fact, and 
the neglect on the part of the British of the most ordinary 
military precautions against surprise, that Washington owed 
his success at both Trenton and Princeton. Yet the second 

^ See closing paragraph, Chap. XXXI, Irving, Washington, II, 382. 



68 MILITARY STUDIES 

year of active operations was drawing to a close ; and, cer- 
tainly, operations during the last four months of that second 
year were not conducted '^ where horses" could not ''be 
brought into action." 

It is narrated of Frederick the Great that, after his first 
experience in active warfare in the fortunate, but for him 
personally inglorious and somewhat mortifying Moll witz cam- 
paign, he subjected himself to sharp self-examination as to 
the errors and oversights for which he felt himself to have 
been personally responsible; and especially he "meditated 
much on the bad figure his cavalry" cut at Mollwitz. And, 
thereafter, he strove incessantly to improve that branch of 
the Prussian service, ''till at length it can be said his suc- 
cess became world-famous, and he had such Seydlitzes and 
Ziethens as were not seen before or since." 

If Washington, in his Morristown winter quarters, sub- 
jected himself, as he doubtless did, to a similar rigid intro- 
spection, the first and most necessary requirement of the 
situation which suggested itself to him, must, it would seem, 
have been an adequate mounted force of some kind, attached 
to his command, at once his army's eyes and ears, its safe- 
guard against surprise and his most ready weapon of offence. 
And, as respects safeguard against surprise, Major-General 
Charles Lee, then second in command in the patriot army, 
furnished at this juncture and in his own person an illustra- 
tion most opportune, though somewhat ludicrous as well as 
forcible. Of Lee it is unnecessary to speak ; both as man 
and soldier he stands condemned.^ But, in the course of 

^ Lee did appreciate the value of cavalry. ''For God's sake, my dear 
General, urge the Congress to furnish me with a thousand cavalry. With 
a thousand cavalry I could insure the safety of these Southern Provinces ; 
and without cavalry I can answer for nothing. I proposed a scheme in 
Virginia for raising a body almost without any expense. The scheme was 
relished by the gentlemen of Virginia, but I am told the project was cen'- 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 69 

these operations, Howe had sent out Colonel Harcourt with 
a detachment apparently of the Seventeenth Light Dragoons 
to obtain information as to Lee's movements. This detail 
seems to have roamed about at will; and finally Colonel 
Harcourt not only learned of General Lee's whereabouts, 
but also got full information as to how he was accom- 
panied through an important intercepted letter of Lee's, 
the carriage and delivery of which, no mounted force 
being available for courier service even, had been entrusted 
to '' a countryman." Stedman says that the Ameri- 
can commander had gone out '^in order to reconnoitre," 
and "stopped at a house to breakfast." Fiske asserts that 
Lee had ''foolishly taken up his quarters" at the house in 
question, and had there slept. However this may be, on 
the morning of the 13th of December, a fortnight to a day 
before the affair at Trenton, a mere squad of British cavalry, 
thirty strong only, swooped down on White's Tavern, near 
Baskingridge, — halfway across the State of New Jersey, 
— and, in leisurely fashion, carried Lee off in slippers and 
dressing-gown, a prisoner of war. Another point of interest 
in connection with this somewhat opei^a bouffe performance 
was the presence in it, as a participant, of Banastre 
Tarleton, then a cornet of light-horse, — the Tarleton who 
subsequently gained so great notoriety as an active and 
enterprising cavalry officer in the Southern Department. 
The capture of Charles Lee does, however, reveal the fact 

sured by some members of the Congress on the principle that a military 
servant should not take the liberty to propose anything. . . . From want 
of this species of troops, we had infallibly lost this Capital, but the dila- 
toriness and stupidity of the enemy saved us." — To Washington, July 1, 
1776, Correspondence of the Revolution (Sparks),!, 246. He had already 
written to the Virginia Committee of Secrecy: "Your resolution to raise 
a body of light-horse is, in my opinion, most judicious. It is a species 
of troops without which an army is a defective and lame machine.'' See 
also Lee Papers, II, 15, 100; IV, 102, 119. 



70 MILITARY STUDIES 

that Howe's army in this campaign did boast a small force 
of regular cavalry, designated by Stedman '4ight dragoons" 
or '4ight-horse," and mention is from time to time made of 
it; but its only noticeable, or even recorded, performance 
was this bagging of Charles Lee. It is none the less ap- 
parent that, with a sufficient and effective auxiliary mounted 
force, such as Tarleton subsequently had under him in the 
Carolinas, the advantages gained in the operations about 
New York during the autumn months of 1776 by Howe and 
Cornwallis could easQy have been followed up later, and 
Washington's straggling and demoralized army might have 
been effectually dispersed. On the other hand, while the 
British, from the lack of a mounted force adapted to irregu- 
lar service and American conditions, did not, and could not, 
follow up their successes, the Americans, for the same reason, 
were wholly unable to harass their enemy and retard his 
advance. They could not even keep informed as to that 
enemy's position and movements, much less cut off his sup- 
plies, or exhaust and distract him by continually beating up 
his cantonments, — a system of tactics subsequently most 
successfully employed in the Carolina campaigns under even 
less advantageous conditions. That during the earlier stages 
of that seven years' struggle, the British failed to "catch on," 
so to speak, to this somewhat novel feature in warfare, as 
then conducted, is perhaps, considering the national char- 
acteristics, no matter for surprise. At best the British sol- 
dier is not peculiarly adaptive ; and, fighting in a new coun- 
try under wholly unaccustomed conditions, a Prince Rupert 
was not at once developed. The curious and hardly expli- 
cable fact, however, is that, later, they did ''catch on" more 
quickly than Washington, who was to the manner born, and 
they did develop, in" advance of the Americans, a substitute 
for Prince Rupert, and a tolerably good one also, in the person 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 71 

of Tarleton. But, with material directly at hand in the way 
of both horses and riders, it is fairly matter of wonder that 
no American Mosby developed anywhere or at any time 
within the field of operations presided over by Washington. 
Further south the partisan leader and the mounted rifleman 
appeared, as if by spontaneous generation, almost imme- 
diately after interior operations began ; for Marion, Sumter, 
Pickens and the two Horrys were the Forrests and Mosbys 
of the earlier struggle. But north of the Chesapeake, 
where the initiative and personal influence of Washington 
set the gait, so to speak, any trace of this aggressive indi- 
vidual enterprise is looked for in vain. Washington sub- 
sequently had recourse to what was at the time altogether 
inappropriately termed a system of Fabian tactics; but the 
Parthian system was quite as well established historically as 
the Fabian,^ and all the conditions lent themselves admirably 
to a recourse to the first named. The men were there; the 
horses were there; the forage was there: all in abundance. 
The organization and leaders only were lacking; nor were 
the leaders far to seek. Daniel Morgan, of Virginia, was 
there, Jersey-born, but of Welsh stock, no less a born com- 
mander of irregular horse than, eighty years later in the War 
of Secession was Forrest, of Tennessee, a man of exactly simi- 
lar typej instinctively a strategist and cavalry leader. And 
again another instance : from the very commencement of 
hostilities, Benedict Arnold gave unmistakable evidence of 
the possession of every quality which went to make up the 
dashing cavalry commander. 

Contrasting him with well-known characters familiar to a 
later generation, Washington seems, on the contrary, to have 
had more traits in common with George H. Thomas than 

1 '' The ne'er yet beaten horse of Parthia 

We have jaded out o' the field." — Antony and Cleopatra, iii, 1. 



72 MILITARY STUDIES 

with either Sherman or Sheridan. To the military critic, he 
is something of a puzzle ; for, though ordinarily cautious and 
even slow, he at times was wonderfully alert, and at other 
times actually audacious. In the operations in and about 
New York during the autumn of 1776 he failed to grasp the 
strategic situation, and vacillated in presence of his opponent 
in a way which should have led to his destruction. The 
decision, alertness and energy displayed by him at Princeton 
and Trenton were, on the other hand, remindful of Wolfe at 
Quebec, and of Prince Henry of Prussia at Haverswerda, 
thirteen days only after Quebec.^ The next year, also, at 
Brandywine and Germantown, the audacity, not to say rash- 
ness, with which Washington challenged battle with an op- 
posing force which, not only in organization and equipment 
but numerically even, completely outclassed his own, was, 
and is, simply confounding. 

Returning, however, to the subject under immediate con- 
sideration, — the organization of a mounted service and its 
effective use in the Revolutionary operations, — Washington 
did not evince mental alertness. On the contrary, while his 
correspondence and reports reveal no trace of the conscious- 
ness of an unsupplied necessity in this direction, he, in the 
field, showed himself distinctly lacking in what may, for 
present purposes, be well enough described as the cavalry 
flair, so conspicuous in Cromwell and Frederick. There is in 
Sheridan's Memoirs a passage curiously illustrative of this 
divergence of view, chiefly attributable to character and tem- 
perament, but in part due to training and vocation. Sheri- 
dan was essentially a cavalry officer, — a sabreur. General 
George G. Meade, the victor of Gettysburg, originally as- 
signed to the artillery, later served in the engineer corps until 

1 Infra, 143. The legend of Frederick's admiration of Washington's 
Trenton-Princeton operation has long been disproved ; see Greene, The 
Revolutionary War, 73 n. 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 73 

August, 1861, when he was put in command of a brigade of 
Pennsylvania infantry then being organized. Both were in 
their respective ways excellent officers, but Sheridan says 
of Meade (Memoirs I. 355) : ^'He was filled with the preju- 
dices that, from the beginning of the war, had pervaded the 
army regarding the importance and usefulness of cavalry. 
General Scott then predicted that the contest would be set- 
tled by artillery, and thereafter refused the services of regiment 
after regiment of mounted troops. General Meade deemed 
cavalry fit for little more than guard and picket duty." 
Sheridan, on the contrary, regarding the problem from the 
cavalry point of view, grasped the possibilities, and wanted 
to weld that arm of the service into an effective, and even 
deadly, w^eapon of offence. Throughout the Revolutionary 
operations, Washington seems to have looked upon cavalry 
much as did Scott and Meade in the later struggle ; and, in 
the Revolution, no Sheridan forged to the front. 

The campaign of 1777 — Washington's third — was 
marked by Burgoyne's invasion from Canada, and the ill- 
considered and altogether aimless movement of Sir William 
Howe on Philadelphia. The northern campaign began in 
the middle of June, and closed with the Saratoga surrender 
on the 17th of October. Burgoyne was a cavalry officer, 
and had won such distinction as he enjoyed by organizing 
the so-called ''light-horse" as an arm of the English military 
service. Now, however, he was called upon to conduct 
operations in a well-nigh primeval wilderness, through which 
he should have moved by water whenever it was possible so 
to do, but elected to march by land. Accordingly, men, 
and Germans in some cases at that, accustomed to Euro- 
pean roads, found themselves following woodland trails 
through a country intersected by creeks, and consisting in 
great part of impassable morasses. Under such conditions, 



74 MILITARY STUDIES 

a mounted force would have been simply an additional en- 
cumbrance. Accordingly, in the Saratoga campaign, cavalry 
cut, and could cut, no figure ; and, as will presently be seen, 
a mistaken inference drawn by Gates from this chapter in 
his earlier experience led a year later to his final undoing. 

But if there was no obvious use to be made of cavalry, 
or rather of an improvised force of mounted rangers, in the 
swampy wilderness at the head of Lake George and about 
Saratoga, it was quite otherwise in Maryland and southern 
and eastern Pennsylvania, the region which Howe selected 
as the field for his operations ; and that in which Washing- 
ton next had to figure. 

During the earlier months of that summer, there had been 
some desultory movements on the part of Howe, from New 
York as a base, which Washington had contented himself 
with observing. He was at this juncture pursuing a true 
Fabian policy. He was, also, wise in so doing ; for, in every 
branch of the service, — infantry, artillery, or even cavalry, 
• — the force opposed to him was incomparably superior to 
anything he could put in motion. These operations were 
at the time not inaptly referred to in England as Howe's 
"two weeks' fooling in New Jersey" ; and it is surely need- 
less to point out how valuable any mounted force, regular 
or irregular, would have been to the patriot commander 
while they were in process. Indeed, it is not easy to see 
how, without even the pretence of such an arm to his ser- 
vice, he contrived to keep in the field. His opponent 
must, apparently, have been singularly devoid of anything 
even remotely resembling aggressive alertness. Presently 
Howe moved his army back to Staten Island, and, loading 
it on transports, disappeared from view until the last days 
of July, when he turned up, so to speak, at the entrance of 
Delaware Bay. Washington at once hurried his ill-organized 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 75 

command to the new field of operations. On his way he 
passed through Philadelphia, where the Continental Con- 
gress was then holding its sittings ; and, from a letter written 
by John Adams to his wife, we get a glimpse of a more or 
less nebulous cavalry contingent as a component part of the 
patriot army. John Adams wrote: ''Four regiments of 
light-horse, Bland's, Baylor's, Sheldon's, and Moylan's. 
Four grand divisions of the army, and the artillery with the 
matrosses. They marched twelve deep, and yet took up 
above two hours in passing by. General Washington and 
the other general officers with their aides on horseback. 
The Colonels and other field-officers on horseback." No 
mention is in this letter made of the First Troop, 
Philadelphia City Cavalry, though that body acted as 
Washington's escort when he passed through the city.^ 

1 The Philadelphia City Troop is probably the oldest distinctively 
cavalry organization in America, and its record, both independently and 
as a school for officers of the national mounted service, has been notice- 
ably creditable. A detailed and elaborate history of the Troop, from its 
organization in November, 1774, to 1874, was prepared and published in 
the latter year. A record of its service also is to be found in the Annual 
Report of the Adjutant-general of Pennsylvania for the year ending 
December 31, 1907. This Troop served under Washington's immediate 
command as a species of headquarters escort, not only at Trenton and 
Princeton but subsequently at Brandywine. Repeatedly in action, it 
took part in such scouting and picketing as was then done. Its record 
was in every way creditable ; but, none the less, the detailed history of 
the Troop confirms the statements in the text, and forcibly illustrates the 
quite disorganized and wholly unreliable character of the mounted force 
attached to Washington's army throughout the operations described. 
Those in command had apparently no conception of an organized cavalry 
force, operating as such and as an independent unit. The service rendered 
by the Troop was for no particular or extended term, and consisted 
chiefly of courier duty, attendance at headquarters, and somewhat in- 
effective scouting, generally, it would appear, by individuals or small 
details. 

Not impossibly, the usefulness of a small cavalry body constituted and 
serving after the manner of the Troop, may have suggested the special 
appeal issued by Congress on March 2, 1778, in which the desire waa 



76 MILITARY STUDIES 

Presently, the British expedition made its appearance in 
Chesapeake Bay; and, finally, a landing was effected near 
Elkton. Philadelphia, it was plain, was now the British 
objective, and Washington proceeded to plant himself in 
Howe's path. With a force some eleven thousand strong, 
only half-disciplined and wretchedly equipped, while Howe 
had eighteen thousand regulars, with an artillery contingent, 
this was distinctly audacious. Going by sea, Howe, of 
course, could not have had any considerable force of mounted 
men, probably only a squadron or two.^ 

What now ensued illustrated most strikingly the absence 
of cavalry on either side. To one trained practically in the 
methods of modern warfare it reads like a burlesque, exciting 
a sense of humor as well as a feeling of amazement. While 
Howe's army lay at Elkton, preparing in a leisurely way to 
take up its line of march to Philadelphia, Washington, it is 
said, accompanied by Greene and Lafayette, with a few aids, 

expressed that a number of like organizations might be formed in all the 
States. It was urged that it was "the duty of those who enjoy in a pecul- 
iar degree the gifts of fortune and of a cultivated understanding, to stand 
forth in a disinterested manner in defence of their country and by laudable 
example to rouse and animate their countrymen to deeds worthy of their 
brave ancestors, and of the sacred cause of freedom." To "the young 
men of Property and Spirit" in the several States it was earnestly recom- 
mended that within their respective States they constitute "a Troop or 
Troops of Light Cavalry to serve at their own expense (except in the ar- 
ticle of provisions for themselves for forage for their horses) until the Slst 
of December next." 

^Stedman says (I. 289) that Howe's army, including "a regiment of 
light-horse," embarked at New York on the 5th day of July, " where both 
foot and cavalry remained pent up, in the hottest season of the year, in 
the holds of the vessels, until the 23d, when they sailed from Sandy Hook." 
It was the 24th of August before the expedition reached its landing-place, 
at the Head of Elk. Not until the 8th of September was the entire 
force concentrated and put in motion towards Philadelphia. Such of the 
horses of the expedition as survived were thus, during the most trying 
period of the American summer, kept exactly seven weeks in the holds of 
the transports. 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 77 

went forward to reconnoitre. In other words, the two 
generals, most prominent in the army and necessary to its 
preservation as well as effectiveness, accompanied by a dis- 
tinguished foreign guest, actually went out in person on a 
scout. In the early days of our Civil War, a prominent 
politician freshly made a general distinguished himself by 
attempting a close reconnoissance on a railroad train ; and, 
in South Africa, on one memorable occasion, an English com- 
mander undertook to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy 
by utilizing a park of artillery as a skirmish line: but no 
case except this of Washington is recorded of a command- 
ing general going on an overnight scout himself because, 
apparently, he could in no other way get information of a 
kind, to say the least, highly desirable. 

Riding forward to certain elevations, from which they got 
a glimpse of a few tents in the distance, Washington and his 
companions were caught on their return in a heavy rain, and 
took shelter for the night in a farm-house which chanced to 
be owned and occupied by a loyalist. They seem to have 
been without escort and ran as great a risk of being gobbled 
up as did Lee, eight months before. Judging by Lafayette's 
long subsequent account of this performance, Washington's 
companions passed, that night, some anxious hours. Sub- 
sequently a friendly warning was received from Virginia, 
to the effect that greater caution on the part of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief would in future be expedient. 

It next devolved upon the patriot army to cover Philadel- 
phia. Howe was perfectly advised as to the composition of 
the force opposed to him, the inadequacy of its equipment, 
its lack of cavalry or any mounted service, and its consequent 
inability to secure early and correct information as to his own 
whereabouts and tactics. He acted accordingly, preparing 
a flank movement almost exactly similar to that so success- 



78 MILITARY STUDIES 

fully employed on Long Island a year previous, and at both 
Chancellorsville and Sadowa in the following century. The 
lesson administered by Clinton at Flatbush, on Long Island, 
had, it would appear, not been sufficiently taken to heart ; 
so Cornwallis proceeded to administer it again at Bir- 
mingham meeting-house, on the Brandy wine. The complete 
absence of any effective mounted force was once more ap- 
parent, as well as the utter impracticability of successfully 
conducting military operations in a fairly open country with- 
out the assistance of such a force. Both propositions received 
added and unmistakable illustration in each changing phase 
of an anxious day, and at every stage of its not very com- 
plicated movements. It is even now instructive to follow 
them in detail. Cornwallis, in immediate command of one 
of the two divisions into which Howe had, for this occasion, 
divided his army, proceeded to move around Washington's 
unsuspecting right, just as ''Stonewall" Jackson eighty-five 
years later, and less than one hundred and fifty miles further 
south, circled Hooker's right. Trevelyan says (Pt. Ill, 228) 
that the reports which now reached Washington ''were in a 
high degree confused and contradictory. He had not the 
means of getting at the positive truth, because he was very 
weak in cavalry"; and so the morning of a momentous day 
wore away "amidst distracting doubts and varying counsels." 
Presently, as the result of a reconnoissance made by a single 
horseman sent out to explore by Sullivan, who commanded 
the American right, Washington was erroneously advised as to 
his opponent's probable plan of operations, and set his forces 
in motion for an attack on that portion of Howe's army in 
his own immediate front. Other and more correct informa- 
tion then at last reaching him, he again changed his plan ; 
but it was now too late. Howe's flanking movement had 
been completely and successfully carried out; and it only 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 79 

remained for the historian to record that the disaster which 
a few hours later overwhelmed the patriot cause was due to 
the fact that those in charge of it could obtain ''no reliable 
information from the inhabitants, and had so few and in- 
sufficient cavalry that they could make no extended and rapid 
explorations." A year almost to a day had elapsed since 
this same Sullivan had found himself the victim of a precisely 
similar movement on Long Island, his opponent getting in 
his rear by a perfectly obvious roundabout route, but one 
over which an enemy's approach was never "dreamed of." 
On that occasion Sullivan, having no men at his disposal to 
watch the road, had, it will be remembered, "paid horsemen 
fifty dollars for patrolling it by night" ; and now, under very 
similar conditions, he wrote, "I have never had any light- 
horse with me since I joined the army. I found four when 
I came to Brentford's Ford, two of whom I sent off with 
Captain Hazen to Jones's Ford." In such a state of affairs, 
with an overpowering hostile force creeping around the 
army's right wing, the question naturally suggests itself, 
where were "Bland's, Baylor's, Sheldon's, and Moylan's four 
regiments of light-horse"? ^ Of them and their movements 
no mention is made. Howe now had Washington exactly 
where a vigorous and energetic commander likes to get his 
opponent. Demoralized and exhausted, the patriot army 
was driven into a cul-de-sac formed by the junction of the 
Schuylkill with the Delaware. Ruthlessly pursued, there 
was no escape for it. As the alternative to surrender it 

' Fisher remarks (II. 27) : " This Sullivan who learned of the flanking 
movement too late at Brandywine, was the same Sullivan who had failed 
to know of the flanking movement in time at Long Island. His forte did 
not lie in protecting an army's flank." This, possibly, is true. It is, 
however, equally true that on a previous notable historical occasion the 
forte of the children of Israel did not lie in the making of bricks without 
straw. 



80 MILITARY STUDIES 

would have been hustled into the river. But now the ab- 
sence of any cavalry contingent in Howe's army became 
equally apparent. An effective mounted force, energetically 
led, if then flung on Washington's disordered and retreating 
masses, could hardly have failed to convert the rout into a 
panic; and Washington might now have undergone the 
same experience at the hands of Cornwallis which Gates 
almost exactly three years later underwent at his and Tarle- 
ton's hands at Camden. Washington owed his salvation 
to the absence of a British cavalry contingent, combined 
perhaps with the constitutional inertness of an opponent 
who never saw any occasion for following up an advantage. 
Having won what could easily have been made a decisive 
victory. Sir William Howe showed no disposition to assume 
an active aggressive, but lay for two weeks in camp in an 
agreeable situation in a healthy high position within a few 
miles of his altogether successful battle-field. 

During this inexplicable interval in active operations, the 
absence on the patriot side of any eyes and ears of an army 
received further forcible illustration in the so-called Paoli 
'^ massacre" of September 20, through which ''Mad An- 
thony" Wayne got a rough lesson in warfare. When Wash- 
ington, after the disaster on the Brandy wine, withdrew across 
the Schuylkill, he left a small force, some fifteen hundred 
strong, on its further side, under Wayne, to watch Howe, and, 
it is said to ''harass his rear" if he moved forward. The 
reason thus given for such a risky division of a force, insuffi- 
cient at best, is not over and above intelligible; and, cer- 
tainly, infantry were here left to do what was plainly the work 
of cavalry. Wayne also was, like Sullivan on the Brandy- 
wine, without the means of effective outpost service. Ap- 
parently he had a few very inefficient mounted men posted 
as videttes, who failed to give timely notice of the enemy's 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 81 

approach.^ The natural result, a night surprise, followed. 
At about one o'clock in the morning Wayne's camp was 
rushed, and he lost about a fifth of his command, — lives 
thrown away. But historically the affair has its lesson ; for 
the different eyes with which historians regard it and state 
the facts connected with it are suggestive. In Trevelyan's 
narrative only is there any comment on the absence of organ- 
ization which made such a foot-surprise practicable, — the 
single military lesson to be learned from it : but one historian 
says of the British commander, Major-General Grey, his 
''only distinction in the war was in prisoner-killing"; and, 
in this case, he '^ committed, it is said, most ruthless slaughter 
with sword and bayonet on those he first came upon. . . . 
Wayne was not surprised, as has been generally supposed. 
. . . He was accordingly well prepared, resisted gallantly, 
and was able to retire, saving his artillery and stores." ^ The 
other historian then tells us: "The best officer in Howe's army, 
short of Cornwallis, was Charles Grey, who died Earl Grey 
of Howick in Northumberland, and who was the father of the 
celebrated Whig prime-minister. It once was the fashion in 
America to write about General Grey as if he was a pair with 
Governor Tryon; but, in truth, he was a high-minded and 
honorable gentleman, and a soldier every inch of him. . . . 
It was as complete a surprise, and as utter a rout, as ever 
occurred in modern warfare." ^ On this disputed point it 
can only be observed that, if the American commander was 
at Paoli not surprised and was ''well prepared" against a 
midnight attack, the outcome thereof called for a great deal 
of explanation on his part. A loss of between three and four 
hundred sustained by his command was counterbalanced by 
"precisely a dozen casualties in the English ranks." If 
"well prepared" for him, Wayne certainly failed, on that 
' Stale's Wayne, 86. 2 Fisher, II, 33. ' Trevelyan, Pt. Ill, 233. 



82 MILITARY STUDIES 

occasion, to give his opponent what is in warfare known as a 
warm reception. At the bar of history the burden of further 
proof would appear to rest on the American investigator. 

During the previous winter Congress, presumably on the 
suggestion of Washington, had given some more or less shad- 
owy consideration to the idea of organizing a body of what 
was termed "light cavalry," in apparent distinction to the 
severely drilled and heavily accoutred dragoon ; for, stated in 
general terms, in Europe the dragoon constituted the more 
solid mounted arm of the service, equipped with carbines, 
while the hussar and lancer, lighter and more dashing, de- 
pended on the sabre and lance. Both were quite unfitted to 
the essential, but little understood, conditions of practical 
warfare in America; and glimpses of the grotesque proposi- 
tions at this stage of the struggle gravely pressed on the 
attention of the Congress are here and there obtainable 
through the correspondence of the time. The following, for 
example, is from an unpublished letter of John Adams, 
written to James Warren of Massachusetts from Philadel- 
phia in June, 1775, nor would it be easy to imagine a 
greater contrast than that between the stagey apparition 
here described, and the actual American irregular mounted 
force which, naturall}^ evolved, rendered such effective ser- 
vice under Lee and Tarleton, in the later stages of the war. 
"A few minutes past" wrote Adams, "a curious Phenome- 
non appeared at the Door of our Congress, — a German 
Hussar, a veteran in the Wars in Germany, in his Uniform, 
and on Horse back, a forlorn Cap upon his Head, with a 
Streamer waiving from it half down to his Waistband, with 
a Deaths Head painted in Front, a beautiful Hussar Cloak 
ornamented with Lace and Fringe and Cord of Gold, a 
Scarlet Waist coat under it, with shining yellow metal 
Buttons — a Light Gun strung over his shoulder, — and a 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 83 

Turkish Sabre, much Superior to an high Land broad sword, 
very large and excellently fortifyed by his side-Holsters 
and Pistols upon his Horse — in short the most warlike and 
formidable Figure, I ever saw. He says he has fifty such 
Men ready to enlist under him immediately who have been 
all used to the Service as Hussars in Germany, and desirous 
to ride to Boston immediately in order to see Burgoignes 
light Horse." 

During the winter of 1776-1777 Congress once more 
authorized the formation of a mounted force; but whether 
any such force ever really came into existence, even on 
paper, is questionable. The historians make no mention of 
it. Meanwhile, Count Pulaski had now been for some time 
in the country and attached to Washington's headquarters 
as a member of his military family. Bancroft, in his not 
very satisfactory or intelligible account of the Brandywine 
operations, enigmatically says, '^on that day [Pulaski] 
showed the daring of adventure rather than the qualities of a 
commander"; but, apparently because of his dashing con- 
duct, Congress, on the recommendation of Washington, com- 
missioned him as brigadier-general.^ This was done, the his- 

1 Pulaski held no appointment at the time of the battle of Brandywine. 
He had a high opinion of his own qualities, for he asked "such rank and 
command in the army of these united states as will leave him subordi- 
nate to the Commander in Chief alone, or to him and the Marquis de 
Lafayette." — Journals, VIII, 673. 

Washington's view of the cavalry may be measured by his recom- 
mendation of Pulaski: "This department is still without a head; as 
I have not, in the present deficiency of Brigadiers with the army, thought 
it advisable to take one from the foot for that command. The nature of 
the horse service with us being such, that they commonly act in detach- 
ment, a general officer with them is less necessary than at the head of 
the Brigades of infantry. . . . But though the horse will suffer less from 
the want of a general officer than the foot, a man of real capacity, ex- 
perience, and knowledge in that service, might be extremely useful." 
Franklin, in his indorsement of Pulaski, said nothing of his special fitness 
for the cavalry service, and Washington doubtless only repeated the PoUsh 



84 MILITARY STUDIES 

torian informs us, ''in order to encourage and develop that 
arm which heretofore had amounted to little or nothing in 
the patriot service." ^ 

It is, of course, easy to be wise after the event, nor, in the 
full light of subsequent occurrences, does it imply much 
perspicacity to see what ought to have been done, or left 
undone, at any given crisis of human affairs. Premising 
all this, it is yet difficult to avoid the conclusion that if, 
in the autumn and winter of 1777, the organization 
and development of an effective mounted force in the 
American Continental army was the end in view, the 

adventurer's own claims when he told Congress that !'as the principal 
attention in Poland has been for some time past paid to the cavalry, it 
is to be presumed this gentleman is not unacquainted with it. " — Writings 
of Washington (Ford), VI, 57n. He was appointed to command, the 
horse, with the rank of brigadier-general, but the experiment was short and, 
apparently, the reverse of fortunate. He resigned his command in March, 
1778, to raise an independent mixed force of horse and foot, known in 
Revolutionary annals as "Pulaski's Legion." — Journals, X, 312. 

1 Pulaski, some months after his appointment, complained of the "in- 
effective state" of the cavalry. !'It cannot be appropriated to any other 
service than that of orderlies or reconnoitring the enemy's lines, which 
your Excellency must be persuaded is not the only service expected from a 
corps, which, when on a proper footing, is so very formidable. Although 
it is the opinion of many, that, from the construction of the country, the 
cavalry cannot act to advantage, your Excellency must be too well ac- 
quainted with the many instances wherein the cavalry have been decisively 
serviceable, to be of this opinion, and not acknowledge that this corps has 
more than once completed victories. . . . What has greatly contributed 
to the present weak state of the cavalry was the frequent detachments 
ordered to the suite of general and other officers, while a colonel com- 
manded, which were appropriated to every use, and the horses drove 
at the discretion of the dragoons." — Corres-pondence of the Revolution 
(Sparks), II, 53. Again, in December, 1777, he wrote: "While we are 
superior in cavalry, the enemy will not dare to extend their force, and, not- 
withstanding we act on the defensive, we shall have many opportunities of 
attacking and destroying the enemy by degrees ; whereas, if they have it 
in their power to augment their cavalry, and we suffer ours to diminish and 
dwindle away, it may happen that the loss of a battle will terminate 
in our total defeat. Our army, once dispersed and pursued by their horse, 
will never be able to rally.'! — 76. 57. 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 85 

selection of Pulaski as the officer to effect that result was 
in no way happy. 

A showy, dashing Polish horseman, and, as the end showed, 
a most generous and gallant young fellow, Pulaski, as Chief of 
Cavalry for the somewhat inchoate Continental army of 1778, 
labored under difficulties which were in fact insuperable. 
With a quick temper and impatient disposition, he could not 
make himself understood in English ; and, a stranger in a 
strange land, his whole former military experience was, 
among Americans and under American conditions, a positive 
drawback. He submitted to Washington a sensible memo- 
rial in which he pointed out clearly the pressing necessity 
of an organized and improved cavalry service; and, subse- 
quently, he forwarded several reports setting forth in most 
imperfect English the difficulties he encountered. These 
undoubtedly were both great and irritating, if, indeed, ap- 
proached in the way proposed, they were not insurmountable. 
But, while Pulaski addressed himself with zeal to the task he 
sought for and which was assigned him, he plainly did not go 
at it in the right way, — in the way in which, for instance, 
Morgan would probably have gone at it. In other words, he 
did not understand America, and had no correct idea as to 
conditions. Consequently, as Sparks very well puts it, 'Hhe 
officers of the several regiments, who had heretofore been in 
a measure independent, were not easily reconciled to the 
orders of a superior, particularly of a foreigner who did not 
understand their language, and whose ideas of discipline, ar- 
rangement, and manoeuvres were different from those to 
which they had been accustomed." ^ The result naturally to 
be expected in due time ensued. Thus the first attempt at a 
Continental cavalry organization failed ; nor can the respon- 
sibility for its failure be attributed exclusively to the inju- 
» Life of Count Pulaski, Sparks' American Biography, New Series, IV. 



86 MILITARY STUDIES 

dicious interference of an intractable Congress. It failed 
because it was in no way American, or entered upon with a 
correct, because instinctive, appreciation of existing poten- 
tialities. And so the brave and unfortunate Pulaski passed 
on to his early death. It was merely another case of a square 
peg in a round hole. But the question still presents itself — 
Who put the peg in that particular hole? — and did the per- 
son making the assignment exactly understand either the 
nature of the hole or the adaptation of the peg to it ? 

And this query leads to the very heart of the historical 
topic now under consideration. Stated broadly and as an 
abstract military proposition, there is no branch of the 
service in which a familiar acquaintance with the country 
to be operated in, and its conditions, is so essential to a 
commander's success, as in the cavalry. To any one experi- 
enced in warfare, this proposition is elementary. A man not 
to the manner born may be a good officer of infantry or of 
artillery, and an excellent engineer, even though he speaks 
but indifferently the language of his soldiers ; not so the effi- 
cient commander of horse. To be really effective, he must 
be of his command ; his troopers must see in him one of them- 
selves. Especially is this so in a new country, such as the 
United States in all respects was during the last half of the 
eighteenth century. In America and in Europe, engineer- 
ing and artillery were in essentials the same. That European 
infantry at times found themselves out of place under Ameri- 
can conditions had been demonstrated before Fort Du Quesne 
and again at Bunker Hill ; but still the European battalion 
and officers could do good work when in the open and out 
of the reach of rangers and riflemen. With cavalry it was 
altogether otherwise. American conditions called for a 
species of mounted service peculiar to themselves; and, in 
organizing and commanding it, a European had first to un- 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 87 

learn everything he had ever been taught, and start fresh. 
He must understand the country, its people and their speech ; 
he must be familiar with its breed of horses, its roads and 
its forage. In a word, no less in Revolutionary times than 
during our War of Secession, if a leader is going to prove a 
cavalry success, he must be a Daniel Morgan and not a 
Casimir Pulaski. 

To the closet historian, all this may at best be news, or at 
worst seem quite immaterial ; but any man who in America 
has himself ever ''set a squadron in the field" in presence of 
an enemy will see in it not only the alphabet, but the very 
crux itself, of his calling. And after two whole years of 
campaigning in the Jerseys and Pennsylvania, Washington, it 
might not unreasonably be assumed, would have grasped this 
elementary proposition. That he did so grasp it, there is 
no evidence whether in his operations or his correspondence. 
Yet the third year of active warfare was now drawing to its 
end, and while poor Pulaski was struggling in vain with the 
English language and a ''Legion" cavalry organization 
at once inchoate, ill-considered and insubordinate, both 
Morgan and Arnold were in command of men who ought 
to have been on horseback with rifles on their saddle- 
bows, but who still marched and fought on foot with 
musket and bayonet. 

To return, however, to the Brandywine and the course 
of military events. The battle was fought September 1 1 ; 
and towards the close of that month, Howe, skilfully out- 
manoeuvring Washington, threw his army across the 
Schuylkill, and occupied Philadelphia. This has been pro- 
nounced "the cleverest piece of work" ever accomplished 
by him, but his success in it was again entirely due to 
Washington's absolute lack of any approach to an effective 
outpost service. 



88 MILITARY STUDIES 

The battle of Germantown followed, involving, of course, 
the continued occupation of Philadelphia by the British. 
An audacious conception, and well planned, it came near 
being a brilliant success. Unfortunately, there was, as the 
historians say, no possibility of quick communication on the 
field; owing to the prevalence of dense fog the position of 
the enemy could not be correctly ascertained ; and the small 
mounted force available, amounting in all perhaps to some 
400 men, was divided up among the several commands for 
headquarter and orderly service. But, considering the 
nature of the locality, and the atmospheric conditions which 
that morning prevailed, it is at least questionable whether 
at Germantown any opportunity presented itself for the 
effective use of horse. The force there present, is, however, 
referred to in the accounts of the affair as '^ Pulaski's cav- 
alry"; and this, so far as appears, is the first recognition of 
the mounted man as a distinctive branch of American army 
organization. 

Such was the close of the campaign of 1777. Valley Forge 
followed ; for, on the 19th of December, Washington led his 
now wholly demoralized following, an army in name only, 
along the western bank of the Schuylkill to their doleful 
winter quarters. 

Summarizing the campaign of 1777, so far as the operations 
conducted by Washington in person were concerned, Trevel- 
yan says that if Washington had 'MDegun the campaign with 
a respectable force of cavalry, numerous enough to cover 
his own front and watch the movements of the enemy, his 
advance guard need never have been surprised at Paoli, 
and even Brandywine might have told another tale." He 
then adds that Washington, during the Valley Forge winter, 
gave much of both time and thought to the creation of such a 
force. The organization of what was subsequently known as 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 89 

''Lee's Legion" resulted.* Though doubtless, as Trevelyan 
says, Washington gave closest attention to everything which 
concerned the enlistment, the equipment, and above all, the 
mounting of the troopers composing this body, yet that very 
corps, famous as it subsequently became in Revolutionary 
annals, and brilliant and effective as the work done by it un- 
questionably was, emphasizes forcibly Washington's limita- 
tions as a cavalry leader, and his failure to grasp in a large 
way the part which a sufficient and effective mounted service, 
both might and should have played in the general field of the 
operations which it devolved on him to conduct. Trevelyan 
says truly enough, "The American cavalry had small begin- 
nings and never attained very large dimensions ; but it was 
a serviceable instrument of war from the first moment, and 
ultimately it played a memorable part in deciding the cam- 
paign which preserved Georgia and the Carolinas to the 
Union." But, while this is undeniable so far as it goes, it is 
suggestive of more, — a good deal more, — to be said on the 
same topic. 

Why was all this thus? ''Lee's Legion," modelled, by the 
way, apparently on Pulaski's ill-conceived idea of an effective 
American cavalry servtce, consisted of some three hundred 
men, one-half only of whom were mounted. Instead of or- 
ganizing a cavalry command of such wholly inadequate pro- 
portions, why was King's Mountain not anticipated, and a 
call sent out for the frontiersmen and rangers of Virginia and 
Pennsylvania to come riding in on their own horses? Why 
were not Morgan's riflemen jerked into the saddle, where they 
would have felt far more at home than on their feet ? ^ 

^ Journals, XI, 545. 

* In the paper laid before the Committee of Congress, in camp, January, 
1778, Washington said : — 

"The benefits arising from a superiority of horse are obvious to those 
who have experienced them. Independent of such as you may derive 



90 MILITARY STUDIES 

In view of what subsequently took place during the War of 
Secession in this country/ and what took place in South 
Africa more recently, under conditions strikingly similar to 
those which obtained here during our Revolution, it is useless 
to say that this was impracticable ; and the question next 
naturally presents itself — Who was responsible for this 
strategic and military shortcoming? The unavoidable an- 
swer suggests itself. And yet Trevelyan in a footnote to the 
very page in his narrative from which quotation has just 

from it in the field of battle, it enables you very materially to control the 
inferior and subordinate motions of an enemy, to impede their knowledge 
of what you are doing, while it gives you every advantage of superior 
intelligence, and consequently facilitates your enterprise against them 
and obstructs theirs against you. In a defensive war, as in our case, it is 
peculiarly desirable, because it affords great protection to the country, 
and is a barrier to those inroads and depredations upon the inhabitants, 
which are inevitable when the superiority lies on the side of the invaders. 
The enemy, fully sensible of the advantages, are taking all the pains in 
their power to acquire an ascendancy in this respect, to defeat which, I would 
propose an augmentation of the cavalry." It was at this very time Wash- 
ington was discussing, in the way described by Trevelyan, the formation 
of Lee's Legion, and he would still have only four regiments of cavalry. 
— Works of Alexander Hamilton (1850), II, 144. 

That the experience was not entirely wasted on Hamilton is shown by 
his opinion given to Pickering in 1797 : "I am much attached to the idea 
of a large corps of efficient cavalry, and I can not allow this character to 
militia. It is all-important to an undisciplined against a disciplined army. 
It is a species of force not easy to be brought by an invader, by which 
his supplies may be cut off, and his activity extremely checked. Were I 
to command an undisciplined army, I should prefer half the force with a 
good corps of cavalry to twice the force without one." — 76. VI, 249. 

1 The most recent (1910) foreign critic on the American Civil War and 
its results thus expresses himself on this point : — 

"Perhaps the principal military lesson (to be derived from a study of 
that war) is in the use of Cavalry. The problem of getting Cavalry to fight 
well on foot, without losing its Cavalry Spirit, is often spoken of now-a-days 
as a sort of ideal to be approached rather than attained ; but Sheridan, 
Stuart, and Forrest all solved it to perfection, using mounted and dis- 
mounted action indifferently, though the two latter had few real cavalry 
in proportion to the size of their commands." — J. Formby, The American 
Civil War, 484. 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 91 

been made, says that when Stuart was taking Washington's 
portrait, wishing to interest his sitter, he wrote, ''I began on 
the revolution, the battles of Monmouth and Princeton, but 
he was absolutely dumb. After a while I got on horses. I 
had touched the right chord." Washington was at that 
time {circa 1794) President, and living in Philadelphia. 
Trevelyan adds he then had twenty-six horses in his 
stable. 

The explanation seems obvious. Washington began his 
military career as a backwoods Indian fighter ; and he never 
forgot the lessons then learned, nor outgrew that experience. 
In the wooded wildernesses of the Alleghanies cavalry could 
not operate. All he knew of it was from hearsay, and reading 
the news-letter accounts of the campaigns and battles of 
Frederick. And so, Virginian though he was, from the be- 
ginning to the end of his military life, there is, so far as can be 
discovered, no indication of any adequate conception of the 
value and importance of the mounted man in military opera- 
tions, and more especially in that particular form of military 
operation which it devolved upon him to conduct. Yet it is 
the first business of any great soldier both to appreciate and 
study the nature of the weapons at his command, and then to 
make full and effective use of them. 

In the employment of the several recognized arms of the 
service in the Revolutionary struggle, the British enjoyed a 
great, and for the patriots an insuperable, advantage as re- 
spects infantry and artillery — what is known as the line-of- 
battle organization. On the other hand, the Americans, 
from the outset, found compensation in their superior mark- 
manship, individuality and mobility. Recourse should, 
accordingly, have been had to the rifle and the horse. From 
Lexington to King's Mountain, with Bennington by the way, 
the opponent the British officer most dreaded the sight of 



92 MILITARY STUDIES 

was the leather-clad ranger ; ^ and, of all descriptions of rang- 
ers, the organized mounted ranger was the most potentially 
formidable. 

It is useless to object that in 1777 the use made of 
mounted men and irregular cavalry in modern warfare had not 
yet been developed. In the first place, such is not the fact. 
It had been developed even in Roman times ; and, as already 
pointed out, Parthian tactics were quite as proverbially fa- 
miliar as Fabian. By the same token, in Virginia the name 
of Rupert was always one to conjure with. In the next 
place, if the use that could be made of mounted men in 
American open country warfare had not previously been 
developed, it was the province of Washington then to 
develop it. That is what he was there for; and a little 
later, at King's Mountain and Cowpens, the instinct of his 
people developed it for him. 

The obvious objection will, of course, next be advanced 

that the keep of horses is costly, and Washington, when not 

wholly destitute, was always short of funds. This hardly 

merits attention. The Connecticut cavalry were dismissed 

and sent home on the specific ground that horses were 

thought to be of no use in the operations then in hand. 

1 Trevelyan, Pt. Ill, 259, 375; Fisher, II, 92. While the rifle as an im- 
plement in warfare seems to have been wholly unknown in the British ser- 
vice of the Revolutionary period, marksmanship was neither taught nor 
practised ; and, as early as during the siege of Boston, Sir William Howe 
wrote home telling of the !' terrible guns of the rebels." Finally he suc- 
ceeded in capturing a ranger, and "sent him to England, rifle and all, and 
the marksman was made to perform there and exhibited as a curi- 
osity." Some six hundred of the Germans sent to America were riflemen, 
known as " Jagers" ; and, in the negotiations with the landgraves, it was 
stipulated that as many of the recruits as possible should be riflemen. — 
Sawyer, Firearms in American History, 81-83, 140. Referring to the so- 
called "massacre" at Paoli, Trevelyan justly observes (Pt. Ill, 236) : 
"Men always attach the idea of cruelty to modes of warfare in which they 
themselves are not proficient ; and Americans liked the bayonet as little 
as Englishmen approved of taking deliberate aim at individual officers." 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 93 

The riders were invited to serve on foot. Yet only a month 
later, because of the lack of even a pretence of a mounted 
service, Washington's advanced line was flanked, and the 
very flower of his army needlessly sacrificed. A thousand 
men were there lost. They represented the price of the 
keep of a few hundred horses for one month ; while, at that 
very time, the majority of the dwellers on Long Island were 
Tories, whose fields were heavy with forage. In the next 
place, Washington did not then, nor afterwards, cry aloud 
for eyes and ears for his army, and have them denied him 
on the score of cost. On the contrary, until Valley Forge 
he does not seem to have been conscious of the absence 
from it of eyes and ears ; at least, no allusion to the want is 
found in his writings. Finally, later on, the item of cost did 
not, in 1780 to 1782, prove an insuperable obstacle in the 
way of the development of a most effective mounted service 
in the Southern Department; though, compared with 
Greene's, Washington's camp chest was a purse of Fortunatus. 
As respects the argument from cost, however, once for all it 
should be premised that war, effectively conducted, is a grim 
reality, and in no way a dilettante, delicately handled pas- 
time. In it men must be armed and equipped, somehow; 
horses must, in some way, be had and fed. The Confederates 
had no great supply of money between 1862 and 1865, but 
they had a most effective mounted service ; likewise, the 
South African Boers in a more recent struggle. In practical 
warfare the formation of a cavalry force is not so much a ques- 
tion of money as of the existence of an adequate supply of 
horses, of forage and of men accustomed to the saddle. Of all 
these, and of the best, the America of the Revolutionary 
period possessed abundance. At King's Mountain, the pro- 
spective cost of horse-keep was, so far as appears, not taken 
into consideration. 



94 MILITARY STUDIES 

If this limitation of Washington's military capacity was 
obvious in the two campaigns of 1776 and 1777, that of 1778 
emphasized the deficiency. The campaign opened, inaus- 
piciously enough, with the somewhat inexplicable Barren Hill 
performance, under the leadership of a boy of twenty, for 
Lafayette at that time still lacked six months of attaining 
his majority. Though May was well advanced, active opera- 
tions had not yet begun. The British army, still under the 
command of Sir William Howe (though being superseded by 
Clinton, he was about to sail for England) occupied Philadel- 
phia; while the patriots, just again gathering strength after 
their terrible winter experience, remained at Valley Forge. 
Washington determined to feel the enemy; and, with that 
end in view, sent out (May 18) a detachment, some fifteen 
hundred strong, of his best troops, with Lafayette in com- 
mand. It was, in fact, a reconnoissance in force; and, as 
such, should have been composed in the main of cavalry, 
with a strong infantry support and artillery contingent. The 
patriot army, however, had no cavalry to speak of, so La- 
fayette marched off with a command composed almost exclu- 
sively of foot. Crossing the Schuylkill by a ford some two 
hours' march only from Valley Forge, he advanced to Barren 
Hill, within twelve miles of Philadelphia, and there went 
into camp. What ensued illustrates several things : among 
them, more especially, the extreme danger of attempting 
without cavalry a close reconnoissance of an enemy of 
superior force ; and, next, the utter impossibility of effect- 
ing an intelligible agreement between any two accounts of 
an outpost affair. 

Fully informed as to the movement, the British arranged 
to bag Lafayette and his command. By merest chance, com- 
bined with the dull incompetence of Major-General Grant, 
who commanded one of the British columns, the bagging plan 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 95 

failed by the narrowest of margins ; but it is instructive 
to read of the affair in the accounts of Tower/ of Fisher ^ and 
of Stedman.^ They agree in hardly any detail ; and Sted- 
man only of the three, the one participant and military writer, 
gives a map of the field of operations and makes mention of 
the "confused galloping of some of the enemy's horsemen," 
through whose panicky performances Lafayette probably 
received his first intimation of impending danger; while 
"'d corps of [British] cavalry took possession of a hill" which 
was not defended, instead of being thrown forward to seize 
the ford by which alone could Lafayette's frightened foot 
effect an escape. The whole episode afforded an interesting 
example both of the absence and misuse of the weapons 
essential to success in warfare. According to Fisher, how- 
ever, Washington did profit by the experience, for he "was 
careful to risk no more valuable detachments to watch for 
the evacuation of Philadelphia." In other words, having 
no cavalry to send, he sent out no more infantry to do 
cavalry work. 

All this was preliminary ; and it was not until a month later 
(June 18) that the campaign really opened. During that 
month Washington was observing Clinton closely, know- 
ing well that the British army must move, but in natural 
doubt as to the direction of movement. It would seem 
that the utmost degree of mobility on his own part 
should then have been present to his mind as the great 
necessity of the hour. If such was the case, the thought took 
no outward form, and remained unexpressed in correspond- 
ence. June, 1778, witnessed at last the withdrawal of the 
British army from Philadelphia, and its somewhat inglorious, 

1 Lafayette in the American Revolution (1895), I, 326-338. 

^ The Struggle for American Independence (190S), II, 146-148. 

^ History of the American'War (1794), I, 376-379. 



96 MILITARY STUDIES 

but successful, transfer across New Jersey to New York. To 
the absence of cavalry as a factor of efficiency in tlie patriot 
army, its escape from total destruction was then largely due. 

Why, at this advanced stage of the war, it should have been 
thus lacking is not apparent. For Trevelyan also tells us 
that when Clinton set out on his march from Philadelphia to 
New York, his army had at its disposition no less than five 
thousand horses, *' almost all of which had been collected by 
requisition or purchase, during Sir WUliam Howe's occupa- 
tion of Pennsylvania." 

To a like effect, the same excellent authority asserts 
that General Greene, Washington's quartermaster, had dur- 
ing the same period "secured a vast quantity of horses for the 
artniery and transport" of the patriot army. Pennsylvania, 
as well as Virginia, it would seem, was well supplied with 
mounts; and, with Virginia only the other side of the Po- 
tomac, troopers would naturally not have been far to seek. 

Sir Henry Clinton had now succeeded Sir William Howe. 
For good and sufficient reasons, when his position at Phila- 
delphia had become difficult as well as objectless, he decided 
to transfer himself to New York. It was in fact a withdrawal 
from a position no longer tenable. For equally satisfying 
reasons, practical as well as strategic, it was determined to 
make the transfer by a land march. When the British army 
started on its return, the movement was not unanticipated on 
the part of Washington; and it is curious in reading the 
narratives to note through incidental mentionings how very 
gradually it was that the use of mounted men in the kind of 
warfare they were then engaged in dawned on the patriot 
leaders. While, for instance, Clinton's troops passed out of 
Philadelphia and crossed the river at dawn, six hours later, 
Trevelyan tells us, a part of Major Lee's dragoons galloped 
down to the quay in time to see the English rear guard off, as 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 97 

it ferried the Delaware. To the same effect, Fisher says that 
Allan McLane with his ' ' rough riders " was the first who entered 
the town. Fisher further notes that during the Valley Forge 
winter this Allan McLane, *''a rough rider and freebooter of 
the most gallant type, had scouted between the Delaware and 
the Schuylkill, makingdashes up to the gates of the redoubts," 
which had been thrown up for the protection of Philadel- 
phia. Finally, he says that Washington during the season 
had troops between the Delaware and the Schuylkill, who, 
being rough riders and acting in small bands, obtained in- 
formation and watched the movements of the British. Pre- 
sumably there were thus attached to the patriot army the 
initial germs of such a mounted organization as the situation 
called for. It is obvious, however, it had not been organized 
on any large scale or comprehensive plan, and was not in 
such force as enabled it materially to effect subsequent 
strategic operations. 

One thing, however, stands plainly out, — undeniable. No 
military movement could possibly have been much more open 
to fatal disaster through an application of Parthian tactics 
than that march of the British army from Philadelphia to 
Sandy Hook, in June, 1778. ''When the British reached 
their second halting-place, the rain poured down for fourteen 
consecutive hours, ruining the highways, soaking the bag- 
gage, spoiling the ammunition and provisions, and drenching 
the soldiers to the skin." Under such conditions Clinton's 
progress was inordinately slow, and he ''consumed a full 
week over the first forty miles of his journey." The heat 
then became intense, and Trevelyan says that the British 
infantry, "burdened like pack horses," were preceded by a 
train of carts "a dozen miles in length and frequently com- 
pelled to travel on a single causeway." The whole country- 
side was up in arms, bent on impeding his progress ; and Sir 



98 MILITARY STUDIES 

Henry Clinton had no cavalry. All the bridges over which 
the column had to pass were broken down ; the road, such as 
it was, "was execrable, and the heat like the desert of Sa- 
hara." When the retreating army got in motion, on the 
torrid morning of the eleventh day, Trevelyan adds, "innu- 
merable carriages gradually wound themselves out of the 
meadows where they had been parked, and covered in un- 
broken file the whole of the eleven miles of highway which 
led northward from Monmouth Court House to the vUlage of 
Middletown." It was 'here that the American infantry, 
under General Charles Lee, struck the retreating column. 
Though since Washington's unhappy experience on Long 
Island in August, 1776, he had struggled through nearly two 
entire years of campaign work, at once active and disastrous, 
Charles Lee now found himself as respects mounted men and 
field intelligence almost exactly in the position of Sullivan 
before Brooklyn and on the Brandywine. It seems incred- 
ible, but so wholly without cavalry was the general in charge 
of Washington's leading division in the advance to Monmouth, 
that at seven o'clock on the evening before the battle, unable 
to get any precise information as to his enemies' whereabouts, 
Lee hurriedly wrote to Washington — " The people here are 
inconceivably stupid. I have sent two lively young foot 
men, for they have no horses, to reconnoitre." Then he 
added in a postscript, "I wish your Excellency would order 
me two or three, if they can be spared, active, well-mounted, 
light-horsemen. ' ' 

From such a revelation, it is curious to reflect on what 
might, under the general conditions of time, place, season, 
topography and movement, have been the result had the 
Americans at this stage of the war resorted to Parthian 
tactics — anticipated the methods of the Boers instead of 
constantly recurring to the traditions and practice of Marl- 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 99 

borough and Frederick, — traditions and practice wholly 
misleading in America. The military as well as historic 
truth is that, on this as on other occasions, Washington 
measured himself and his army up against his adversary at 
the point where they were strongest and he was least so. 
He opposed infantry to infantry ; oblivious of the fact that 
the British infantry were of the most perfectly organized 
kind, while his own was at best an extemporized force. 
The natural result followed. Whatever the mounted force 
under Harry Lee or Allan McLane may have been, it is ap- 
parent that it was not sufficient to cut any figure during the 
momentous movement culminating at Monmouth Court 
House. To a wagon train, eleven miles in length, the 
American cavalry offered no disturbing obstacle. To have 
stopped that train's forward movement, and, in so doing, to 
have thrown the whole column into confusion, would in our 
day have been a simple matter. But the weapon was not at 
command. It was by a margin of only five days that Clin- 
ton's army escaped heavy disaster, if not total destruction. 
Drawing inferences from this record, would it be unfair to 
conclude that two thousand of the King's Mountain rangers 
led, we will say, by Daniel Morgan, might, during those 
momentous ten days of transfer, have very potently contrib- 
uted towards then and there ending the War of Independ- 
ence? If so, there would seem to be ground for concluding 
that at that juncture of Revolutionary experiences also, as 
well as at Flatbush and on the Brandywine, economy in 
horse-keep may have cost somewhat dearly. 

''No more pitched battles were fought in the North. 
Washington never met Clinton in the field. The two com- 
manders, one impregnably intrenched in the Highlands, and 
the other impregnably intrenched in the town of New York, 
simply watched each other, from July, 1778, until September, 



100 MILITARY STUDIES 

1781, when Washington made his sudden move to Yorktown, 
Virginia." ^ 

The period of active operations which has now been passed 
in review covered almost exactly two years, from July, 1776, 
to July, 1778. During nearly the whole of that period the 
British operations were directed by Sir William Howe. 
With no natural aptitude for cavalry leadership, Howe 
had no cavalry at his command ; nor does it seem ever to 
have occurred to him that the key of the situation, so far 
as active field operations were concerned, lay in the de- 
velopment and use of that weapon in warfare. But of 
Howe and his characteristics it is not necessary here to speak. 
They are elsewhere discussed.^ Suffice it now to say that 
both as a man and a commander he was one of a class fre- 
quently met with in all military annals, but in British mili- 
tary annals perhaps a little more frequently than elsewhere. 
Lacking in initiative, he was also inert in the hour of victory, 
belonging to the '^enough-for-one-day " order of merit. Wel- 
lington's career once supplied a dramatic illustration of 
what is apt to occur when a born soldier suddenly finds 
himself at a moment of crisis subordinated to one of this 
type, — the incident eliciting from Wellington at the time 
a highly characteristic ejaculation. It was in Portugal, at 
Vimeiro, August 20, 1808, where Sir Arthur Wellesley, as he 
then was, in temporary command of the British expedition- 
ary force, met the French army of occupation under Junot. 
That day the future Duke found himself pitted for the first 
time against the soldiers of the Empire. He scored a decided 
success; and then, a born fighter with victory in his grasp, 
he was replaced in command by Sir Harry Burrard, his 
senior in commission, who had put in his appearance while 

1 Fisher, II, 207. Morgan, at this time, wrote to Washington, "You 
know the cavalry are the eyes of the infantry." ' Infra, 168-170. 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 101 

the battle was still on. Junot was in exactly the position of 
Washington after the Brandywine. By a vigorous forward 
movement Junot could be cut off from Lisbon, as Washing- 
ton from Philadelphia. Wellesley saw his opportunity. 
The French were in full retreat, and the English advance 
along the Torres Vedras road had begun ; when, suddenly, 
Burrard, assuming command, ordered all pursuit to stop. In 
vain Wellesley expostulated, saying: ''Sir Harry, now is 
your time to advance. The enemy are completely beaten. 
We shall be in Lisbon in three days." Like Howe at Flat- 
bush and again at the Brandywine, Burrard held that 
''enough had been done for one day"; and it only re- 
mained for the disgusted Wellesley to turn away, remarking 
characteristically to his aid as he did so, "Well, then, there is 
nothing for us soldiers to do here except to go and shoot red- 
legged partridges!" Judging by his own masterly dispo- 
sition and energetic pursuit of a routed enemy three years 
later at Camden (August 16, 1780), Cornwallis, at the Brandy- 
wine (September 11, 1777), must have been in much the same 
mood towards his commander as was Wellington, long after- 
wards, at Vimeiro. The flank movement conducted by him 
had been wholly successful ; taken unawares and beaten, the 
American army was in full retreat, while Philadelphia, the 
British objective eighteen miles only from them, was three and 
twenty from the main body of the Americans, driven into 
a cul-de-sac. And, under such circumstances, Cornwallis 
heard Howe order his army to discontinue pursuit. As on 
Long Island a year before, "enough had been done for that 
day." In narrating the course of British operations about 
New York under Howe, Lord Mahon exclaims (VI, 194), 
"Thus was some respite obtained for the harassed and dis- 
pirited remnant of the American army. — Oh ! for one 
hour of Clive !" Lord Clive was four years only the senior of 



102 MILITARY STUDIES 

Sir William Howe, as he was four years Gage's junior. It is 
well known historically that when, in November, 1774, Clive 
died by his own hand, the British Ministry, in view of that 
appeal to the sword towards which the disputes with the 
American colonists were then plainly tending, had planned to 
avail themselves of his services. In the outcome of either 
Flatbush or the Brandywine, Cornwallis in command would 
probably have sufficed wholly to change the course of events ; 
but it confounds the imagination to try even to conceive 
what history might have had to record had it been fated for 
Washington, in place of Major-General Thomas Gage, or 
Lieutenant-Generals Sir William Howe and Sir Henr}^ 
Clinton, to confront Robert Clive at Boston in 1775, at New 
York in 1776, on the Brandywine in 1777, or at Monmouth 
in 1778. 

After Monmouth, the seat of active Revolutionary warfare 
was transferred from the vicinity of New York and the Jer- 
seys to the Carolinas, and General Nathanael Greene, in place 
of Washington, directed operations. Before, however, 
Greene superseded Gates, one incident connected with the 
latter's southern fiasco is suggestive in the present connec- 
tion. When Gates first assumed command, some of the 
officers with experience in his new Department, especially 
Colonel White and Lieutenant-Colonel Washington, both of 
whom had commanded mounted men, pressed on his atten- 
tion the importance of that branch of the service in the coun- 
try in which he now had to operate. Gates paid no atten- 
tion to their suggestions. His indifference probably resulted 
from his experience at Saratoga where, as already pointed 
out, cavalry could, from the nature of the country and the 
conditions under which operations were conducted, perform 
no obviously important service. In his Memoirs, ''Light 
Horse Harry" Lee attributes to his neglect of the advice 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 103 

now tendered the crushing disaster which at Camden soon 
after befell Gates. ''In no country in the world," he adds, 
''were the services of the cavalry more to be desired than 
was that which was committed to Major-General Gates, and 
how it was possible for an officer of his experience to have 
been regardless of this powerful auxiliary remains inexpli- 
cable." 

It is not necessary here to enter in detail into the opera- 
tions conducted in the Carolinas between the occupation 
of Charleston by the British, in May, 1780, and their final 
evacuation of South Carolina in September, 1782. It is 
sufficient to say that, as a military study from, the cavalry 
point of view, those operations afford a striking contrast 
to what had previously taken place during an almost exactly 
similar space of time in the Northern Department. 

There was, it is true, a large royalist faction in the Caro- 
linas ; but the same element was found in almost equal pro- 
portion in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The 
horse was equally at hand in each region ; while forage was 
more plentiful in the northern than in the southern States : 
but it seemed as though both sides, simultaneously and as if 
from instinct, "caught on" in the Carolinas.^ For instance, 

1 Describing the expedition to Savannah under Clinton, Tarleton, then a 
lieutenant-colonel, says {Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, 4-6) it included 
."a powerful detachment of artillery" and "two hundred and fifty cavalry." 
It left New York on the 26th of December, 1779 ; but, encountering a 
succession of storms, the fleet was dispersed, and "most of the artillery 
and all the cavalry horses perished." On landing in Tybee harbor Tarle- 
ton "found the condition of his corps mortifying and distressing ; the horses 
of both officers and men, which had been embarked in excellent order, 
were destroyed, owing to the badness of the vessels employed to transport 
them, and, unfortunately, there was no substitute found in Georgia to 
remedy such a catastrophe." Transporting his "men and furniture" by 
boat to Port Royal Island, Tarleton proceeded "to collect at that place, 
from friends and enemies, by money or by force, all the horses belonging 
to the islands in that neighborhood." This was towards the end of Feb- 
ruary; but "about the middle of March" Tarleton received orders to 



104 MILITARY STUDIES 

Savannah surrendered on the 11th of May, 1780, and, on the 
29th of the same month, only eighteen days later, Tarleton 
had behind him seven hundred mounted men when he sur- 
prised Colonel Buford at the Waxhaws, and destroyed 
nearly his entire command. The British officer had covered 
one hundred and fifty-four miles in fifty-four hours. This 
was great cavalry work. Nothing like it was attempted, 
much less accomplished, by any of Washington's command 
in the Monmouth campaign. 

The tactics employed on both sides in the Carolina struggle 
were strikingly suggestive of those employed in South Africa 
a century and a quarter later. They were in largest part 
partisan. Irregular bodies, the men mounted on their own 
horses, called together at a moment's notice and separating 
at the will of those composing the band, harried the land, 
cut off detached parties, showed small mercy to prisoners, 
and, withal, did little in the way of effective work towards 
bringing warfare to an end. It was a process of exhaus- 
tion. Made up chiefly of eccentric partisan operations, as 
studied in the voluminous detail of McCrady's two bulky 
volumes, the narrative conveys no lesson. The one cause 

join the main command, "if he had assembled a sufficient number of 
horses to re-mount the dragoons ; the number was complete, but the 
quality was inferior to those embarked at New York." Less than a month 
later (April 12) Tarleton, with his command thus re-mounted, surprised 
General Huger at the Cooper River crossing; and "four hundred horses 
belonging to officers and dragoons, with their arms and equipments (a 
valuable acquisition for the British cavalry in their present state), fell into 
the hands of the victors. . . . This signal instance of military advantage 
may be partly attributed ... to the injudicious conduct of the American 
commander, who besides maldng a false disposition of his corps, by placing 
his caA'alry in front of the bridge during the night, and his infantry in the 
rear, neglected sending patrols in front of his \qdettes" (lb. 16, 17). Ex- 
actly one month later Charleston was surrendered, and Tarleton led his 
command, remounted in the way described, on the raid referred to in the 
text. No similar showing of energy and enterprise in the cavalry arm 
of the service had up to this time been seen on either side. 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 105 

for wonder is, how Greene, without arms, munitions, cloth- 
ing, commissariat or camp-chest, contrived to keep the 
field at all. 

As to Greene, also, it is impossible now to say whether he 
possessed in any marked degree the elements of an officer 
of cavalry. He, however, fully realized, as a result of 
experience, the immense importance of that arm of the 
service, causing him to write to Lafayette, when the latter 
was conducting operations in Virginia, the enemy "are 
increasing their cavalry by every means in their power, and 
have a greater number than we have, though not of equal 
goodness. We are trying to increase ours. Enlarge your 
cavalry or you are inevitably ruined." ^ . 

It is a curious and very noticeable fact, also, that as 
respects both the organization of cavalry and its effective 
use, the British not only seem to have taken the initiative, 
but they held their advantage up to the close of the struggle. 
In other words, whUe cavalry in the campaigns of Corn- 
wallis and Lord Rawdon acted as an adjunct in military 
operations, and was used effectively in this way, this on 
the patriot side was the case to a very limited extent only. 
All the cavalry Greene ever could depend upon as an effec- 
tive weapon in his immediate central command, were the 
comparatively insignificant organizations commanded by 
Harry Lee and Lieutenant-Colonel Washington. On the 
other hand, judging by McCrady's statements, Pickens, 
Marion, Sumter and the rest gave Greene almost as much 

' G. W. Greene, Life of General Greene, III, 320. Greene's cry for 
cavalry seems to have been loud and incessant, for, as he wrote to Wash- 
ington, November 23, 1777, during the operations about Philadelphia, 
before the army went into its winter-quarters at Valley Forge: "We are 
greatly distressed for want of a party of light-horse ;" and again, the fol- 
lowing day, "I would wish if possible some horse might be sent, as every 
army is an unwieldy body without them.'' — Ih. I, 517, 519. 



106 MILITARY STUDIES 

trouble as they rendered him assistance. He was continually- 
making futile attempts to draw them under his personal 
control for some concentrated movement ; while they, much 
older men and natives of the country, plainly more or less 
jealous of his, the Rhode Islander's, authority, acted on 
their own responsibility, obeying or neglecting to obey his 
orders much as they saw fit. 

Two conflicts, however, which occurred in the Carolinas, 
the one at King's Mountain on the 6th of October, 1780, the 
other at the Cowpens on January 17, 1781, are especially 
noticeable ; and King's Mountain offered what has since 
been admiringly referred to by the latest British investigator 
as an exploit which affords '^as fine an example as can be 
found of the power of wood-craft, marksmanship and sports- 
manship in war."^ The whole patriot force engaged was 
less than fourteen hundred strong, ^'over-mountain men," 
as they were called. Suddenly concentrated, and covering 
a considerable distance with great rapidity, "as soon as 
they arrived near the base of the spur [on which the conflict 
occurred] the riflemen all dismounted and, leaving their 
coats and blankets strapped to the saddles, tied their horses 
in the woods and with scarcely a moment's delay started on 
foot up the three easy sides of the spur." Stedman's ac- 
count of this episode is curiously suggestive : " These men 
. . . the wild and fierce inhabitants of Kentucky, and other 
settlements west of the Alleganey Mountains . . . were all 
well mounted on horseback and armed with rifles: each 
carried his own provisions in a wallet, so that no incum- 
brance of waggons, nor delays of public departments, 
impeded their movements. . . . When the different 
divisions of mountaineers reached Gilbert-town, which was 
nearly about the same time, they amounted to upwards 
* Fortescue, History of the British Army, III, 323. 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 107 

of three thousand men. From these fifteen hundred of 
the best were selected, who, mounted on fleet horses, were 
sent in pursuit." ^ 

So, three months later, at Cowpens (January 17, 1781), 
Daniel Morgan there gave evidence of the possession of all 
the attributes of a born military commander and cavalry 
leader. Making his dispositions without regard for accepted 
military rules, he availed himself in the best way possible 
of the weapons at his command. He had a small force of 
cavalry only, amounting perhaps to one hundred and fifty 
troopers. They were under the command of Harry Lee; 
and these he flung upon Tarleton's flank at the crisis of the 
action, in a manner so effective that defeat became at once 
a rout. He hurled his little band of horsemen on his oppo- 
nent, when, to use Napoleon's expression, ''the battle was 
ripe," much as a stone is flung by a slinger. One of the very 
few patriot victories of the entire war, Cowpens was alto- 
gether the most neatly, though unscientifically, fought 
battle in it. The distinctive American attributes were 
there manifest both in the commander and in his 
command. 

1 Major Patrick Ferguson of the 2d Battalion, 71st Regiment Light 
Infantry, Highlanders, an excellent and enterprising officer, commanded 
the loyalists at King's Mountain, and there lost his life. It is a curious 
and most interesting historical fact in connection with the subject of the 
present paper that Ferguson was the inventor of the first serviceable and 
practical breech-loading rifled weapon ever adopted into any service. 
Patented in England in 1776, by it "four aimed shots a minute could be 
fired, as against an average of one shot in fifteen minutes with a European 
muzzle-loading rifle after it had become foul." — Sawyer, Firearms in 
American History, 137-139. 

The only difficulty with the Ferguson breech-loader seems to have been 
that it was, as a weapon in practical European warfare, a full half century 
before its time. Even as late as our own War of Secession the West Point 
martinets and ordnance officers were wholly opposed to the adoption of 
the breech-loading weapons for use by infantry. Breech-loading cavalry 
carbines were in use. 



108 MILITARY STUDIES 

So far as Greene's operations were concerned, while most 
skilfully as well as persistently conducted, they indicated 
rather the possession by him of the attributes of an excellent 
commander of infantry than the dashing qualities of one 
either accustomed to the handling of cavalry or naturally 
inclined to it. Both Guilford Court-House and Eutaw 
Springs could have been turned from defeats, or at best 
indecisive actions, into complete victories, had he then had 
attached to his command an effective force of cavalry and, 
like Morgan, known exactly when and how to make use of it. 
Even as it was, his small body of mounted men, under com- 
mand of Lee and Washington, rendered on more than one 
occasion effective service. As to Tarleton, he proved the 
right arm, such as it was, of Cornwallis, and the raids led 
by him, both in the Carolinas and in Virginia, seem extraor- 
dinary in dash and daring. 

But when it is borne in mind that the active military 
operations of the Revolutionary period extended from the 
affairs at Lexington and Concord in April, 1775, to the fall of 
Yorktown, in October, 1781, or through more than six years 
of incessant field work, while, on the other hand, the war in 
South Africa lasted only two years, and our own War of 
Secession covered not more than four years, the slowness 
with which the patriot side realized the nature of the situa- 
tion, and learned to make the most effective use of the wea- 
pons at its command, is indisputably, to say the least, sug- 
gestive. It even gives rise to a doubt whether, after all, 
there was not some ground for the impatience at times felt 
in the Congress, and whether recourse might not well earlier 
have been had to a different, and much more effective, sys- 
tem of tactics. In any event, this phase, as yet undeveloped, 
of an interesting historical situation merits careful study on 
the part of some future investigator. 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 109 



This^ and the following paper, entitled "The Campaign of 1777," 
were originally prepared for submission to the Massachusetts 
Historical Society, and are to be found in its Proceedings. (Vol. 
XLIII, 547-593; Vol. XLIV, 13-65.) Certain facts relating to 
the reason of their preparation, and the process through which 
they assmned final shape, are there given. While appropriate 
enough in papers submitted to an historical society at its stated 
meetings, such matter, largely personal and to a certain extent 
at times colloquial, is manifestly out of place in a more formal 
publication. The two papers have, therefore, now been revised 
in this respect, and, in a manner, recast. The general reader is, 
however, always more or less careless, while the judgment of the 
specialist and investigator is apt to be affected by preconceptions 
or prejudice. In the case of these papers, misapprehensions 
would, therefore, almost surely rise in the minds of most, unless 
they read with some understanding of the purpose for which the 
studies were prepared, and the successive steps through which they 
obtained whatever they may have of both form and proportion. 

For a number of years an intermittent correspondence has been 
carried on between Sir George Otto Trevelyan and myself. More 
recently we had, when together, discussed certain phases of the 
Revolutionary struggle in connection generally with the work on 
which Sir George was engaged, and more especially with persons 
and events necessarily to be dealt with in the forthcoming por- 
tions of his unfinished history. Chancing to be in Europe during 
the autumn of 1909, I had proposed a visit to Wallington, Sir 
George's Northumberland home, for the purpose more especially 
of discussing with him the use of cavalry by Washington in his 
military operations, or rather Washington's failure to make any 
use of that arm of the service ; and this was to be discussed in 
the light of what had recently occurred in South Africa. It so 
chanced, however, that Sir George was, at just the time suggested 
for the proposed visit, leaving England for the Continent. As a 
personal meeting could, therefore, not be arranged, it was agreed 
that on my return to America I should put my suggestions in the 
form of a memorandum for Sir George's consideration. 

1 Supra, 59 n. 



110 MILITARY STUDIES 

This accordingly was presently attempted. As originally pro- 
posed, the memorandum in question it was thought might cover 
at most some eight or ten pages of typewritten letter-paper. 
When entered upon, however, the undertaking developed, and 
presently assumed almost the proportions of a treatise. I then 
concluded that the best way for it to reach its destination was 
through the medium of the Proceedings of the Massachusetts 
Historical Society. The preparation of the paper in this form 
then brought to light new material, otherwise suggestive. One 
step thus led to another, until the original brief memorandum of 
ten typewritten pages developed into five papers covering over 
one hundred and fifty of the somewhat solid printed pages of 
the Society's Proceedings. The papers in question were entitled 
(1) ''Washington and Cavalry," (2) "The Campaign of 1777," 
(3) " Contemporarj'^ Opinion of the Howes," (4) "The Weems 
Dispensation," and (5) "General Craufurd's March." In their 
original form, and with full references to the authorities made use 
of, these papers can be found in Volumes XLIII and XLIV of the 
Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society. Only the 
more essential portions are here reproduced, together with a few 
additions, and the citation of some authorities brought to light 
since the original papers were prepared. 

Obviously, the themes and events discussed are lacking in 
novelty. The story has been many times told; and, even now, 
is being retold in greater or less detail by investigators whose 
volumes are in course of preparation, or not yet come from the 
press. A justification of this reproduction must, therefore, be 
found, if, indeed, it exists, in the fact that, as I was step by step 
drawn on in my investigations, I became more and more persuaded 
of the truth of the following observation of Sydney G. Fisher, in 
his recently (1908) published work. The Real Struggle for American 
Independence : — 

"Although our Revolution is said to have changed the thought 
of the world, like the epochs of Socrates, of Christ, of the Reforma- 
tion, and of the French Revolution, yet no complete history of it 
has ever been written upon the plan of dealing frankly with all 
the contemporary evidence and withholding nothing of importance 
that is found in the original records. Our histories are able 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 111 

rhetorical efforts, enlarged Fourth of July orations, or pleasing 
literary essaj^s on selected phases of the contest. . . . 

''Although we are a democratic country, our history of the 
event which largely created our democracy has been written in the 
most undemocratic method — a method which conceals the real 
condition ; a method of paternalism which seeks to let the people 
know only such things as the writer supposes will be good for 
them ; a method whose foundation principle appears to be that 
the people cannot be trusted with the original evidence." (Preface, 
V, vi, ix.) 

In plain language the entire already much written history of 
what is known as the American Revolution, but which, as Hamil- 
ton observed over a century ago, was no revolution at all,^ but 
should more correctly be styled the War of American Indepen- 
dence, — this entire much written history needs to be, not re- 
written exactly, but written de novo. The trouble with the exist- 
ing narratives is not that those who prepared them were either 
superficial or inaccurate, or that stores of new material have been 
brought to light altering the aspect of events, or the motives which 
actuated individuals ; on both of these heads something might 
be said, but nothing affecting the main issue. The difficulty — 
and, so far as the American school of historians is concerned, it is 
radical — is that pointed out by Mr. Fisher ; and it is pervasive 
as well as radical. Our American historians have approached 
their task in neither a judicial frame of mind nor a detached spirit. 
In plain vernacular, they write under an overruling patriotism 
or hero-worshipping preconception; and their work is accord- 
ingly of the spread eagle and Fourth of July variety — this some- 
times unconsciously and from tradition, but not infrequently 
through an intentional suppression of facts, a perversion of evi- 
dence or a recourse to manifest special pleading. 

This, undeniably, is a sweeping indictment ; yet, after years 
passed in the reading of narratives and the study of the original 
material on which they are supposed to be based, to this conclu- 
sion I have, in common with Mr. Fisher, found myself compelled. 
And, such being the case, the fact, if stated at all, had best be 

1 Alexander Hamilton, by A. McLean Hamilton, 296. Massachusetts 
Historical Society Proceedings, XLIV, 233. 



112 MILITARY STUDIES 

stated in language which does not admit of misapprehension. 
Take Washington, for instance ; Washington was in reality an ex- 
tremely human man, one of a class; a high-minded, partially 
educated, Virginia country gentleman and planter of the colonial 
period. Of eminently lofty character, fair ability, and great com- 
mon-sense, he was throughout genuine — a gentleman in the 
highest sense of the term. As such, he impressed himself on all 
with whom he came in close personal contact. He stands, and 
deservedly stands, second to none, not even to William of Orange, 
in the gallery of those world-recognized as great historical figures. 
Yet as one conducting critical military operations, his limitations, 
except in the pages of the distinctive American historian, were 
great and apparent. The briUiant Hamilton, his favorite aide- 
de-camp and confidential civil adviser, even went so far as to say 
that he had no military aptitude whatever ; ^ and in this conclu- 
sion Pickering, his quarter-master-general, and Steuben, his in- 
spector-general, are known to have concurred. In the eyes of 
the American type of historian, however, the expression of such 
an opinion savors strongly of something which bears a close re- 
semblance to the questioning of the Godhead in the mind of an 
Orthodox minister of the old school, or to lese-majesty in a pres- 
ent-day German correctional court. 

Washington in reality conducted active operations in five 
campaigns, that (1) of 1775-1776 before Boston; that (2) of 1776, 
in New York and New Jersey ; that (3) of 1777, about Philadel- 
phia; that (4) of 1778, culminating at Monmouth Court House; 
and, finally, that (5) of 1781, closing at Yorktown. Of these, the 
first, the operations in and about Boston, were creditable, though 
in no wise brilliant ; but they most fortunately established Wash- 
ington's reputation, \vinning him the confidence of his countrymen. 
The operations of 1776, in New York, ill-conceived at the start, in 
their development were, in reality, little more than a succession of 
blunders which by rights should have irretrievably ruined the 
American cause: the campaign was, however, saved, if not re- 
deemed, by a brilliant final counterstroke made possible by the 
gross incapacity of the adversary. The 1777 campaign in Penn- 
sylvania was, like the 1776 campaign in New York, in judgment a 

1 Pickering, MSS. 46, 354. 



WASHINGTON AND CAVALRY 113 

mistake, and in execution disastrous ; in military parlance, a 
mess was made of it. The Monmouth campaign (1778) reflected 
no considerable credit on any one, American or British, wholly fail- 
ing of decisive results. Finally, the Yorktown campaign of 1781 
was the one real success to be set down to Washington's military 
account. Boldly, as well as brilliantly, conceived and in detail 
planned, it was carried out with prescience, judgment, skill and 
energy, and crowned by complete success. A fine design strategi- 
cally, too much praise cannot be awarded to its execution. 

Yet to-day, in the accepted rendering, there is as much need of 
a re-writing of the military record of Washington as there was of 
that of Cromwell, when Carlyle took up the theme. The former 
has, up to this time, been as much written up as the latter had 
to as late a period as 1845 been written down. Yet to-day, if an 
effort is made to discuss Washington, the Soldier, dispassionately, 
intelligently and critically — applying to his operations recognized 
strategic rules and precedents — the answer is made that Freder- 
ick, Napoleon, Lee, all made mistakes in war, so why call atten- 
tion to those of Washington ; to which the proper reply is that the 
mistakes made are in the case of each of those named pointed out, 
acknowledged and criticized. In the case of Washington, they are 
on 'the contrary by the American ''standard" historian, literary 
or school — but more especially by those writing for the young — 
ignored, palliated, or flatly denied, and that on principle and as a 
habit. 

In short, when deahng with the Revolutionary period, to make 
out America's case on every occasion has been the manifest, 
almost the avowed, purpose of the American historian. As to 
hero-worship, Lord Rosebery has recently^ found occasion, when 
referring to Thomas Carlyle, tersely to observe that it "makes 
bad history." Finally, while Dr. Johnson energetically defined 
"patriotism" as "the last refuge of a scoundrel," it might with 
equal point, and far more truth, be otherwise denominated the 
Stumbling Block of the Historian. 

1 Lord Chatham, 186. 



IV 

THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777^ 

'^When Sylla, after all his victories, styled himself a happy, 
rather than a great, general, he discovered his profound 
knowledge of the military art. Experience taught him that 
the speed of one legion, the inactivity of another, the ob- 
stinacy, the ignorance, or the treachery of a subordinate 
officer, was sufficient to mar the best concerted plan, — 
that the intervention of a shower of rain, an unexpected 
ditch, or any apparently trivial accident, might determine 
the fate of a whole army. It taught him that the vicissi- 
tudes of war are so many, disappointm.ent will attend the 
wisest combinations ; that a ruinous defeat, the work of 
chance, often closes the career of the boldest and most 
sagacious of generals; and that to judge of a commander's 
conduct by the event alone is equally unjust and unphilo- 
sophical, a refuge for vanity and ignorance." ^ 

In penning these reflections, while writing of the tragic 
outcome of Sir John Moore's Corunna campaign. Sir William 
Napier might well have added to his vicissitudes of warfare 
the good fortune of a commander who finds himself con- 
fronted with a succession of dull incompetents, or unenter- 
prising professional strategists ; and when the caliber and 
temperaments of those opposed in command to him, and 

^ A paper submitted to the Massachusetts Historical Society at its 
October meeting, 1910; and printed in its Proceedings (XLIV, 13-65.). 
See supra, 109-113. Citations of authorities can be found by reference 
to the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society. 

^ Napier, War in the Peninsula, Bk. IV, Chap. VI. 

114 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 115 

with whom only he was fated to measure himself, are taken 
into account, there may possibly be grounds for concluding 
that Washington, even more than Sylla, might have had 
cause to style '^ himself a happy, rather than a great, general." 

The names of Major-General Thomas Gage, Sir William 
Howe and Sir Henry Clinton do not readily associate them- 
selves with any considerable military achievements. Indeed, 
those who bore them are remembered only as having been 
opposed to Washington; who, again, stands out in world 
history far more conspicuously than does Sylla. And yet 
an English contemporary, writing in 1778 of the operations 
of 1777, summed the matter up by saying ''in short, I am 
of the of)inion . . . that any other General in the world 
than General Howe would have beaten General Washington ; 
and any other General in the world than General Washing- 
ton would have beaten General Howe." 

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Revolutionary 
campaign of 1777 — the third of that conflict — from a 
purely critical point of view, as distinguished from the 
points of view — partisan, patriotic or hero-cult — - from 
which it has been seen and described by the distinctively 
''standard" American historians. 

In our great Civil War the thing known as "Strategy" 
was first and last much, and not always over-wisely, dis- 
cussed; the most popular definition of the term, and the 
one generally accepted among the more practically experi- 
enced, being that attributed to the Confederate leader, 
Nathan B. Forrest. A somewhat uncouth Tennessean, 
taught, like Cromwell, in the school of practical warfare 
and actual fighting, General Forrest is reported to have 
remarked that, so far as his observation went, the essence of 
all successful strategy was simply "to get there fust, with 
most men." With all due respect, however, to General 



116 MILITARY STUDIES 

Forrest, — unquestionably a born soldier of high grade, — 
while his may be accepted as a definition so far as it goes, 
it hardly covers the whole ground. The getting 'Hhere" 
first with most men is undeniably of the essence of aU 
sound strategy; but the word 'Hhere" in this connection 
implies another word, — ^^ Where?" Put in a different 
way, there is a key to about every military situation; 
but that key has to be both found and properly made use 
of. When found and properly utilized, there is apt to result 
what in chess is known as a check, or, possibly, a check- 
mate. Strategy, therefore, is nothing more nor less than 
the art of playing, more or less skilfully, a complicated 
game of chess with a considerable, not seldom with a vast, 
area of broken country as its board, on which geographic 
points, cities and armies, are the Kings, Queens and Castles, 
while smaller commands and individual men serve as Pawns. 
In the present case, therefore, — that of the Revolutionary 
campaign of 1777, — as in every similar case, it is essential 
to any correct understanding of the game and its progress to 
describe the board, and to arrange the pieces in antagonism. 
The board of 1777 was extensive; but, for present pur- 
poses, both simple and familiar. It calls for no map to 
render it visually comprehensible. With the Canada boun- 
dary and Lake Champlain for a limit to the north, it extends 
to Chesapeake Bay on the south, — a distance of approxi- 
mately four hundred and fifty miles. Bordering on the 
ocean, this region was almost everywhere vulnerable by 
water, while its interior depth at no point exceeded two 
hundred and fifty miles, and for all practical purposes was 
limited to one hundred miles; Oswego, on Lake Ontario, 
being the farthest point from New York (250 miles) on the 
northwest, and Reading the farthest point westward (100 
miles) from the Jersey coast. Practically New York City 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 117 

was at the strategic centre, — that is, where movement was 
concerned, it was about equidistant from Albany and Fort 
Edward at one extreme, and from the capes of the Delaware 
and the head-waters of Chesapeake Bay on the other. In 
either sphere and in both directions the means of communi- 
cation and of subsistence were equally good, or equally 
inadequate or insufficient. Philadelphia, the obvious but 
unessential military objective at the south, was practically 
one hundred miles from New York; while Albany, the 
equally obvious but far more important military objective 
at the north, was one hundred and fifty miles from it. The 
average day's march of an army is fifteen miles ; by a forced 
march thirty miles or more can be covered. From New York 
as a strategic starting-point, Albany was therefore a ten 
days' march distant, while Philadelphia was three less, or a 
march of seven days. 

Such being the board on which the game of war was to be 
played, it remains to locate the pieces as they stood upon it. 
The June of 1777 was well advanced before active operations 
were begun. After the brilliant and redeeming Trenton- 
Princeton stroke with which Washington, in the Christmas 
week of that year, brought the 1776 campaign to a close. 
Sir William Howe had drawn the British invading forces 
together within the Manhattan lines, and there, comfortably 
established in winter quarters, had awaited the coming of 
spring, and the arrival of reinforcements and supplies from 
England. Washington had placed himself in a strong de- 
fensive position at Morristown, there holding together as 
best he could the remnants of an army. Nearly due west of 
the town of New York, and about twenty-five miles from 
the Jersey shore of the Hudson, Morristown was a good 
strategic point from which to operate in any direction, 
whether towards Peekskill, — the gateway to the Hudson 



118 MILITARY STUDIES 

Highlands on the road to Albany, fifty miles away, — or 
towards Trenton, forty miles off in the direction of Phila- 
delphia. When, therefore. Sir William Howe, moving with 
that inexplicable and unsoldierly deliberation always char- 
acteristic of him, began at last to bestir himself, the situa- 
tion was simple. Washington's army, some seven thousand 
strong, but being rapidly increased by the arrival of fresh 
levies, was at Morristown, waiting for Howe to disclose a 
plan of operations; General Israel Putnam, quite incompe- 
tent and with only a nominal force under his command, made 
a pretence of holding the Hudson Highlands, the stronghold 
of the patriots, in which they had stored their supplies, 
''muskets, cannon, ammunition, provisions and military 
tools and equipments of all kinds." ^ Farther north. General 
St. Clair, with some thirty-five hundred men all told, occu- 
pied the defences of Ticonderoga at the foot of Lake George, 
a strategic outpost erroneously supposed to be well-nigh 
impregnable, and hence utilized as a sort of arsenal and 
supply-depot; in point of fact, however, it was, in face of 
any skilfully directed attack, wholly untenable. Here, 
accordingly, had been collected a great number of cannon — 
some one hundred and twenty pieces — and a large amount 
of ammunition, together with a quantity of beef and flour. 
Elsewhere the patriots had nothing with which the British 
commanders would be compelled to reckon. Opposed to 
this half-organized, j^oorly armed, unclad and scattered 
musterfield gathering, numbering perhaps an aggregate of 
fifteen thousand, insufficiently supplied with artillery and 

1 Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, II, 101. In the present 
paper this work is used as the standard and for recurring reference because 
of its detailed and systematic citations. In the preface to his narrative 
(p. x) Mr. Fisher takes occasion to lament the "great mistake" made by 
the historians of our Revolution "in abandoning the good, old-fashioned 
plan of referring to the original evidence by foot-note citations." 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 119 

with no mounted auxiliary force, the British arrayed two 
distinct armies counting, together, thirty-three thousand 
effectives; eight thousand under General Burgoyne in 
Canada, and twenty-five thousand under Sir William Howe 
in and about New York. Perfectly organized and equipped, 
well disciplined and supplied, they had a sufficient artillery 
contingent, though few cavalry ; and what of mounted force 
they mustered was ill adapted to American conditions. The 
British control of the sea was undisputed, but ineffective as 
respects blockade. 

Thus, making full allowance for every conceivable draw- 
back on the part of the British, and conceding every possible 
advantage to the patriots, the outlook for the latter was, in 
the early summer of 1777, ominous in the extreme. To 
leave their opponents even a chance of winning, it was plain 
that the British commanders would have to play their game 
very badly. And they did just that ! Displaying, whether 
on land or water, an almost inconceivable incompetence, 
they lost the game, even though their opponents, beside 
failing to take advantage of their blunders, both fundamental 
and frequent, committed almost equal blunders of their 
own. 

What has in recent years come to be known as the General 
Staff was in the eighteenth century undreamed of as part 
of a military organization; but, viewed from a modern 
General-Staff standpoint, the contrast of what actually was 
done on either side in that campaign with what it is obvious 
should have been done, affords a study of no small histor- 
ical interest. Such a contrast is also one now easy to make, 
for not only is hind-sight, so called, proverbially wiser and 
more penetrating than fore-sight, but a century's perspec- 
tive lends to events and situations a proper relative pro- 
portion. That becomes clear which was at the time obscure. 



120 MILITARY STUDIES 

For instance, the merest tyro in the study of the conditions 
on which great military movements depend can now point 
out with precision and confidence the errors of policy and 
strategy for which Napoleon was responsible in 1812 and 
1813, and which lured him to destruction. What is obvious 
in the case of Napoleon less than forty years later is, of 
course, even more obvious in the case of Sir William Howe 
and General Washington in 1777. 

Coming then to the point now at issue, the military policy 
and line of strategic action Howe would have pursued had 
he, in May, 1777, firmly grasped the situation and risen to 
an equality with it, are now so manifest as to be hardly open 
to discussion; they need but to be set forth. Having a 
complete naval and a great military superiority, he would 
have sought to open from his base at New York, and se- 
curely hold, a connection with Montreal and Canada by 
way of the Hudson and Lake Champlain, thus severing his 
enemy's territory and, in great degree, paralyzing his mili- 
tary action. The means at disposal with which to accom- 
plish this result were ample, — Howe's own army, twenty- 
five thousand strong at New York, moving north on the 
easy line of the Hudson, could, cooperating with the fleet, 
easily open the route, while a naval support would insure 
the invading column constant and ample supplies. In 
close contact with an open and navigable river, there 
need be no fear of a repetition of the tactics of Concord 
and Lexington. Beyond any question. Sir William, lean- 
ing on Lord Howe's arm as he advanced on this line, 
would be able to connect with the army of Burgoyne, 
eight thousand strong, moving down from Montreal. 
His single other military objective would then be the 
patriot army under Washington, in every respect inferior 
to the force at Howe's own disposal; and this army it 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 121 

would be his aim to bring to the issue of pitched battle on 
almost any terms, with a view to its total destruction or 
dispersal. If he succeeded in so doing, the struggle would 
be ended, he holding the dividing strategic line of the 
Hudson ; if, however, he failed to get at and destroy Wash- 
ington's army, he would still hold the line of the Hudson, 
and the navy under Lord Howe then seizing for permanent 
occupation Wilmington, at the mouth of the Delaware, 
and Hampton Roads on the Chesaj^eake, the brothers 
Howe could securely depend on the blockade ^ and the 
gradual securing of other strategic points to bring to their 
opponent sure death through inanition, — or, in the language 
of General Charles Lee in the ''Plan" of operations prepared 
by him during his New York captivity, and then submitted 
to Howe, would "unhinge and dissolve the whole system 
of [patriot] defence." ^ Such a strategy, in pursuance of a 

1 The crushing influence of an effective blockade on the revolted Prov- 
inces was at the time forcibly set forth by the Philadelphia renegade 
and exiled loyalist, Joseph Galloway, in his pamphlet entitled "A Letter 
to the Right Honorable Lord Viscount H — e, on His Naval Conduct in 
the American War," London, 1779. Galloway shows that the naval 
force put at Lord Howe's disposal was more than ample for an effective 
blockade ; that to establish and maintain such a blockade was wholly 
practicable ; and, finally, that had one been thus established and main- 
tained, "the whole commerce of the revolted Colonies must have ceased. 
Their army and navy must have been ruined, from the utter impractica- 
biUty of procuring for them the necessary provisions, clothing and sup- 
plies. Their produce must have perished on their hands." Salt, for 
instance, was almost wholly imported. In Philadelphia " this commod- 
ity, which before the rebellion was commonly bought for 15 to 20 pence 
now (1776-77) sold from £15 to £20 in currency of the same value." 

2 N. Y. Hist. Soc, Lee Papers, IV, 408. The story of this traitorous 
"plan" of Charles Lee is told by George H. Moore, and can be found in 
New York Historical Society Collections, 1874, vol. IV, p. 406. Fisher 
refers to it as " a plan of no military merit " (ii, 76) ; but on what groimd 
he thus condemned it is not apparent. There is, on the contrary, reason 
for concluding that it was based on a thorough and correct understanding 
of existing conditions, and evinced a clear strategic insight. Speaking 
of the course of events at that time, Hamilton, in a conversation with 



122 MILITARY STUDIES 

policy at once aggressive and passive, was not only safe, 
but obvious. Secure in control of the sea, Howe had but 
to divide his opponent's territory, and then destroy his 
army or starve it out. 

The policy and strategy to be adopted and pursued by the 
Patriots were, on the other hand, hardly less plain. With 
no foothold at all on the sea, except through a sort of mari- 
time letter-of-marque militia, on land they were hopelessly 
outclassed, — outclassed in numbers, in organization, in 
weapons, in discipline, and in every form and description of 
equipment. They had three things only in their favor: 
(1) space, (2) time, and (3) interior lines of communication, 
implying mobility. In any pitched battle they would 
necessarily take the chances heavily against themselves. 
Their manifest policy was, therefore, to fight only in posi- 
tions of their own choosing and with every advantage on 
their side, striking as opportunity offered with their whole 
concentrated strength on an enemy necessarily more or less 
detached, and his detachments beyond supporting distance 
of each other. Put in simpler form, and drawing examples 
from actual experience, Bunker Hill, Lexington and Concord 
pointed the way so far as policy and positions were con- 
cerned, and Princeton and Trenton perfectly illustrated 
the system of harassing and destroying segregated detach- 
ments. On the other hand, the bitter lessons received on 
Long Island and in and about Manhattan in 1776 should have 

Pontigibaud about the year 1792, remarked — "All the English need 
have done was to blockade our ports with twenty-five frigates and ten 
ships of the line. But, thank God, they did nothing of the sort." (Allen 
McLane Hamilton, Hamilton, 295.) This, Charles Lee at the time dis- 
tinctly saw, and counselled Sir William Howe accordingly. The utter 
failure of the two Howes to avail themselves of the sea power by insti- 
tuting a rigid blockade of the Chesapeake and Delaware bays can be 
explained only on grounds of professional incapacity. They neither of 
them knew how to make effective use of the weapons at their command. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 123 

taught the patriot leaders that, face to face in ordered 
battle, their half -equipped, undisciplined levies, when op- 
posed to the European mercenaries, stood just about the 
chance of a rustic plough-boy if pitted in a twelve-foot 
ring against a trained prize fighter. It was challenging 
defeat. 

Such, as is now apparent, being the manifest and indis- 
putable conditions under which each party moved, and 
must win or lose the game or in it hold its own, it possibly 
is not passing a too sweeping criticism to say that every one 
of these conditions was either ignored or disregarded equally, 
and on both sides, throughout that momentous campaign. 
In other words, British or Patriot, it was a campaign of 
consecutive and sustained blundering. The leisurely fashion 
in which it was opened has already been referred to. Wash- 
ington, holding together with difficulty what was hardly 
more than a skeleton organization, remained prudently 
in his lines at Morristown. There, his army as a military 
objective was apparently within Howe's grasp all through 
the months of April and May, — practically at his mercy. 
It could easily have been manoeuvred out of its positions, 
and dispersed or sent on its wanderings; it continued to 
hold together only so long as its antagonist failed to avail 
himself of his superiority and the situation. Howe, mean- 
while, in his usual time-killing way, was perfecting his 
arrangements in New York; Burgoyne, at Montreal, was 
similarly engaged. Not until May was well advanced, and 
what is for that region some of the best campaigning weather 
in the whole year was over, did Washington voluntarily 
emerge from his winter-quarters, and, so to speak, look about 
to see what his opponent might be up to ; for, that he must 
be up to something, seemed only likely. That opponent 
had, however, apparently not yet roused himself from his 



124 MILITARY STUDIES 

winter's lethargy, and it was not until June was half over 
that he at last gave signs of active life. Burgoyne at the 
same time (June 17) moved on his path towards Ticonderoga, 
the first stage in his march to Albany. Now was Howe's 
opportunity. It dangled before his eyes, plain and unmis- 
takable. Washington's army should have been his objec- 
tive. Only seven thousand strong, Howe could oppose 
twenty thousand to it either for direct attack or purposes of 
manoeuvre. Washington's army disposed of or held off, 
Howe, following the dictates of simple common sense, would 
then have turned his face northwards, and marched, prac- 
tically unopposed, to Albany, by way of Peekskill. Co- 
operating with the British fleet, Clinton four months later 
did this with four thousand men only; capturing on his 
way "vast supplies of muskets, cannon, ammunition, pro- 
visions and military tools and equipments of all kinds which 
the patriots had stored in their great stronghold," the 
Hudson Highlands. Howe thus wholly failed to avail 
himself of what was obviously the opportunity of a good 
soldier's lifetime. Both what he did do and what he failed 
to do were and remain enigmas to both friends and foes. As 
a strategic operation it resembled nothing so much as the 
traditional and familiar movement of the unspecified King 
of France. Howe marched his twice ten thousand men over 
into New Jersey ; and then marched them back again. 
Well might Stedman afterwards plaintively ask: "Why did 
he not march round either on the North or South to the rear 
of that enemy, where he might have been assaulted without 
any other hazard than such as must, in the common course 
of war, be unavoidably incurred?" ^ The query to this day 
remains unanswered ; but, certainly, the British commander 
did not then make any considerable effort to bring matters 
* History of the American War, I, 288. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 125 

"to the issue of pitched battle on almost any terms." 
When, shortly after, severely criticised for his conduct, Howe 
simply said: '"I did not think it advisable to lose so much 
time as must have been employed upon that march during 
the intense heat of the season." The march in question 
could not very well have been made to cover much more 
than fifty miles; though it might have implied some dis- 
comfort from heat and dust. Washington was wholly 
unable to account for his opponent's proceedings ; those who 
participated in the subsequent midsummer marchings and 
fightings of our Civil War have been unable to account for 
them since. Howe's explanation was puerile. 

This military ^^fooling" over, Howe next evacuated New 
Jersey altogether, leaving the astonished Washington and 
his army free to go where they liked and to do what they 
pleased, quite unmolested; but, instead of turning his face 
north, and marching up to meet Burgoyne, thus making 
secure the Hudson line of communication with Canada, the 
British commander next shipped his army on a mighty fleet 
of transports, gathered in New York Bay, and, after idly 
lingering there some precious weeks, sailed away with it 
into space. The contemporary verdict on these perform- 
ances was thus expressed by a participant, in language 
none too strong : — 

" In the spring and summer it is impossible for the mind of man 
to conceive the gloom and resentment of the army, on the retreat 
from the Jerseys, and the shipping them to the southward : nothing 
but being present and seeing the countenances of the soldiers, could 
give an impression adequate to the scene ; or paint the astonish- 
ment and despair that reigned in New York, when it was found 
that the North River was deserted, and Burgoyne's army 
abandoned to its fate. All the former opportunities lost through 
indolence or rejected through design, appeared innocent when com- 
pared with this fatal movement. The ruinous and dreadful con- 



126 MILITARY STUDIES 

sequences were instantly foreseen and foretold ; and despondence 
or execration filled every mouth. 

" Had there been no Canada army to desert or to sacrifice, the 
voyage to the southward could only originate from the most pro- 
found ignorance or imbecility." ^ 

Disappearing from sight on the 24th of July, on the 30th 
the British armament was reported as being off the entrance 
of the Delaware River; again vanishing, not until the 21st of 
August did it at last make its appearance in the Chesapeake. 
Howe's objective then was apparent. He was moving on 
Philadelphia, — the town in which the Congress was hold- 
ing its sittings, — the seat of Government, — the Capital of 
the provinces in rebellion ! 

As a move on the strategic chess-board this further pro- 
ceeding on the part of Sir William was at the time incompre- 
hensible ; nor has it since been accounted for. Had he 
marched to Philadelphia overland (ninety miles), he would 
at least have relieved Burgoyne by keeping Washington's 
entire available force occupied ; possibly he might have 
brought on a pitched battle in which every chance would 
have been in his favor. He would also have been free at any 
moment to countermarch north, with or without a battle. 
Electing to go by sea, when he got into Delaware Bay the 
Admiral in command of the fleet apparently bethought 
himself of Sir Peter Parker's dismal experience before 
Charleston just a year before, and did not like to face on a 
river water-front the guns of the several forts below the 

^ View of the Evidence relative to the Conduct of the American War under 
Sir William Howe, etc., 152. 

" Sir Henry Clinton, in his manuscript notes to Stedman's American War, 
says, ' I owe it to truth to say there was not, I believe, a man in the army, 
except Lord Cornwallis and General Grant, who did not reprobate the 
move to the Southward, and see the necessity of a co-operation with Gen- 
eral Burgoyne.'" — Fisher, II, 71. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 127 

town covering obstructions in the channel ; ^ so, instead of 
landing his army at Wilmington, and proceeding thence to 
Philadelphia, Howe had recourse to another of those flank- 
ing movements to which, after his Bunker Hill frontal experi- 
ment, he always showed himself addicted. The front door 
to Philadelphia being closed, he made for the back door, 
sailing south around Cape Charles and up Chesapeake Bay 
to what was known as the Head of Elk, close to Havre de 
Grace, some fifty miles southwest of Philadelphia; Wil- 
mington being at that time not only wholly unprotected 
and perfectly accessible, but lying on the Delaware almost 
exactly half the distance from Philadelphia to the Head of 
Elk, and, as every one making a trip from New York to 
Washington now knows, on the direct road between the 
two first-mentioned points. By this move, very cunning of 
its kind, Sir William Howe, unquestionably, though in 
most unaccountable fashion, flanked the defences of his 
objective point, which now lay at his mercy; but the^ move 
had taken him as far away from the line of the Hudson as he 
could conveniently and comfortably, at that hot season of 
the year, arrange to get, and had consumed four weeks of 
precious time. But, with Sir William Howe, time was never 
of moment ! Such a thing is not to be suggested, and, in 
the case of Sir William Howe, is inconceivable, but had he 
deliberately and in cold blood designed the ruin of Burgoyne, 
— as was, indeed, charged by his more hostile critics, — he 
would not have done other than he did. He not only took 
himself off and out of the way, but, by hovering in sight of 
the mouth of Delaware Bay and then sailing southward, he 
gave Washington the broadest of hints that he need appre- 
hend no interference on Howe's part with any northward 

^ On this point see the passage and note in J. W. Fortescue's History of 
the British Army, III, 212. 



128 MILITARY STUDIES 

movement the patriots might see fit to decide upon. Theirs 
was the chance ! The blunder — for disloyalty and treach- 
ery, though at the time suspected, are not gravely alleged — 
the blunder of which the British general had now been guilty 
was, in short, gross and manifest; so gross and manifest, 
indeed, that it could only be retrieved by a blunder of equal 
magnitude on the part of his adversary. This followed in 
due time ; meanwhile, Howe, wholly losing sight of his 
proper immediate objective, — Washington's army, — had 
moved away from the sphere of vital operations, — the 
severance of New England from New York and the Middle 
Provinces, — and made himself and the force under him 
practically negligible quantities for the time being. Off 
the board, he was out of the game. 

Even now, any plausible explanation of Howe's course at 
this time must be looked for in the mental make-up and 
physical inclinations of the man. Of him and them, as 
revealed in the record, something will be said later on in this 
paper. It is sufficient here to observe that if, as held from 
the beginning of time, it is one of the distinctive traits of a 
great soldier to read the mind of an opponent so truly as to 
be able immediately to forecast his line of conduct, Wash- 
ington now certainly did not evince a conspicuous posses- 
sion of that particular trait. 

The explanation, at once most plausible and most chari- 
table, of Howe's performance is that, during the winter of 
1776-77, he had conceived an exaggerated and wholly erro- 
neous idea of the importance of the possession of Philadelphia 
as a moral as well as strategic factor in the struggle the con- 
duct of which had been entrusted to him. There were, in- 
deed, good grounds for believing that a large and influential 
element in the population of the middle provinces — New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania and Maryland — were distinctly of 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 129 

loyalist proclivity, and that they only needed countenance 
and protection to assert themselves. Doubtless also Howe 
counted largely on his own personal magnetism and kindli- 
ness of temper, as elements of political conciliation. He 
then, in his military operations, proceeded to discard every 
sound strategic rule and consideration in favor of moral effect 
and social influence. He also seems to have looked on Phila- 
delphia as if it had been a Paris or a Berlin or a Vienna ; and 
he recalled the vital importance of those capitals in the wars 
of Marlborough and Frederick, — the legendary past of the 
British army. He was accordingly under an obsession ; pos- 
sessed by what was from a strictly military point of view a 
pure delusion. Thirty-five years later one infinitely greater 
than Howe suffered in the same way, but with results far 
more serious. In his work. How England saved Eur'ope, 
W. H. Fitchett says (IV, 81) of Napoleon's Russian cam- 
paign, ''Russia, like Spain, to quote Professor Sloane, 'had 
the strength of low organisms.' Its vitality was not centred 
in a single organ. It could lose a capital and survive." If 
this was true of Russia, as Napoleon in 1812 to his cost found, 
it was yet more true of the American federated States in 
1777; for, practically, in Revolutionary warfare Philadelphia 
in itself, in that respect wholly unlike Albany, was of no 
more strategic importance than an}^ other considerable town. 
When, therefore, Howe carried off the bulk and flower of 
the army of British invasion and set it down in Philadelphia, 
he made as false a move as was possible in the game assigned 
him to play. 

It then remained for his opponent to avail himself of the 
great and unlooked-for opportunity thus offered him, — to 
call a check in the game, possibly even a checkmate. This 
Washington wholly failed to do ; on the contrary, he actually 
played his opponent's game for him, redeeming Howe's blun- 



130 MILITARY STUDIES 

ders by the commitment of blunders of his own, fortunately 
less fatal in their effect, though scarcely in nature less gross. 
When Howe, after disappearing with his armament below the 
sea-line on the 24th of July, reappeared off the mouth of the 
Delaware on the 30th of the month, and his general objective 
thus became obvious, the relation to each other, and to the 
game, of the remaining pieces on the military chess-board 
would seem to have been plain. No matter where Howe now 
went, it was settled that he was not going up the Hudson. 
That made clear, he might go where he pleased. Using a 
shallow artifice, he tried to induce Washington to think he 
was going to Boston, thence to make a juncture with Bur- 
goyne. " Silly " is the only term to apply to such a weak 
invention of the enemy. ^ Why go to Boston to march over- 
land to Albany, when the shorter way by the Hudson lay 
open before him? Had he really proposed so to do, W^ash- 
ington might pleasantly have bade him God-speed, and 
pointed out that his best route lay through Lexington and 
Concord, or, possibly, up Bennington way. Under condi- 
tions similar to those then confronting Washington, it is 
not difficult to imagine the nervous energy or ''stern con- 
tentment" with which Frederick or Wellington, or still more 
Napoleon, with his ''tiger spring," would have contemplated 
the arrangement of the strategic board. The game would 
have been thrown into their hands. His opponent had 
hopelessly divided his forces beyond the possibility of 
effective mutual support, and Washington held the interior 
line. On which of the three should he pounce? And this 
question seemed to answer itself. Howe was not only too 
strong for successful attack, but, for every immediate 
strategic purpose, he had made of himself a negligible quan- 
tity. Placed where he had put himself, or plainly proposed 
1 Irving, Washington (Geoffrey Crayon ed.), Ill, 164. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 131 

to put himself, he could not greatly affect results. Clinton, 
at New York, was equally negligible; for, while the force 

— some six thousand men — left there with him by Howe 
was not sufficient properly to man the defences, much less 
to assume a dangerous aggressive, the place was secure under 
the protection of the British fleet. There was no victim 
in that quarter ripe just yet for sacrifice. There re- 
mained Burgoyne. He could incontinently be wiped from 
off the face of the earth, or, to speak more correctly, re- 
moved from the chess-board. That done, and done quickly ; 
then — the next ! 

Extrication by retreat was now no longer possible; Bur- 
goyne was hopelessly entangled. His bridges were burned ; 
he had to get through to Albany, and thence to New York, 
with destruction as his sole alternative. Six weeks before 
(June 17) he had set out on his southward movement, four 
days after Howe had crossed from New York into New 
Jersey for his "two weeks' fooling." On the 5th of July 
Burgoyne occupied Ticonderoga; on that day Howe, his 
''two weeks' fooling" over, was loading his army on the 
transports anchored in New York Bay, and Washington was 
observing him in a state of complete and altogether excus- 
able mental bepuzzlement. What move on the board had 
the man in mind? Clearly, his true move would be up the 
Hudson ; but why load an army — foot, horse and artillery 

— on ocean transports to sail up the Hudson ? The idea 
was absurd. But, if Albany was not Howe's destination, 
what other destination had he in mind ? At length, July 24, 
he put to sea, — disappeared in space. In the interval Bur- 
goyne had made his irretrievable mistake. Hitherto his 
movement had been in every respect most successful. Win- 
ning victories, capturing strongholds and supplies, he had 
swept on, forcing the great northern barrier. He had now 



132 MILITARY STUDIES 

the choice of two routes to Albany. He could go by water 
to the head of Lake George on his way to Fort Edward, 
capture it and in ten days be in Albany; or he could try to 
get there by constructing a military road through the woods. 
He elected the latter, plunging into "a half- wilderness, 
rough country of creeks, marshes and woodland trails." 
Beside removing obstructions and repairing old bridges, he 
had to build forty new; and one of these ''was a causeway 
two miles long across a swamp." ^ To withdraw was now 
impossible ; the victim was nearing the sacrificial spot. He 
occupied the hastily evacuated Fort Edward on the 30th of 
July. On that same day ''the people living at Cape Hen- 
lopen, at the entrance of Delaware Bay, saw the ocean 
covered with a vast fleet of nearly three hundred transports 
and men-of war." It was Howe's armament. He was not 
bound for Albany ! From that moment, strategically and 
for immediate purposes, he was for Washington as if he did 
not exist. He might go where he willed to go ; he was out- 
side of the present field of vital operation, — clean off the 
chess-board. 

Did Washington see his opportunity, and quickly avail 
himself of it, Burgoyne was now lost — hopelessly lost. He 
might indeed get to Albany ; but Washington could get there 
"fust with most men." Washington had now twelve thou- 
sand men. A large portion of them were militia, and the 
militia were notoriously unreliable whether on the march or 
in battle ; as Washington expressed it, under fire they were 
"afraid of their own shadows"; and so, teaching them how 
to cover the ground rapidly and well was mere waste of time. 
They would, of course, have had to be left behind to occupy 
the attention of the enemy. There would remain probably 
some eight thousand marching and fighting effectives. 
1 Fisher, II, 65 ; Trevelyan, Pt. Ill, 123. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 133 

Schuyler had forty-four hundred men with him when (July 
30) he abandoned Fort Edward ; and the militia were pour- 
ing in. A month later Gates, who relieved Schuyler in com- 
mand, had seven thousand. Here was a force fifteen thou- 
sand strong, if once united, and Burgoyne, when he emerged 
from the wilderness, could muster less than five thousand. 
It was the opportunity of a lifetime ; unfortunately, Wash- 
ington did not so see it, failed to take full advantage of it. 
Instead, he again had recourse to those halfway measures 
always in warfare so dangerous.^ 

The possibility of such a move on the part of his adver- 
sary had indeed occurred to Howe, and, apparently, to him 
only; so, just before sailing from New York, he wrote to 
Burgoyne, congratulating him on his occupation of Ticon- 
deroga (July 5), and added: ''Washington is awaiting our 
motions here, and has detached Sullivan with about twenty- 
five hundred men, as I learn, to Albany. My intention is 
for Pennsylvania, where I expect to meet Washington ; but 
if he goes to the northward, contrary to my expectations, 
and you can keep him at bay, be assured I shall soon be after 
him to relieve you." ^ The letter containing this extraor- 
dinary assurance of support did not reach Burgoyne until 
the middle of September. It lends a touch of the grotesque 
to the situation. Three weeks before Howe's missive 
reached Burgoyne, Washington might with perfect ease have 
effected a junction of his own army with that under Schuy- 
ler, and crushed Burgoyne. 

That, as Commander-in-Chief, Washington had ample 
authority to undertake such a diversion without previously 
consulting Congress or obtaining its consent thereto, did not 
admit of doubt. The question had already been raised, and 

1 Supra, 51. 

2 Fiske, The American Revolution, I, 308. 



134 MILITARY STUDIES 

it had once for all been settled; '^all the American forces 
were under his command, whether regular troops or volun- 
teers, and he was invested with full powers to act for the 
good of the service in every part of the country." The 
conditions were now exactly those prefigured by Charles 
Lee the year before at Boston, when he said to Washington : 
''Your situation is such that the salvation of the whole 
depends on your striking, at certain crises, vigorous strokes, 
without previously communicating your intention." ^ 

When Howe was descried at the mouth of the Delaware 
(July 30), Washington was still in central New Jersey, in the 
neighborhood of the Raritan. Clinton, in New York, was 
looking for reenforcements, which did not reach him until 
October. Powerless for aggression, he could be safely dis- 
regarded. Albany was only one hundred and fifty miles 
away; if taken leisurely, a pleasant ten days' summer 
march. It was a mere question of shoe leather; and, in all 
successful warfare, shoes are indeed a prime factor. So 
much is this the case that when, some thirty-five years later, 
Wellington, attending to every detail which contributed to 
the effectiveness of his army, was preparing for that final 
campaign in the Peninsula which culminated one month 
later in the complete overthrow of the French under King 
Joseph, directed and dry-nursed by Marshal Jourdan, at 
Vittoria, it was prescribed that every British infantry soldier 
should carry in his knapsack three pairs of shoes, with an 
extra pair of spare soles and heels. Such an ample provision 
of foot-wear would in the summer of 1777 have probably 
been beyond the reach of Washington's Quartermaster- 
General ; but, shortly before, shoes sufficient, it is said, for 
twenty-five thousand troops had arrived safely at Ports- 
mouth, sent out with other munitions of war by French 
1 N. Y. Hist. Soc, Lee Papers, IV, 262. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 135 

sympathizers. New England, moreover, was then a com- 
munity of cordwainers, and the coarse cowhide foot-wear of 
the period could, if called for, have hardly failed somehow 
to be forthcoming. In any event, the march of one hundred 
and twenty-five miles towards Chesapeake Bay actually 
made at that time was in degree only less destructive of sole 
leather than one twenty-five miles longer to Albany. As to 
the operation from any other point of view, it was exactly 
the experience and discipline the patriot army stood most 
in need of. As every one who has had any experience in 
actual warfare knows, there is nothing which so contributes 
to the health, morale and discipline of an army as steady 
and unopposed marching over long distances. In our own 
more recent experience Sherman's famous movements 
through Georgia and the Carolinas afforded convincing illus- 
tration of this military truism. Nothing, on the other hand, 
is so bad for the morale and physical health of a military 
force, especially one hastily levied, as long hot-weather tarry- 
ing in any one locality. For instance, at the very time now 
under consideration, while Washington was waiting near the 
Falls of the Schuylkill for Howe's movement to reveal itself, 
we are told that the sanitary arrangements of the patriots 
were ''particularly unfortunate," and in the "hot August 
weather a most horrible stench rose all round their camp." 
Had Washington, straining on the leash, broken camp and 
set his columns in motion for Peekskill on the Hudson during 
the first week in August, by the 20th of a month of easy 
marches he would have joined Schuyler, and the united 
armies, fifteen thousand strong, would have been on top of 
Burgoyne. At that time Gates had not yet assumed com- 
mand of the Northern Department. Lincoln and Stark were 
wrangling; and Schuyler was issuing orders which both re- 
fused or neglected to obey. The battle at Bennington was 



136 MILITARY STUDIES 

fought on August 14. Out-flanked, surrounded, crushed by 
an overwhelming superiority of force, his enemy flushed with 
victory, Burgoyne's camp everywhere searched day and 
night by rifle-bullets, while cannon-balls hurtled through the 
air, a week at most would have sufficed ; the British com- 
mander would have had to choose between surrender and 
destruction. The combination and catastrophe of Ulm 
thirty-eight years later, might, on a smaller scale and in a 
different field, have been anticipated ; but with results not 
less decisive. Events would thus have been precipitated 
seven weeks, and the early days of September might have 
seen Washington moving south on his interior lines at the 
head of a united army, flushed with success and full of con- 
fidence in itself and its leader. Rich in the spoils of Bur- 
goyne, it would also have been a force well armed and 
equipped, especially strong in artillery; for, indeed, even at 
this interval of more than a century and a quarter of time, 
it leads to something closely resembling a watering of the 
American eyes and mouth to read at once the account of 
the parade of Washington's so-called army through Phila- 
delphia on its way to the Brandywine during the latter da3^s 
of August, 1777, and the schedule of the impedimenta 
turned over by the vanquished to the victors at Saratoga 
fifty days later. Of the first Fisher says (II, 19) : '' The 
greatest pains were taken with this parade. Earnest appeals 
were made to the troops to keep in step and avoid strag- 
gling. ... To give some uniformity to the motley hunting- 
shirts, bare feet, and rags, every man wore a green sprig in 
his hat. . . . But they all looked like fighting men as 
they marched by to destroy Howe's prospects of a winter in 
Philadelphia." This authority then unconsciously touches 
the heart of the strategic blunder in that march being per- 
petrated by adding : ''With the policy Howe was persistently 



,THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 137 

pursuing, it might have been just as well to offer no obstacle 
to his taking Philadelphia. He merely intended to pass the 
winter there as he had done in Boston and New York." 
Mr. Fisher does not add that this half-organized, half- 
armed, half-clad, undisciplined body twelve thousand strong 
was on its way to measure itself in pitched battle against 
eighteen thousand veterans, British and German, perfectly 
organized, equipped and disciplined, in an effort doomed in 
advance to failure, — an effort to protect from hostile occu- 
pation a town of not the slightest strategic importance ! It 
was in truth a very sad spectacle, that empty Philadelphia 
parade of victims on the way through a dark valley of 
death and defeat to Valley Forge as a destination. The 
cold, hard military truth is that the flower of that force — 
eight thousand of the best of the twelve thousand should 
then have been at Saratoga, dividing among themselves the 
contents of Burgoyne's army train — ^'a rich prize," con- 
sisting, as Trevelyan enumerates, almost exclusively of 
articles which the captors specially needed. ''There were 
five thousand muskets, seventy thousand rounds of ball- 
cartridges, many ammunition wagons, four hundred sets of 
harness, and a fine train of brass artillery, — battering guns, 
field guns, howitzers, and mortars ; — forty-two pieces of 
ordnance in all." This surrender actually occurred on 
October 18 ; it might equally well have been forced in early 
September, and the united, victorious and seasoned army 
which compelled it might on the 8th of that month — • the 
day Howe landed at the Head of Elk on Chesapeake Bay 
— have been hurrying forward, well advanced on its way 
back to confront him. 

That Washington had at this juncture no realizing sense, 
or indeed any conception of that fundamental strategic 
proposition of Frederick and Napoleon — the value and 



138 MILITARY STUDIES 

effectiveness in warfare of concentration and mobility 
through utilizing interior lines against a segregated enemy 
— was now made very manifest. For a time it was sup- 
posed that the far-wandering and elusive British armament 
might have Charleston for its destination. The Congress 
now (August 1) conferred on Washington plenary po*wers 
as to the Northern Department. Instead of acting on this 
empowerment instantly and decisively, in the way the situa- 
tion called for, Washington excused himself on the singular 
ground that the situation in the Northern Department was 
''delicate" and might involve ''interesting consequences." 
He then called a council of war to advise on the general 
strategic situation and the line of action best calculated to 
meet it. Assuming that Howe's objective was Charleston, 
the council decided in favor of a movement toward the 
Hudson. As such a "movement might involve the most 
important consequences," Washington, instead of acting, 
sent a letter to the President of Congress, requesting the 
"opinion of that body." Congress gave the seal of its ap- 
proval to the conclusion of the council. When every one 
had thus been consulted and all possible advice solicited and 
received, the northward movement was initiated. But at 
just that juncture Howe appeared in the Chesapeake. That 
Philadelphia was his objective now became certain ; and 
immediately the northern movement was countermanded. 
The grounds on which it was countermanded were thus set 
forth by Washington himself: "The state of affairs in this 
quarter will not admit of it. It would be the height of im- 
policy to weaken ourselves too much here, in order to in- 
crease our strength [in the Northern Department] ; and it 
must certainly be considered more difficult, as well as of 
greater moment, to control the main army of the enemy, 
than an inferior, and, I may say, a dependent one ; for it is 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 139 

pretty obvious that if General Howe can be kept at bay, 
and prevented from effecting his purpose, the successes of 
General Burgoyne, whatever they may be, must be partial 
and temporary." In other words, the advantages of con- 
centration were to be ignored, and no use made of time and 
interior lines in the striking of blows, — now here, now 
there. It is quite safe to say that neither Frederick, twenty 
years before, nor Napoleon, twenty years later, would have 
viewed that particular situation in that way. They, with 
all their strength concentrated in one solid mass, would have 
struck Burgoyne first, and then Howe. They would hardly 
have weakened themselves by sending Morgan to help ''hold 
Burgoyne at bay " ; and then insured the loss of Philadelphia, a 
thing in itself of no consequence, by confronting Howe with half 
of an army, which, as a whole, was insufficient for the work. 

As Irving shows with a delightful naivete, the significance 
of which Fiske wholly failed to appreciate, ''Washington 
was thus in a manner carrying on two games at once, with 
Howe on the seaboard and with Burgoyne on the upper 
waters of the Hudson, and endeavoring by a skilful move- 
ment to give check to both. It was an arduous and compli- 
cated task, especially with his scanty and fluctuating means, 
and the wide extent of country and great distances over 
which he had to move his men." ^ To attempt to carry on 
"two games at once" on the chess-board of war, especially 
with "scanty and fluctuating means," is a somewhat peril- 
ous experiment, and one rarely attempted by the great 
masters of the art. But, with Sir William Howe for an 
opponent, almost any degree of skill would suffice ; opposite 
him at the board blundering did not count. 

In the next place, the extreme slowness of movement 
which characterized all the operations of this campaign, 
1 Washington (Geoffrey Crayon ed.), Ill, 180-181, Chap. XIII. 



140 MILITARY STUDIES 

whether British or patriot, is by no means their least notice- 
able feature. Neither side seems to have known how to 
march in the Napoleonic or Wellingtonian sense of the term, 
or as the grenadiers of Frederick covered space. Phila- 
delphia, for instance, was only ninety measured miles from 
New York; it was Howe's objective, by way of the Head of 
Elk, Taking twenty-eight days (July 24-August 21) to get 
to the Head of Elk, Howe then spent nine more days in 
landing his army and setting it in motion ; finally, having 
won a complete victory on the Brandywine on the 11th of 
September, it was not until September 26 that he occupied 
Philadelphia, only some twenty miles away from his suc- 
cessful battle-field. In all sixty-five days had been con- 
sumed in the process of getting into Philadelphia from New 
York. On the other hand, the patriot movements were no 
more expeditious. In sending reenforcements to Gates, 
Morgan, then at Trenton, received from Washington orders 
to move north, August 16; the distance to be covered was 
approximately two hundred miles, and the riflemen did it at 
the rate of ten miles a day. Reporting to Gates, September 
7, Morgan was actively conspicuous in the subsequent opera- 
tions, which dragged on through forty days. Burgoyne 
capitulated October 17, and Washington was then in sore 
straits after Germantown (October 4) ; but not until No- 
vember 1 did Morgan even receive his orders to return, and 
it was eighteen days more before he at last reported back at 
Whitemarsh; having, quite unopposed and under pressing 
orders for haste, covered some two hundred and fifty miles 
in eighteen days — an average of fourteen miles a day. 
Under the circumstances, he should certainly have covered 
twenty. He had then been gone ninety-four days in all ; 
under Wellington, Frederick or Napoleon, thirty at most 
would have been deemed quite enough in which to finish 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 141 

up the job, with a court-martial and dismissal from the ser- 
vice the penalty for dilatoriness. Not until eighteen days 
after the capitulation at Saratoga was official notice thereof 
communicated to Congress ; and it was the 20th of Novem- 
ber — five full weeks — after Burgoyne's surrender before 
the longed-for reenforcements from the Army of the North 
put in an appearance. ''Had they arrived but ten days 
sooner/' wrote Washington, "it would, I think, have put it 
in my power to save Fort Mifflin and consequently have 
rendered Philadelphia a very ineligible situation for the 
enemy this winter," ^ They ought to have been back in 
Howe's front ten weeks earlier; and, even as it was, allow- 
ing for both Gates's inexcusable procrastination and Put- 
nam's wrong-headed incompetence,^ they had moved to 
Washington's relief in a time of well-understood crisis at the 
snail-like pace of twelve miles a day. Marching in the Pen- 
insula towards Talavera (Jul}^ 28, 1809) to the assistance of 
his less hardly pressed chief. General Crauford's famous 
Light Brigade, moving over execrable roads under an almost 
intolerable midsummer sun, covered thirty-six miles in eigh- 
teen hours; only seventeen men having fallen out of the 
ranks.^ Four years later (1813) Wellington, in a campaign 

1 Irving, Washington, III, 371. - lb. 363-367. 

' Napier's statement is that on this occasion the Light Brigade covered 
sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours (B. VIII, Chap. II) and subsequent 
authorities have followed Napier. The statement is erroneous. See 
Mass. Hist. Soc, Proceedings, XLIV, 296. The correct time and distance 
are as stated in the text. 

Incomparably the best and most dramatic infantry march I personally 
ever witnessed was that of the Sixth (Sedgwick's) Corps of the Army of the 
Potomac on the 2d of July, 1863, hurrying to the support of Meade, very 
hardly pressed by Lee on the second day of Gettysburg. Breaking camp 
at 9 P.M. of the 1st, and marching all the next day, under a Pennsylvania 
July sun, the corps, moving in solid column, covered some thirty-four miles. 
The leading brigade was then double-quicked into position to help hold the 
Little Round Top against Longstreet. 

In each of those cases, that in Spain in 1809 and that in Pennsylvania 



142 MILITARY STUDIES 

of six weeks conducted in a Spanish midsummer and over 
Spanish roads, marched his army six hundred miles, passed 
six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two 
fortresses, and drove from Spain a homogeneous army of 
French veterans a fifth more numerous than his own con- 
glomerate command/ As Napier in recording these events 
tersely observes, ''the difference between a common general 
and a great captain is immense, the one is victorious when 
the other is defeated." 

This, however, was thirty years subsequent to the Howe- 
Washington campaign in Pennsylvania ; but, just twenty 
years before, Frederick had set a yet higher standard of 
concentration and mobility with which all military men were 
familiar in 1777. Berlin, the capital of Prussia, was raided 
and occupied by the imperialists on the 17th of October, 
1757, and a contribution levied upon it. Frederick was then 
at Leipsic, eighty miles away. His confederated enemies 
were pressing in upon him from every side. Twenty days 
later (November 5) he routed the French at Rossbach on 
the western limits of his kingdom ; and then, turning fiercely 
to the east, fighting battle on battle and announcing his 
determination to assault Prince Charles and his Austrians 

in 1863, both officers and men knew how to march. I may claim to have 
participated in the march last mentioned ; as the First Massachusetts 
Cavalry was then temporarily detached from the brigade, under orders 
to report to Sixth Corps headquarters. Its marching directions for July 
2 were to follow immediately in rear of the corps, and permit no strag- 
gling whatever. That day the regiment had practically nothing to do ; 
there was no straggling. My recollection is that, in the saddle at sunrise 
(4 o'clock), we reached the field of battle at about 4 p.m. As respects 
speed, solidity and spirit, the infantry march could not have been im- 
proved upon ; and the deployment of the column as it reached the rear 
of the line of battle at the crisis of the day's fight was the most striking and 
impressive incident I remember to have witnessed during my period of 
service. 

1 Napier, History of the Peninsular War, B. XX, Chap. VIII. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 143 

'^ wheresoever and whensoever I may meet with them/' on 
the 5th of December he won his great victory of Leuthen in 
Silesia two hundred miles from Rossbach, the odds in num- 
bers engaged being some three to one against him. In that 
campaign (1757), concentrating his strength, throwing his 
whole force from side to side of his kingdom regardless equally 
of distance or of odds, he executed a multiplicity of compli- 
cated movements, fought seven pitched battles, and occu- 
pied one hundred and seven different positions. After 
Leuthen, without a moment's hesitation investing Breslau, 
with its garrison twenty thousand strong, he compelled its 
surrender December 19, and then, and not until then, was 
what was left of his war-worn and foot-sore battalions per- 
mitted to go into winter quarters. Two years later (Sep- 
tember, 1759), during the darkest hours of Frederick's seem- 
ingly hopeless struggle for existence, his brother. Prince 
Henry, ''a highly ingenious dexterous little man in affairs of 
War, sharp as needles," ^ evaded Marshal Daun, who had 
everything fixed to destroy him on the Landskron, near Gor- 
litz, at break of day, and marching in fifty-six hours through 
fifty mUes of country ^'wholly in the Enemy's possession," 
fell upon the Austrian general, Wehla, and kUled or cap- 
tured his entire command, utterly wrecking the imperialist 
plan of campaign for that year. This was conducting mUi- 

• Carlyle, Frederick the Great, B. XIX, Chap. VI. From a literary- 
point of view most remarkable, and indisputably a work of genius, Carlyle's 
Frederick as a military narrative is undeniably irritating. In almost every 
page of his very striking account of the Second Silesian War, it is apparent 
that the narrator was wholly devoid of familiarity with the details of 
matter-of-fact warfare. Had it been Carlyle's fortune to have himself 
lugged a knapsack and musket a few hundred miles, to have passed a 
winter or two in camp, and to have participated in half a dozen battles, 
his narrative would have been altogether other than it is, and vastly more 
instructive as well as realistic. Carlyle's Frederick smells of the lamp ; 
Napier's Peninsular War, of the camp-fire. 



144 MILITARY STUDIES 

tary operations on great strategic lines and in strict con- 
formity with the fundamental rules governing the game; 
but it contrasts strangely with the performances in America 
exactly twenty years later. 

Bearing in recollection such military operations and 
possibilities, conducted on interior lines to well-considered 
and attainable objectives under correct strategic rules, it is 
interesting to consider what Washington actually did in 
1777. As will be seen, it is not unsafe to say that during 
the four months — August to November — every sound prin- 
ciple whether of policy or strategy was on the patriot side 
either disregarded or violated. 

Recurring to the 24th of July, when Howe, putting out 
to sea from Sandy Hook, disappeared below the horizon, the 
pieces on the strategic chess-board, as already seen, stood 
as follows : Washington with some twelve thousand men, 
probably eight thousand of whom were marching effectives, 
was at Middlebrook on the Raritan. He held a controlling 
position on the interior line, practically midway between 
Peekskill, on the Hudson, and Philadelphia, on the Dela- 
ware, — one hundred and seventy miles from Albany to the 
north, and one hundred and forty from Elkton, at the head 
of Chesapeake Bay, to the south. From the military, operat- 
ing point of view the two places were practically equidistant, 
Albany being two days' march further off than Elkton. 
Clinton, it will be remembered, had been left by Howe to 
hold the British base at the mouth of the Hudson, with 
hardly force enough (six thousand men) for the purpose. 
For the time he was a mere pawn in the game. Burgoyne, 
with some seven thousand effectives, was slowly approach- 
ing Fort Edward, which the patriots abandoned, and he 
occupied, July 30. In his front, forty miles only from 
Albany, was Schuyler with some forty-five hundred de- 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 145 

moralized men. Howe, with the bulk of the British army, 
some eighteen thousand, had disappeared, — his where- 
abouts and destination were matters of pure conjecture. 
To the strategic eye of Washington two things only were 
clear; while the advance of Burgoyne must at any cost be 
checked, Howe must be watched, and, if possible, circum- 
vented. As respects the first, he was right; as respects the 
second, he was in error : and, because of that error, Wash- 
ington now made two egregious, and, as the result showed, 
well-nigh fatal mistakes. Instead of going himself at the 
head of the whole effective part of his army, he, in the face 
of an enemy already superior in every respect, divided that 
army, sending a large detachment, some three thousand 
strong including Morgan's riflemen, — the very kernel and 
pick of his command, — to reenforce Gates, now (August 16) 
in charge of the Northern Department; he himseK, in his 
pest-hole of a summer camp near Philadelphia, continuing 
his anxious watch for Howe. It may have been generous, 
but it was not war ; and, within less than a week (August 21), 
after he had thus depleted his previously insufficient strength, 
Howe put in his appearance at the Head of Elk. With his 
divided force to risk a pitched battle under such circum- 
stances was to disregard the first strategic rule for his con- 
duct, and, in so doing, to invite disaster and defeat; yet 
that was just what Washington did. When, in 1812, after 
Borodino, Kutuzof, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, was 
urged to risk another battle before abandoning "the holy 
Ancient Capital of Russia" to the hated invader, Tolstoi says 
that he put the case thus to the Council of War: "The 
question for which I have convened these gentlemen is a 
military one. That 'question is as follows: The salvation 
of Russia is her army. Would it be more to our advantage 
to risk the loss of the army and of Moscow too by accepting 



146 MILITARY STUDIES 

battle, or to abandon Moscow without a battle?" Tolstoi 
tells us that a long discussion ensued. At last, during one of 
the lulls which occurred, when all felt that nothing remained 
to be said, ''Kutuzof drew a long sigh, as if he were prepared 
to speak. All looked at him; 'Eh bien. Messieurs, je vols 
que c'est moi qui payerai les pots casses,' said he. And, 
slowly getting to his feet, he approached the table: 'Gentle- 
men, I have listened to your views. Some of you will be dis- 
satisfied with me. But' — he hesitated — 'I, in virtue of 
the power confided to me by the sovereign and the country, 
I command that we retreat.'" ^ Half a loaf is proverbially 
better than no bread ; and this homely domestic aphorism 
holds true also of military operations. The Russian General- 
in-Chief merely recognized the fact. Kutuzof lost Moscow, 
but, as the invader presently found out to his great cost, 
he saved the Russian army. Washington not only lost 
Philadelphia, but the wreck and remnant of the patriot 
army survived two unnecessary defeats only to face the 
privations and disease of Valley Forge. 

That, strategically, and from the American point of view, 
the battle of the Brandywine ought never to have been 
fought is a point upon which there is no disagreement. It 
is, however, argued that it was a political and moral neces- 
sity, — that a meddling and impracticable Congress com- 
pelled it out of regard to an unreasoning public sentiment. 
As Marshall, a contemporary authority, and himself then 
serving in a Virginia regiment under Washington, assures us : 
''Their inferiority in numbers, in discipline, and in arms, 
was too great to leave the Americans a probable prospect of 
victory. A battle, however, was not to be avoided. Public 
opinion, and the opinion of Congress, required it. To have 
given up Philadelphia without an attempt to preserve it 
1 War and Peace, Pt. XI, Chap. IV. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 147 

would have excited discontents." ^ If such was indeed the 
case,^ the decision announced by Kutuzof to his Council of 
War in 1812 would have been very apposite in the mouth of 
•Washington in 1777. As the result of the battle, he should 
have lost his army ; for, in addition to the fact that it ought 
never to have been fought at all, the battle of the Brandy- 
wine, while well and skilfully fought by the British, was very 
badly and blunderingly fought on the side of the Americans. 
They were out-manoeuvred, surprised, out-fought and 
routed. That the chief patriot army — the mainstay of 
the cause of Independence — was not on that occasion 
utterly destroyed was, indeed, due wholly to the indolent 
forbearance of Howe. It was one of the pithy aphorisms 
of Napoleon that the art of war is to march twelve leagues 
in a single day, overthrow your enemy in a great battle, and 
then march twelve leagues more in pursuit. Sir William 
Howe met neither requirement ; but it was in the last that 
he failed most conspicuously. As Galloway, the Philadelphia 
loyalist, with the best conceivable opportunities for forming 
an opinion, wrote of him, '^Howe always succeeded in every 
attack he thought proper to make, as far as he chose to suc- 
ceed." In this respect Brandywine was a mere repetition 
of Bunker Hill and Flatbush. Of two French officers who 
took part in the operations on the Brandywine, one (La- 
fayette) observes, "Had the enemy marched directly to 
Derby, the American army would have been cut up and 
destroyed ; they lost a precious night" ; the other (Du Por- 
tail) wrote, "If the English had followed their advantage 
that day, Washington's army would have been spoken of no 
more." But Howe would not do it. If he had pursued 

1 Washington, III, 144, 152, 164. 

' To the same effect Irving, Washington, III, 241. This subject will 
again be referred to in this paper, infra, 163. 



148 MILITARY STUDIES 

Washington, it was said, and inflicted a crushing defeat, he 
might have left part of his force to occupy Philadelphia, and 
marched the rest to the assistance of Burgoyne. This was 
what the ministry had expected. As matter of cold historic 
truth Washington had, in the great game of war, played into 
his opponent's hands, — done exactly what that opponent 
wanted him to do, and what he ought never to have done.^ 
He had permitted Howe to draw him away from his true 
objective, — the army of Burgoyne, — then to divide his 
force, and, finally, in the sequence of so doing, to venture a 
pitched battle which he had not one chance in ten of win- 
ning. Great in ministerial circles were the gratulations when 
news arrived in London- that Howe's false move had been 
thus retrieved by a move equally false on the patriot side. 
*'I confess," wrote Lord George Germain, — and one can 
even now almost hear a deep-drawn breath of relief in the 
words, — ^'I confess I feared that Washington would have 

1 In his defence of his proceedings, after resigning his command and 
returning to England, Howe claimed that so far as Burgoyne was con- 
cerned, his Chesapeake Bay expedition was a well-designed and altogether 
successful movement, fully accomplishing its intended purpose. "Had 
I adopted the plan of going up Hudson' s-river, it would have been alleged, 
that I had wasted the campaign Avith a considerable army under my com- 
mand, merely to ensure the progress of the northern army, which could 
have taken care of itself, provided I had made a diversion in its favour, by 
drawing off to the southward the main army under General Washington." 
Therefore, acting upon the advice of the admiral, Lord Cornwallis and 
other general officers, believing that Washington would follow him, he 
"determined on pursuing that plan which would make the most effectual 
diversion in favour of the northern army, which promised in its conse- 
quences the most important success, and which the Secretary of State at 
home, and my own judgment upon the spot, had deliberately approved." 
— Parliajnentary History, XX, 693, 694. And in his Obseruations upon a 
Pamphlet entitled ^^ Letters to a Nobleman,''' 6L Howe repeated the assertion. 
"I shall ever insist, and I am supported by evidence in insisting, that the 
southern expedition, by drawing off General Washington and his whole 
force, was the strongest diversion [in favor of the northern army] that 
could have been made." 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 149 

marched all his force towards Albany, and attempted to 
demolish the army from Canada, but the last accounts say 
that he has taken up his quarters at Morristown after de- 
taching three thousand men to Albany, If this is all he 
does, he will not distress Burgoyne." ^ Thus, while himself 
wandering off with an utterly false objective — Philadelphia 
— in view, by supreme good fortune Howe had not only 
induced Washington to follow him, but also in so doing to 
give the British leader a chance at his true objective, Wash- 
ington's own army. In the final outcome, it is difficult to 
see how blundering could have gone further. Out-ma- 
noeuvred and out-fought, twice beaten in pitched battles, 
neither of which under the circumstances he ought to have 
risked, Washington presently crawled into his winter-quar- 
ters at Valley Forge, while Howe ensconced himself com- 
fortably in Philadelphia. Yet months before, Charles Lee, 
then a prisoner of war in New York, had traitorously but 
truly advised Howe, ''In my opinion the taking possession 
of Philadelphia will not have any decisive consequences." 

The undeniable fact is that from a cold military point of 
view, Howe's movement ought to have been encouraged by 
Washington, and the British occupation of Philadelphia 
rather facilitated than opposed. A mere show of obstruction 
to it should have sufficed; for, as Franklin, the shrewdest 
observer of the day, whether of nature or of events, is said 
to have remarked when the news reached him that Howe 
had captured Philadelphia: ''No, Philadelphia has captured 
Howe!" 

In a recent Congressional Report ^ on the proposal to erect 
a statue of General Nathanael Greene on the battleground at 

1 Lord George Germain to General Irwin, August 23, 1777. Hist. MSS. 
Com., Report on MSS. of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville, I, 138. 
* House Report, No. 1698, 61st Congress, 2d Session. 



150 MILITARY STUDIES 

Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina, it is stated with ap- 
parent correctness that when, in March, 1781, nearly four years 
after Howe's occupation of Philadelphia, Greene made his 
indecisive North Carolina fight, Washington had formed a 
plan to attack Clinton, who had 12,000 troops, in New York ; 
and, the French fleet cooperating, to capture him and his 
army, thereby putting an end to the war. His preparations 
to that end were in full progress, when, suddenly, tidings of 
Greene's battle reached him, and of the subsequent falling 
back of Cornwallis on Wilmington. Though victorious, un- 
able, because of his losses, longer to hold the field in the 
South, the British commander must obviously return north- 
ward through the lower part of Virginia. Grasping the essen- 
tial fact that the capture of either Cornwallis or Clinton 
would bring the war to an end, Washington, this time, saw his 
opportunity. Cornwallis, as Burgoyne in 1777, was the surer 
victim, he having only 7000 men, while Clinton had 12,000. 
Washington changed his j^lans accordingly. Deceiving 
Clinton, he moved rapidly upon the weaker force, and 
by a masterly movement brought hostilities to a practical 
close at Yorktown. But it is difficult to see why a move- 
ment and combination of precisely similar character might 
not have brought the war to a close four years earlier. The 
march to Lake Champlain would, in 1777, have been both 
shorter and easier than the subsequent march of 1781 from 
the banks of the Hudson to the shores of the Chesapeake ; and 
Howe at Philadelphia in 1777 would have been even more 
powerless to stay it than in 1781 was Clinton in New York. 
The actual strategy of the campaign of 1777 has now been 
passed in view, and its merits or demerits on either side 
tested by the application to them of the acknowledged prin- 
ciples of a sound policy or rules of correct strategy, laid down 
in the full light of subsequent events and with our knowledge 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 151 

of conditions then existing. The result has been stated. On 
neither side was the great game played with an intelligent 
regard to its rules ; but, taken as a whole, the mistakes com- 
mitted and the blunders perpetrated on the British side clearly 
and considerably more than counterbalanced those on the 
patriot side. On each side they were bad ; but in Bur- 
goyne's capitulation the British lost so to speak a queen, 
while in Howe's failure to destroy Washington's army after 
his victory on the Brandywine the British threw away the 
chance of mating their adversary's king, by no means im- 
possibly of calling a checkmate. 

Charles Lee was second to Washington in command of all 
the American armies. Captured, or rather ignominiously 
bagged, by the British at Basking Ridge, December 13, 
1776, Lee passed the entire year 1777 a prisoner of war 
in New York, not being released in exchange until May, 
1778. While in New York, Lee experienced a change of 
heart as respects the conflict in which he was a partici- 
pant ; and the plan of operations he then drew up for the 
consideration of Sir William Howe has already been re- 
ferred to.^ Charles Lee was not a man who inspired either 
confidence or respect. So lightly did his former British 
army associates regard him that when his capture was an- 
nounced and the disposition to be made of him as a pris- 
oner of war was mooted, it was contemptuously observed 
by "one of the wisest servants of the Crown" that he was 
so constituted that "he must puzzle everything he med- 
dles in, and he was the worst present the Americans could 
receive." ^ Lee, nevertheless, did have a certain military 
instinct as well as training, and the scheme of operations out- 
lined by him for Howe's consideration was in close general 
conformity with the principles set forth in the earlier portion 
1 Supra, 121. 2 N. Y. Hist. Soc. Lee Papers, IV, 402. 



152 MILITARY STUDIES 

of this paper. Holding New York as a base, the British navy 
was also to secure the control of Chesapeake Bay ; and then, 
cutting New England off from the Middle Provinces, was to 
rely on a gradual process of inanition to dissolve the patriot 
levies. So self-evident did this strategic proposition seem to 
Lee that up to the 15th of June, 1778, three days only before 
Howe's successor, Clinton, abandoning Philadelphia in the 
summer following Brandywine, began his march to New 
York, Lee at Valley Forge insisted, in a long letter addressed 
to Washington, that the plainly impending move of the 
British commander would be in the direction of Lancaster, 
Pa., with a view to manoeuvring the patriot army out of 
its strong position at Valley Forge and forcing it to a trial of 
strength under conditions less advantageous to it ; and then, 
whatever the result, Clinton purposed to take possession of 
some convenient tract of country effectually protected by 
the British command of the sea, and, by so doing, to para- 
lyze further resistance.^ 

The French alliance, jeopardizing as it did for the time 
being — and until Rodney's victory (February 19, 1782) — 
the British control of the sea, had in June, 1778, introduced 
a new and controlling factor into the strategic situation, in 
obedience to which Clinton made his move from Philadelphia 
to New York. But until the news of Burgoyne's capitula- 
tion reached Europe (December, 1777), resulting in the 
Franco-American alliance (January, 1778), it is difficult to 
detect any point of weakness in ''Mr. Lee's Plan." If put 
in operation at any time during 1777 and systematically 
pursued, it could hardly have failed to work. The British 
commander had at his disposal an ample force with which 
to do anything, except generally occupy the country. Had 
he seen fit in June, 1777, to move up the Hudson by land and 
* Lee Papers, II, 401. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 153 

river to effect a junction with Burgoyne, the Americans, as 
their leaders perfectly well knew, could have offered to him 
no sort of effective opposition. ''Nothing under Heaven 
can save us/' wrote Trumbull, ''but the enemy's going to 
the southward." ^ Chesapeake Bay, with Hampton Roads 
as a depot and arsenal, next lay at the mercy of the British 
fleet. Wilmington, carrying with it a complete control of 
the Delaware and the whole eastern shore of Maryland, did 
not admit of defence ; neither, as events subsequently 
showed, did Charleston or the coast of the Carolinas: and 
the interior was subsidiary to the seaboard controlling 
points. The patriot army, if left to itself, behind an effec- 
tively blockaded coast, could not be held together because 
of a mere lack of absolute necessities in the way of food, 
raiment and munitions. All the British had to do was, 
apparently, to hold the principal points of seaboard supply 
and distribution, and a single line of interior communica- 
tion — New York Bay to Lake Champlain — and then — 
wait ! How utterly and completely they failed to adopt 
this policy, or to act on these strategic lines, is matter of 
record. They not only threw away their game, but they 
lingered out eight years in doing it. 

Turning now to the other side, the conclusion to be 
reached is not greatly better. The sequence of events 
hardly needs to be recalled : at the South, Brandywine (Sep- 
tember 11), Paoli (September 20), Germantown (October 4), 
Fort Mifflin (November 15), and Valley Forge (December 9) 
— all in 1777. An undeniably bad and ill-considered 
record, with a most wretched termination. At the North it 
was better, though somewhat checkered ; Ticonderoga lost 
(July 5), Fort Edward abandoned (July 30), Bennington 
won (August 14), Fort Montgomery and the Hudson High- 

1 Fisher, II, 71. 



154 MILITARY STUDIES 

lands lost (October 6), winding up with the Saratoga capitu- 
lation (October 17). Assuming now that the game had 
been played quite otherwise than it was played, and more 
in accord with the rules of ''good generalship," it is possible, 
knowing as we do the characters and temperamental methods 
of those responsible for the movements made, approximately 
to predicate results. As already set forth, and for ulterior 
reasons once more briefly summarized, they would have been 
somewhat as follows : — 

On July 30 Howe's armament appeared at the entrance of 
Delaware Bay, and again vanished. Had Washington been 
endowed with the keen military instinct of Frederick or of 
Napoleon, that one glimpse would have been enough. 
Holding the interior line, Washington would have realized 
that Howe had made himself for an indefinite but most vital 
period of time a purely negligible military quantity. Bur- 
goyne, on the other hand, had compromised himself. There 
would have been one tiger spring; and, before the last- 
named British commander realized his danger, he would 
have been in the toils. The next move would have been a 
logical sequence. Working on interior lines and applying 
either Frederick's or Napoleon's pitUess mobility to the 
situation, eighteen days would have seen the patriot army 
either striking savagely at Clinton in the absence of a pro- 
tecting fleet, or back on the Delaware. 

What Frederick or Napoleon would next have done, if 
placed in the position of Washington, it would be foolish 
to undertake to say ; for Frederick and Napoleon were men 
of genius, and, when the critic or theorist undertakes to indi- 
cate the path either of the two would have followed under any 
given conditions, one thing only can safely be predicated : 
The conclusion reached would be far from the mark ! Not 
impossibly, however, if a guess may be ventured by a tyro, 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 155 

— and in the case of Frederick such a move would have 
been characteristic, — the morning after Burgoyne's capitu- 
lation, the head of the patriot column would have been 
in motion towards Albany. Surveying the chess-board, and 
the character and location of the pieces upon it, Frederick 
might have argued somewhat as follows : Howe is in Phila- 
delphia; if I now strike swiftly and heavily at Clinton in 
New York, Howe, — and I think I understand the man, — 
suddenly awakened to the fatal mistake he has made, and 
his imperilled base, will be sure to hurry by the shortest 
route to Clinton's rescue ; and I, abandoning New York, will 
then meet him, with every man and gun I can muster, at a 
point I will myself select in New Jersey; but ''I propose to 
fight him wheresoever and whensoever I can find him." 
Clinton's turn would have come next. 

Wellington, on the other hand, if similarly circumstanced, 
would not improbably have from the outset observed Howe's 
performances with the same ''stern contentment" with which 
he observed the mistaken move of Marmont at Salamanca.^ 
He would have been not ill pleased to have his opponent 
establish himself in Philadelphia, thus dividing his com- 
mand, and placing himself in an isolated spot far from his 
base and of no strategic importance. Looking into the 
necessary subsequent moves in the game, Wellington would 
have seen that Howe, once in Philadelphia, must as a mili- 
tary necessity possess himself of the forts on the Delaware; 
he had to communicate with the British fleet. Those forts 
were held by patriot garrisons, and, after the bagging of 
Burgoyne, their capture must be effected under the eyes of 
a united and well-equipped covering force awaiting its op- 
portunity, in no degree depleted by defeat. To a hawk- 
eyed commander, and that Wellington unquestionably was, 

1 Infra, 178. 



156 MILITARY STUDIES 

such an opportunity could hardly fail to offer itself; and 
the equivalent of Germantown would then have been fought 
under wholly different auspices. It would have been fought 
to cover the defences on the Delaware. It is useless to ven- 
ture a surmise as to the probable outcome of such a trial of 
strength. One thing only can safely be predicated of it, a 
victory won under those conditions would have cost Howe 
heavily — Bunker Hill over again, in it not impossibly half 
his army would have melted away. 

Unfortunately Washington did not, until too late, see this 
latter situation in any such light. On the contrary, during 
the aimless marching and countermarching which followed 
the disaster on the Brandywine, when no doubt longer 
existed of Howe's ultimate occupation of Philadelphia, Mar- 
shall says: ''To the requisitions for completing the works 
on the Delaware, the general answered that the service 
would be essentially injured by employing upon them at 
this critical juncture, while another battle was contemplated, 
any part of the continental troops ; that, if he should be 
enabled to oppose the enemy successfully in the field, the 
works would be unnecessary ; if not, it would be impossible 
to maintain them." As the actual result showed, this con- 
clusion was wrong at each point; the enemy was not suc- 
cessfully opposed in the field, and the forts should have at 
once been completed, to be firmly held under the watchful 
eyes of a covering and as yet unbeaten army. 

It is related of the Duke of Wellington that, on the day 
following one of his Peninsular battles, he gruffly observed 
to an old Scotch regimental commander, ''How's this. Colo- 
nel, I hear that some French cavalry got inside your square 
yesterday?" To which he received the no less gruff reply, 
"Is that so, your Grace; but ye did'na happen to hear they 
got out again, did ye ?" It was easy enough for Howe, after 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 157 

Brandy wine, to get into Philadelphia; it was for Washing- 
ton to see that, once in, it was not equally easy for Howe's 
army to open communications with the British fleet. 

Speaking generally, however, and making no attempt to 
peer too curiously into the infinite might-have-beens, the 
situation of the pieces on the strategic chess-board in Sep- 
tember, 1777, and after Brandy wine, was comparatively 
simple. Certain moves, become military necessities, may 
safely be predicated as having then been inevitable; for, 
unless they had complete control of the Delaware to the 
sea, ''Philadelphia was nothing but a death-trap for the 
British." ^ Had the game therefore been played by the 
Americans skilfully and in accordance with the rules, Howe 
would have been permitted to march into the trap there, 
then to find the door between him and his fleet very firmly 
barred. In other words, avoiding a pitched battle like 
Germantown, but manoeuvring for delay, the patriots should 
have perfected and provisioned the defences, throwing into 
them strong garrisons of the more reliable troops, under 
their most resolute commanders. The covering army should 
then menacingly have watched ; for Howe would have been 
compelled at any cost to possess himself of the works. 
Nothing of the sort was done. When at last a force of some 
two hundred men was thrown into Fort Mifflin, it was found 
to be ''garrisoned by thirty mUitia only." The whole mili- 
tary situation had been misconceived ; ^ but Howe, after 
Germantown, most characteristically gave his opponent two 
weeks' time in which to do the long-neglected obvious, and 
in some slight degree save the gravely jeopardized patriot 

1 Fisher, II, 44. 

2 "It had been impracticable for the commander-in-chief to attend per- 
sonally to these works, and they were entirely incomplete. The pres- 
ent relative position of the armies gave them a decisive importance." — 
Marshall, Washington, III, 175. 



158 MILITARY STUDIES 

situation. With Germantown fought on October 4, not 
until the 19th did the British commander address himself 
to the imperative problem of securing the defences on the 
Delaware. Two weeks of time very precious to his side had 
been wantonly wasted. Fortunately for him, his adversary 
had also failed to improve them. Delays were equally 
divided : for, far to the north, Burgoyne, who should have 
been wiped off the board six weeks at least before, had ca- 
pitulated on October 17; but not for over two weeks yet 
(November 1) did Morgan and his riflemen receive orders to 
rejoin Washington, and they found him at Whitemarsh, 
November 18. The campaign was then over. Such dila- 
toriness does not admit of satisfactory explanation. War- 
fare was not then, nor can it ever be, successfully conducted 
in that way. 

Apparently Washington's still divided army had as a 
fighting unit been used up in two ill-considered and hopeless 
battles, that on the Brandy wine (September 11) and that at 
Germantown (October 4), and was equal to no aggressive 
action during the month of Howe's operations against the 
forts (October 22-November 15). A golden opportunity 
was thus lost. 

It is hardly worth while further to consider what might 
have been the outcome of that campaign, with Howe still 
in command of the British, had the patriots pursued a more 
active and intelligent course. But, had the fundamental 
rules which should have governed the game been grasped 
and observed, it is by no means beyond the range of reason- 
able possibilities that the conflict might, even as it was, 
have then been brought to a triumphant close. Burgoyne 
disposed of even by the middle of October, a united and 
seasoned patriot army, equipped with Burgoyne's stores and 
strengthened by his excellent field batteries, might have con- 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 159 

fronted Howe in his Philadelphia death-trap; and they 
would then have been in position to assail him fiercely when 
he tried to open the securely fastened door which stood in 
the way of all communication with his fleet. Even as it was, 
those defences — neglected, half-finished only, ill-garrisoned, 
unsupplied and unsupported — held out six weeks, checking 
the more important operations against Washington's de- 
pleted and twice beaten army. During that time Howe was 
in great danger of being starved out of Philadelphia, as his 
army had to be supplied by flatboats running the gauntlet 
of the forts at night, and never had more than a week's 
rations on hand.^ Under these circumstances it was small 
cause for surprise that as the days crept on the extreme 
gravity of the situation "was apparent in the countenance of 
the best officers, who began to fear that the fort would not 
be reduced";^ in which case was it at all impossible that 
Howe might in one season have shared the fate of Burgoyne, 
the tactics and mobility of Princeton and Trenton having 
been enlarged and developed to cover the broader strategic 
field between Philadelphia and Saratoga? In such case 
Yorktown would have been anticipated by exactly four 
years. 

Again, and finally, reviewing the campaign of 1777, it is 
almost undeniable as an historical and strategic proposition, 
that, either in its early stages or in the course of it, decisive 
results as respects the entire conflict were within the safe 
and easy reach of either party to it, who both saw and took 

^ View of the Evidence relative to the Conduct of the American War under 
Sir William Howe, etc., 114. 

^ Letters to a Nobleman [Howe] on the Conduct of the War in the Middle 
Colonies, 81. Greene, writing November 4, said : "The enemy are greatly- 
discouraged by the forts holding out so long ; and it is the general opinion 
of the best of citizens that the enemy will evacuate the city if the fort 
holds out until the middle of next week." — Life, I, 504. 



160 MILITARY STUDIES 

advantage of the conditions in his favor and the opportunities 
offered him. Had Howe gone up the Hudson in June and 
effected a junction with Burgoyne on the land side, while 
with the navy the British seized Hampton Roads and 
blockaded the Delaware from Wilmington, further resist- 
ance would have been almost completely paralyzed, and the 
patriot army must apparently have dissolved from inani- 
tion. There would have been no visible alternative. On 
the other hand, when Howe, at the crisis of the campaign, 
disappeared in space, leaving the field free for his opponent, 
Saratoga, the Philadelphia death-trap and the defences of 
the Delaware offered almost infinite strategic and tactical 
possibilities. 

It remains to forestall, and, if possible, in advance meet the 
criticisms which may not improbably be made upon the views 
herein taken and the conclusions reached. In the first place, 
it will almost inevitably be urged that due allowance has not 
been made for the earlier and less matured conditions existing 
in 1777, as compared with those of the present time or of 
1861-18G5. In the Revolutionary period the country was in 
no way self-sustaining ; the present means of information did 
not exist ; the roads and channels of communication, when as 
yet not still unmade, were at best crude and inadequate; 
and, consequentl}^, such military mobility as that suggested, 
while practicable for Frederick, was impossible for Washing- 
ton. 

The reply to this criticism is obvious and conclusive. In an- 
swer to a call of great exigency from Albany after the evacu- 
ation of Ticonderoga (July 4) Washington, in presence of the 
enemy, — dividing thereby a force at best insufficient, — 
sent Glover's brigade and Morgan's riflemen, in all some 3000 
of his most effective troops, to confront Burgoyne. They 
covered the ground with a fair degree of rapidity, and ren- 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 161 

dered valuable service. There is no apparent reason why what 
was accomplished by this large detachment with no serious 
difficulty should have been impracticable for the commander- 
in-chief with the bulk of his army. Four years later, when the 
operation suggested itself to him, Washington moved a larger 
force through a more difficult country a yet greater distance 
in less time; and he did it with no particular trouble. A 
French contingent, some fifteen hundred strong, then pro- 
ceeded from Newport, R.I., through Connecticut, crossed 
the Hudson above New York, and marched down to the 
Head of Elk on Chesapeake Bay ; this in midsummer and 
early autumn. Apparently those composing this array had 
a highly enjoyable outing.^ Accompanying the movement 
of the allied forces from the Hudson to Yorktown, Washing- 
ton, with his companions, is said to have at times got over 
sixty miles a day. During the intervening four years he had 
obviously improved both in strategy and mobility. In 

^ The entire distance, land and water, traversed by Rochambeau's 
command in this movement was 756 miles. Setting out from Providence 
June 18, Yorktown was reached October 28. The actual road-marching 
distance was 518 miles, which were covered in thirty-seven days, or at an 
average rate of fifteen miles a day. The American army set out from 
Dobbs Ferry August 20, and reached Williamsburg, 492 miles, September 
14, having covered on an average twenty miles a day. The itinerary of 
the allied army in the Yorktown movement is described in graphic detail 
in Chapter XX of the posthumously published France in the American 
Revolution of the late James Breck Perkins. Elsewhere in his narrative 
(p. 319) Mr. Perkins observes, in connection with a somewht similar 
operation at one time considered in New York, "to attack the French [in 
Rhode Island] successfully and then return to meet the American army 
[under Washington] required decision, celerity, and boldness. Clinton 
possessed none of these qualities. . . . The daring that takes great risks 
and accomplishes great results had been common in the officers who were 
inspired by Chatham, but it was not found in the generals and admirals 
whom George III sent out to fight with his rebellious subjects." The 
same author speaks (p. 385) of " the dull inefficiency that seemed charac- 
teristic of the operations of the English in America," whether naval or 
military. 

M 



162 MILITARY STUDIES 

effecting on interior lines this really fine concentrated move- 
ment against a divided enemy, the American commander 
had, also, knowingly left Philadelphia quite uncovered from 
the direction of New York, where Sir Henry Clinton lay with 
18,000 idle effectives at his disposal. It has been urged in 
justification of Washington's course in following Howe's 
movement south in 1777 and futilely striving to protect 
Philadelphia, that, had he done otherwise, some great 
disaster might have befallen the cause; his ''interior lines" 
would have been jeopardized. He could not — it is argued 
— know exactly how long Howe's salt-water excursion would 
last, or where it might end. It is not easy to assign its 
proper weight to such shadowy considerations. In warfare 
there is always an element of doubt as to what ma}^ be 
occurring, as Wellington put it, ''on the other side of the 
hill," or as to the counterstroke an opponent may meditate ; 
but the risk in this way incurred in the Yorktown move- 
ment of 1781 was quite as great as would have been any risk 
incurred by a similar movement to the north in 1777. For- 
tunately, however, the fear lest Clinton, were he not at 
hand to prevent, break loose and do something terrible in 
the direction of Albany or Philadelphia did not hold Wash- 
ington back from aggressive action in 1781. Four years 
before a similar fear as respects Howe had both held him 
back and led him astray. The real explanation of the York- 
town movement, and of Clinton's inertness while it was in 
process must be looked for elsewhere ; nor is it far to seek. 
The simple fact is that both sides had at last got to a realiz- 
ing sense that, strategically, Philadelphia was eccentric. A 
mere pawn in the game, its loss or taking, signified nothing. 
The sudden concentrated move on Cornwallis at Yorktown 
called, on the contrary, checkmate to King George. 
In their deeply suggestive and intensely interesting story. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 163 

Le Conscript de 1813, which, now become a classic, excited 
some fifty years ago such world-wide attention, Erckmann- 
Chatrian describe the veteran sergeant Pinto observing 
through the vanishing mist the allied armies about to attack 
Napoleon in flank and cut his column in two, on the morning 
of Liitzen (May 2, 1813) ; as he does so, '4e nez en I'air et la 
main en visiere sur les yeux," he remarks to the conscript at 
his side, ''C'est bien vu de leur part; ils apprennent tous 
les jours les malices de la guerre." A similar observation 
might have been applied by Sir Henry Clinton to Washing- 
ton and his movement in September, 1781. Meanwhile the 
conditions under which operations were carried on had not 
greatly changed since July, 1777; it was Washington who 
had developed. 

Another objection urged will not improbably be to the 
effect that Washington's military action was, in July, 1777, 
hampered. From considerations of prestige and on political 
grounds he could not afford to leave Philadelphia and the 
Middle Provinces even temporarily uncovered, no matter 
what great and speedy results might by so doing be secured 
in the North. In the first place be it observed, Washington 
never suggested any such move as that against Burgoyne, 
leaving Philadelphia uncovered to await its outcome ; nor, 
accordingly, did Congress in any way hamper him as respects 
making it. On the contrary, he seems to have acted wholly 
on his own volition and in accordance with his own best judg- 
ment, and is himself on record to this effect. But, even 
assuming the contrary, the extreme unwisdom, not to say 
weakness, of allowing clergymen, politicians, editors and 
citizens generally to influence campaign operations has been 
generally admitted ever since September 3, 1650, and that 
day's experience of Leslie's Scotch army at the hands of 
Cromwell, near Dunbar. Really masterful captains do not 



164 MILITARY STUDIES 

give ear, much less yield, to such influences. On the other 
hand, it is matter of record that Washington was noticeably 
given to holding councils of war, ever seeking advice and 
showing a somewhat excessive deference to public opinion. 
He did so on Long and Manhattan Islands in 1776; and 
again before Philadelphia, in 1777; in both cases thereby 
gravely jeopardizing the cause entrusted to him. He did 
so knowingly and avowedly; for, difficult as it is of belief, 
he seems actually for a time to have held himself bound 
to follow the opinions of the councils he had called in 
all cases where they diverged from his own.^ As to Phila- 
delphia, Washington in the summer of 1777 seems him- 
self to have been laboring under as great a delusion as that 
which possessed Howe. It apparently never occurred to him 
that Philadelphia could most certainly be either saved or 
rescued by a sudden, concentrated blow struck just north of 
Albany. Greene, far and away the ablest of his lieutenants, 
also shared in the costly delusion ; but with a saving hesita- 
tion due to his keener military instinct. ''I think it," he 
wrote, on August 14, 1777, ^'an object of the first importance 
to give a check to Burgoyne, . . . [but] Philadelphia is the 
American Diana, she must be preserved at all events. There 

1 In March, 1777, Washington sent Greene to Philadelphia to reach a 
distinct understanding with the Congress on this subject, among others. 
The question was then formally raised, and the following recorded: ''Re- 
solved, that General Washington be informed that it never was the in- 
tention of Congress that he should be bound by the majority of voices 
in a council of war, contrary to his own judgment." — Greene, I, 348; 
Journals of the Congress, March 24, 1777. In this connection it is inter- 
esting to note the important part played by councils of war in the Parlia- 
mentary armies of the English Civil War period. Frequently held and 
largely attended, they seem to have been regarded almost as a matter 
of right, and the neglect of a commander to call them was denounced as 
"unconstitutional." Fairfax undertook no important operation with- 
out consulting a council. (Firth, CromioelVs Army, 57-59.) A study of 
the American Revolutionary army, similar to that made by Firth of the 
Parliamentary army, is much needed. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 165 

is great attention paid to this city ; it is true it is one of the 
finest upon this continent, but in my opinion is an object of 
far less importance than the North River.'' ^ So, less wise 
than Kutuzof in the next generation, Washington sacrificed 
an army in hopeless conflict to save ''the American Diana"; 
and, when the ''Diana" in question fell a prey to the ravisher, 
it was in due time discovered that she was not worth saving, 
but, on the contrary, only a Delilah, and rather in the nature 
of a "death-trap" to the foreign possessor. Having, so far 
as the record shows, been in no respect hampered in his action, 
but following the dictates of his judgment, "his own valiant 
spirit" and "the native ardor of his character," ^ but, unfor- 
tunately, in pursuance of a thoroughly unmilitary plan, 
Washington lost Philadelphia and reduced his army to im- 
potence from repeated defeat. He then presently did what 
he should have done four months before, abandoned Phila- 
delphia to the enemy and elsewhere sought salvation for 
the cause. Even this, however, was decided upon only 
after the holding of yet other useless councils of war. 

These grounds of criticism anticipated, and perhaps in 
degree overcome, the final and fundamental objection to the 
views here advanced remains ; and that objection, already 
alluded to, is in reality at the basis of all others, and conse- 
quently the one most difficult to overcome. 

At the threshold of his Life of Columbus, Washington Ir- 
ving, in a tone so earnest as to amount almost to indignation 
of utterance, lays down this canon for the guidance of his- 

^ Greene, I, 435. " Philadelphia was then the largest city in America, 
and even those accustomed to European capitals found in it much to 
admire. The population was about forty thousand, the buildings were 
good, the streets broad and straight, and they were even provided with 
sidewalks. The shops were numerous and richly supplied. Some of the 
brick buildings on Market St. were of such proportions that the [officers 
of Rochambeau's army] called them immense." Perkins, France in the 
Revolution, 370. 2 Irving, Washington, III, 241-242. 



166 MILITARY STUDIES 

torical investigation: '' There is a certain meddlesome spirit, 
which, in the name of learned research, goes prying about 
the traces of history, casting down its monuments, and 
marring and mutilating its fairest trophies. Care should 
be taken to vindicate great names from such pernicious 
erudition. It defeats one of the most salutary purposes 
of history, that of furnishing examples of what human 
genius and laudable enterprise may accomplish." ^ This 
in the case of Columbus; but the same, or a very simi- 
lar, canon of criticism is levelled at all those who since 
have ventured, or even now venture, in any way or degree to 
dissent from that sweeping and altogether indiscriminate 
estimate of Washington, whether as a man, a patriot or a 
captain, emanating first from Mason L. Weems, as early as 
1800, and since greatly elaborated by a large and devoted 
school of investigators and biographers, of which Weems 
must ever remain the unacknowledged head. Of this school 
Irving is himself, perhaps, the chief and most respected ex- 
ponent. Such have established a cult — almost a creed. To 
dissent from it in any respect may not indeed be proof of 
moral turpitude, but is with them suspiciously suggestive of 
intellectual weakness. In our historical literature this cult 
has been carried to such a point as to have become a proverb 
in Europe. Bagehot, for instance, in alluding to some exag- 
geration of statement, says it would be as absurd as 'Ho 
describe a post-boy as a sonneteer describes his mistress, 
or as the Americans stick metaphors upon General Washing- 
ton." ^ This almost theological desire to preserve the Wash- 
ington legend in undiminished lustre, above all doubt and 
beyond limitation, has gone to the extent even of a systematic 
suppression of evidence and consequent falsification of his- 

' Columbus (Geoffrey Crayon ed.), I, 71. 
* Literary Studies, I, 126. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 167 

tory. In some well-established cases this has been advanced 
as a patriotic duty. A striking instance is afforded in the Life 
of Greene by his grandson. Among the papers consulted by 
G. W. Greene in the preparation of his work were the Pick- 
ering MSS., in the possession of the Massachusetts Historical 
Society. He there found this anecdote, recorded by Timothy 
Pickering/ Adjutant-General of Washington's army during 
those operations about Philadelphia in the autumn of 1777 
which have just been passed in review: "On one of these 
dreary nights," wrote Pickering, "as the army marched up- 
wards on the eastern side of the Schuylkill, in its rear I fell in 
with General Greene. We descended the bank of Perkiomen 
Creek together, and while our horses were drinking, I said to 
him : ' General Greene, before I came to the army, I enter- 
tained an exalted opinion of General Washington's military 
talents, but I have since seen nothing to enhance it.' I did 
not venture fo say it was sensibly lowered, though that was 
the fact; and so Greene understood me, for he instantly 
answered in these words precisely: 'Why, the General does 
want decision; for my part, I decide in a moment.' " 

The biographer of Greene then adds this delightful com- 
ment and naive confession, breathing in its every word the 
whole spirit of the Weems school and Washington cult: 
"That Greene did decide, after a careful examination of 
facts, with marvellous promptitude, is asserted by all who 
knew him, and proved by all his independent acts. Still, I 
could wish that he had never permitted himself to call Wash- 
ington's decision in question ; for the hereditary reverence I 
have been trained up in for that wonderful man, and which 
Greene's precept and example have made traditional in his 
family, renders it difficult for me to enter into the feelings of 
those who, acting with him, and loving and revering him, and 
^ See Massachusetts Historical Society, Proceedings, XLIV, 233. 



168 MILITARY STUDIES 

putting full faith in his civic talents, still permitted them- 
selves — as Hamilton and Pickering and Steuben are known 
to have done — to doubt his military talents." 

Then follows, in a foot-note: ''I have been counselled not 
to repeat this anecdote; but, as I interpret the historian's 
duty, the suppression of a characteristic fact is a practical 
falsehood. Greene saw faults in Washington, but saw too 
that they were outbalanced by his virtues. Lafayette tells us 
that Washington's 'reluctance to change opinion' led him 
to expose himself and his suite to a serious danger. Did 
Lafayette look up to him with any the less reverence?" 

Further comment is unnecessary. Volumes could not 
express more; but, followed in that spirit, 

"Science is a blind man's guess 
And History a nurse's tale." 

Finally, as to the two opponents confronting each other at 
the chess-board of the Kriegspiel which has now been passed 
in review, — Howe and Washington. Of Howe it is not 
easy to find much that is pleasant or anj^thing commendatory 
to sa3^ Trevelyan, after his kindly fashion, tries to part from 
him with a few pleasantish words, but does so with at best 
indifferent success. He says of him that he was ''an indul- 
gent commander ; who lived and let live ; and who, when 
off duty, was as genial to his followers, high and low, as on 
the actual day of battle he was formidable to the enemy." 
But, when it came to presenting an estimate of Sir William 
Howe, Charles Stedman enjoyed far better opportunities for 
so doing than Sir George Trevelyan ; and, if the cold historical 
truth is the thing sought, Stedman's measured but stern in- 
dictment of the British commander should be read in close con- 
junction with Trevelyan's words of friendly farewell. A man 
of unquestioned physical courage, as a soldier Howe was a 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 169 

very passable tactician. Face to face, on the way to a field 
of battle or on that field itself, he never failed both to out- 
manoeuvre and to out-fight Washington; but, on the other 
hand, he had no conception of a large strategy, or of the value 
of time and energy as factors in warfare. Most companion- 
able, he was lax in morals, physically self-indulgent and in- 
dolent in the extreme. In no way either thoughtful or studi- 
ous, he was without any proper sense of obligation, personal 
or professional ; and, moreover, there is reason to suspect 
that he was somewhat disposed to jealousy of those who 
might be considered in the line of succession to him,^ espe- 
cially of Sir Guy Carleton and General Burgoyne, who chanced 
both to be his seniors, the last by no less than seven years. 
Receiving at Bunker Hill a severe lesson in his over-confident 
attempt at a frontal attack, he afterwards showed a fair 
degree of skill in a recourse to flanking tactics; but, judged 
by the higher standards of this sort of work both before and 
since, what he accomplished was in no degree memorable. 
As a man of thirty he led Wolfe's famous scaling party at 
Quebec on the morning of September 13, 1759; but in 1777 
he was forty-eight years old, and, becoming heavy in person, 
had apparently lost any mental or physical alertness he might 
once have possessed. Certainly, it cannot be claimed that 
during the campaigns of either 1776 or 1777 he evinced the 
possession of either personal character or professional skill. 
In 1777 his failure to grasp the controlling factors of the situa- 
tion was so gross as to excite surprise at the time, and after- 
wards to defy all efforts at explanation either by himself or 
the historian. It remains to this day a puzzle, or worse; 
for, in plain language, his course, as already intimated, was 
suggestive at least of jealousy and disloyalty, if not of actual 
treachery. If he did not intentionally betray him, he wan- 
1 Fisher, Chap. LIX, with authorities oited. 



170 MILITARY STUDIES 

tonly abandoned Burgoyne to his fate. A man, in short, of 
the Charles II type, he set the worst possible example to his 
subordinates, and did much to debauch and demoralize the 
army entrusted to him. Altogether, it can hardly be denied 
that, in 1777, he was, in mess-room parlance, a rather poor 
shote.^ 

Washington, on the other hand, impresses one throughout 
as being a clear-headed, self-centred Virginia planter and 
gentleman of the colonial period, noble-minded, serene and 
courageous, upon whom, at the mature age of forty-three, had 

1 Charles Lee was two years Howe's junior, Howe in 1775 being forty- 
eight and Lee forty-six. They had probably known each other before 
our Revolutionary troubles. Both had served in America during King 
George's War, Lee having been with Braddock at Fort Duquesne 
(1755), and Howe with Wolfe at Quebec (1759). Lee was a prisoner 
of war in New York, where Howe was in command, from December, 
1776, to April, 1778, and the two doubtless then saw more or less of 
each other. Subsequently Lee, writing to Benjamin Rush from the camp 
at Valley Forge, June 4, 1778, gave to his correspondent the following 
pen-and-ink sketch of Howe, who had then shortly before laid down his 
command and gone to England: "From my first acquaintance with Mr. 
Howe I liked him. I thought him friendly, candid, good natur'd, brave 
and rather sensible than the reverse. I believe still that he is naturally 
so, but a corrupt or more properly speaking no* education, the fashion 
of the times . . . have so totally perverted his understanding and heart, 
that private friendship has not force sufficient to keep a door open for 
the admittance of mercy towards political Heretieks. . . . He is besides 
the most indolent of mortals. ... I believe he scarcely ever read the 
letters he signed. . . . You will say that I am drawing my Friend Howe 
in more ridiculous colors than He has yet been represented in — but this 
is his real character — He is naturally good humour'd and complacent, but 
illiterate and ignorant to the last degree unless as executive Soldier, in 
which capacity He is all fire and activity, brave and cool as Julius Csesar 
— his understanding is, as I observ'd before rather good than otherwise, 
but was totally confounded and stupify'd by the immensity of the task 
impos'd upon him — He shut his eyes, fought his battles, drank his bottle, 
had his little whore, advis'd with his Counsellors, received his orders from 
North and Germain, one more absurd than the other, took Galloways 
opinion, shut his eyes, fought again, and is now I suppose to be called to 
Account for acting according to instructions ; but I believe his eyes are now 
open'd.*: — Lee Papers, II, 397-398. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 171 

been imposed the conduct of a cause through the command of 
the simulacrum of an army, A man of dignified presence and 
the purest morals, his courage, both moral and physical, was 
unquestioned ; but, frequently puzzled and hesitating, he 
showed a proneness to councils of war in no way characteristic 
of the born commander of men. As a strategist, he was 
scarcely superior to Howe ; while, as a tactician, Howe, me- 
diocre as in this respect he indisputably was, distinctly and 
invariably outclassed him. Washington fought two pitched 
battles in the 1777 campaign, neither of which can be justi- 
fied under the circumstances; and both of which he lost. 
His strategy was at the time and h-as since been characterized 
as Fabian, yet in every one of his campaigns he evinced a 
most un-Fabian reluctance to abandoning any position, even 
though of no strategic importance, or perhaps incapable of 
successful defence. It was so at Brooklyn and on Manhattan 
Island in 1776; and, again, on the Delaware in 1777. In 
both cases he was, in fact, altogether too ready to fight. To 
characterize such a strategy and tactics as Fabian is in- 
dicative of complete misconception both of terms and op- 
erations ; they are the reverse of Fabian. That the tools with 
which he had to work were poor, unwieldy and altogether too 
often unreliable does not admit of question ; but it is the part 
of great commanders to make good such deficiencies in un- 
expected ways. This Washington failed to do. What he 
lacked is obvious, though then it could not have been forth- 
coming, — a trained and experienced chief of staff, a man 
who would have been to him what Gneisenau was to Bliicher 
in 1815, and what A. A. Humphreys was to General Meade 
during sixteen months of the Army of the Potomac. Among 
the revolutionary officers Greene unquestionably would 
most nearly have met the requirements of the place ; but 
Greene, though naturally a soldier, was self-taught and lacked 



172 MILITARY STUDIES 

experience. It is doubtful if he had any correct idea of the 
functions of a staff, and he certainly was not familiar with 
the details of a complete military organization, even to the 
degree that organization had attained prior to the wars of 
Napoleon. But, probably, it is fortunate no such position 
then existed ; for, had it existed, some foreigner would al- 
most certainly have been selected to fill it ; and it would be 
difficult to name any foreigner, adventurer or otherwise, who 
in the American service has ever yet really understood either 
American conditions or the American as a soldier. Almost 
invariably such bring to their task European notions and 
formulas ; and such do not apply. Essentially a volunteer, 
a ranger and a rifleman, the American soldier has an instinc- 
tive dislike for the European martinet; and, curiously 
enough, Washington himself neither understood nor used the 
American soldier as did Greene and Morgan in the Revo- 
lution, Jackson in the War of 1812, or Grant, Sherman and 
Sheridan, on the one side, and Lee, Jackson and Forrest on 
the other in the War of Secession. 

In one respect, however, and a most important respect, 
Washington was supremely and uniformly fortunate, — his 
luck as respects those opposed to him in the game of war was 
notable and uniform. Gage, Howe, Clinton, fairly vied with 
each other in their low level of the British commonplace, — 
what Stedman most happily terms ''monotonous mediocrity." 
Finally, as has elsewhere been said, Washington, courageous 
and enduring, confident himself and inspiring confidence in 
others, great in saving Common Sense, was unequalled in the 
possession of those qualities which go to make up what men 
know, and bend before, as Character. 

Not only in this respect but in his other limitations as well 
as attributes, a study of Washington is suggestive of William 
of Orange. Each evinced throughout life and under most 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMPAIGN OF 1777 173 

trying conditions the same overruling sense of duty and obli- 
gation, — the same steadfastness and serenity in presence of 
adversity, an equal saneness of judgment and patient con- 
fidence in the cause to which fate had devoted him. As a 
soldier, William did not excel. Confronted in Alva with a 
really capable military opponent, he never won a battle, and 
his campaigns were utter failures. The Spaniard in fact did 
with him almost as he pleased ; yet the Dutchman was in- 
domitable. Though between the Duke of Alva and Lieuten- 
ant-General Sir William Howe no comparison can, of course, 
be instituted, it was much the same in this respect with 
Washington. Neither William nor Washington evinced in 
his career the possession of any highly developed military or 
strategic instinct. In both also there was a noticeable ab- 
sence of aggressive will power; and, moreover, be it added 
of that dangerous and ill-boding arbitrariness of disposition 
almost invariably the concomitant of an excess of will power. 
In Washington, as in William, there was likewise noticeable 
a certain lack of intellectual alertness, amounting at times 
almost to a slowness of apprehension. 

By universal admission there is no more considerable, as 
well as admirable, figure in all modern history than William 
the Silent ; and, while he stands forth as the great historical 
prototype of Washington, it may not unfairly be asserted the 
latter suffers nothing in a comparison with him. 



V 

THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS* 

Weiting in India, in his sixty-eighth year, Sir Charles 
Napier, in reminiscent mood, thus referred to certain inci- 
dents in his earlier life, when, a young man of twenty-eight, 
he was serving under Wellington, in his famous Peninsular 
campaigns : — 

'^September 27th [1849]. — Anniversary of Busaco, where 
Wellington first essayed the courage of the Portuguese 
troops. . . . Well, Busaco was the great test, and a very 
beautiful fight it was. The French were in the valley, 
shrouded in mist when the morning broke and the running 
fire of the outposts began ; soon an irregular but very sharp 
musquetry rung through the gradually dispersing mist, 
which, mingled with smoke, came up the mountain, and from 
it many wounded men broke out. The picquets then 
appeared, being driven back, but firing so hard that our line 
loudly cheered them from the crest above : following fast 
came the enemy's columns, and eighty pieces of cannon 
opened with a roar from the summit of the mountain, send- 
ing shrapnels, shells and round shot down on them. The 
battle was thus begun, and soon they reached us. The 
firing rolled loud and heavy, the shouts of our men were 
grand, and their charges in different parts of the line went 
fiercely home. I was hit, woe the whUe for me'! Now, 
thirty-nine years after, the horrid suffocation of that wound 

1 From the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Second 
Series, Vol. XIII, 412-433. Recast, revised and enlarged. 

174 



THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 175 

is scarcely endurable. Oh! it shakes my very soul, the 
horror of this feeling does ! ' I was carried into a small 

chapel of the convent of Busaco [Presently] I got 

up from the pallet on which I had been laid, walked clean 
out, and got to the convent door, looking for my horse. I 
was however seized instantly by Edward Pakenham, and 
led back with this expression, 'Damn it, Napier, are you 
mad to think you can go back in this state to the action ? 
Be quiet for God's sake!' I could not speak plain, as my 
jaw was broke, and blood flowed freely from my mouth, so 
my looks were worse than the reality. . . . Poor Edward 
Pakenham was wounded at Busaco, which was what brought 
him to the convent, and having been dressed he was return- 
ing to the battle when he caught me trying to do the same. 
Poor fellow! He was a heroic man, that Edward Paken- 
ham, and it was a thousand pities he died in defeat : it was 
not his fault, that defeat." 

It was at New Orleans, a little more than four years after 
the Busaco fight here referred to by Napier, that this Edward 
Pakenham thus "died in defeat." The battle in which he 
died, fought in the early morning hours of January 8, 1815, 
was the sequel of what had occurred at Bladensburg five 
months before. The general in command of the British 
force had, it is true, been changed, for Major-General Robert 
Ross was killed before Baltimore, and Sir Edward Paken- 
ham, fresh from the battle fields of the Peninsula, had suc- 
ceeded him. But the British regiments, which had, simply 

_ 1 Sir Charles Napier, then suffering from an attack of a chronic trouble 
with which he was afflicted, thus wrote at Orleans, France, May 8, 1848 : 
"Perhaps there is no better way of dying, except apoplexy: that is 
prince of deaths ! No pain, no preparation, no trouble to friends. You 
go 'like shot out of a shovel.' I know it! God defend me from the 
suffocating feel in my nose, produced by my horrid wound at Busaco • 
rather would I be broke upon the wheel.': 



176 MILITARY STUDIES 

with a volley, a shout and a rush, walked over the American 
line at Bladensburg, all took part in the attempt to do the 
same at New Orleans. The tactics, if such they deserve to 
be called, were in each case identical, — they were those of 
the football field. In other words, at Bladensburg the 
British officers, proceeding in conformity with their simple 
traditional rules, endeavored to do, and succeeded in doing, 
exactly what they intended to do, and failed in doing, at 
Bunker Hill ; that is, they marched up directly in face of 
the defending force, carried the position with little loss, 
routed their opponents, and then, as matter of course, cap- 
tured the objective those opponents were there to defend. 
The proceeding was perfectly simple, — a body of superior 
troops carrying by frontal assault weakly defended defen- 
sive positions. Examined in this connection, however. Bun- 
ker Hill and New Orleans afford the basis of a study, not 
only interesting in itself, but extremely suggestive as illus- 
trating racial characteristics as developed in actual warfare. 
For, in any carefully considered account of the operations 
of December, 1814, and January, 1815, before New Orleans 
the suddenly levied, and hence undisciplined force of Amer- 
ican riflemen and rangers, under command of Andrew 
Jackson, must necessarily be brought in striking contrast 
with the highly organized battalions of British veterans 
directed and led by an officer trained in the school of Wel- 
lington. 

And, first, something needs to be said of Sir Edward 
Pakenham, and his record in the Spanish peninsula. In 
Great Britain, even more than in America, Pakenham is an 
almost forgotten military character. The reason for this 
oblivion, so far as his own country is concerned, will pres- 
ently appear; but, in America, so far as he is mentioned 
at all, he has been misunderstood when not misrepresented. 



THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 177 

A brother of the wife of the Duke of Wellington, it is as- 
sumed that, because of family influence, he was entrusted 
with a command. Brave to rashness, it is next assumed 
that otherwise he was quite incompetent. A more careful 
examination of his record in the light of recently published 
memoirs of those closely associated with Sir Edward lead 
to the conclusion that he was in many respects a very dif- 
ferent and much more interesting character, not undeserving 
even at this late day of kindly and appreciative mention. 

James Parton was by birth English, and in his Life of 
Jackson — one of the most picturesque and vivid biogra- 
phies, be it said, in the language — Parton speaks thus of 
the class to which Pakenham belonged ; and his words were 
no less true of those prominent in the recent war in South 
Africa than of those who fought in the Peninsula, at Water- 
loo and at New Orleans nearly a century before. The 
characteristics are racial. 

"The British service seems to develop every high and noble 
quality of man and soldier, except generalship. Up to the hour 
when the British soldier holds an independent command, he is 
the most assured and competent of men. Give him a plain, 
unconditional order — Go and do that — and he will go and do it 
with a cool, self-forgetting pertinacity of daring that can scarcely 
be too much admired. All of the man below the eyebrows is 
perfect. The stout heart, the high purpose, the dexterous hand, 
the enduring frame are his. But the work of a general in com- 
mand demands head — a cool, calculating head, fertile in expedi- 
ents; a head that is the controlling power of the man. And this 
article of head, which is the rarest production of nature every- 
where, is one which the brave British soldier is apt to be signally 
wanting in; and never so much so as when responsibility rests 
upon him." 

Turning back now to Sir William Napier's famous narra- 
tive of the Peninsular War, in it there is a spirited account of 



178 MILITARY STUDIES 

the battle of Salamanca, fought by Wellington on the 22d 
of July, 1812, a year after Busaco and about thirty months 
before New Orleans, a battle in which Pakenham won great 
distinction. Then thirty-five years of age, he commanded, 
temporarily, what was known as the Third, or Picton's 
Division of Wellington's army, familiarly spoken of as the 
'^Fighting Third." 

Napier, himself a combatant that day, says that at about 
three o'clock in the afternoon a report reached Wellington — 
'Hhat the French left was rapidly fronting towards the 
Ciudad Rodrigo Road. Starting up he repaired to the high 
ground and observed their movements for some time with a 
stern contentment, for their left wing was then entirely 
separated from the center; the fault was flagrant, and he 
fixed it with the stroke of a thunderbolt. A few orders 
issued from his lips like the incantations of a vv^izard, and 
suddenly the dark mass of troops which covered the English 
Hermanito seemed agitated by some might}^ spirit; rush- 
ing violently down the interior slope of the mountain they 
entered the great basin amidst a storm of bullets which 
appeared to shear away the whole surface of the earth over 
which they were moving. , . . The Third Division was, 
however, still hidden from (Marmont ^) by the western 
heights, and he hoped the tempest of bullets under which the 
British line was moving in the basin beneath wo aid check it 
until he could bring up his reserve divisions. ... In this 
crisis, despatching officer after officer to hasten up his troops 
from the forest, others to stop the progress of his left wing, 
he with fierce and sanguine expectation still looked for 
victory, until he saw Pakenham with the Third Division 

1 Due de Ragusa. Youngest of Napoleon's marshals, Marmont was 
born in 1774, made marshal in 1809, and died at Vienna in 1852. 
He had in 1811 succeeded Massena in command of the forces opposed to 
Wellington. 



THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 179 

shoot like a meteor across [his subordinate, General] Mau- 
cune's path ; then pride and hope alike died with him, and 
desperately he was hurrying in person to that fatal point 
when an exploding shell stretched him on the earth." 

Salamanca has been pronounced 'Hhe most soldierly and 
skilful" of all AVellington's battles, and he himself con- 
sidered it the occasion which best proved his military genius. 
The use then made of the Third Division was the master 
stroke of the day. The details of what occurred, as given in 
the several narratives, are curious, and, in several ways, 
suggestive. They in the first place are in all the renderings 
individually as well as racially characteristic ; in the next, 
they illustrate well the school of British soldiership in which 
Pakenham had that education which resulted in the assault 
on Jackson's lines below New Orleans ; and, finally, not 
least suggestive of all, a good example is furnished of the 
extreme difficulty attendant on an effort at anything ap- 
proaching accuracy on a point of historical detail. One 
account says that when Wellington saw the gap in his 
opponent's formation, he at once turned it to account. 
''^Now's your time, Ned,' he said to Pakenham, who stood 
near him. The hint was enough. Pakenham kissed his 
brother-in-law, and, giving the word to his division, moved 
on, and won the battle." ^ The next account, obviously 
taken almost verbatim from the foregoing, reads as fol- 
lows : Watching the gap in his opponent's line widen, 
'''Now's your time, Ned,' (Wellington) said to Pakenham, 
who was standing near him; and the words were scarcely 
spoken before Pakenham gave the word to his division, and 
commenced the movement which won the battle."^ The 

^ G. R. Gleig, in Appleton's Cyclopedia of American Biography, vol. 
IV, "Pakenham." 

2 Dictionary of National Biography, "Pakenham." 



180 MILITARY STUDIES 

next rendering of this family incident is equally graphic, 
but quite different: ''Pakenhana was in command of 'the 
Fighting Third/ and Wellington's orders were given to him 
in person, and with unconventional bluntness. 'Do you 
see those fellows on the hill, Pakenham/ he said, pointing 
to where the French columns were now visible ; ' throw 
your division into columns of battalions at them directly, 
and drive them to the devil ! ' Pakenham, an alert and 
fiery soldier, formed his battalions into column with a word, 
and took them swiftly forward in an attack described by 
admiring onlookers as 'the most spirited and most perfect 
thing of the kind ever seen.'" ^ 

The last, and what must be considered the most official 
account of what the English commander-in-chief really did 
and actually said on this dramatic and memorable occasion 
is that in Sir Herbert Maxwell's Life of Wellington (I, 281). 
And, in the first place, it may not be improper to observe 
that, when Salamanca was fought, ''Our Special Head- 
Quarters Correspondent" had not yet been evolved; and 
Wellington most distinctly discouraged the presence of 
civilians within the sphere of his operations. Looking upon 
them as interlopers, he was strongly inclined to treat them 
as spies. There is consequently no authentic contempo- 
raneous report of his exact words and acts on the occasion 
in question. It is not unsafe, however, to surmise that 
Wellington then gave no "hints" to his brother-in-law, nor 
did the brother-in-law indulge in any osculation in return 
for the same. Wellington, a somewhat grim personality, was 
not given to "hints" on the field of battle, nor was kissing 
conspicuously in order in the English Peninsular service. It 
is tolerably safe, therefore, to dismiss these two details as, so 
to speak, unhistorical. Others will follow presentl3\ 
1 Fitchet, How England saved Europe, III, 325-326. 



THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 181 

This is the Maxwell account : Wellington had during 
the morning hours been observing Marmont's movements 
from the Oripile. Shortly after mid-day he had withdrawn 
and was snatching a hasty meal in the rear of a farm build- 
ing exposed to the enemy's fire, when, as he was ^'stumping 
about and munching," word was brought him of the open- 
ing offered by Marmont's false move. Mounting at once, 
he galloped back to his former point of observation. Ob- 
serving the movement for a time, with Napier's ''stern con- 
tentment," he presently ordered the formation of the Fifth 
Division ; he then dashed off to where the Third was resting. 
Riding up to Pakenham, he said, "Ned, d'ye see those 
fellows on the hill ? Throw your division into column ; 
at them! and drive them to the devil!" He then at once 
returned at speed to the Oripile, whence he came. This was 
at one o'clock. Movements on the field of battle take time; 
orders are not executed as soon as uttered ; and it was five 
o'clock, or four whole hours later, before the head of Paken- 
ham's division struck the advancing French formation. 

Unlike the others, this rendering has a natural sound. 
There is in it no suggestion of "hints," no kissing, no in- 
stantaneous movement; but a doubt does suggest itself as 
to the exact words used. They are not quite Welling- 
tonian. The destination of the driving is not altogether in 
accordance with the somewhat picturesque as well as forci- 
ble Peninsular usage as it has come to us, and it is more 
probable that Wellington indicated "hell" as the terminal 
point of the "drive" than that he named "the devil." 

However this may be, and it is not important, it is now 
in order to return to Napier's trumpet-toned narrative of 
what next occurred: "It was about five o'clock when 
Pakenham fell on Maucune's first division under Thomieres, 
who had then just reached an isolated open hill at the ex- 



182 MILITARY STUDIES 

tremity of the southern range of heights. . . . The counter 
stroke was terrible ! Two batteries of artillery placed on 
the summit of the western heights suddenly took his troops 
in flank, Pakenham's mass of infantry supported by cavalry 
and guns was bearing full on his front, and two thirds of 
his own division, lengthened out and unconnected, were 
still behind in a wood where they could hear but could not 
see the storm which was bursting : from the chief to the 
lowest soldier, all felt they were lost, and in an instant 
Pakenham, the most frank and gallant of men, commenced 
the battle. . . . Bearing onwards with the might of a 
giant, Pakenham broke the half -formed lines into fragments 
and sent the whole in confusion upon the supporting col- 
umns. . . . Some French squadrons now fell on the flank 
of the third division ; . . . but Pakenham, continuing his 
tempestuous course, found the remainder of Thomieres' 
division very imperfectly arrayed on the wooded heights 
behind the first hill, offering two fronts. ... In this 
oppressed state, while Pakenham was pressing their left 
with a conquering violence, whUe the fifth division was 
wasting their ranks with fire, the interval between those 
divisions was suddenly filled with a whirling cloud of dust 
which moved swiftly forward, carrying with it the tram- 
pling sound of a charging multitude. . . . Anson's cavalry 
had suffered little in the charge, and now passing quite over 
the ridge were joined by D'Urban's horsemen and took the 
place of Le Marchant's exhausted men. United with the 
third and fifth divisions and the guns, they formed one for- 
midable line more than a mile in advance of where Paken- 
ham had commenced the battle, and that impetuous officer, 
with unmitigable fury, was still pressing forward, spreading 
terror and confusion." 

Such was the estimate of Edward Pakenham held by the 



THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 183 

famous English field marshal, and by England's most 
distinguished military historian. To a like effect, Welling- 
ton, shortly after Salamanca, wrote to the Horse Guards in 
London, strongly commending the ''celerity and accuracy" 
which marked Pakenham's conduct of the operations of 
that day, adding, "Pakenham may not be the brightest 
genius, but my partiality for him does not lead me astray 
when I tell you that he is one of the best we have." These 
three estimates, from such different quarters and so sepa- 
rated in time, certainly give a favorable impression of the 
chief victim of the 8th of January, — the defeated of New 
Orleans. Looking at that battle from his point of view, 
it now remains to explain, if possible, why and how it was 
that this ''heroic soul" — "the most frank and gallant of 
men" — went, as he did, to his own death, while thrusting 
his storming columns against breastworks bristling with ar- 
tillery and swarming with riflemen; thus seeking, in bull- 
headed fashion, to accomplish a result which could have 
been secured in another and more scientific way absolutely 
without loss. For, strange as it sounds to American ears, 
New Orleans was on the 8th of January, 1815, within the 
easy grasp of the British army. 

After the death of Ross before Baltimore, September 12, 
1814, the British War Office looked about for some one to 
take charge of active operations in America. The field of 
these it was proposed to transfer from Chesapeake Bay to 
the Gulf of Mexico, making New Orleans the military ob- 
jective. The conflict with Napoleon had then been brought 
to a triumphant, and, apparently, final close ; Napoleon, 
having abdicated six months before, was in exile at Elba. 
Though the campaign of Waterloo was to open less than six 
months later, Wellington's veteran army of the Peninsula 
had already been withdrawn from the south of France, 



184 MILITARY STUDIES 

and largely disbanded. Wellington himself was in London. 
Under these circumstances, it was proposed to send him to 
America, not only to take charge of operations in the field, 
but with full powers to negotiate, and bring hostilities to a 
close ; for that struggle was after all but a side show to the 
great European conflict. That ended, why prolong the side 
show? For very sufficient reasons connected with the still 
disturbed aspect of continental affairs, it was not deemed ex- 
pedient to have Wellington out of immediate reach, and the 
choice of a successor to Ross was left to him. He desig- 
nated his brother-in-law, Pakenham. Sailing from Ports- 
mouth in November, Sir Edward was accompanied among 
others by Brigade-Major Smith, afterward Lieutenant-Gen- 
eral Sir Harry Smith, whose autobiography, published in 
1909, affords some lifelike glimpses of his commander. 
Smith, having often come in contact with him in the Penin- 
sula, thought highly of Pakenham. Referring to him as 
'Mear Sir Edward," he describes him as '^a most light- 
hearted fellow" and ''one of the most amusing persons 
imaginable — high-minded and chivalrous in every idea, 
and to our astonishment very devoutly inclined"; he adds, 
''I never served under a man whose good opinion I was so 
desirous of having," and 'Ho fall in his estimation would 
have been worse than death by far." 

A brave officer, trained in the European school of actual 
warfare during a period in which the bayonet was still 
looked upon as the effective weapon, and rifle marksman- 
ship was not yet highly regarded, Pakenham's bravery was 
"of that animated intrepid cast that he applied his mind 
vigorously at the moment to the position of his own troops 
as well as that of the enemy . . . but he never avoided a 
fight of any sort." In other words, an excellent subordi- 
nate in Spain, — a most effective weapon in the hands of 



THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 185 

Wellington, -he was, as an officer in independent command 
under American conditions, to him altogether strange no 
match for Andrew Jackson. ' 

Strategically speaking, the object of his campaign was 
obvious. It was the capture of New Orleans. The destruc- 
tion of Jackson's army was desirable as an incident, but by 
no means necessary to the end in view. The British base 
of supplies was close to the objective point, and communica- 
tion could easily be kept up either by the right bank of the 
river, or by the river itself; or, indeed, by the left bank 
provided only Jackson could be forced from his lines. The 
essential thing was to compel him to leave his lines. If he 
did so, he must abandon New Orleans to the British. From 
a tactical point of view the situation was different. Through 
a reconnoissance in force, and as the result of an artillery 
action, it had been ascertained that Jackson's lines were 
strong, and would be extremely difficult to carry by assault 
The assaulting party, whether it approached from the cen- 
tre or on either wing, would be subjected to a converging 
fire of artniery and riflemen. Under these circumstances 
It would obviously have been the part of a skilful tactician 
to endeavor to turn Jackson out of his works by render- 
ing them untenable. This the English commander could 
perfectly well have done. Being in close proximity to New 
Orleans, — only four miles from that, his objective, point 
- all General Pakenham had to do was to pass a strong 
division of his army across the Mississippi to its western 
bank, and by it threaten, if he did not capture. New Orleans 
from the west side of the river, operating from that side on 
Jackson's flank and rear. The Mississippi was less than 
half a mile m width; its current, varying with the tide, did 
not at that season of the year exceed four mOes an hour 
and presented no obstacle to crossing by boat or barge' 



186 MILITARY STUDIES 

which could likewise be propelled upstream by hugging the 
convex or western bank. Pakenham had from the fleet an 
abundance of boats at his disposal, well manned by saUors; 
and, by establishing his artillery upon the western bank, he 
could enfilade Jackson's line, searching his works within easy 
range, and rendering them, in case of assault, practically 
untenable. Under such circumstances, Jackson would have 
had no choice but to vacate his position, and allow New 
Orleans to fall. 

It has always been assumed that Pakenham, after the wont 
of the English officer, preferred a direct assault, — that, 
greatly underrating his antagonist, the recent Bladensburg 
experience lured him on. So far as that portion of the force 
composing his army which arrived with him was concerned, 
this is unquestionably true; and, in the literature of the 
campaign, it is curious to come across footprints of the fact. 
Pakenham joined the army before New Orleans on the morn- 
ing of Christmas Day, 1814, — only two weeks before the 
battle. The English had then already met with much stiffer 
resistance than they had anticipated, and those whom 
Pakenham relieved of command recognized the difficulty of 
the confronting problem. Nevertheless, as the reenforce- 
ments the new commander-in-chief brought with him stepped 
on shore, not a few of them expressed their fears lest they 
should be too late to take part in the advance, as they 
thought New Orleans would be captured before they could 
get into line. On the 7th of January, the day before the 
battle, as one of the newly arrived regiments moved towards 
the front, passing another regiment which had been at Blad- 
ensburg, some of the officers of the former remarked to those 
of the latter that ''it would be now our turn to get into New 
Orleans, as they had done at Washington." 

On the other hand, Jackson at this juncture evinced one 



THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 187 

of the highest and rarest attributes of a great general : he 
read correctly the mind of his opponent, — divined his course 
of action. And yet it was a narrow chance ; for, it now 
appears that the British commander was not so completely 
impervious to reason and changed conditions as has been 
supposed. According to Smith, who was then serving as 
the senior officer of his staff, Pakenham, immediately after 
getting on the ground, reconnoitred Jackson's position. As 
the result of so doing he came to the conclusion that it could 
not be successfully assailed in front or on either flank. Smith 
asserts that being asked for his opinion, he then said in 
reply, "As yet the enemy has not occupied the opposite 
[right] bank of the river. We must possess the right bank, 
enfilade the enemy's position with our fire, and, so soon as 
we open a fire from the right bank, we should storm the 
work in two, three or more columns." This opinion, Smith 
says, commended itself to Pakenham, and he proceeded 
accordingly, giving orders for the erection of batteries. As 
the proposed movement assumed shape, it naturally caused 
Jackson anxiety. All depended on its magnitude. If it 
was the operation in chief of the British army, New 
Orleans could hardly be saved. Enfiladed, and threatened 
in his rear from the west bank, Jackson must fall back. 
If, however, the west bank movement was only a diver- 
sion in favor of a main assault planned on his front, the 
demonstration across the river might be checked, or prove 
immaterial. As the thing developed during the night pre- 
ceding the battle, Commodore Patterson, who commanded 
the American naval contingent on the river, became 
alarmed, and hurried a despatch to Jackson, advising him 
of what was taking place, and begging immediate reenforce- 
ment. At one o'clock in the morning the messenger roused 
Jackson from sleep, stating his errand. Jackson listened 



188 MILITARY STUDIES 

to the despatch, and at once said: ''Hurry back and tell 
Commodore Patterson that he is mistaken. The main 
attack will be on this side, and I have no men to spare. 
General Morgan must maintain his position at all hazards." 
To use a vernacular, but expressive, term, Jackson had 
''sized" Pakenham correctly, — when the moment came, 
he could be depended on not to do what the occasion re- 
quired. He would not throw a sufficient force across the 
river, and move on his objective by a practically undefended 
road, merely holding his enemy in check on the east bank. 
Had he done so, he would have acted in disregard of that 
first principle both of tactics and strategy which forbade 
the division of a force in presence of an enemy in such a way 
that the two parts are not in position to support each other ; 
— but he would have taken New Orleans ! An attack in 
front was, on the contrary, in accordance with British mili- 
tary traditions and the recent experience of Bladensburg. 
Pakenham acted accordingly. In his main assault he sac- 
rificed his army and lost his own life, sustaining an almost 
unexampled defeat; while his partial movement across the 
river was completely successful so far as it was pressed, 
opening a straight and practicable road to New Orleans, 
and gravely jeopardizing Jackson's position. A mere 
diversion or auxiliary operation, the principal attack having 
failed it was not persisted in. 

Possibly it might by some now be argued that had Paken- 
ham thus weakened his force on the east side of the river 
by operating on New Orleans and on Jackson's flank and 
rear from the west side, in the way suggested, a vigorous 
fighting opponent, such as Jackson unquestionably was, 
might have turned the tables on him, for thus violating an 
elementary rule of warfare. Leaving his lines, and boldly 
taking the aggressive, Jackson, it will then be urged, might 



THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 189 

have overwhelmed the British force in his front, thus cutting 
the column operating west of the river from the fleet and its 
base of supplies, — in fact, destroying the expedition. Not 
improbably Pakenham argued in this way; if he did, how- 
ever, he simply demonstrated his incompetence for high 
command. He failed to grasp the situation, or put a correct 
estimate on its conditions; for it is the part of a skilful 
commander to know when to secure results by making ex- 
ceptions to even the most general and the soundest rules. 
Pakenham, it is true, grossly exaggerated the number of 
the force confronting him. He, and those with him, put 
them at from 26,000 to 30,000 ; but all militia. In point of 
fact, however, his command outnumbered that of Jackson 
by about two to one; while, moreover, the British were 
veterans, those composing Jackson's levy were hardly more 
than raw recruits, — like the South African Boers, good 
material, well accustomed to handling rifles. As one of 
the best of his own brigadiers, General Adair, afterwards 
expressed it, ''our men were militia without discipline, 
and if once beaten, they could not be relied on again." 
They were, in fact, men of exactly the same temper and 
stuff as those who were stampeded by a volley and a shout 
at Bladensburg; and the unpleasant principle of military 
morale thus stated by General Adair was only that learned 
by Washington at Kips Bay forty years previous. The 
force Pakenham had under his command before New Orleans 
was, on the other hand, composed of seasoned soldiers of 
the best class. In the open field and on anything approach- 
ing equality of position, he had absolutel}^ nothing to fear. 
He might safely provoke attack ; indeed, the very most he 
could ask was to get Jackson out from behind his breast- 
works on almost any terms. So fully, moreover, did he real- 
ize this, that it inspired him to his assault. It is useless, 



190 MILITARY STUDIES 

therefore, to suggest that he hesitated to separate his force, 
overestimating Jackson's numbers and aggressive capacity. 
Had he done so, he would hardly have ventured to assail 
Jackson in front. On the contrary, Pakenham's trouble 
lay, not in overestimating, but in underestimating, his 
adversary. He failed to divide his force and operate on 
correct principles, not because he was afraid to do so, but 
because he did not know enough to do so. 

In case, then, dividing his command, Pakenham had 
thrown one half of it across the river to assail New Orleans 
in force and turn Jackson's rear, and then with the other 
half held his position on the east bank, thus keeping open his 
communications with the fleet, the only possible way in 
which Jackson could have taken advantage of the situation 
would have been by leaving his lines and attacking. 

Now, it so happens that resisting attack under just such 
circumstances is the position in which the British soldier 
has always developed his best staying qualities. Quebec 
was a case directly in point. Again, the men under Paken- 
ham before New Orleans were even more reliable than those 
who, only five months later at Waterloo, after the auxiliary 
troops had been swept from the field by the fury of the 
French attack, held their position from noon to a June sun- 
set against an assaulting force of nearly twice their number 
commanded by the Emperor himself. The somewhat un- 
reasoning bulldog tenacity of the English infantry under 
such circumstances is well known ; nor needs to be dilated on. 
But concerning it, there is a statement of the French marshal, 
Bugeaud, curious, and bearing on its face evidence that it 
was written by a military man of practical experience, 
— one who knew from his own recollections that whereof 
he spoke. Marshal Bugeaud, in making this statement, 
referred not to Waterloo, but to the operations in the Penin- 



THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 191 

sular War, — that school in which the soldiers under Paken- 
ham had learned their business. What he says reveals, 
moreover, a curious insight into the characteristics of the 
French and English infantry : — 

" The English generally occupied well chosen defensive positions, 
having a certain command, and they showed only a portion of their 
force. The usual artillery action first took place. Soon, in great 
haste, without studying the position, without taking time to ex- 
amine if there were means to make a flank attack, we marched 
straight on, taking the bull by the horns. About 1000 yards from 
the English line the men became excited, spoke to one another, 
and hurried their march ; the column began to be a little confused. 

"The English remained quite silent, with ordered arms, and 
from their steadiness appeared to be a long red wall. This steadi- 
ness invariably produced an effect on the young soldiers. 

"Very soon we got nearer, shouting 'Vive I'Empereur, en avant ! 
a la bayonette ! ' Shakos were raised on the muzzles of the mus- 
kets ; the columns began to double, the ranks got into confusion, 
the agitation produced a tumult ; shots were fired as we advanced. 

"The English line remained still, silent and immovable, with 
ordered arms, even when we were only 300 paces distant, and 
appeared to ignore the storm about to break. 

"The contrast was striking; in our inmost thoughts, each felt 
that the enemy was a long time in firing, and that this fire, reserved 
for so long, would be very unpleasant when it did come. Our 
ardour cooled. The moral power of steadiness, which nothing 
shakes (even if it be only in appearance), over disorder which 
stupefies itself with noise, overcame our minds. At this moment 
of intense excitement, the English wall shouldered arms, an in- 
describable feeling rooted many of our men to the ground, — they 
began to fire. The enemy's steady concentrated volleys swept 
our ranks ; decimated we turned round, seeking to recover our 
equilibrium : then three deafening cheers broke the silence of our 
opponents ; at the third they were on us, pushing our disorganized 
flight. But to our great surprise, they did not push their ad- 
vantage beyond a hundred yards, retiring calmly to their lines to 
await a second attack." 



192 MILITARY STUDIES 

Those thus vividly described by an hereditary race oppo- 
nent, who had himself confronted them, were the identical 
men Jackson would have had to attack, had he, as the only 
possible alternative to a precipitate retreat and the aban- 
donment of New Orleans, found himself compelled on the 
8th of January to leave his lines and assume the aggressive. 
Unfortunately for himself and for his command, Pakenham 
underestimated his opponent; and it is hardly necessary 
to say that, as an opponent, in a rough-and-tumble fight, 
whether street, political or military, Andrew Jackson was a 
factor not safe to regard lightly. Certainly on the 8th of 
January, 1815, Jackson was under about as great an obliga- 
tion to Pakenham as one man can be to another. Paken- 
ham offered Jackson his opportunity; and Jackson was 
equal to the occasion. 

From neither the strategic nor the tactical point of view 
is there, or, at the time, was there, anything new to be 
learned from the New Orleans episode. It was, as already 
more than once pointed out, in every essential respect 
merely Bunker Hill over again, — forty years after, — a 
body of highly disciplined veterans led by experienced 
officers confronted from behind improvised breastworks by 
intensely individual but scarcely organized rangers and 
riflemen. The assaulting party enjoyed in both cases the 
advantage of flanking water surroundings, and, having a 
complete maritime control, by an obvious movement could 
have made the position they undertook to storm wholly 
untenable by their opponents. Underestimating those 
opponents, though of the same blood as themselves, the 
British commander in each case elected to throw away the 
lives of those subject to his orders. The American rifleman 
under cover was simply beyond their powers of compre- 
hension. 



THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 193 

Thus the one really interesting and suggestive feature at 
New Orleans was the instinctive recourse of the American 
general to what may not unfairly be termed the racial char- 
acteristics of those composing the force under him — their 
individuality, their adaptability to conditions, their natural 
inclination to ranger tactics. If it had come to a line of 
battle formation or battalion evolutions under fire, the 
seasoned veterans from the Peninsula would, as at Bladens- 
burg, have made very short work of the American levies ; 
but, apparently, it never occurred to Jackson, a born 
fighter, to measure himself and his command against his 
opponent in that way ; and those composing his command 
instinctively recognized in Jackson one of themselves. He 
knew how to fight them for all they were worth ; and they 
knew that he knew it. The one chance, therefore, Paken- 
ham had was so to manoeuvre as to compel Jackson either to 
withdraw from in front of the British objective, or to come 
out and fight on Pakenham's own terms — '*^man fashion," 
as the expression went. Throwing away his opportunity 
to compel this, he took the consequences. 

And yet, studied in the light of Sir Harry Smith's auto- 
biographic statements, it is marvellous to see how close, for 
both Jackson and Pakenham, the call was. The British 
assault was to be made at dawn of the 8th. The storming 
columns were all moved into position during the earlier 
hours of the night. The firing of two rockets was to be the 
signal for assault. A detachment was meanwhile to be 
thrown across the river, to move up the right bank, 
capture the batteries, and turn the guns on Jackson's flank, 
enfilading his works at the moment they were assailed in 
front. To get the boats from the fleet, anchored in the 
bayou, across the intervening plantations to the river it 
was necessary to widen slightly a canal which connected the 



194 MILITARY STUDIES 

two. The river stood at higher level than the bayou ; con- 
sequently a certain amount of water had to be let into the 
canal, using it as a lock, so as to raise it to the necessary 
level. When it came to opening the river end, the bayou 
end was dammed ; but when the banks of the river were 
cut, the pressure of the inflowing water drove the dam out, 
and the delay necessary to repair the damage thus done 
prevented the boats being worked into the river at the hour 
assigned. Smith at that time was with the column of General 
Lambert, one of the three formed for the assault planned on 
the left, or eastern, bank. What ensued he thus describes : — 

"About half an hour before daylight, while I was with General 
Lambert's column, standing ready. Sir Edward Pakenham sent 
for me. I was soon with him. He was greatly agitated. ' Smith, 
most Commanders-in-Chief have many difficulties to contend with, 
but surely none Hke mine. The dam, as you heard me say it 
would, gave way, and Thornton's people will be of no use whatever 
to the general attack.' I said, 'So impressed have you ever been, 
so obvious is it in every military point of view, we should possess 
the right bank of the river, and thus enfilade and divert the atten- 
tion of the enemy ; there is still time before daylight to retire the 
columns now. We are under the enemy's fire so soon as discovered.' 
He says, ' This may be, but I have twice deferred the attack. We 
are strong in numbers now comparatively. It will cost more 
men, and the assault must be made.' I again urged delay. While 
we were talking, the streaks of daylight began to appear, although 
the morning was dull, close, and heavy, the clouds almost touching 
the ground. He said, 'Smith, order the rocket to be fired.' I 
again ventured to plead the cause of delay. He said, and very 
justly, ' It is now too late : the columns would be visible to the 
enemy before they could move out of fire, and would lose more 
men than it is to be hoped they will in the attack. Fire the 
rocket, I say, and go to Lambert.' This was done. . . . The 
rocket was hardly in the air before a rush of our troops was met 
by the most murderous and destructive fire of all arms ever poured 
upon column." 



THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS I95 

In the diary entry with which this paper began, Sir 
Charles Napier, a man presumably well informed on the 
facts of the particular case and one generally well qualified 
to express an opinion professionally, spoke of Pakenham as 
havmg died in defeat — a defeat " not his fault." And to 
the same effect, Captain Edward Codrington, as he then 
was, writing home to his wife from the British fleet shortly 
after the battle, said that Pakenham -fell a sacrifice to the 
errors of others." Codrington, on the spot and a partici- 
pant in the operations, was personally cognizant of the facts • 
Napier, writing long after the event, expressed a common 
understanding among contemporaries. To the same effect, 
Sir Harry Smith, with Pakenham up almost to the very 
moment of his death, writing long afterward, exclaimed • 
"Poor dear Sir Edward Pakenham, a hero, a soldier, a man 
of abUity in every sense of the word, had to contend with 
every imaginable difficulty, starting with the most unwise 
and difficult position in which he found the Army. By 
perseverance, determination, and that gallant bearing which 
so insures confidence, he overcame all but one, which he 
never anticipated, a check to the advance of British soldiers. 
... The fire, I admit, was the most murderous I ever 
beheld before or since." What then had all these in mind 
when each made the same or a similar reservation ? What 
was the British army belief at the time, and tradition after- 
wards, in regard to the outcome of the New Orleans expedi- 
tion and the fate of Wellington's brother-in-law? 

Neither the Ross expedition, which resulted in the cap- 
ture and burning of Washington, nor the Pakenham expe- 
dition, which ended as in this paper described, loom large in 
any except American military annals. As. already said, 
they were at best a mere side show to the larger and more 
concentrated drama then drawing to its close in Europe. 



196 MILITARY STUDIES 

America was in 1815 a remote region, very unfamiliar to 
Europeans; and, strange as such slowness in transmission 
now seems, the news of disaster to their arms at New Or- 
leans, and Pakenham's death, did not reach England until 
early in March. This was fifty days subsequent to the 
event, and ten whole weeks after formal announcement of 
the treaty, signed at Ghent (December 24) which should 
have brought the trans- Atlantic hostilities to a close. Those 
tidings thus would, in the ordinary course of events, have 
been suggestive only of a dying echo of the remote last gun 
of a long war ; but the course of events at that time was in 
no way '^ordinary." Not only England and English army 
circles, but all Europe, were, in the early days of March, 
1815, listening, not to the echoes of the last guns of a war 
which was ended, but for the deep reverberation of those 
which were to announce that a fresh life-and-death struggle 
had begun. And so, ''amid the excitement caused by the 
return from Elba, the battle of Waterloo, and the subsequent 
exile of the emperor, little was heard, and less was thought, 
of the events that had transpired in the delta of the Missis- 
sippi. A vague, brief and incorrect bulletin was published 
in the official Gazette, and then the expedition against New 
Orleans was allowed to be forgotten." ^ 

What then was the true inwardness of the fatal event of 
the morning of January 8? A formidable British fleet 
of sixty sail, carrying about a thousand guns and manned 
proportionately, made part of the New Orleans expedition- 
ary force. Of this naval contingent, Vice-Admiral Sir 
Alexander Cochrane was flag officer, as he had also been of 
the similar naval contingent during the joint operations in 
Chesapeake Bay, four months before. His recollection of 
what had taken place at Bladensburg was fresh as well as 
^ Parton, Jackson, II, 326. 



THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 197 

personal ; and he would have been less than English had he 
not felt the deepest contempt for the resisting qualities of 
hastily organized and undisciplined American levies, and 
given most outspoken expression thereof. He had come in 
contact with them, and seen them routed from behind 
breastworks like a pack of sheep. Pakenham, on the other 
hand, found himself in command of an army amid sur- 
roundings and under conditions wholly strange to him. 
His previous military experience was in fact worse than 
useless; it was misleading. Though at his death not yet 
thirty-seven, he had already served over twenty years. 
Writhig immediately after the battle in which he fell, 
Codrington spoke of him as 'Hhe flower of the flock," and 
wrote 'Hhere was something about him which made me 
look forward to a future intercourse with him as a source 
of great satisfaction." He had been placed in command 
with an eye to a particular service. It was proposed to 
capture New Orleans, and occupy Louisiana with a view 
to effect on the negotiations already (July 24) entered on, 
which resulted, five months later, in the Treaty of Ghent 
(December 24). The mouth of the Mississippi and the 
region adjacent thereto was to be seized and held with a 
view ''to obtaining better terms in the pending negotiation 
or of exacting cession thereof as the price of peace." ^ 
Pakenham, it has been seen, did not join the New Orleans 
expeditionary force until late in December, and it was the 
25th of that month before he assumed actual command. 
During the fourteen days which now intervened before 
the battle and his own death, the British commander was 
not only much occupied, but was mentally perplexed in 
the extreme. He found himself in independent control for 
the first time, and that in a most difficult position. At the 
' Henry Adams, United States, voL VIII, 313. 



198 MILITARY STUDIES 

outset he seems to have shown a somewhat unexpected 
degree of caution. Though accustomed under Wellington 
to furious direct assaults, when, three days after assuming 
command, he came suddenly in his advance on Jackson's 
unfinished but still ugly-looking breastworks, they gave him 
pause. Things were not according to rule. Improvised 
earthworks were to him a novelty. Belonging to the class 
''Fortifications," they must be treated as such ; and, accord- 
ing to all Peninsular precedents a practical breach in them 
must be effected, and the position then stormed. To pro- 
ceed in this way required time and breaching artillery. So, 
instead of being told to advance at once and clear the way, 
as at Bladensburg, the army was, to the surprise of all, 
ordered to retire out of cannon range, and to go into camp. 
The order was, of course, obeyed ; but, as one of those who 
obeyed it afterwards wrote, ''there was not a man among 
us who failed to experience both shame and indignation." 
This was on the 28th of December. 

Fresh from the Chesapeake, and with Bladensburg and 
Washington in memory, Vice-Admiral Cochrane, a man 
twenty years Pakenham's senior, seems to have viewed this 
proceeding with marked disfavor. Siege equipage had now 
to be brought up from the ships, and the work of bringing it 
up fell upon the sailors. The guns, loaded on boats, had 
first "with incredible labor" to be rowed from the fleet to 
the bayou, and then dragged through three miles of bog to 
the British lines. At last, by the evening of the 31st, they 
were in position. But, meanwhile, Jackson had not been 
idle; his breastworks had been perfected, and he also had 
mounted some heavy guns. At 8 o'clock on the morning 
of January 1 the British batteries opened fire ; and those 
behind them, Pakenham least of all, "made not the slightest 
doubt of its effect." The opposing batteries replied, at 



THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 199 

first faintly and with seeming difficulty ; but, by and by, as 
a British officer wrote, their "salutation became more 
spirited, till it gradually surpassed our own, both in rapidity 
and precision." About noon the British fire slackened; 
and, at one o'clock, it had been completely overpowered. 
''Never," wrote the British officer, ''was any failure more 
remarkable or unlooked for than this." Its effect on 
Pakenham can be imagined. He was at his wit's ends; 
something must be done, and that quickly ; but — what ? 
Having his personality and position in mind, the situa- 
tion now becomes distinctly tragic; to a degree, pathetic. 
In his perplexity he next had recourse to something to 
which his brother-in-law and master in practical warfare 
never once had recourse in his whole long military life — 
if he did not actually hold a formal council of war, he sought 
advice; and, most naturally, of Sir Alexander Cochrane 
among others. There is no authentic report of what advice 
was given him, but it is said^ that the strategic purpose of 
the expedition — the capture of New Orleans — was by some 
of his advisers kept in mind, and it was proposed to accom- 
plish this result by throwing a heavy detachment across the 
river in the way already referred to, which should march by 
its west bank up to a point opposite the town, and command- 
ing it. The only difficulty in the way of so doing lay in 
finding a practical method of crossing troops and artillery. 
The Americans had destroyed or removed all the boats. 
Admiral Cochrane, it is said, suggested that the Villere 
canal from the Bayou connecting with Lake Borgue could 
easily be deepened and widened, and opened into the river, 
thus admitting of the passage of boats and barges from the 
fleet. This was obviously feasible, and was determined on. 

^ Z. F. Smith. The Battle of New Orleans (Filson Club Publications, 
No. 19) , 91 ; Bourchier, Codrington, vol. I, 336. 



til 



200 MILITARY STUDIES 

So far, all was well ; things were going swimmingly. But it 
is now further related that Pakenham wished the main 
movement to be made by the west side, and the capture of 
New Orleans so assured ; while Jackson was to be held in a 
position now made useless as well as untenable by a demon- 
stration in force on his front, supported by a renewed 
artillery fire. Thoroughly sensible in itself, this plan of 
operations could hardly have failed of success; indeed, as 
the event showed, it would have succeeded. Most fortu- 
nately for Jackson, most unhappily for Pakenham and 
numerous good officers and brave men under his command, 
Cochrane at this point again, as it is alleged, intervened, 
this time making some observation to the effect that a 
movement in force by the west side might be all very well, 
but, for his part, ''if the army could not take those mud- 
banks, defended by ragged militia, he would undertake to 
do it with two thousand sailors armed only with cutlasses 
and pistols." ^ Gross injustice may have been done Vice- 
Ad miral Sir Alexander Forester Inglis Cochrane, and pos- 
sibly he never was guilty of so cruel a slur on a brother 
officer, one much his junior in years and in a trying posi- 
tion. But at that time Pakenham had within ten days 
of his assumption of command been twice balked in his 
operations ; and, having in fresh recollection what Ross 
had so recently accomplished at Bladensburg and Wash- 
ington, most naturally an unfavorable comparison between 
the two leaders was in the minds and mouths of all. Coch- 
rane also had been on peculiarly friendly terms with Ross, 
writing that in him were ''blended those qualities so essen- 
tial to promote success where cooperation between the two 
services becomes necessary." He and Ross were also of 
nearly the same age, while Ross's successor was in the eyes 
^ Parton, Jackso7i, vol. II, 189. 



THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 201 

of the rough old admiral hardly more than a boy. In any 
event, the story has a natural sound to lend probability to 
it, and it appears in all the narratives/ Curiously enough, 
also, a force of sailors, armed in the way described, did, at 
the exact time of Pakenham's failure and death on the east 
bank, accomplish on the west bank the very feat Cochrane 
had claimed they could accomplish. Armed only with cut- 
lasses and pistols they, in the course of Colonel Thornton's 
successful flank movement, carried the American earthworks 
and captured their batteries. Their loss was also incon- 
siderable, about one in eight of those engaged. 

Speaking historically, it will not do to yield a too im- 
plicit credence to those legends of the quarter-deck and 
the mess-room. But, conceding a basis of fact for the 
Cochrane cutlass-and-pistol taunt, both Napier's and Cod- 
rington's implications are accounted for. Nationality even 
becomes a factor : for Cochrane was a Scotchman ; Paken- 
ham an Irishman. Bladensburg was only four months gone, 
and Pakenham had succeeded the gallant and dashing Ross. 
The implication was obvious ; what Ross had done, Paken- 
ham could do — if he dared ! And so, as Codrington at the 
time wrote, Pakenham, though acting against his better 
judgment, ''did not like to countermand an order for attack 
a second time." 

It is needless to follow further the chain of inference. It 
is, however, curious to consider what Pakenham's brother- 
in-law would have done if similarly circumstanced. In the 
first place, Wellington would have called no council of war, 
nor would he have invited suggestions. With his extraor- 
dinary eye for a military situation and keen tactical sense, 
he would unquestionably have moved on his objective by 

^ Latour, Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana, 
162 ; Parton, Jackson, II, 189. 



202 MILITARY STUDIES 

the west bank of the river, holding Jackson firmly by one 
arm while he seized New Orleans with the other; finally, 
if a commander in another branch of the service, either in 
his presence or to his knowledge, had criticised his conduct 
or impugned his courage, it is not difficult to imagine the 
cutting curtness of look and speech with which his imperti- 
nence would at once have been met and disregarded. Pak- 
enham was differently constituted. 



VI 

THE ETHICS OF SECESSION ^ 

'ANAFKH 

"Laws derive their authority from possession and use: 'tis 
dangerous to trace them back to their beginning; they grow 
great and ennoble themselves, like our rivers, by running ; follow 
them upward to their source, 'tis but a httle spring, scarce dis- 
cernible, that swells thus and thus fortifies itself by growing old. 
Do but consult the ancient considerations that gave the first 
motion to this famous torrent, so full of dignity, awe, and rever- 
ence ; you will find them so light and weak that it is no wonder if 
these people, who weigh and reduce everything to reason, and 
who admit nothing by authority or upon trust, have their judg- 
ments very remote and differing from those of the pubUc." — Mon- 
taigne, Essays, Book II, Chap. XII. 

Two hundred and sixty-four years ago a schism, since be- 
come historic, occurred in the infant colony of Massachusetts 
Bay. It was rent in twain ; and so, as the Father of Massa- 
chusetts has recorded, ''finding, upon consultation, that two 
so opposite parties could not continue in the same body with- 
out apparent hazard of ruin to the whole, [those in the major- 
ity] agreed to send away some of the principal." ^ And 
again, "by the example of Lot in Abraham's family, and 
after Hagar and Ishmael, he [Governor John Winthrop] saw 
they must be sent away." ^ Those thus proscribed went ac- 

1 An address delivered at Charleston, S. C, December 24, 1902, at the 
annual celebration of the New England Society of that city. See infra, 
p. 227 ; also, Massachusetts Historical Society, Proceedings, Second Series, 
Vol. XVII, pp. 90-116. 

2 Winthrop History (Savage's ed.), Vol. 1, p. *245. 
» Ibid., Vol. I, p. *250. 

203 



204 MILITARY STUDIES 

cordingiy into banishment ; and so, the year following, Rhode 
Island came into existence. This was in 1638; and, in 1640, 
the chief of those thus thrust into exile having occasion to 
write to the magistrate who had enforced the order of ban- 
ishment, said, with a pathos reached only by words of sim- 
plicity, "what myself and wife and family did endure in that 
removal, I wish neither you nor yours may ever be put 
unto";^ but again, and at almost the same time, writing 
from his new home in Newport, Governor William Codding- 
ton expressed to Governor John Winthrop the approval he 
felt "of a speech of one of note amongst you, that we were 
in a heate and chafed, and were all of us to blame ; in our 
strife we had forgotten that we were brethren." ^ 

The expression is apt; the admission appropriate. More, 
much more than two years ago, — longer ago than the life- 
time of a generation, — Massachusetts and South Carolina 
got in "a heate and chafed" one with the other, and fell into 
bitter strife. Forgetting that we were brethren, were we 
also "all of us to blame" ? 

Not long since, circumstances led me into a dispassionate 
reexamination of the great issues over which the country di- 
vided in the mid-years of the last century. As a result thereof, 
I said in a certain Phi Beta Kappa Society address^ delivered 
in June [1902], at Chicago, — "legally and technically, — not 
morally, again let me say, and wholly irrespective of hu- 
manitarian considerations, — to which side did the weight 
of argument incline during the great debate which culmi- 
nated in our Civil War? ... If we accept the judgment of 
some of the more modern students and investigators of his- 



» The Winthrop Papers, 4 Mass. Hist. Coll., Vol. VI, p. 314. 
2 Ibid., p. 317. 

' "Shall Cromwell have a Statue?" See Lee at Appomattox and Other 
Papers (2d ed.), pp. 366, 367. 



THE ETHICS OF SECESSION 205 

tory,— either wholly unprejudiced or with a distinct Union 
bias, — it would seem as if the weight of argument falls into 
what I will term the Confederate scale." For instance, 
Goldwin Smith, — an Englishman, a life-long student of his- 
tory, a friend and advocate of the Union during the Civil 
War, the author of one of the most compact and readable 
narratives of our national life, — Dr. Smith has recently 
said : ''Few who have looked into the history can doubt that 
the Union originally was, and was generally taken by the 
parties to it to be, a compact, dissoluble, perhaps, most of 
them would have said, at pleasure, dissoluble certainly on 
breach of the articles of Union." ^ To a like effect, but in 
terms even stronger, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, now a senator 
from Massachusetts, has said, not in a political utterance, 
but in a work of historical character: "When the Constitu- 
tion was adopted by the votes of States at Philadelphia, and 
accepted by the votes of States in popular conventions, it is 
safe to say that there was not a man in the country, from 
Washington and Hamilton, on the one side, to George Clin- 
ton and George Mason, on the other, who regarded the new 
system as anything but an experiment entered upon by the 
States, and from which each and every State had the right 
peaceably to withdraw, a right which was very likely to be 
exercised." ^ Incited by those utterances to yet further in- 
quiry of my own, the result thereof was, to me at least, curi- 
ous ; — and moreover suggestive of moralizing. 
The question is now one purely historic ; but on that ques- 

^ " England and the War of Secession," Atlantic Monthly Magazine 
March, 1902, p. 305. 

' Webster, American Statesmen Series, p. 172. But see Mass. Hist Soc 
Proceedings, Second Series, XVI, 151-173, paper entitled "Historical Con- 
ception of the Constitution," in which the views expressed by Dr. Smith 
and Mr. Lodge are controverted by D. H. Chamberlain. Also lb XVIII 
397-398. ■ ' 



206 MILITARY STUDIES 

tion of the weight of authority and argument as respects the 
right of secession, I found a divergence of opinion existing to- 
day so great as hardly to admit of reconciliation. On the 
one side it was — I am told still is ^ — taught as an article of 
political faith, that not only was the constitutional right of 
peaceable secession at will plain, manifest and expressly 
reserved, but that, until a comparatively recent period, it 
had never been even disputed. In the words of one writer of 
authority, ''Through a period of many years, the right of 
secession was not seriously questioned in any quarter except 
under the exigencies of party politics." ^ On the other 
hand, in the section of the country where my lot has been 
cast, this alleged heresy is sternly denounced, and those pro- 
pounding it are challenged to their proofs. With equal posi- 

' During the summer of 1903 a significant discussion was carried on 
in the columns of the press, more especially in the New York Evening 
Post and the Boston Transcript, It originated in a communication which 
appeared in the New York Nation of August 7, 1902, from a professor of 
Randolph-Macon College, Virginia. The writer said : "This public opinion 
[now prevalent in the South] positively demands that teachers of history, 
both in the colleges and high schools, shall subscribe unreservedly to two 
trite oaths: (1) That the South was altogether right in seceding from 
the Union in 1861 ; and (2) that the war was not waged about the negro." 
During the early months of 1911 a somewhat similar controversy developed 
in Roanoke College, Virginia, the demand being that Elson's History of 
the United States should be put on the Southern Index Expurgatorius be- 
cause of references considered objectionable to the "institution" and to 
the "slave-holders' rebellion." Referring to the communication in the 
Nation of August 7, 1902, a Southern writer commenting thereon, and, to 
a degree, controverting its statements, proceeds on the assumption that 
"Historical scholarship has settled the fact that according to the inter- 
pretation of the American Constitution up to the time of the Civil War 
the Southern States did have the right to secede from the Union." The 
whole opposite contention, from the days of Andrew Jackson and Daniel 
Webster to 1860 is thus summarily dismissed. 

'' J. William Jones, Chaplain-General of the United Confederate Vet- 
erans, on the Study of American History in Southern Schools and Colleges. 
The South in History, Baltimore Sun, August 10, 1902. See also oration by 
Hon. John W. Daniel on the Life, Services and Character of Jefferson 
Davis, January 25, 1890, pp. 33-35. 



THE ETHICS OF SECESSION 207 

tiveness it is claimed that, from the time of the adoption of 
the Constitution down to a comparatively recent day, ''there 
was not a man in the country who thought or claimed that 
the new system was anything but a perpetual Union." ^ 

Which contention, I asked, is right ? And separating my- 
self from my present environment, I tried to go back to the 
past, and to see things, not as they now are, but as they were ; 
as they appeared to those of three generations gone, — to the 
fathers, in short, of our grandfathers. It was a groping after 
forgotten facts and conditions in places dark and unfamiliar. 
The results reached also, were, I confess, very open to ques- 
tion. But, while more or less curious as well as unexpected, 
they were such as a Massachusetts man, forty years ago at 
this time in arms for the Union, need not hesitate to set forth 
in South Carolina, where the right of secession, no longer pro- 
claimed as a theory, was first resorted to as a fact. 

It was Alexander Pope, hard on two centuries ago (1733), 
who wrote : — 

"Manners with fortunes, humors turn with climes, 
Tenets with books, and principles with times." 

And, again, Tennyson in our day has said : — 

"The drift of the Maker is dark, an Isis hid by the veil. 
Who knows the ways of the world, how God will bring them about? 
Our planet is one, the suns are many, the world is wide. 

" We are puppets, Man in his pride, and Beauty fair in her flower ; 
Do we move ourselves, or are moved by an unseen hand at a game 
That pushes us off from the board, and others ever succeed?" 

As I delved into the record, I concluded that humors 
turned quite as much with climes in the nineteenth century as 
they did in the eighteenth ; and that, in the later as in the 

' D. H. Chamberlain, Mass. Hist. Soe. Proceedings, Second Series, 
XVI, 173. 



208 MILITARY STUDIES 

earlier period, '^principles/' so called, bore a very close rela- 
tion to ''times." We, too, had been "puppets" moved by 
"an unseen hand at a game." As, in short, I pursued my in- 
quiries, the individual became more and more minimized ; 
chance and predestination cut larger figures ; and, at last, it 
all assumed the form of a great fatalistic process, from which 
the unexpected alone was sure to result. 

But to come to the record : For more than a century, 
lawyers, jurists and publicists — journalists, politicians and 
statesmen — have been arguing over the Federal Constitu- 
tion. Sovereignty carries with it allegiance. Wherein 
rested sovereignty? Was it in the State or in the Nation? 
Was the United States a unit, — an indissoluble Union of 
indestructible States,^ — or was it a mere confederacy of na- 
tions, held together solely by a compact, upon possible in- 
fringements of which each one, so far as it was concerned, 
was a final judge? Each postulate has been maintained 
from the beginning; for that matter, is maintained still. 
Each has been argued out with great legal acumen and much 
metaphysical skill to results wholly satisfactory to those that 
way inclined ; and yet absolutely illogical and absurd to the 
faithful of the other side. It was the old case of the shield 
of the silver and golden sides. That the two sides were ir- 
reconcilable made no difference. Be it silver or gold, the 
thing to him who had eyes to see was in his sight silver or 
gold, as the case might be. And yet, as I pursued my in- 
quiries, I gradually felt assured, not that the thing was in this 
case either silver or gold, but that it was both silver and gold. 
Everybody, in short, was right; no one, wrong. Merely 
conditions changed ; and, with tliem, not only appearances 

^"An indestructible Union composed of indestructible States," Chief 
Justice Chase, Texas v. White, 7 Wallace, 725. "An indissoluble Union 
of imperishable States," Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitu- 
tion, Vol. II, p. 334. 



THE ETHICS OF SECESSION 209 

but principles, and even facts. Simply, the inevitable, and 
yet the unexpected, had occurred. 

This I propose for my thesis. 

In dealing with these questions the lawyers, I find, start 
always with the assumption that, at a given time in the past, 
to wit, at or about 1788, there was in the thirteen States, then 
soon to become the present United States, a definite consen- 
sus of public opinion, which found expression in a written 
compact, since known as the Federal Constitution. But was 
this really the case? Public opinion, so called, is a very 
elusive and uncertain something, signifying things different 
at different times and in different places. Especially was 
this the case in the States of the old Federation. So far as 
I can ascertain, every State of the Federation became a mem- 
ber of the Union with mental reservations, often unexpressed, 
growing out of local traditions and interests, in the full and 
correct understanding of which the action of each must be 
studied.^ Dissatisfied with the past and doubtful of the 
future, jealous of liberties, to the last degree provincial and 
suspicious of all external rule, intensely common-sensed but 
illogical and alive with local prejudice, the one thing our an- 
cestry united in most apprehending was a centralized gov- 
ernment. From New Hampshire to Georgia such a govern- 
ment was associated with the idea of a foreign regime. The 
people clung to the local autonomy, — the Sovereignty of 
the State. With this fundamental fact the framers of the 
Constitution had to deal. And they did so, in my opinion, 
with consummate skill. Accepting things as they were, they 
went as far as they could, leaving the outcome to time and 

I "Every State has some objection to the present form [the Constitution 
of 1788, then under discussion], and these objections are directed to 
different points. That which is most pleasing to one is obnoxious to 
another, and so vice versa.'' George Washington to Bushrod Washington, 
November 10, 1787. Writings, Ford's ed., XI, 184. 
p 



210 MILITARY STUDIES 

the process of natural growth. The immediate result was a 
nation founded on a metaphysical abstraction, — a con- 
dition of unstable equilibrium. In the nature of things, such 
a condition could not be permanent. But the great mass of 
people composing a community — Lincoln's ''plain people" 
— are not metaphysicians, and do not philosophize. Lov- 
ing to argue, in argument they are not logical. Even in Vir- 
ginia they were not then all abstractionists ; and while, in a 
vague way, the Virginians wanted to become part of one 
people, they never proposed to cease to be Virginians, or to 
permit Virginia to become other than a Sovereign State. 
It was so with the others. 

Confronted with this fact, what did the framers of the Con- 
stitution propose? Taking refuge in metaphysics, they pro- 
posed a contradiction in terms — a divided sovereignty ! 
Sovereignty, it was argued, was in the People. But who are 
the People ? The People of the United States, it was replied, 
are the aggregate of those inhabiting the particular States. 
Then they began to apportion sovereignty, oblivious of the 
fact that sovereignty does not admit of apportionment. 
A modus Vivendi may, of course, be agreed on, and even work 
effectively as well as harmoniously, by any number of people 
and for an indefinite period of time, but the agreed modus 
Vivendi is a proposed substitute for sovereignty, not the thing 
itself. The Constitution as framed and originally put in 
operation was, so far as sovereignty was concerned, an 
avowed modus vivendi. Agreeing on this abstraction, the 
framers, next pursuing some vague analogy of the solar sys- 
tem, and conceiving of States as planets in their orbits, 
caused the people of the particular States to assign to the 
Nation a modicum of sovereignty, to confer another modicum 
on the State governments, and reserve whatever remained to 
the People themselves. Now it is written, ''No man can 



THE ETHICS OF SECESSION 211 

serve two masters: for either he will hate the one and love 
the other; or else he will hold to the one and despise the other." 
The everlasting truth of this precept in the fulness of time 
held good in our case. From the moment the fathers sought 
to divide the indivisible, the result was written on the wall. 
It was a mere question of years and of might. Sovereignty, 
in case of dissent insisting peremptorily on final arbitrament, 
had to be somewhere, and accepted as being there. 

Thus, intentionally by some of the most far-seeing, uninten- 
tionally by others anxious to effect only a more perfect union, 
a pious fraud was in 1788 perpetrated on the average Ameri- 
can, and his feet were directed into a path which inevitably 
led him to the goal he least designed for his journey's end.^ 

" Through the Valley of Love I went, 
In the lovingest spot to abide, 
And just on the verge where I pitched my tent, 
I found Hate dwelling beside." ^ 

The bond was deceptive ; for, on this vital point of ultimate 
sovereignty, — To whom was allegiance due in cases of direct 

1 "The convention framed a constitution by the adoption of which 
thirteen peoples imagining themselves still independent and sovereign, 
really acknowledged themselves to be but parts of a single political whole. 
But they made this acknowledgment unconsciously. They continued 
to think of themselves as sovereigns, who indeed permitted an agent to 
exercise some of their functions for them, but who had not abdicated their 
thrones. If the constitution had contained a definite statement of the actual 
fact ; if it had said that to adopt it was to acknowledge the sovereignty of 
the one American people, no part of which could sever its connections from 
the rest without the consent of the whole, it would probably have been 
rejected by every State in the Union." — J. P. Gordy, Political Parties in 
the United States (ed. 1900), Vol. I, p. 79. "To the familiar state govern- 
ments which had so long possessed their love and allegiance, [the plan 
devised and recommended by the Federal Convention of 1787] was super- 
adding a new and untried government, which it was feared would swallow 
up the states and everywhere extinguish local independence." — Fiske, 
The Critical Period of American History, p. 237. 

^Browning, Pippa Passes, II, Noon. 



212 MILITARY STUDIES 

issue and last resort ? — on this crucial point of points the 
Constitution was not self-explanatory, — explicit. Nor was 
it meant to be. The framers — that is, the more astute, 
practical and farseeing — went as far as they dared. The 
difficulty — the contradiction involved — was explicitly, 
and again and again, pointed out. It is impossible to believe 
that a man so intellectually acute as Hamilton failed to see 
the inherent weakness of the plan proposed. He did see it; 
but, under existing conditions, the plan was, from his point 
of view, the best attainable. Madison, though a man of dis- 
tinctly constructive mind, was also an abstractionist. He 
seems really to have had faith in the principle of an unstable 
political equilibrium. At a later day that faith was put to a 
rude test ; and, in 1814, while the Hartford Convention was 
in session, the scales fell from his eyes. He had all he wanted 
of a divided sovereignty in practical operation ! Lawyers, 
meanwhile, have since argued on this point ; philosoi^hers and 
publicists have refined over it; historians have analyzed 
the so-called original materials of history; and men with 
arms in their hands have 'fought the thing to a final result. 
Nevertheless, the real facts in the case seem quite clear; 
though altogether otherwise than they are usually assumed 
to have been. 

When the Federal Constitution was framed and adopted, — 
an indissoluble Union of indestructible States, — what was 
the law of treason, — to what or to whom, in case of final 
issue, did the average citizen owe allegiance ? Was it to the 
Union or to his State ? As a practical question, seeing things 
as they then were, — sweeping aside all incontrovertible 
legal arguments and metaphysical disquisitions, — I do not 
think the answer admits of doubt. If put in 1788, or indeed 
at any time anterior to 1825, the immediate reply of nine 
men out of ten in the northern States, and of ninety-nine 



THE ETHICS OF SECESSION 213 

out of a hundred in the southern States, would have been 
that, as between the Union and tlie State, ultimate allegiance 
was due to the State. 

A recurrence to the elementary principles of human nature 
tells us that this would have been so, and could have been no 
otherwise. We have all heard of a famous, much-quoted 
remark of Mr. Gladstone to the effect that the Constitution 
of the United States was "the most wonderful work ever 
struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." 
This may or may not be so. I propose neither to affirm nor 
to controvert it, here and now; but, however wonderful it 
may actually have been, it would have been more than won- 
derful, it would have been distinctly miraculous, had it on 
the instant so wrought with men as at once to transfer the al- 
legiance and affection of those composing thirteen distinct 
communities from their old traditional governments to one 
newly improvised. The thing hardly admits of discussion. 
The change was political and far-reaching ; but it produced no 
immediate effect on the feelings of the people.^ As well say 
that the union of the crowns of Scotland and England immedi- 
ately broke up Scotch clanship. It did break it up ; but the 
process was continuous through one hundred and fifty years. 
The British union became an organic and legalized fact in 
1707 ; but, as the events of forty years later showed, the con- 
sequences of the union no Campbell nor Cameron foresaw. 
So with us in 1788, allegiance to State had only a few years 
before proved stronger than allegiance to the Crown or to the 
Confederation, and no one then was "foolish enough to sup- 
pose that" the executive of the Union "would dare enforce 
a law against the wishes of a sovereign and independent 
State"; the very idea was deemed "preposterous." "That 
this new government, this upstart of yesterday, had the 

^ Toequeville, Democracy in America, Reeve's ed. (1889), I, 389, n., 
394. Injra, 349. 



214 MILITARY STUDIES 

power to impose its edicts on unwilling States was a political 
solecism to which they could in no wise assent." ^ 

I am sure that all this was so in 1788. I am very confident 
it remained so until 1815. I fully believe it was so, though in 
less degree, until at least 1830. A generation of men born in 
the Union had then grown up, supplanting the generations 
born and brought up in the States. Steam and electricity 
had not yet begun to exert their cementing influence; but 
time, sentiment, tradition, — more, and most of all, the in- 
tense feeling excited North and South by our naval successes 
under the national flag in the War of 1812, — had in 1815 
in large part done their work. The sense of ultimate alle- 
giance was surely, though slowly as insensibly, shifting from 
the particular and gravitating to the general, — from the 
State to the Union. It was not a question of law, or of the in- 
tent of the fathers, or the true construction of a written in- 
strument ; for, on that vital point, the Constitution was 
silent, — wisely, and, as I hold it, intentionally silent. But, 
though through and because of that silence there may have 
been ground for a difference of opinion as to the right of seces- 
sion, there is no possible room for doubt, whether doubt legal 
or doubt historical, on the question of a divided sovereignty.^ 
That is part of the record. Only strictly limited and care- 
fully enumerated powers were conceded by the States to the 
Nation ; the rest were reserved. Even, therefore, though Mr. 

1 Gordy, Political Parties in the United States, I, 203, 341. 

2 "Every State ia the Union, in every instance where its sovereignty 
has not been delegated to the United States, is considered to be as com- 
pletely sovereign as the United States are in respect to the powers sur- 
rendered. The United States are sovereign as to all the powers of govern- 
ment actually surrendered ; each State in the Union is sovereign as to all 
the powers reserved*" — Mr. Justice Iredell of the United States Supreme 
Court, in 1793 (2 Dallas, 435). Judge Iredell was a member of the Con- 
vention of 1787, which framed the Constitution, and advocated its adoption 
in the North Carolina Convention. 



THE ETHICS OF SECESSION 215 

Lodge and Gold win Smith, and the other authorities I have 

referred to, may be totally wrong on the question of the right 

of withdrawal from the Union, and the views held in regard 

to a withdrawal at the time the Constitution was adopted,^ 

— and I wish here distinctly to say that, in my opinion, they 

were wrong, and a somewhat careful examination of the 

* record has disclosed to me no evidence on which to base their 

somewhat sweeping assertions, — though, I say, Mr. Lodge 

and Dr. Smith may be wrong, yet whether they were wrong 

or right does not affect the proposition that, from 1788 to 

1861, in case of direct and insoluble issue between sovereign 

State and sovereign Nation, every man was not only free to 

decide, but had to decide the question of ultimate allegiance 

for himself; and, whichever way he decided, almost equally 

good grounds in justification thereof could be alleged. The 

Constitution gave him two masters. Both he could not 

serve; and the average man decided which to serve in the 

light of sentiment, tradition and environment. Of this I feel 

as historically confident as I can feel of any fact not matter of 

absolute record or susceptible of demonstration. 

I have already referred to the academic address I some 

months ago had occasion to deliver. In response to it I re- 

^ As respects contemporaneous opinion, there can be no authority 
higher than that of Madison, cited by Mr. Chamberlain, Mass. Hist. Soc. 
Proceedings, Second Series, XVI, 167. On the point raised Fiske says : 
,"The decisive struggle was over the question whether New York could 
ratify the Constitution conditionally, reserving to herself the right to with- 
draw from the Union in case the amendments upon which she had set her 
heart should not be adopted. Upon this point Hamilton reinforced him- 
self with the advice of Madison, who had just returned to New York. 
Could a State once adopt the Constitution, and then withdraw from the 
Union if not satisfied ? Madison's reply was prompt and decisive. No, 
such a thing could never be done. A State which had once ratified was in 
the federal bond forever. The Constitution could not provide for nor con- 
template its own overthrow. There could be no such thing as a constitu- 
tional right of secession." — The Critical Period of American History, 1783- 
1789, pp. 343, 344. 



216 MILITARY STUDIES 

ceived quite a number of letters, one of which, bearing on 
this point, seemed very notable. It was from the president 
of an historic Virginia college, who himself bears an historic 
Virginia name. In the address alluded to I had said that, 
''however it may have been in 1788, in 1860 a nation had 
grown into existence." This I take to be indisputable. In no 
way denying the fact, my correspondent, quoting the words 
I have given, thus wrote: ''But is it not true that this 
nationality was after all a Northern nationality? Did the 
South share in it to any extent? On the contrary, the Con- 
federate character of the Union was more strongly impressed 
upon the South in 1861 than in 1788. So that it may be 
more truly said that the Secessionists' recourse in 1861 
was to peaceable separation, and not to the sword. If 
the North was really the only national part of the Union, 
and its national character reached out after the South, must 
not the responsibility for the use of the sword be visited upon 
the North, and not on the South? Both North and South 
started out from the same constitutional standpoint of seces- 
sion ; but, while the South adhered to the same idea, the 
North fused into a nation, which, in 1861, determined to con- 
quer the other and conservative part. That the South had 
ever suffered nationalization in spirit or in fact, previous to 
1861, I think your address clearly disproves." 

In some of the conclusions assumed in this extract from the 
letter of my Virginia correspondent, it is needless to say I do 
not concur. I do not, as I have said, believe in the right of 
secession as an original "constitutional standpoint" from 
which, in 1788, North and South started out. Neither do I 
believe that a "peaceable separation" was ever contemplated 
as a possibility by any one ; least of all by those who took the 
lead in the Confederate movement of 1861. I do, however, 
believe, and the record moreover shows, that the essential 



THE ETHICS OF SECESSION 217 

basic principle of the Constitution was a divided sovereignty, 
and, in the contingency of a direct insoluble issue, a conse- 
quently divided personal allegiance.-^ 

But, this premised, on the main issue — the essential point 
involved in the extract from his letter — the writer was, I 
think, right. Previous to 1861, the South did not undergo 
nationalization, to the same extent, in any event, as the 
North. And why did it not? Again, Tennyson's ''unseen 
hand at a game"! — a game in which we are "puppets." 
But, after all, what is that ''unseen hand"? And how did 
it manifest itself in our national life during the three-fourths 
of a century between 1788 and 1861 ? That "unseen hand," 
theologically known as an "inscrutable providence," I take 
to be nothing more or less than those material, social, in- 
dustrial and political conditions, domestic and public, which, 
making up our environment, mould our destiny with no very 
great regard for our plans, our hopes, our traditions or our 
aspirations. All of which is merely our nineteenth-century 
agnostical way of putting the fifteenth-century aphorism that 
"Man proposes, but God disposes." With a political instinct 
which now seems marvellous, Madison, in the course of debate 
in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, casting a prophetic 
glance into futurity, said : "The great danger to our general 
government is, that the Southern and Northern interests of 
the continent are opposed to each other, not from their dif- 
ference of size, but from climate, and principally from the 
effects of their having or not having slaves. Defensive power 
ought to be given, not between the large and small States, 
but between the Northern and Southern." And again, "The 
greatest danger is disunion of the States"; and "It seems 
now well understood that the real difference of interests lies, 
not between the large and small, but between the Northern 

1 Infra, p. 300. 



218 MILITARY STUDIES 

and Southern States." Based on this line of broad difference, 
the contest was ''between the fear of the centripetal and the 
fear of the centrifugal force in the system." On the other 
side of the Atlantic, a shrewd observer and pioneer economist, 
profoundly opposed to the British policy during our War of 
Independence, had thus, shortly before, cast a horoscope of 
the American people : ''The mutual antipathies and clashing 
interests of the Americans, their difference of governments, 
habitudes and manners indicate that they will have no centre 
of union and no common interest. They never can be united 
into one compact empire under any species of government 
whatever ; a disunited people till the end of time, suspicious 
and distrustful of each other, they will be divided and sub- 
divided into little commonwealths or principalities according 
to natural boundaries, by great bays of the sea and by vast 
rivers, lakes, and ridges of mountains. " ^ 

Into the details of the conflict over sovereignty which 
dragged along for seventy years, it is needless for me here to 
enter. A twice-told tale, I certainly have no new light to cast 
upon it ; but in freshly reviewing it, that aspect of it which 
has most impressed me is its resemblance to the classic. 
Throughout Fate, the inevitable, "the unseen hand," are 
everywhere now apparent, — destiny had to be fulfilled. In 
connection with the history of those momentous years, we 
read much of men ; and, indeed, it is a galaxy of great names, 
— Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, Marshall, Madison, 
Webster, Calhoun ; but, as I went back to the deeper under- 
lying influences, — the profound currents of thought and 
action which in the end worked results, — one and all those 
bearing even these names became Tennyson's "puppets" 
moved by the "unseen hand at the game." In this respect 

^ Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester, quoted by Bancroft, History of the 
Formation oj the Constitution, I, 65. 



THE ETHICS OF SECESSION 219 

our story is suggestive of some cosmic theory, — the process 
by which suns and planets and satellites are evolved ; and 
gradually it seems as if the individual man were able to affect 
the course of events and final results as respects the outcome 
of the one as much as he does of the other.-^ The elaborate 
legal arguments, the metaphysical theories and historical 
disquisitions, — even the rights and wrongs of the case, — 

^ This assertion, I am aware, is very open to dispute, and impossible of 
proof. The theory that men, who, in history, appear to have given shape 
to their own times, and, by so doing, to subsequent times, did, after all, but 
represent, embody and bring to a head the tendencies of their age ; which em- 
bodiment would have inevitably taken place through some other, if they had 
not been, — this theory of historic fatalism was first developed by Buckle in 
his History of Civilization in England, half a century ago. There is certainly 
an element of truth in it, inasmuch as no man can be really great except in 
so far as he reads his time aright, "translating its dumb inarticulate cry into 
some articulate language, divining its wants and satisfying them, seeing and 
laying hold of the helps which the time affords to carry out the work 
which the time requires." On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore the 
influence of exceptional individuality on the course of events, as evidenced 
by innumerable instances from Moses to Bismarck. In the case of the 
development of American nationality because of the adoption, and under 
the operation, of the Federal Constitution, the two possible individual 
exceptions to the general rule would seem to be Washington and Marshall. 
But for the respect in which Washington was held, and the general recog- 
nition of his great attributes of character, it is very questionable whether 
the Constitution of 1788 would have been adopted, or could have been set 
in successful operation. But for the solid judicial renderings of Marshall, 
stretching through a long period of years, our system of constitutional law 
would hardly have assumed consistency and shape. Yet, on the other 
hand, the American community made both Washington and Marshall 
possible. They were the natural outcome of their environment. The 
producing power and the thing produced had to be in harmony, and act 
and react on each other. While the United States that now is would almost 
certainly have been something quite other but for the presence and in- 
fluence of Washington and Marshall as factors in the solution of the problem, 
Washington and Marshall would have failed to produce their results had 
they not been in complete and happy accord with the community and 
conditions in which they lived and worked. As to the others named, there 
is no sufficient reason to doubt that the work done and the influence exerted 
by them would have been done and exerted by others had they not come 
forward. 



220 MILITARY STUDIES 

became quite immaterial, and altogether insignificant. In 
obedience to underlying influences, and in conformity with 
natural laws, a system is crystallizing. Discordant elements 
blend ; assimilation, willing or reluctant, goes on. 

See how the sides change — how rapidly '^ humors turn 
with climes" ; while, as to the principles involved, the muta- 
tion is only less complete than sincere. Nationality, as we 
see it to-day, had its birth in Virginia; and the sovereignty 
of the Union assumed shape through the agency of Washing- 
ton and w^as slowly perfected by Marshall, both more or less 
consciously responding to a natural movement, and working 
in harmony with it. Next, Virginia and her offspring, 
Kentucky, are passing the resolves of 1798, and arraying 
themselves under the standard of decentralization. The 
government then passes into the hands of the protestants ; 
and, almost at once, again in response to an underlying, un- 
seen influence too strong to resist, the process of a more 
complete crystallization enters on a new phase ; and, as it does 
so, catholic suddenly becomes protestant, and while Federalist 
New England formally pronounces the Union at an end, 
Jeffersonian Virginia supplies fresh aliment to nationality. 

Meanwhile, the ''unseen hand" is again at work, and the 
''puppets" duly respond. They thought, and we once 
thought, they were free agents. Not at all ! In the light 
of development it is clear to us now that they merely went 
through their motions in obedience to influences of the very 
existence of which they were at most but vaguely conscious. 
The drama was drawing insensibly to a crisis; the forces 
were arraying themselves in opposing ranks on the lines fore- 
cast by Madison in 1787. With much confidence, I assert, in 
its fundamentals there was no right or wrong about it ; it was 
an inevitable, irrepressible conflict, — the question of sov- 
ereignty was to be decided, and either side could offer good 



I 



THE ETHICS OF SECESSION 221 

ground, historical and legal, for any attitude taken in regard 
to it. That shield did actually have a silver as well as a 
golden side. 

Historically speaking, from the close of our second War of 
Independence, — commonly known as that of 1812, — the 
ebb and flow of the great currents of influence had set in new 
and definite channels. Gradually they assumed irresistible 
force therein. Side by side two civilizations — a Chang and 
Eng — were developing. North of the Potomac and the 
Ohio a community was taking shape, the whole tendency of 
which was national. Very fiuid in its elements, commercial 
and manufacturing in its diversified industries, it was largely 
composed of Europeans or their descendants, who, knowing, 
little of States, cared nothing for State Sovereignty, which, 
indeed, like the Unknown God to the Greeks, was to them 
foolishness. This vast discordant migration the railroad, 
the common school and the newspaper were rapidly merging, 
coalescing and fusing into a harmonious whole. Naturally 
it found a mouthpiece ; and that mouthpiece preached Union. 
It was not exactly a consistent utterance ; for, less than a 
score of years before, the same voice had been loud and em- 
phatic in behalf of State Sovereignty.* 

^ See speech on the Conscription Bill, made by Mr. Webster in the House 
of Representatives at Washington, December 9, 1814. Infra, p. 339. 

In language slightly varied the speech referred to was a repetition of the 
words of Governor Jonathan Trumbull, addressed to the legislature of 
Connecticut, at the opening of its special session, February 23, 1809 : 
"Whenever our national legislature is led to overleap the prescribed 
bounds of their constitutional powers, on the State legislatures, in great 
emergencies, devolves the arduous task — it is their right — it becomes 
their duty, to interpose their protecting shield between the right and 
liberty of the people and the assumed power of the General Government." 
Again, Mr. Webster did but voice, in the extract quoted, the full spirit of 
the famous Hartford Convention, which began its sessions six days after 
delivery of the speech. The following was among the resolutions there 
passed, following closely, in time of active foreign war, Madison's own lan- 
guage in drafting the Virginia Resolutions of 1798: "The mode and the 



222 MILITARY STUDIES 

So much. for Chang, north of the Potomac and the Ohio; 
but with Eng, south of those streams, it was altogether other- 
wise. Under the influence of climate, soil and a system of 
forced African labor the southern States irresistibly reverted 
to the patriarchal conditions, becoming more and more agri- 
cultural; and, as is always the case with agricultural races 
and patriarchal communities, they clung ever more closely 
to their traditions and local institutions. Then it was that 
Calhoun, the most rigid of logicians, in obedience to an 
irresistible influence of the presence and power of which 
he was unconscious, — Calhoun, the unionist of the War of 
1812 and protectionist of 1816, turned to the Constitution; 
he began that ''more diligent and careful scrutiny into its 
provisions, in order to ascertain fully the nature and charac- 
ter of our political system. " Needless to say, he there found 
what he was in search of.^ But a similar scrutiny was at the 

energy of the opposition should always conform to the nature of the 
violation, the intention of its authors, the extent of the injury inflicted, the 
determination manifested to persist in it, and the danger of delay. But 
in cases of deliberate dangerous and palpable infractions of the Consti- 
tution, affecting the sovereignty of a State and liberties of the people, it 
is not only the right but the duty of such a State to interpose its authority 
for their protection in the manner best calculated to secure that end. 
When emergencies occur which are either beyond the reach of the judicial 
tribunals, or too pressing to admit of the delay incident to their forms, 
States which have no common umpire must be their own judges, and exe- 
cute their own decisions." 

Mr. Webster, in his reply to Hayne, said : " I do not hold that the Hart- 
ford Convention was pardonable, even to the extent of the gentleman's 
admission, if its objects were really such as have been imputed to it." 
It is somewhat curious to consider what would have been the attitude of 
the Massachusetts senator, if, after uttering these words, the senator from 
South Carolina had been able to confront him with his speech of fifteen 
years previous in the other hall of the Capitol. But 

i' Manners with fortunes, humors turn with climes, 
Tenets with books, and principles with times." 

1 "Just at what time Calhoun changed from a protectionist to a free 
trader, from a liberal to a conservative, from a liberal constructionist to a 



THE ETHICS OF SECESSION 223 

same time going on in New England. As a result of the two 
scrutinies, Chang and Eng both changed sides. Before, 
Chang's side of the shield was gold, while that of Eng was 
sUver; now, Chang saw quite clearly that it was silver after 
all, while Eng recognized it as burnished gold of the purest 
stamp. Both were honest, and both fully convinced. Both 
also were right ; the simple truth — the truth of Holy Writ 
— being that no man can serve two masters ; and two mas- 
ters the fundamental law prescribed. The inevitable en- 
sued. 

But what was the inevitable? That again, as I read the 
story of our development, was purely a matter of circumstance 
and time. Fate — the Greek 'Avay/07 — intervened in those 
lists and decided the issue of battle. To my mind, the record 
is from its commencement absolutely clear on one point, — 
and that the vital point. After the 25th of July, 1788, when 
the last of the nine States necessary to the adoption of the 

strict constructionist, from a progressionist to an obstructionist, has been 
difficult to determine. One thing is clear ; his change followed that of the 
majority of the people of the State ; and whatever pressure there was, was 
exerted by the State on him, and not by him on the State." — David 
Franklin Houston, A Critical Study of Nullification in South Carolina, 
Harvard Historical Studies, pp. 60, 82. 

When time was ripe, however, and he had directed that "more diligent 
and careful scrutiny" into the provisions of the Constitution necessary "in 
order to ascertain fully the nature and character of our political system," 
he found himself compelled to a dispensation, — a dispensation new to him, 
to the country very old. He thus formulated it : "The great and leading 
principle is that the general government emanated from the people of the 
several States, forming distinct political communities, and acting in their 
separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people forming one 
aggregate political community ; that the Constitution of the United States 
is, in fact, a compact, to which each State is a party, in the character 
already described ; and that the several States, or parties, have a right to 
judge of its infractions ; and in ease of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous 
exercise of power not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort (to 
use the language of the Virginia Resolutions) 'to interpose for arresting 
the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, 
the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.'" — Ibid. 



224 MILITARY STUDIES 

Federal Constitution acted favorably thereon, the withdrawal 
of a State, or States, from the Union, all theories to the con- 
trary notwithstanding, became practically an issue of might. 
Into the abstract question of right I will not enter, — least of 
all, here and now. But, conceding everything that may be 
asked on the point of abstract right, — looking only on im- 
perfect and illogical man as he is, and as he acts in this world's 
occasions and exigencies, — I on this point adhere to my 
own belief. In 1790 Rhode Island was spared from being 
'^ coerced" into the Union only by a voluntary, though very 
reluctant, acceptance of it; and from that day to 1861 any 
attempted withdrawal from the Union would, after long ar- 
gument over the question of right, have ultimately resolved 
itself into an issue of might. 

Here again the elements of the Greek drama once more 
confront us — the Fates, necessity. What at different epochs 
would have been the probable outcome of any attempt at 
withdrawal ? That ever, at any period of our history since 
1790, a single State — no matter how sovereign, even Vir- 
ginia — could alone have made good, peaceably or otherwise, 
a withdrawal in face of her unitedly disapproving sister 
States, I do not believe. Naturally or as a result of force 
applied, the attempt would have resulted in ignominious 
failure. But how would it have been at any given time with 
a combination of States, acting in sympathy, — a combina- 
tion proportionately as considerable when measured with the 
whole as was the Confederacy in 1861 ? I hold that, here 
again, it was merely a question of time, and that such a with- 
drawal as then took place would never have failed of success 
at any anterior period in our national history. Steam and 
electricity settled the issue of sovereignty ; not argument, not 
military skill, not wealth, courage or endurance ; not even 
men in arms. Before 1861 steam and electricity, neither on 



THE ETHICS OF SECESSION 225 

land nor water, had been rendered so subservient to man as 
to make him equal to the prodigious, the unprecedented, task 
then undertaken, and finally accomplished. In that case, 
might in the end made right ; but the end was in no degree 
a foregone conclusion. 

In my own family records I find a curious bit of contem- 
porary evidence of this, and of the line of thought and reason- 
ing then resulting therefrom. Following the foresight of 
Madison, J. Q. Adams, noting the set of the currents in 1820, 
became instinctively persuaded that the North and the 
South would be swept into collision by the forces of inherent 
development. Again and again did he put this belief of his 
on record.^ Contemplating such an eventuality, he, in 1839, 
thus expressed himself in a public utterance, in words which 
I have of late more than once seen quoted in support of the 
abstract constitutional right of secession. Speaking in New 
York on what was called the Jubilee of the Constitution, or 
the fiftieth anniversary of its adoption, he said : ^'If the day 
should ever come (may Heaven avert it !) when the affections 
of the people of these States shall be alienated from each 
other, when the fraternal spirit shall give way to cold in- 
difference, or collisions of interest shall fester into hatred, 
the bands of political association will not long hold together 
parties no longer attracted by the magnetism of conciliated 
interests and kindly sympathies ; and far better will it be for 
the people of the disunited States to part in friendship from 
each other than to be held together by constraint. Then will 
be the time for reverting to the precedents which occurred at 
the formation and adoption of the Constitution, to form 

1 See the paper entitled "John Quincy Adams and Martial Law," 
Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, Second Series, XV, 436-478. Separately 
printed as "John Quincy Adams, His Connection with the Monroe Doc- 
trine (1823) and with Emancipation under Martial Law (1819-1842)," 
by Worthington Chauncey Ford and Charles Francis Adams. 



226 MILITARY STUDIES 

again a more perfect union by dissolving that which could no 
longer bind, and to leave the separated parts to be reunited 
by the law of political gravitation to the centre." ^ 

In other words, forecasting strife, and measuring the coer- 
cive force available at a time when steam on land and water 
was in its stages of earlier development, J. Q. Adams regarded 
the attempt at an assertion of national sovereignty as so futile 
that, though he most potently and powerfully believed in that 
sovereignty, he looked upon its exercise as quixotic, and, 
consequently, not to be justified. A dissolution of the Union, 
at least temporarily, he believed to be inevitable. So 
strongly was he convinced of the power of the disintegrating 
influence as contrasted with the cohesive force, that the late 
Robert C. Winthrop, then a young man of twenty-seven, writ- 
ing in 1836, described him as saying, in the course of dinner- 
table talk, that **he despaired of the Union, believing we 
are destined soon to overrun not merely Texas, but Mexico, 
and that the inevitable result will be a break-up into two, 
three, four or more confederacies." "Inevitable!" the un- 
expected alone is inevitable. These two utterances were, the 
one in 1836, the other in 1839. In 1839 there were not five 
hundred miles of constructed railroad in the United States; 
steam had not been applied to naval construction ; electricity 
was a toy. So far as he could look into the future, Mr. 
Adams was right ; only — the unexpected was to occur ! It 
did occur; and it settled the question. In 1788 the pre- 
ponderance of popular feeling and affection was wholly in the 
scale of State Sovereignty as opposed to Nationality ; in 1801 
the Union was, in all probability, saved by being taken from 
the hands of its friends, and, so to speak, put out to nurse 
with its enemies, who from that time were converts to cen- 
tralization; in 1815 the final war of independence gave a 
* J. Q. Adams, Jubilee of the Constitution (April 30, 1839), p. 69. 



THE ETHICS OF SECESSION 227 

great impetus to Nationality, and the scales hung even ; in 
1831 the irrepressible conflict began to assert itself, and now 
they inclined slightly but distinctly to Nationality, the 
younger of the two sovereigns asserting a supremacy ; be- 
tween 1831 and 1861 science threw steam and electricity into 
his scale, and, in 1865, they made the opposite scale kick the 
beam. But, when all is said, merely a fresh illustration had 
been furnished of the truth of that scriptural adage in regard 
to a divided service. 

Such are the conclusions reached from a renewed and some- 
what careful review of a record frequently scanned by others. 
They found it in the outcome of great orations, labored argu- 
ments and the teaching of individuals. I cannot so see it. 
It is, as I read it, one long, majestic Greek tragedy. 

"Like to the Pontic sea, 
Whose icy current and compulsive course 
Ne'er feels retiring ebb, but keeps due on 
To the Propontic and the Hellespont, " — 

so that great drama swept on to its inevitable catastrophe, — 
Fate and Necessity ever the refrain of its chorus, — until, at 
the end, the resounding clash of arms. 



The circumstances connected with the preparation of the fore- 
going paper, and its delivery as an address, were peculiar. Not of 
a merely personal and passing interest, they were in a way even 
of historic significance. A somewhat particular reference to them 
may, therefore, be justified, even if not actually called for. 

During the earlier months of 1902 I chanced to be engaged in a 
somewhat careful study of the view generally taken at the time 
of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, of the right of secession. 
Led into a more elaborate examination than I anticipated when I 
began my inquiry, early in October of that year an invitation 
reached me from the New England Society of Charleston, S. C, 
to go there on Forefather's Day, December 22, and, as its guest, to 



228 MILITARY STUDIES 

address that society on any subject I might select. I had never 
been in Charleston ; and yet I had passed well-nigh an entire year, 
— that is, the eight months from January to August inclusive, — 
almost in sight of the famous town. The only actual glimpse I 
had ever got of it was a distant one from James Island, looking 
across the harbor towards Charleston, with Fort Sumter looming 
up midway, flying the Confederate flag. This was in June, 1862, 
immediately after the engagement known by us as that of James 
Island, and by the Confederates as Secessionville. Remaining in 
South Carolina with my regiment, the First Massachusetts Cav- 
alry, until August, we, together with all other available forces, were 
then ordered north. Charleston was for the time being relieved 
of our presence, and from apprehension. It was a respite for a city 
doomed. Since the stern solution less than three years later of the 
grave question which we had been sent to South Carolina, not to 
discuss but to dispose of, a period equal to that passed by the 
children of Israel in the wilderness had elapsed. Such being the 
case, it was in no way unnatural that I should have felt a strong 
desire actually to see the city, the possession of which we had in 
1862 so greatly coveted. When the invitation I have referred to 
reached me, I accordingly felt disposed to accept it. 

Moreover the suggestion that a Massachusetts man of my par- 
ticular antecedents should go to Charleston, of all conceivable 
places, deliberately proposing there to canvass the constitutional 
ethics of secession, was undeniably startling. It was like penetrat- 
ing the crater of a recently extinct volcano, and philosophizing 
over the causes, character, and, if the expression may be used in 
such a connection, the justification, of a furious eruption, the cin- 
ders of which were still warm. The very delicacy of treatment 
called for in so doing enhanced the desire to do it. To speak the 
truth on that subject there, treating it as an academic question, in 
a purely philosophic, dispassionate tone, was not easy. The 
temptation was great. I concluded to accept the invitation. 

Since I, on that day in June, 1862, had viewed the place from an 
island across its bay, it seemed as if there was no sorrow, no hu- 
miliation, no loss of property, Charleston had not undergone. 
Conflagration, blockade, siege, bombardment, hostile occupation, 
confiscation, servile supremacy and finally earthquake had fol- 



THE ETHICS OF SECESSION ' 229 

lowed each other in irregular but ordered sequence. Under these 
circumstances I freely confess that not only was my sympathy now 
excited, but my admiration was stirred by the indications of re- 
siliency I everywhere saw, and still more by the cheerfulness, and 
quiet, uncomplaining dignity with which all those I met discussed 
the past, and accepted the conditions of the present. If any bitter- 
ness of feeling existed towards those who had so largely contributed 
to their calamities, it was not to me as one of them apparent in 
word or sign. Everywhere I was received with the same simple 
courtesy, and listened to the same frank reference to historic and 
other events, as my attention was called to what remained of the 
household gods peculiar to the place, and pertaining to a civiliza- 
tion long since passed away, — the civilization of plantation and 
slave-owning days. 

One thing was apparent : — the community having, when 
further repining was obviously in vain, adapted itself as best it 
could to the conditions imposed upon it by force or nature, the 
people composing it were facing the future with confidence as well 
as courage. And yet that future did not strike me as altogether 
encouraging. On the contrary, the one thing which most deeply 
impressed me throughout South Carolina, but in Charleston more 
especially, was the terrible handicap under which the community 
was laboring in the race of competition. As an average observer, 
and something of a sociologist, I by no means share in that optimis- 
tic confidence, so much in vogue in the present day, which sees 
only progress everywhere. On the contrary there is to my mind 
much truth in this observation of the late Sir Leslie Stephen, one 
of the keenest observers and most subtle thinkers of the last half of 
the nineteenth century : 

" Progress is the rare exception : races may remain in the lowest 
barbarism, or their development be arrested at some more ad- 
vanced stage during periods far surpassing that of recorded 
history ; actual decay may alternate with progress, and even true 
progress implies some admixture of decay. The intellectual ac- 
tivity of the acuter intellects, however feeble may be its immediate 
influence, is the great force which stimulates and guarantees every 
advance of the race. It is of course opposed by a vast force of in- 
ertia. The ordinary mind is indifferent to the thoughts which 
occupy the philosopher, unless they promise an immediate ma- 



230 MILITARY STUDIES 

terial result. Mankind resent nothing so much as the intrusion 
upon them of a new and disturbing truth. The huge dead weight 
of stupidity and indolence is always ready to smother audacious 
inquiries. " ^ 

Thus the preponderance of the factors tending towards an up- 
lifting is, even with the most progressive nations, but a slight per- 
centage of the whole. That slight percentage, varying either 
way, makes the difference between up and down, — it causes the 
scales to tip. 

Hence, to-day, of an hundred distinct nationalities, speaking 
different languages, — civilized, semi-civilized and barbarian, — 
white, yellow and black, — it is fairly questionable whether as 
many as ten are really, in themselves and of themselves, progres- 
sive. The United States, Great Britain, Germany and Japan are 
distinctly uplifting ; but can the same, save exceptionally, be said 
of the Latin races on either continent, or of any of the peoples of 
Southern Asia or of Africa ? The vast majority of mankind are, of 
themselves, at best merely stationary. What impetus they have 
is from without. 

Now, as compared with ourselves, the Southern people have a 
dead-weight of Africanism tied to them, which is tending perpetu- 
ally to hold back or pull down. It may seem heterodox, perhaps it 
will be stigmatized as pessimistic, to say so, but I have myself little 
doubt that, if left to themselves, apart from the example and sus- 
taining energy of the white man, even the most advanced types of 
the African race on this continent, taken as a mass, would tend 
steadily to deteriorate, — they would sensibly gravitate towards 
the normal African conditions. In other words, it is not a self-sus- 
taining, much less an inherently advancing human species. It is 
held up to any standard to which it is brought by the presence 
and influence of the white man. Meanwhile, on the other hand, 
it acts as a dead-weight on the uplifting race, tending steadily to 
diminish its forward impetus, even if it does not produce direct 
deterioration. Instinctively comparing what I saw in South Car- 
oHna with the more fortunate conditions prevailing in Massachu- 
setts, the impression left was that the white race in the South, 
especially in South Carohna, were at a distinct disadvantage. In 

1 English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, Vol. I, p. 17. 



THE ETHICS OF SECESSION 231 

Charleston, for instance, there are about three inhabitants of 
black blood to two of white. The problem before that comniun- 
ity is, therefore, momentous. They are now making an effort, 
both honest and strenuous, to educate the African. What the re- 
sult will be at some remote future period, I do not undertake to 
predict. But, so far as can be judged from present indications, 
the outlook, in spite of expensive schooling, is not propitious. 
The races are segregating, and becoming more and more antagon- 
istic. The African does not originate, he is imitative. It is so in 
dress, in manners, and, to a certain extent, in morals. In all these 
respects an increasing separation of the two species, living perforce 
not side by side but together, is bad for both. From what I saw 
and heard I should apprehend that the great future handicap of 
the South would be the presence in its civilization of a vast, im- 
perfectly assimilated mass of barbarism veneered. 

The foregoing paper is, therefore, a thesis submitted in Charles- 
ton in 1902, by a Massachusetts man, there born and still there 
resident, who had stood in arms before Charleston in 1862. Pre- 
sented in the full light of existing conditions, it related to the 
constitutional theories and social, political and economical influ- 
ences of the earher period which had been preparatory to those 
existing conditions. The why-and- wherefore problem was ap- 
proached in a purely historic spirit; for, as I now see it, the 
question involved can never be disposed of if technically dealt 
with. Not a mere matter of the verbal construction of a written 
instrument, it far transcends legal argument, however close or 
logically convincing. It is a case of evolution, — the growth and 
development of a living organism. What was true of the Ameri- 
can people in 1787 had become false in 1860; conditions and 
modes of thought which prevailed generally in the earUer period 
had passed out of existence in the latter. Not only were they de- 
funct, they were actually and literally forgotten. The world had 
moved ; and, with the passage of years, the Constitution had be- 
come transformed, if not transfigured. It was this process of his- 
torical evolution and development which interested, and not the 
proper construction of words and phrases. To that, and to that 
alone, attention was directed. 



VII 

SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR ' 

Based on the careful study of a vast mass of material, 
patiently gathered and judicially considered, Mr. Rhodes's 
fifth vc lume is literary in tone and calm in spirit, — a 
thoroughly good piece of up-to-date historical work. The 
significance of the period dealt with will, moreover, only 
increase wath the lapse of time, and to its history this vol- 
ume is a contribution of lasting value. If for no other 
reason, it will so prove from the fact that it is not so removed 
from the time of which it treats as to cease to be contem- 
poraneous. He who writes has in this case shared in the 
intensity of that of which he writes ; with his own eyes he 
has seen many of the actors in the events of which he tells, 
and his ears have drunk in their own descriptive words. 
How great an advantage this may prove to one competent 
to avail himself of it has been shown more recently by 
Clarendon and Thiers, as in the classic times by Tacitus and 
Thucydides. What is more, the judgments both of men and 
of events now rendered by Mr. Rhodes, while based on an 
exhaustive study of material, are not only cautiously 
reached, but expressed in measured terms, quite devoid of 
either zeal or preconception. Neither a partisan nor a 

1 James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise 
of 1850. Vol. V (October, 1864 — August, 1866) . This paper was prepared 
for submission to the Massachusetts Historical Society and appears in its 
Proceedings. (Second Series, XIX, 311-356). It has been revised, and 
to a certain extent remodelled for the present publication. Supra, 109. 

232 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 233 

theorist, Mr. Rhodes is nothing unless critical. It is, there- 
fore, not unsafe even now to predict that in essentials the 
conclusions here reached by him will prove in harmony with 
the ultimate verdict. Nor is this something to be lightly 
said ; for the events and men of the period of Gettysburg 
and Emancipation will be studied and weighed not less 
closely by the historians and historical investigators of the 
twenty-third century than were those of the Naseby and 
Commonwealth period by Masson, by Carlyle, by Macaulay 
and by Gardiner in the century recently closed. 

But, in writing history, especially the narrative of events 
still to a large extent contemporaneous, much necessarily 
depends on the point of view. The direction of approach 
involves, indeed, nothing less than the question of perspec- 
tive, — the relative proportion of parts. On these, in turn, 
depend to some extent the conclusions reached. 

Mr. Rhodes approaches his subject in a general way. 
Neither a politician nor a soldier, he is as unskilled in prac- 
tical diplomacy as he is innocent of any study of international 
law; nor can he be classed as a publicist. Once, indeed, a 
man of affairs, he is now a judicially-minded general investi- 
gator, bringing much hard common-sense to bear, always 
modestly, on the complex problems of a troubled and event- 
ful period. Now it so chances that having myself been a 
participant in both the political movements and the military 
operations of the earlier time, I have more recently, through 
the study of historical material as yet unpublished, had 
occasion to look upon the problems discussed by Mr. Rhodes 
from points of view other than his. I therefore propose in 
this paper to discuss, in a spirit of criticism wholly friendly,^ 

1 Both Mr. Rhodes and the writer were at this time members of the 
Massachusetts Historical Society. Mr. Rhodes was present at the meet- 
ing (October 12, 1905) at which the present paper was submitted. 



234 MILITARY STUDIES 

what from those points of view seem deficiencies and short- 
comings in Mr. Rhodes's treatment. They wih prove not 
inconsiderable. Indeed, they in some repects go to the 
heart of the subject. 

At the close of his summary of the war, in that chapter 
devoted to a consideration of the internal affairs of the Con- 
federacy during the struggle, Mr. Rhodes suggests a query 
which many others have often put to themselves, and over 
which, first and last, they have pondered much. Tersely 
stated, it is this : How was it that we succeeded in over- 
coming the seceded States ? A task truly Titanic ! — 
and, looking back now through a vista of fifty years, 
one still instinctively asks, How did we ever accom- 
plish it? 

Seeking an answer to this far from self-explanatory query, 
Mr. Rhodes says: ''A certain class of facts, if considered 
alone, can make us wonder how it was possible to subjugate 
the Confederates. It could not have been accomplished 
without great political capacity at the head of the Northern 
government, and a sturdy support of Lincoln by the Northern 
people." * This, assuredly, is an inadequate answer to a per- 
plexing question, — a question which goes to the heart of 
any correct historical treatment of our Great Rebellion, to 
adopt Clarendon's title. It goes without saying that to 
overcome a combination of numbers, resources and territory 
such as that composing the Southern Confederacy implied 
great political capacity in the overcoming power, and the 
sturdy popular support of him upon whom the task de- 
volved. As Shakespeare causes Horatio to observe in an- 
other connection, "There needs no ghost come from the 
grave to tell us this." But the question suggested by Mr. 
Rhodes, being one of a very perplexing character, cannot 

1 Vol. V, p. 481. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 235 

satisfactorily be disposed of by generalities. To formulate 
an answer at once definite and satisfactory, we must, de- 
scending to particulars, be more specific. 

The usual and altogether conventional explanation given 
is the immense preponderance of strength and resources — 
men and material — enjoyed by one of the contending parties. 
The census and the statistics of the War Department are 
then appealed to, and figures are arrayed setting forth the 
relative population and wealth, — the resources, manu- 
factures and fighting strength of the two sides. As the 
result of such a showing, a certain amount of astonishment 
is finally expressed that the Confederacy ever challenged 
a conflict ; and the conclusion reached is that, under all the 
circumstances, the only real cause for wonder is that such 
an unequal contest was so long sustained. 

But this answer to the question will hardly bear examina- 
tion. After the event it looks well, — has a plausible 
aspect; but in 1861 a census had just been taken, and every 
fact and figure now open to study was then patent. The 
South knew them, Europe knew them ; and yet in the spring 
of 1861, and from Bull Run in July of that year to Gettys- 
burg and Vicksburg in 1863, no unprejudiced observer any- 
where believed that the subjugation of the Confederacy and 
the restoration of the old Union were reasonably probable, 
or, indeed, humanly speaking, a possibility. Mr. Gladstone, 
a man wise in his generation, and as a contemporaneous 
observer not unfriendly to the Union side, only expressed 
the commonly received and apparently justified opinion of 
all unprejudiced onlookers, when at Newcastle, in October, 
1862, he made his famous declaration in public speech that 
'^ Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South . . . have 
made a nation. . . . We may anticipate with certainty the 
success of the Southern States so far as regards their separa- 



236 MILITARY STUDIES 

tion from the North. I cannot but believe that that event 
is as certain as any event yet future and contingent can be." 
No community, it was argued, numbering eight millions, as 
homogeneous, organized and combative as the South, in- 
habiting a region of the character of the Confederacy, ever 
yet had been overcome in a civil war; and there was no 
sufficient reason for supposing that the present case would 
prove an exception to a hitherto universal rule. All this, 
moreover, was so. Wherefore, then, the exception? How 
was it that, in the result of our civil war, human experience 
went for nothing? 

Was, then, the unexpected really due to preponderance in 
force? Confederate authorities have, of late, evinced a 
strong disposition to insist upon this as the correct and 
sufficient explanation. In order, however, to make out even 
a 'prima facie showing, the Confederate authorities have 
assumed, or endeavored to show, that the South never, from 
Sumter to Appomattox, had over 600,000 men in the aggre- 
gate in arms ; and these, first and last, were opposed by, as 
they assert, some 2,800,000 on the part of the Union. Ad- 
mitting these figures to be correct of both sides, — a large 
admission, and one which any careful analysis would clearly 
disprove, — it is none the less obvious that a force six 
hundred thousand strong, made up of fighting material of 
the most approved character, wholly homogeneous, mustered 
for the protection of the hearthstone, is something not easily 
overcome. It constitutes in itself a defensive army of almost 
unprecedented size; and one more especially formidable 
when the minds of those composing it are to the last degree 
embittered against an opponent whose courage, as well as 
capacity, they held in almost unmeasured contempt. Such 
a force would, under the conditions existing in 1861 and 
1862, unquestionably have considered itself, and been pro- 



Jk 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 237 

nounced by others, quite adequate for every purpose of 
Southern defence. 

But this estimate of Confederate field force obviously in- 
vites criticism of another character. It calls for explanation. 
The Confederate historians and investigators responsible for 
it do not seem to realize that, in the very act of advancing it, 
they cast opprobrium on the community they belong to and 
profess to honor. If this estimate is sustained, the verdict 
of the historian of the future cannot be escaped. He will say 
that if 600,000 men were all the Confederacy, first and last, 
could get into the field, it is clear that the South went into 
the struggle in a half-hearted way, and, being in it, showed 
but a craven soul. No effort of the government, no induce- 
ment of pride or patriotism, sufficed to get even a moiety of 
its arms-bearing effectives into the fighting line. 

Such a showing on the part of the Confederacy, if estab- 
lished, will certainly not compare favorably with the forty 
years later record of the Boers in the very similar South 
African struggle. Accepting the Confederate figures as 
correct, how do the two cases stand ? Territorially the Con- 
federacy covered some 712,000 square mUes, — a region 
considerably (30,000 square miles) larger than the combined 
European areas of Austro-Hungary, Germany, France and 
Italy, with Belgium, Holland and Denmark thrown in. 
This vast space was inhabited by five million people of 
European descent, with three millions of Africans who could 
be depended upon to produce food for those of European 
blood in active service. In the course of the conflict, and 
before admitting themselves beaten, every white male in the 
Confederacy between the ages of seventeen and fifty capable 
of bearing arms was called out. Wherever necessary to, 
preclude evasion of military duty, the writ of habeas corpus 
was suspended, and the labor, property and liv.e^jof "all in 



^ 
f^ 



.it*V>^ 



238 MILITARY STUDIES 

the Confederacy were by legislation of the most drastic 
character put at the disposal of an energetic executive. The 
struggle lasted four full years; and during that period the 
eighth part of a generation grew up, yielding its quota of 
arms-bearing men. Consequently, under any recognized 
method of computation, the Confederacy, first and last, 
contained within itself some 1,350,000 men capable of doing 
military duty. This result, also, is in accordance with the 
figures of the census of 1860.^ During the war the Con- 
federate army was reenforced by over 125,000 sympathizers^ 
from the sister slave States not included in the Confederacy. 
The upshot of the contention thus is, out of a population of 
5,600,000 whites, only 475,000 put in an appearance in re- 
sponse to a many-tongued and often reiterated call to arms, 

1 The exact number, arithmetically computed on the census returns 
of 1860, but of course to a certain extent inaccurate and deceptive, was 
1,356,500. 

2 An exact statistical statement of the number of sympathizers from 
Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri, who, first 
and last, found their way into the ranks of the Confederate army, is 
of course impossible. It has been asserted that there were 316,424 
."Southern men in the Northern army." This large contingent, so far 
as not imaginary, would naturally have come in greatest part from the 
"Border States," so called. It would be not unnatural to assume that 
these States furnished an equal number of recruits to the Confederacy ; 
but such an assumption would, on the basis above given, be manifestly 
absurd, leaving a comparatively pitiful contingent of less than 300,000 to 
be accredited to the States which formed the Confederacy. The War 
Records contain lists of all military organizations of the Confederate army 
referred to in that publication. Including regiments, battalions and com- 
panies belonging to all branches of the service, regular and provisional, these 
numbered 279 from the four States, West Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky 
and Missouri. Included in these were 238 full regiments. If these aver- 
aged, from first to last, only 600 each, they represented an aggregate of 
143,000 men. No less than 132 lesser organizations, battalions, and com- 
panies, and all individual enlistments, remain to be allowed for. In view 
of these facts. Colonel T. L. Livermore, who has made a specialty of this 
subject, writes under date of October 24, 1905, "I think a larger estimate 
than 135,000 in the Confederate army from these States might safely 
be made." 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 239 

— a trifle in excess of one man to each twelve inhabitants. 
There were, moreover, more than 500,000 able-bodied negroes 
well adapted in every respect for all the numerous semi- 
military services, — such as teamsters, servants, hospital 
attendants and laborers on fortifications, the call for which 
always depletes the number present for duty of every army/ 
Yet it is now maintained by Confederate authorities that all 
the efforts of the Richmond government, backed by every 
feeling of pride, patriotism, protection of the domestic roof- 
tree and hate of the enemy, could only induce or compel a 
comparatively Spartan band to turn out and strike for in- 
dependence.^ 

How was it, under very similar circumstances, with the 
South Africans ? On Confederate showing they are a braver, 
a more patriotic and self-sacrificing race. Two communities, 
the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, were engaged in a 
defensive struggle against Great Britain. They included 
within their bounds an area of 160,000 square miles, — less 
than a fourth of that included in the Confederacy. Their 
entire white population was but about 325,000, and, when the 
war commenced, it was estimated they could muster a force 
not in excess of 48,000. Yet in their two years of resistance, 
the Boers, it is computed, had 90,000 men, first and last, in 
actual service, or more than one in four of their population, 
as against the one out of twelve in the case of the Con- 

* "I propose to substitute slaves for all soldiers employed out of the 
ranks — on detached service, extra duty, as cooks, engineers, laborers, 
pioneers, or any kind of work. Such details for this Uttle army amount 
to more than 10,000 men. Negroes would serve for such purposes better 
than soldiers. . . . The plan is simple and quick. It puts soldiers and 
negroes each in his appropriate place ; the one to fight, the other to work. 
I need not go into particulars." — Gen. J. E. Johnston, to Confederate 
Senator L. T. Wigfall, January 4, 1864 ; Mrs. D. G. Wright, A Southern 
Girl in '61, pp. 168, 169. 

* See note, infra, 282. 



240 MILITARY STUDIES 

federacy.^ The preponderance of force opposed to the Boers 
was as five to one ; the preponderance of force in the case of 
the Confederates, according to this latest estimate of their 
historians, was at most but four and a half to one.^ 

Such an estimate is, however, as far from the mark as, were 
it based on actual facts, it would be discreditable to Confed- 
erate manhood. It is simply unbelievable that, measured 
by the proportion of fighting men to the total populations, 
the Boer spirit was to the spirit of the Confederacy as three 
is to one. The statement carries its own refutation ; and 
the Southerners of that period were no such race of miching, 
mean-spirited, stay-at-home skulkers as their self-constituted 
and most ill-advised annalists would apparently make them 
out. On the contrary, as matter of historical fact, they did 

^ To be exact, one out of each eleven and eight-tenths. 

2 We have census (1860) figures of the population of the States of the 
Confederacy at the breaking out of the Civil War ; but the Confederate 
muster-rolls, showing actual enlistments, are confessedly defective. It 
is not easy to reach any accurate figures as to either the population 
of the two South African republics, or the number of men actually put 
into the field by them during the war. The "total number of officers 
and men of all Regular and Auxiliary [British] Forces in the South African 
War from the beginning to the end " is officially stated as 448,435. At 
the beginning of the war the Intelligence Division of the British War Office 
estimated the total available forces of the Transvaal at 29,917, and those 
of the Orange Free State at 13,104, or an aggregate of 43,021 combatants. 
At the close of the war, however, the total number accounted for was 
72,974 Transvaal and Free State combatants, with 16,400 "Rebels," 
"Renegades and Foreigners," or a grand total of 89,374. The British 
officials content themselves with saying, "It is difficult to explain the ex- 
cess over the Boer official returns [preceding the conflict], unless, indeed, 
these purposely understated the actual strength of the burghers." — Re- 
port (1903) of "His Majesty's Commissioners appointed to Inquire into 
the Military Preparations and Other Matters Connected with the War in 
South Africa," pp. 35, 158, 168. Excluding in each case foreign sym- 
pathizers, the two South African republics apparently put into the field 
as combatants one man to each four and two-tenths (4.2) of their entire 
population ; on the claim of the Southern historians the nine States of the 
Confederacy put into the field one combatant to each eleven and eight- 
tenths (11.8) of their total white population. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 241 

both turn out in force/ and they fought to a finish. Un- 
doubtedly there was, towards the close of the contest, a 
large desertion from the Confederate ranks. The army 
melted imperceptibly away. The men would not stay by 
the colors. When, in April, 1865, Jefferson Davis, after 
his flight from Richmond, met at Greensboro', N. C, 
Joseph E. Johnston, then in command of the army confront- 
ing Sherman, a species of council was held, at which the course 
to be pursued, in the then obviously desperate condition of 
affairs, was discussed. Johnston, knowing well the condition 
of things, and the consequent feeling among his men, when 
appealed to for his opinion bluntly said that the South felt it 
was whipped, and was tired of the war. Davis, on the other 
hand, was eager to continue the struggle. He insisted that 
in spite of the "terrible" disasters recently sustained, he 
would in three or four weeks have a large army in the field ; 
and, further, expressed his confident belief that the Con- 
federates could still win, and achieve their independence, 
if, as he expressed it, ''our people will turn out." ^ 

That Davis even then honestly so thought is very probable ; 
and, looking only to the number of fighting men on each side 
available for service under proper conditions, he was right. 
And yet under existing conditions he was altogether wrong. 
As respects mere numbers, it is capable of demonstration 
that, at the close of the struggle, the preponderance was on 
the side of the Confederacy, and distinctly so. The Union 
at that time had, it is said, a million men on its muster rolls. 
Possibly that number were consuming rations and drawing 

^ See note, infra, 282. 

^ Alfriend, Life of Jefferson Davis, pp. 622-626 ; B. T. Johnson, Life of 
Joseph E. Johnston, p. 219 ; Roman, Military Operations of General Beaure- 
gard, Vol. II, p. 665. Roman here prints a letter, dated March 30, 1868, 
from J. E. Johnston to Beauregard, giving his recollections of what was 
said and took place at the Greensboro' meeting of April 12-13, 1861. See 
infra, 241, 325. 



242 MILITARY STUDIES 

pay. If such was the case, acting on the offensive, and deep 
in a vast hostile country, the Union might possibly have been 
able to put 500,000 men in the fighting line. On the other 
side, notwithstanding the heavy drain of four years of war, 
the fighting strength of the Confederacy at the close cannot 
have been less than two-thirds of its normal strength. The 
South should have been able to muster, on paper, 900,000 
men. Such a force, or even the half of it, acting on the 
defensive in a region inadequately supplied with railroad 
facilities, — and these, such as they were, very open to 
attack, — should have been ample for every purpose. 
Texas alone had in 1860 a white population larger by 
nearly 100,000 than the white population of the Transvaal 
and Orange Free State combined in 1899.^ Texas covered 
an area of 265,780 square miles, as against the 161,296 of the 
combined African republics; and this vast region was ren- 
dered accessible in 1861 by some 300 miles of railroad, or 
about one mile of railroad of most inferior construction to 
each 900 square miles of territory.^ The character of the 
soil made heavy movement, slow and difficult always, at 
times impossible. In such a region and under such con- 
ditions, how could an invading force have been fed or trans- 
ported, or kept open its lines of communication ? Thus, on 
the face of the facts, Davis was right, and the South, if it 
chose to defend itself, was invincible. 

And here we find ourselves face to face with one of the 
greatest of the many delusions in the popular conception of 

1 According to the best authorities, the combined white population of 
the two South African States at the beginning of hostilities was approxi- 
mately 323,113 ; the white population of Texas was returned in the census 
of 1860 at 421,294. 

^ The census of 1860 returned 307 miles of railroad in operation in 
Texas; in 1903 it was stated that 11,256 miles were in operation. The 
proportion of railroad mileage to area was, in 1860, one mile to each 865 
square miles of territory ; in 1903 it was one mile to each 24 square miles. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 243 

practical warfare. In his remark at the Greensboro' con- 
ference about the South ''turning out," Jefferson Davis 
seems to have fallen into it. The South, at that stage of the 
conflict, simply could not ''turn out." So doing was a 
physical impossibility. It was Napoleon who said that an 
army was like a serpent, it moves on its belly. In dealing 
with practical conditions in warfare, it has always to be 
borne in mind that an army is a most complex organization ; 
and its strength is measured and limited not by the census 
number of men available, but the means at hand of arming, 
equipping, clothing, feeding and transporting those men. 
This topic is elsewhere discussed in the present publication ; ^ 
here, and in this connection, it is sufficient to say that, so 
far as its military organizations were concerned, for those 
of all grades, from the general in command to the camp- 
follower, after January, 1865, the possibility of organized 
resistance on the part of the Confederacy no longer existed. 
The choice lay between surrender and disbandment; or, 
as General Johnston subsequently wrote: "We, without 
the means of purchasing supplies of any kind, or procuring 
or repairing arms, could continue this war only as robbers 
or guerillas." ^ 

The next question is : How had this result been brought 
about? How did it happen that five millions of people in 
a country of practically unlimited extent, and one almost 
invulnerable to attack, were physically incapable of further 
organized resistance ? How did they come to be so devoid of 
arms, food, clothing and means of transport? In other 
words, what is the correct answer to the query suggested by 
Mr. Rhodes ? He certainly does not give it ; but, perplexing 

» Infra, 325. 

* Johnston to Beauregard, March 30, 1868 ; Roman, Beauregard, Vol. 
II, p. 665. 



244 MILITARY STUDIES 

as the question is, a plausible answer can surely at this late 
day be at least approximated. 

When it comes to rendering a judgment on passing events 
or on contemporaries, Lord Bacon long ago classed foreign 
nations and posterity together, to them making his individual 
appeal for ''name and memory." To like effect another and 
more modern writer has pronounced "a foreign nation a kind 
of contemporaneous posterity." This, in both cases, ob- 
viously because in the opinion and estimate of a ''foreign 
nation" it may be possible to find, in degree at least, that 
detachment and sense of proportion always incompatible 
with nearness and familiarity. A recourse to this tribunal, 
for what it is worth, is in the present case possible. Black- 
wood's jEJ(im6wrgr/i ikfa^'a^ine for July, 1866, contains a some- 
what elaborate contemporaneous paper entitled The Prin- 
ciples and Issues of the American Struggle} Philosophizing 
over the outcome of the struggle rather more than a year 
after it had been brought to a close, the writer of the article 
thus answered Mr. Rhodes's query some thirty-eight years 
in advance of the time when Mr. Rhodes put it : — 

"By dint of obstinate endurance — by dint of illimitable paper 
money and credit — by dint of foreign soldiers from Ireland and 
Germany who swarmed into the country, allured by bounties on 
enlistment varying from £100 to £200 sterling per head — by dint 
of sacrificing general after general, however brave and able, who 
could not gain a victory — by dint of a blockade of the sea-board, 
producing in due time a famine, or something very like it, through 
the most fertile portions of the South ; and last, but by no means 
least, by dint of the cowardice or incapacity of the British govern- 
ment, that refused to unite with that of France in acknowledging 
the independence of the South — the Northern people conquered 
their Southern brethren." 

^ Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, July, 1866, C, 31. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 245 

Here, then, is a foreign contemporaneous explanation, and 
one, in some respects, close to the mark. Yet it is not wholly 
satisfactory. It again is too general ; for, though the writer 
is specific enough, he generalizes in his specification, omitting 
nothing that suggests itself, and emphasizing everything 
about equally. Further elimination and a more severe 
analysis are necessary. 

Six contributing causes are specified. Let us, through the 
perspective of forty years, see which stUl stand as material. 
The initial two, '^obstinate endurance" and ''illimitable 
paper dollars and credit," we may pass over. The first goes 
without saying ; and the last would not in itself have sufficed 
to accomplish the end sought in 1865, any more than it had 
sufficed to accomplish the end then sought, when, in the 
struggle with its revolted American provinces which ended 
in 1783, Great Britain, in like manner, had at its command 
^' illimitable paper " notes and " credit," as against a worth- 
less Continental currency. The allegation was simply 
fatuous. The third count also cuts no considerable figure 
in a revised summary. The backbone of the Union army 
at the close of the struggle, as at its beginning, was made 
up of Americans. The number of foreigners, Irish or Ger- 
man, drawn to the country by the temptation of bounties 
may have been considerable; but, as a factor of active, 
fighting strength it has been misunderstood and vastly 
exaggerated. In the early stages of the war, more than 
half a million men, nearly all Americans and young, were 
suddenly withdrawn from industrial life. A paralysis of 
production should necessarily have followed. That, as 
a matter of fact, it did not follow was due to an inrush of 
foreigners, filling the void thus created. The immigrants 
replenished the depleted ranks of industry, not those of the 
army in the field. This most interesting sociological and 



246 MILITARY STUDIES 

economical fact has since been demonstrated through a care- 
ful analysis of records and statistics/ On the other hand, 
any advantage the nationalists did actually derive from 
bounty-drawn, immigrant enlistments was far more than 
counterbalanced by the drastic conscription enforced 
throughout the Confederacy. Three factors now only re- 
main for consideration. One of these, the sacrificing of 
those leaders who failed to win victories, is a feature of 
all warfare, and in no way peculiar to our civil strife. As 
a factor in results it was not especially noticeable there ; 
and, moreover, there is no sort of question that both com- 
munities and those in authority are as a rule so constituted 
that a preference is felt for commanders in the field whose 
names are associated with bulletins of victory rather than 
with the habitually '^ unlucky," even though plausible in 
their explanations of failure. The writer of the paper re- 
ferred to obviously had McClellan in mind ; but, in his case, 
history, and the coming to light of historical material 
have more than justified the course finally pursued by 
Lincoln and Stanton towards that excellent organizer, but 
exceedingly insufficient field commander. Of the two re- 
maining factors of success, — the blockade and absence of 
foreign intervention, — the last may be left out of considera- 
tion. It is useless to discuss historical problems from the 
point of view of what would have happened if something 
had occurred which in point of fact never did occur. On 
this foreign and contemporaneous judgment of conditions 
we are thus through elimination brought down to one factor, 
the blockade, as the controlling condition of Union success. 
In other words, that success was made possible by the 
undisputed naval and maritime supremacy of the national 

1 Fite, Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil War, 
5-14. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 247 

government. Cut off from the outer world and all exterior 
sources of supply, reduced to a state of inanition by the 
blockade, the Confederacy was pounded to death. ^ 

Or, to put the proposition in yet another form, in the game 
of warfare, maritime supremacy on the part of the North — 
what Admiral Mahan has since developed historically as the 
Influence of the Sea Power — even more than compensated 
for the military advantage of the defensive, and its interior 
strategic lines, enjoyed by the South. Such being the case, the 
greater command of men, supplies, munitions and transporta- 
tion by one party to the conflict worked its natural result. 

Unquestionably much could be said in support of this con- 
tention. More than plausible, it fairly explains an outcome 
otherwise inexplicable now, as contrary to all foreign expecta- 
tion then. Without, however, going into any elaborate dis- 
cussion of the arguments for and against it as a satisfactory 
historical postulate, but for present purposes accepting it as 
such, a distinct grasp and full recognition of the advantage 
in the struggle pertaining to the mastery of the sea is one 
of the most noticeable deficiencies in Mr. Rhodes's treatment 
of the outcome of the conflict. In this respect his narrative 
is lacking in a proper sense of proportion. As compared with 
the space devoted to the movements on land, he fails to give 
to the sea operations the emphasis properly belonging to 
them. Towards the close of that portion of his fifth volume 
devoted to a summary of the preceding narrative, Mr. Rhodes, 
it is true, does incidentally say that the " work of the 
United States navy was an affair of long patience unrelieved 
by the prospect of brilliant exploits ; lacking the incitement of 
battle, it required discipline and character only the more. 
But the reward was great; for the blockade was one of the 
effective agencies in deciding the issue of the war." ^ This 
1 Injra, 317, 320, 321. 2 Vol. V, p. 399. 



248 MILITARY STUDIES 

is a somewhat faint recognition of services really decisive; 
but, such as it is, it may pass. As one reads Mr. Rhodes's 
narrative, however, it would hardly be supposed that a 
blockade existed at all, much less that it entered into the 
struggle as the essential pivot on which turned many of 
the most important of those land movements so fully de- 
scribed. For instance, an undisputed maritime supremacy 
made possible both Grant's operations in Virginia and 
Sherman's march to the sea. 

To this general criticism an exception must be made in 
the case of the action between the Monitor and the Merrimac. 
To that a sufficiency of space (five pages) is given ; for, ob- 
viously, on its result depended McClellan's strategy. Be- 
sides being temptingly dramatic in itself, it had to be dealt 
with in connection with land operations. But the capture of 
Hatteras Inlet (August 26, 1861) and of Port Royal (Novem- 
ber 7, 1861) are incidentally mentioned in part of a twenty- 
three line paragraph, though strategically they were, and 
subsequently proved, of the utmost consequence, distinctly 
foreshadowing that process of devitalization as a result of 
which the Confederacy ultimately collapsed. Again, the 
taking of New Orleans, from every point of view one of the 
most important events of the war, as well as one of its 
most striking episodes, — a knife-thrust in the very vitals of 
the Confederacy, — is disposed of in two pages. The sinking 
of the Alabama by the Kearsarge is truly enough referred to 
''as of no moment towards terminating the war"; but its 
moral effect in Europe at a critical period was very memo- 
rable. Finally, to assert that the achievements of Admiral 
Farragut contributed not less than those of General Sherman 
to the downfall of the Confederacy may or may not be an 
exaggeration ; but, on the part of the navy, it may safely be 
claimed that the running of the forts at the mouth of the 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 249 

Mississippi, and the consequent fall of New Orleans, was as 
brilliant an operation, and one as triumphantly conducted, 
as the march through Georgia. It struck equal dismay into 
the hearts of the Southern leaders. Yet the name of Farra- 
gut appears but once in the index of Mr. Rhodes's fifth 
volume, in which he summarizes the war; and that once is 
in connection with Andrew Johnson's famous ^'swinging- 
round-the-circle " performance. Twelve lines of text are 
devoted to the battle of Mobile Bay, while two lines only are 
made to suffice for the capture of Wilmington, which closed 
the last inlet of the Confederacy, hermetically sealing it. 
Here, then, from Hatteras Inlet to Fort Fisher, — between 
August, 1861, and January, 1865, — is a consecutive series 
of operations, prime factors in the final result, and they are 
disposed of in ninety lines of a narrative covering 1350 pages ! 
About a sixth of one per cent of the entire space is given to 
them. With Hilton Head, Hatteras Inlet, New Orleans, 
Hampton Roads, Mobile Bay, Wilmington and Cherbourg 
blazing imperishably on the record, Mr. Rhodes incidentally 
remarks that the work of the navy was '^unrelieved by the 
prospect of brilliant exploits" ! Nor do the names of those 
identified with our naval triumphs thunder in the general 
index. Judged by that test, six lines suffice for the allu- 
sions to Farragut, and five for those to Porter; while four 
solid columns are judged scarcely adequate for Grant and 
two for Sherman. This is clearly disproportionate. In 
some future edition an entire chapter for each year would 
not be too much to devote to an account of the operations 
of that arm of the Union service which on the sea counter- 
balanced the advantage of interior lines on the land which 
the Confederates so confidently counted upon, and of which 
all the military strategists or critics, whether domestic or 
foreign, so everlastingly wrote. To be steadily and effect- 



250 MILITARY STUDIES 

ually throttled from behind is not usually considered a 
negligible disadvantage, if suffered by one party to an 
otherwise not wholly unequal life-and-death grapple; and 
when the throttling process is from time to time accentuated 
by a spear thrust in the ribs or active knife- work in the 
back the consequences are apt to be contributory to defeat. 
In the matter of our maritime supremacy, the Confederacy 
so found it. As a Southern writer has in long reminiscence 
recently said : " Aptly did camp slang name the blockade 
the ' Conda.' It was the crush of the ' Conda ' that 
squeezed us to death." 

Passing to another topic of scarcely less importance, Mr. 
Rhodes's sense of correct proportion is again at fault. The 
Confederacy did not go into the conflict unadvisedly. On the 
contrary, its leaders gave what at the time they considered 
full consideration to all the factors on either side essential 
to success.^ As was apparent in the outcome, they reckoned 
without their host ; but, none the less, they did reckon. Un- 
fortunately for it, the Southern community in the years prior 
to 1861 was phenomenally provincial. Judged by its litera- 
ture and the published utterances of its men and women, 
particularly its women, it seemed — intellectually, socially, 
economically and physically — to be conscious only of itself. 
This characteristic, among many other phases of develop- 
ment, was inordinately and most offensively apparent in an 
undervaluation of its prospective opponent, both for char- 

1 For instance, in the very matter of a blockade, as an incident to war, 
James H. Hammond, then in the Senate from South Carolina, in a speech 
delivered in 1858, and presently referred to, thus summarily dismissed the 
idea as an absurdity : "We have three thousand miles of continental sea- 
shore line so indented with bays and crowded with islands that when their 
shore lines are added, we have twelve thousand miles. . . . Can you hem 
in such a territory as that ? You talk of putting up a wall of fire around 
eight hundred and fifty thousand square miles so situated ! How absurd! " 
— Selections from Letters and Speeches of James H. Hammond, pp. 311, 312. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 251 

acter and courage/ and in an overvaluation of the importance 
of the South as a commercial world-power. As respects the 
undervaluation of the prospective opponent, the mental 
condition of the South in 1861 was fairly expressed by 
General L. P. Walker, the first Confederate Secretary of War, 
when, on the occasion of the running up of the Confederate 
flag on the capitol of Montgomery, Alabama, on a day in 
early April, 1861, he pledged himself to the excited crowd 
there gathered to raise at no remote time the flag in question 
over ''Faneuil Hall in the City of Boston." Curiously as 
it now sounds, there is no exaggeration in the statement 
that " at first flush of war the masses of the South really 
believed that one Southerner ' could whip a half-dozen 
Yankees and not half try,' "^ 

The explanation of this and other utterances of a similar 
character has since been very tersely stated by General 
Bradley T. Johnson, himself a Confederate, though born in 
Maryland, — at once jurist and veteran: "The Southern 
people for several generations had trained themselves into 
a vainglorious mood toward the Northern men. They be- 
lieved that they were inconquerable by the North and that 
the men of the North were not their physical nor mental 
equals." ^ And, reviewing the conflict and outcome through 
the vista of thirty years, this typical Southron reached a 
conclusion, bearing directly on the query suggested by Mr. 
Rhodes: '^The Confederate States were not crushed by 
overwhelming resources nor overpowering numbers. They 
were out-thought by the Northern men."' As respects the 

^"Vulgar, fanatical, cheating Yankees — hypocritical, if as women 
they pretend to real virtue ; and lying, if as men they pretend to be 
honest." — W. H. Russell, My Diary North and South, Chap. XIX. 

2 T. C. De Leon, Belles, Beaux and Brains in the 60' s, pp. 56, 394. 

' Memoir oj the Life and Public Service of Joseph E. Johnston (1891), 
pp. 60, 61. 



252 MILITARY STUDIES 

other great factor of self-deception, the overvaluation of itself 
by the South as a commercial world-power, the mere men- 
tion of that delusion recalls to memory the once familiar, 
now quite forgotten, postulate, — ^'Cotton is King!" To 
the South its infatuation on this point was the fruitful mother 
of calamity; for the commercial supremacy of cotton, 
accepted as a fundamental truth, was made the basis of 
political action. The unquestioning faith in which that 
patriarchal community cherished this belief has now passed 
out of memory, and the statement of it savors of exaggera- 
tion. As a matter of fact, it does not admit of exaggeration. 
For instance, what modern historical presentation could be 
so framed as to exceed in strength, broadness and color the 
following from a speech delivered in the United States Senate, 
March 4, 1858? James H. Hammond, representing South 
Carolina, then said : — 

" But if there were no other reason why we should never have 
war, would any sane nation make war on cotton ? Without firing 
a gun, without drawing a sword, should they make war on us we 
could bring the whole world to our feet. The South is perfectly 
competent to go on one, two, or three years without planting a seed 
of cotton. . . . What would happen if no cotton was furnished 
for three years? I will not stop to depict what every one can 
imagine, but this is certain : England would topple headlong and 
carry the whole civilized world with her, save the South. No, 
you dare not make war on cotton. No power on earth dares to 
make war upon it. Cotton is King. Until lately the Bank of 
England was king, but she tried to put her screws as usual, the 
fall before the last, upon the cotton crop, and was utterly van- 
quished. The last power has been conquered. Who can doubt, 
that has looked at recent events, that cotton is supreme?" ^ 

It would not be difficult to multiply almost indefinitely 

utterances like the above ; but for the purpose in hand this 

^ Selections from the Letters and Speeches of James H. Hammond (New 
York, 1866), pp. 316, 317. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 253 

one will suffice. Intensely provincial, the idea was vulgarly 
commercial ; in the jargon of the Stock Exchange, the South 
was satisfied that she had in her hand a corner on Cotton, 
and, if she so willed it, the World must walk up to her 
counter, and settle on any terms she saw fit to prescribe ! 
As Russell, of the London Times, observed: ''These tall, 
thin, fine-faced Carolinians are great materialists. Slavery 
perhaps has aggravated the tendency to look at all the 
world through parapets of cotton-bales and rice-bags, and, 
though more stately and less vulgar, the worshippers here 
are not less prostrate before the 'almighty dollar' than 
the Northerners." ^ 

Thus in complete provincialism and childlike faith a com- 
munity was willing to venture, and actually did venture, life, 
fortune and sacred honor on its contempt for those composing 
the largest part of the community of which they were them- 
selves but a minority, and on the soundness of a commercial 
theory. In regard to the extent and implicit character of the 
faith held on both these points, no better witness could testify 
than Dr. William H. Russell, the once famous Times Crimean 
correspondent just referred to. Russell certainly had no 
prejudice against the South, or Southern men. On the con- 
trary, he liked both; while he did not take kindly to the 
North as a whole, or to its people. A foreign observer with 
a remarkable faculty for vivid description, he was here to 
take notes and to portray things as they appeared. In 
South Carolina immediately after the bombardment of 
Sumter, he there mixed freely with the exponents of public 
sentiment. In his Diary he thus describes what he heard 
on the subject of Southern superiority and cotton supremacy, 
— he is recording what occurred at the Charleston Club on 
the evening of April 16, 1861, ex-governors of the State, 
^ My Diary North and South, Chap. XV. 



254 MILITARY STUDIES 

senators, congressmen, and other prominent South Carolinians 
being of the company : — 

" We talked long, and at last angrily, as might be between friends, 
of political affairs. 

"I own it was a little irritating to me to hear men indulge in ex- 
travagant broad menace and rodomontade, such as came from their 
lips. 'They would welcome the world in arms with hospitable 
hands to bloody graves.' 'They never could be conquered.' 
'Creation could not do it,' and so on. I was obliged to handle the 
question quietly at first, — to ask them ' if they admitted the 
French were a brave and warlike people ! ' ' Yes, certainly.' 
' Do you think you could better defend yourselves against invasion 
than the people of France ? ' ' Well, no ; but we'd make it pretty 
hard business for the Yankees.' 'Suppose the Yankees, as you 
call them, come with such preponderance of men and materiel, that 
they are three to your one, will you not be forced to submit?' 
'Never.' 'Then either you are braver, better disciplined, more 
warlike than the people and soldiers of France, or you alone, of all 
the nations in the world, possess the means of resisting physical 
laws which prevail in war, as in other affairs of life.' 'No. The 
Yankees are cowardly rascals. We have proved it by kicking 
and cuffing them till we are tired of it ; besides, we know John Bull 
very well. He will make a great fuss about non-interference at 
first, but when he begins to want cotton he'll come off his perch.' 
I found this was the fixed idea everywhere. The doctrine of 
'cotton is king' — to us who have not much considered the ques- 
tion a grievous delusion or an unmeaning babble — to them is 
a lively all-powerful faith without distracting heresies or schisms."^ 

The following day, Dr. Russell was one of a party on an ex- 
cursion down Charleston harbor, visiting Forts Sumter and 
Moultrie. In the course of the trip he met, among others, 
L. T. Wigfall, the notorious Texan who had recently resigned 

1 My Diary North and South, Chap. XIII. Later, April 19, the Times 
correspondent called on the governor of the State, F. W. Pickens. Of 
him he wrote: "The Governor writes very good proclamations, never- 
theless, and his confidence in South Carolina is unbounded. If we stand 
alone, sir, we must win. They can't whip us." — Ibid. Chap. XVI. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 255 

a seat in the Senate of the United States to throw in his 
fortunes with the Confederacy. Dr. Russell says in his Diary, 
Aprni7: — 

"For me there was only one circumstance which marred the 
pleasure of that agreeable reunion. Colonel and Senator Wigfall, 
who had not sobered himself by drinking deeply, in the plenitude 
of his exultation alluded to the assault on Senator Sumner as a type 
of the manner in which the Southerners would deal with the 
Northerners generally, and cited it as a good exemplification of 
the fashion in which they would bear their 'whipping.'" ' 

A day or two later, Mr. Bunch, the British consul at 
Charleston, who not long afterwards achieved a most unhappy 
diplomatic notoriety, entertained Dr. Russell at dinner. It 
was a "small and very agreeable party," but of the talk at 
that table the guest recorded : — 

"It was scarcely very agreeable to my host or myself to find that 
no considerations were believed to be of consequence in reference 
to England except her material interests, and that these worthy 
gentlemen regarded her as a sort of appanage of their cotton king- 
dom. 'Why, sir, we have only to shut off your supply of cotton 
for a few weeks, and we can create a revolution in Great Britain. 
There are four millions of your people depending on us for their 

1 A montli later Mr. Wigfall received, through his wife, from a corre- 
spondent in Providence, R. I., an ardent sympathizer with the Con- 
federacy, a warning curiously characteristic of the period, and most 
suggestive of the estimate in which the Northern community was then 
held by those impregnated with Southern ideals : — 

"I think, however, that you at the South are wrong to undervalue the 
courage and resources of the Northern States. They were no doubt less 
accustomed to the use of firearms — ■ there are very few who know how 
to ride, and they are less fiery in their impulses. They are less disposed 
to fight, but they are not cowardly where their interests are concerned 
and will fight for their money. Where their property is at stake they will 
not hesitate to risk their lives. ... I would not advise you of the South 
to trust too much in the idea that the Northerners will not fight ; for I 
believe they will, and their numbers are overwhelming." — Mrs. D. G. 
Wright, A Southern Girl in '61, pp. 52, 53. 



256 MILITARY STUDIES 

bread, not to speak of the many millions of dollars. No, sir, we 
know that England must recognize us,' etc. 

"Liverpool and Manchester have obscured all Great Britain to 
the Southern eye. I confess the tone of my friends irritated me." 

He next visited the leading merchants, bankers and 
brokers : — ■ 

"In one office I saw an announcement of a company for a direct 
communication by steamers between a southern port and Europe. 
'When do you expect that fine to be opened?' I asked. 'The 
United States cruisers will surely interfere with it.' 'Why, I 
expect, sir,' replied the merchant, 'that if those miserable Yankees 
try to blockade us, and keep you from our cotton, you'll just send 
their ships to the bottom and acknowledge us. That will be 
before autumn, I think.' It was in vain I assured him he would 
be disappointed. 'Look out there,' he said, pointing to the 
wharf, on which were piled some cotton bales; 'there's the 
key will open all our ports, and put us into John Bull's strong 
box as well.'" 

A guest shortly after on the island plantation of Mr. Tres- 
cot, he there met Edmund Rhett, a member of a family 
prominent in South Carolina public life. The Rhett dwell- 
ing house and plantation were on Port Royal Island, a few 
miles only from the smaller island on which Mr. Trescot 
dwelt. They thus were neighbors. The stranger and guest 
describes the South Carolinian as ''a very intelligent and 
agreeable gentleman," but from his lips also came the same 
old story. "'Look,' he said, 'at the fellows who are sent out 
by Lincoln to insult foreign courts by their presence.' I 
said that I understood Mr. Adams and Mr. Dayton were very 
respectable gentlemen, but I did not receive any S3^mpathy ; 
in fact, a neutral who attempts to moderate the violence of 
either side is very like an ice between two hot plates. Mr. 
Rhett is also persuaded that the Lord Chancellor sits on a 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 257 

cotton bale. 'You must recognize us, sir, before the end of 
October.'"^ 

But perhaps the curious and complete state of misappre- 
hension, material and moral, then pervading the Southern 
community, has best been described by a Southerner who 
himself at the time shared in it to the full extent. Writing 
nearly fifty years later, he said, speaking of the very time 
described by Russell in the above extracts: ''Two ideas, 
however, seemed to pervade all classes. One was that key- 
stone dogma of secession, 'Cotton is king,' the other that 
the war — did one come — could not last over three months. 
The man who ventured dissent from either idea, back it by 
what logic he might, was looked upon as an idiot, if his 
disloyalty was not broadly hinted at." ^ 

As respects the outcome of what may well enough be called 
the South 's cotton campaign, Mr. Rhodes's narrative is 
again distinctly deficient. In fact the most far-reaching, 
and, in world effect, the most important of all the cam- 
paigns inaugurated and carried out by the Confederacy, in its 
result they sustained complete and disastrous defeat, — 
a defeat which entailed on them in the midst of the contest 
and in presence of the enemy, an entire change of front, 
economical, financial and diplomatic. This nowhere appears 
in Mr. Rhodes's narrative; and yet on this phase of the 
struggle both Confederate finance and Confederate diplo- 
macy hinged. And here again the blockade comes to the 
front. 

Had the theory as respects the potency of cotton on which 

* This meeting was on April 28. A few days only more than six months 
later both the Rhetts and Mr. Trescot hurriedly abandoned their homes, 
immediately after the bombardment and capture of the forts at Hilton 
Head, November 7, 1861, by the expedition under command of Captain, 
afterwards Admiral, Dupont. All of the South Carolina sea-islands, as 
they were called, were thenceforth occupied by the Union forces. 

2 T. C. De Leon, Belles, Beaux and Brains of the 60's (1907), p. 50. 



258 MILITARY STUDIES 

the South went into the war been sound, the blockade would 
have proved the Confederacy's most potent ally; for the 
blockade shut off from Europe its supply of cotton as it could 
have been shut off by no other possible agency. In so far 
the government of the Union played the game of the Con- 
federacy, and played it effectively. In the early days of the 
struggle, they talked at Richmond of an export duty on their 
one great staple, and of inhibiting its outgo altogether ; the 
blockade made any action of this nature quite unnecessary. 
Through the blockade the cotton-screw, so to speak, was 
applied to the fullest possible extent. Nor was the over- 
throw of the potentate brought about easily. Pie was well 
entrenched, and dethroning him entailed on the commercial 
world one of the most severe trials it has ever been called 
upon to pass through.^ In this phase of the struggle Lanca- 
shire was the field of central battle ; and there, as the result 
of a torture extending through eighteen months, the Con- 
federate ikon was tumbled down. The catastrophe was 
complete ; and the whole Southern program, economical, 
fiscal, and, at last, strategic, where it did not utterly col- 
lapse, underwent great change. The summer of 1862 
marked the crisis ; before that, as Mr. Rhodes truly states,^ 
the Confederate policy was to keep cotton at home, and by 
withholding it to compel foreign recognition; after that, 
the one effort was to get it to market with a view to its 
conversion into ships, munitions of war and necessaries of 
life. Mr. Rhodes disposes of this crucial Confederate defeat 
lightly. He says: '^As we have seen, [England and France] 
when they could not get cotton from America, got it else- 
where." The authority on which this statement is made 
does not appear ; but it is not in accordance with the facts. 
In the early months of 1861 the estimated weekly consump- 
1 Infra, 405. ^ Vol. V, p. 382. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 259 

tion of cotton in Great Britain was 50,000 bales ; at the 
close of 1862 it had fallen to 20,000 bales, inferior in weight 
as well as quality. Indeed, so bad was the quality that its 
manufacture was destructive to machinery. Of this greatly 
reduced quantity, moreover, a considerable portion — some 
twenty per cent — was the American product, run through 
the blockade. So great was the dearth that in September, 
1862, the staple, which two years before had sold in Liver- 
pool for fourpence a pound, had gone up until it touched 
the unheard-of price of half a crown. Cotton simply was 
not forthcoming from any quarter, and the commercial 
world was everywhere in search of substitutes for it. 

To this subject Mr. Rhodes might well have devoted a 
chapter. As it stands, it is a case of anti-climax; intro- 
duced with a loud blast of trumpets, the potentate simply 
vanishes, — like Macbeth's witches, he made himself air. 
How, and what became of him, nowhere appears. Judging 
by Mr. Rhodes's narrative, one would infer that it was a case 
of insensible dissolution, or, as Mr. Lincoln might have 
phrased it, a disappearance ^^unbeknowns't." As an his- 
torical fact, it was very far otherwise.^ Not all that Mr. 
Hammond and others predicted, or that the Confederate 
leaders confidently looked to see happen, actually did 
happen ; but, none the less, the process involved a com- 
mercial and industrial disturbance of the first magnitude. 
The episode, too, carried with it a most instructive historical 
lesson as to the danger even nations incur from indulging 
with undue confidence in a theory, — in other words, the old 
South furnished in 1800-1861 a very striking illustration of 
the homely truth that the risks incident to what is humanly 
known as a condition of mental ''cocksureness" are not con- 
fined to individuals. In 1861 that whole Southern com- 

1 Infra, 315-318. 



260 MILITARY STUDIES' 

munity was socially and economically daft. But no people 
and no period are exempt from such states of delusion. 
Within the memory of those now living, this country has 
been subject to a dozen such; but, fortunately, as respects 
the extent and awful character of the consequences of a 
delusion, the experience of the South was exceptional ; for 
by their excess of over-confidence and utter misconception 
of the real facts of the case as respects the world at large, 
as well as both themselves and their immediate opponent, 
the people of the South brought down on their devoted 
heads the contents of the vials of wrath to the very dregs 
thereof. The vividness of it is now forgotten ; but, at the 
time, the world-wide supremacy of King Cotton was a 
Southern dream from which the awakening must have been 
terribly bitter. 

The first recorded indication of this awakening may be 
found in a speech made by William L. Yancey at an im- 
promptu reception given him in the rotunda of the St. 
Charles Hotel at New Orleans, on his return in March, 1862, 
from that wholly abortive mission to Europe on which he 
had been sent by Jefferson Davis a j^ear before. He had 
learned something in the course of his travels, and he then 
significantly said: '^It is an error to say that 'Cotton is 
King.' It is not. It is a great and influential power in 
commerce, but not its dictator." A little foreign travel 
had educated that particular Southern prophet out of some 
of his provincialism. Almost immediately his words found 
an echo in Richmond, a Louisiana senator there sadly 
declaring in debate, ''We have tested the powers of King 
Cotton and have found him to be wanting." ^ While three 
months later, in June, 1862, Alexander II. Stephens enun- 

1 Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1862, p. 261, quoted by Rhodes, 
Vol. V, p. 411. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 261 

ciated too late the correct principle. They had been pos- 
sessed with the idea, he told them, that ''cotton was a 
political power. There was the mistake, — it is only a 
commercial power." ^ 

Passing to the other topics in the treatment of which the 
narrative of Mr. Rhodes, though sufficiently full, seems from 
another point of view open to criticism, reference may next 
be made to his account of Sherman's famous march to the 
sea in November, 1864, and Grant's advance on Richmond 
in May, 1864. Mr. Rhodes quotes General Sherman as say- 
ing in his Memoirs: ''Were I to express my measure of the 
relative importance of the March to the Sea and of that 
from Savannah northward, I would place the former at 
one and the latter at ten, or the maximum." We are then 
told, in a foot-note to the same page,^ that General Scho- 
field was of a different opinion. "Considered," he said in 
his Forty-six Years (p. 348), "as to its military results, 
Sherman's march cannot be regarded as more than I have 
stated — a grand raid. The defeat and practical destruc- 
tion of Hood's army in Tennessee was what paved the way 
to the speedy termination of the war, which the capture of 
Lee by Grant fully accomplished ; and the result ought to 
have been essentially the same as to time if Sherman's march 
had never been made." 

' What is known as the alternative Confederate fiscal policy is referred 
to, and discussed, by Mr. Rhodes (Vol. V, pp. 381, 382). There is in the 
appendix to Roman's Life of Beauregard (Vol. II, pp. 674-680) an elaborate 
letter on this subject written by Mr. Stephens to Beauregard in 1882, 
seventeen years after the close of the struggle. In the letter he quotes 
at length from a speech made by him at Crawfordville, Ga., in the 
fall of 1862. He then said : "The great error of those who supposed that 
King Cotton would compel the English ministry to recognize our govern- 
ment and break the blockade, and who will look for the same result from 
the total abandonment of its culture, consists in mistaking the nature of 
the kingdom of the potentate. His power is commercial and financial, 
not political." 2 vol. V, p. 107. 



262 MILITARY STUDIES 

On this point Mr. Rhodes expresses no opinion. He wisely 
leaves it for the military critics to fight it out among them- 
selves. At the time, however, and in Europe, this view of 
the relative importance of operations did not obtain. Far 
from it. Schofield, of course, refers to Sherman's march 
north from Savannah, through the Carolinas ; but it is 
open to grave doubt whether his estimate of the strategic 
importance of that march, or Sherman's estimate of its rela- 
tive importance as compared with that through Georgia, are 
either of them correct. While, so far as the fall of the Con- 
federacy was concerned, both exercised great influence on 
the outcome, there is good ground for belief that the march 
through Georgia was the more potent in influence of the 
two. It was so for an obvious reason. In war, as in most 
other affairs in which mankind gets itself involved, moral 
effects count for a good deal ; and especially is this so with 
somewhat volatile and excitable communities, such as that 
inhabiting the South unquestionably was. But, so far as 
Europe was concerned, it is safe to assert that no other 
operation of the entire war was productive of a moral effect 
in any way comparable with that caused by the march to 
the sea. Indeed, coming as it did and when it did, it is not 
too much to say it was an epochal event in that it marked 
the turning of the tide of European and especially of English 
opinion as respects the United States and things American. 

James Russell Lowell wrote in those years a well-remem- 
bered essay ''Upon a Certain Condescension in Foreigners"; 
and, during the earlier stages of the Civil War, this ''con- 
descension" resolved itself quite naturally into a studied 
tone of scorn, in no way veiled. The change which has since 
become so marked in this respect began with Sherman's 
march. That march in a way smote the foreign imagina- 
tion ; and the vv-hole course of subsequent events has 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 263 

served to promote what has now developed into a revolution 
in tone and estimate. As every one realizes, Lowell's '^for- 
eigner" has undergone a total change; his '^ condescension" 
is of the past. The beginning of that change may best 
perhaps be traced through the utterances of the European 
press. Up to the autumn of 1864, and the reelection of 
Lincoln, the general tone of the European and especially of 
the English periodicals and papers was one of exaggerated 
admiration for Confederate valor and leadership ; while, on 
the other hand, the leadership and courage of the Union 
side were referred to with studied contumely. Sometimes, 
however, the contempt was equally distributed over both 
parties to the fray. The famous remark attributed at least 
to Von Moltke is still remembered, that he "did not have 
time to devote to the study of the combats of two armed 
mobs." But a much more curious and illustrative utter- 
ance was one of Charles Lever, the Irish military novelist, 
who, most unfortunately for himself, chose as the time and 
place in which to deliver himself the January Blackwood^ s 
of 1865. The paper was, of course, prepared some time 
before. By mere ill luck, however, it appeared in London 
just as Sherman put in his appearance at Savannah. In this 
paper Mr. Lever undertook to compare the American com- 
batants to two inmates of a lunatic asylum playing chess. 
They went through moves similar to those of chess, but 
without the slightest comprehension of the game. He then 
goes on: ''Now, does not this immensely resemble what 
we are witnessing this moment in America? There are the 
two madmen engaged in a struggle, not one single rule nor 
maxim of which they comprehend. Moving cavalry like 
infantry, artillery like a wagon train, violating every princi- 
ple of the game, till at length one cries Checkmate, and the 
other, accepting the defeat that is claimed against him, 



264 MILITARY STUDIES 

deplores his mishap, and sets to work for another contest. 
. . . Just, however, as I feel assured, nobody who ever 
played chess would have dignified with that name the 
strange performance of the madmen, so am I convinced that 
none would call this struggle a war. It is a fight — a very 
big fight, if you will, and a very hard fight too, but not 
war." ^ There is much more to the same effect, the intensely 
ludicrous side of which at just that juncture the genial 
Irishman himself subsequently appreciated most keenly. 
What I have quoted will, however, suffice for the purpose of 
present illustration. At the very time Mr. Lever was thus 
rashly committing himself in cold print. General Sherman 
was entering on his famous march ; and, while that march 
was in progress, the daily tone of the London newspapers 
was pitched in much the same key as that of Mr. Lever's 
lucubration in the forthcoming number of BlackwoocVs. The 
outcome of the move of the ''Yankee" general was looked 
for with a contemptuous interest : it clearly was not war ; 
a harebrained effort, dictated probably by desperation, it 
could end only in disaster; most probably it was an ill- 
considered attempt at getting out of an impossible military 
situation. But one day the tidings came that the heads of 
Sherman's columns had emerged on the sea-coast, that they 
had made short work of the forces there found to oppose 
them, and that Savannah had fallen. The Union army and 
the Union navy had struck hands ! The announcement 
seemed absolutely to take away the breath of the foreign 
critics, — social, military, journalistic. An undeniably orig- 
inal and brilliant strategic blow had been struck ; an opera- 
tion, the character of which could neither be ignored nor 

^ Cornelius O'Dowd upon Men and Women and other Things in General, 
Part XII, The Fight over the Way. Blackwood' s Edinburgh Magazine, 
Vol. XCVII, pp. 57-59. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 265 

mistaken, had been triumphantly carried through to a 
momentous result ; the thrust — and such a thrust ! — had 
penetrated the vitals of the Confederacy ; — what next ? 
From that moment the end was plainly foreshadowed. 
Europe recognized that a new power of unknown strength, 
but undeniable military capacity, was thenceforth to be 
reckoned with. 

To one feature, and one feature only, in Mr. Rhodes's 
account of this memorable war episode, is there occasion 
here to allude. The historian passes somewhat gently over 
the pronounced vandalism which characterized Sherman's 
operations from Atlanta to Savannah ; and yet more from 
Savannah to Raleigh. It is referred to, indeed, both gen- 
erally, and more especially in connection with what occurred 
in South Carolina, reaching a climax at Columbia; but the 
treatment is, notwithstanding, distinctly perfunctory.* The 
other and more realistic side is portrayed in sufficient detail, 
and with reference to chapter and verse, in General Bradley 
T. Johnson's Life of Joseph E. Johnston? It there appears 
what Sherman meant by his famous aphorism ''War is 
Hell." The truth is that in 1864-1865 the conflict had 
lasted too long for the patience of the combatants. The de- 
fence of the South had been unreasonably stubborn. The rules 
and limitations of civilized warfare, so far as non-combatants 

* '*It seems probable that the inhabitants of North Carolina were better 
treated than had been those of the sister State. Nevertheless correction 
of the bad habits engendered in the soldiery by the system of 
foraging upon the country was only gradually accomplished and the ir- 
regular work of stragglers was not circumscribed by State boundary lines. 
. . . The men who followed Sherman were probably more humane gen- 
erally than those in almost any European army that marched and fought 
before our Civil War, but any invading host in the country of the enemy 
is a terrible scourge. On the other hand, there is considerable Southern 
evidence of depredations committed by Wheeler's cavalry." — Vol. V, 
pp. 102, 104. 

2 Chaps. XI, XII. XIII, pp, 119-225. 



266 MILITARY STUDIES 

were concerned, were no longer observed, and Sherman's 
advancing army was enveloped and followed by a cloud of 
irresponsible stragglers, known throughout the country as 
''bummers," who were simply for the time being desperadoes 
bent on pillage and destruction, — subject to no discipline, 
amenable to no law. They were looked upon then by the 
North, weary of the war, with a half-humorous leniency ; but, 
in reality, a band of Goths, their existence was a disgrace to 
the cause they professed to serve. It is not a pleasant 
admission, but the historic, if ungrateful, truth is that, as 
respects what are euphemistically termed the ''severities" 
of warfare, the record made by our armies during the latter 
stages of the conflict will not bear comparison v/ith that of 
the Army of Northern Virginia while in Pennsylvania 
during the Gettysburg campaign.^ Lee's memorable general 
order (No. 73) dated at Chambersburg, June 27, 1863, 
is well known, and need not be quoted ; but there was 
truth in the reference to those opposed to him when in 
it he said, "No greater disgrace could befall the army, 
and through it our whole people, than the perpetration 
of barbarous outrages upon the unarmed and defence- 
less, and the wanton destruction of private property, that 
have marked the course of the enemy in our own country. 
It will be remembered that we make war only upon armed 
men." Our own methods during the final stages of the 
conflict were sufficiently described by General Sheridan, 
when, during the Franco-Prussian War, as the guest of Bis- 
marck, he declared against humanity in warfare, contending 
that the correct policy was to treat a hostile population with 
the utmost rigor, leaving them, as he expressed it, "nothing 
but their eyes to weep with over the war." ^ 

» Infra, 308. 
2 Infra, 294. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 267 

In other words, a veteran of our civil strife, General Sheri- 
dan, advocated in an enemy's country the sixteenth-century 
practices of TUIy, described by Schiller, and the later devas- 
tation of the Palatinate policy of Louis XIV, commemorated 
by Goethe. In the twenty-first century, perhaps, partisan 
feeling as regards the Civil War performances having by 
that time ceased to exist, American investigators, no longer 
regardful of a victor's self-complacency, may treat the epi- 
sodes of our struggle with the same even-handed and out- 
spoken impartiality with which Englishmen now treat the 
revenges of the Restoration, or Frenchmen the dragonnades 
of the Grand Monarque. But when that time comes, the 
page relating to what occurred in 1864 in the valley of the 
Shenandoah, in Georgia, and in the Carolinas, — a page 
which Mr. Rhodes somewhat lightly passes over, — will 
probably be rewritten in characters of far more decided 
import. 

One final topic; dealt with by Mr. Rhodes in his fourth 
volume rather than in the fifth, it still occupies a prominent 
place in his narrative, and its treatment necessarily involves 
a man who, first and last, for good or evil, will assuredly 
stand forth in history as one of Massachusetts' most conspic- 
uous contributions to our Great Rebellion period. The topic 
is that Virginia campaign which made sadly memorable the 
spring and summer of 1864; the individual. General B. F. 
Butler. It may well be questioned whether Mr. Rhodes 
has either done justice, or fully meted out justice, to the epi- 
sode or to the man. 

And, primarily, something remains to be said of Grant's 
strategy in that campaign, no less memorable than bloody. 
Reasons might readily be adduced for deeming the plan for 
the operations this campaign necessarily involved much 
better considered, and more creditable to him, than would 



268 MILITARY STUDIES 

be inferred from Mr. Rhodes's narrative. Mr. Rhodes 
then, secondarily, fails to place where it belongs the grave 
responsibility for the failure of Grant's plan with the awful 
loss of life therein involved. Grant's original scheme as- 
sumed the active and harmonious cooperation of three dis- 
tinct armies, — that of the Potomac, under General Meade ; 
that of the James, operating in, or from, the military de- 
partment of which General Butler was in command, but 
with General W. F. Smith in immediate charge of field 
movements; and, finally the Ninth Corps, 15,000 strong, 
under General Burnside. Grant himself, with independent 
and movable headquarters, was present in the field of opera- 
tions, thereby insuring the necessary concentration and 
directness of movement. Meade, with the Arm}^ of the 
Potomac, was to advance and engage Lee, holding the Con- 
federate army of NorthernVirginia fully occupied ; Burnside, 
meanwhile, was to be in reserve, immediately in Meade's rear ; 
and, while Lee was thus occupied, the Army of the James, 
composed of two corps, the Tenth and Eighteenth, and in 
all some 35,000 to 40,000 strong, was to push forward vigor- 
ously, threatening Richmond, and jeopardizing Lee's com- 
munications. Thus an important, if not vital, part in the 
plan of operations depended on the Army of the James. 
Opposed to that completely equipped and numerically for- 
midable command, was a wholly inadequate and widely 
scattered force under General Beauregard, recently (April 15) 
assigned to duty, and not yet on the ground.^ If by an 
offensive movement, intelligently conceived and skilfully as 
well as vigorously handled, the Confederate line could be 
broken and thrown back into Richmond, Lee's rear would 

1 Beauregard was at Weldon, N. C, from April 22 to May 10, wait- 
ing the development of the Union plan of campaign. He did not reach 
Petersburg until May 10. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 269 

be exposed, his lines of communication threatened, and he 
must, abandoning Richmond, have fallen back towards 
Lynchburg or the Carolinas. Grant then proposed to follow 
him up, hanging doggedly on his rear, and catch Lee be- 
tween an upper and a nether millstone, — the Army of the 
James holding him in check until the Army of the Potomac, 
hurrying up, could force a decisive battle. 

Grant's orders were framed accordingly. To Meade he 
wrote: "Lee's army will be your objective point. Wher- 
ever Lee goes, there you will go also. Gillmore will join 
Butler with about 10,000 men from South Carolina. Butler 
can reduce his [Fortress Monroe garrison] so as to take 
23,000 men into the field directly to his front. The force 
will be commanded by Major-General W. F. Smith. With 
Smith and Gillmore, Butler will seize City Point, and operate 
against Richmond from the south side of the river. His 
movement will be simultaneous with yours." ^ At the same 
time Grant wrote to Butler as follows : Major-General 
Smith "is ordered to report to you to command the troops 
sent into the field from your own department. . . . The 
fact that Richmond is to be your objective point, and that 
there is to be cooperation between your force and the Army 
of the Potomac, must be your guide." Butler was at once 
to seize City Point, and there. Grant wrote, "concentrate all 
your troops for the field as rapidly as you can. From City 
Point directions cannot be given at this time for your further 
movements." Holding a firm base on the south bank of the 
James, the force from Butler's department, under the field 
command of Smith, was thus left free to move in any direc- 
tion its commander saw fit; and "should the enemy be 
forced into his intrenchments in Richmond, the Army of 
the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the 

1 Grant to Meade, April 9, 1864, Personal Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 135. 



270 MILITARY STUDIES 

two armies would become a unit." ^ Such were Butler's 
instructions; meanwhile of Smith, who was ''to command 
the troops sent into the field/' Grant at the same time wrote 
to Halleck, General Smith ''is possessed of one of the clearest 
military heads in the army; is very practical and indus- 
trious. No man in the service is better qualified than he 
for our largest commands."^ General Smith "is really one 
of the most efficient officers in service, readiest in expedients, 
and most skilful in the management of troops in action."^ 
Grant's orders were defective in one respect. Given neces- 
sarily to Butler as the major-general commanding the 
Military Department, they did not, regardless of Butler's 
feelings, ambitions or desires, distinctly specify that he was 
to confine himself strictly to departmental duties, with his 
headquarters at Norfolk or at Fortress Monroe, leaving 
Smith in full command of all operations in the field and in 
direct communication with Grant himself. Grant was yet 
to make himself acquainted with Butler's peculiarities as a 
man and his military limitations. Butler, in no way dis- 
posed to be ignored or relegated to purely departmental 
functions, availed himself of the opportunity thus afforded, 
and assumed full field command. Grant acquiesced, evi- 
dently hoping that Butler would in active operations allow 
himself to be guided by Smith. 

Such, however, was in no way Butler's purpose. Eager 
for military distinction, inordinately self-confident until 
face-to-face with an opponent in actual battle, when, on the 
night of May 5, the Army of the James was landed from 
the transports at Bermuda Hundreds, Butler was there in 
full command. The movement was a complete surprise to 

1 Grant to Butler, April 2, 1864, Butler's Book, p. 630 ; War Records, 
Serial No. 95, p. 15. 

2 Grant to Stanton, November 12, 1863, Chattanooga to Petersburg, p. 15. 

3 Grant to Halleck, July 1, 1864, ibid. p. 29. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 271 

the Confederates. By mere chance General Hagood's South 
Carolma brigade was on its way to Richmond. Suddenly 
called into field service from garrison duty at Charleston, the 
men composing it were little better than militia, and, as sub- 
sequent operations showed, unreliable in presence of resolute 
attack.^ A detachment of this brigade, some 600 strong, had 
been pushed forward by rail from Petersburg, and as the 
men jumped off the platform cars at Walthall Junction a 
little before five o'clock on the afternoon of May 6, to their 
complete surprise they found themselves in the presence of a 
brigade of the Army of the James, thrown forward by Butler 
to seize the railroad at that point. The Confederate de- 
tachment had no artillery and no supports. Those compos- 
ing it should have been incontinently captured ; but the 
opportunity, a great one, was lost. A weak attack was re- 
pulsed ; and, according to the Confederate rendering, ''Thus 
were Petersburg and Richmond barely saved by the oppor- 
tune presence and gallant conduct of Hagood's command. 
It was upon that occasion that General Butler's forces were 
baffled and beaten off in their attempt to seize the Richmond 
railroad above Petersburg." ^ ''The authorities at Rich- 
mond were now in a state of great excitement. The enemy 
had been repulsed on the Richmond railroad, and, to all 
appearance, had abandoned his original intention of investing 
Petersburg ; but where he would next attempt to strike was 
the all-absorbing question." ^ At this juncture Beauregard 
had not yet arrived from Weldon ; nor were there 3000 men 
all told south of Walthall Junction, or available for the de- 
fence of Petersburg. The key to the whole military situa- 
tion was unprotected. "Meanwhile troops were hastily 
called for from all quarters," and on the 10th Beauregard 

1 Hagood, Memoirs, 221, 224. 

2 Roman, Beauregard, Vol. II, p. 198. » Ibid. p. 199. 



272 MILITARY STUDIES 

arrived, with the first body of reinforcements. The golden 
opportunity was rapidly passing. On the evening of the 
9th Generals Gillmore and Smith, being then at Swift's 
Creek, about four miles north of Petersburg, united in a 
written communication to General Butler suggesting that 
the whole command should be directed on Petersburg, in- 
stead of Richmond, as previously agreed. They claimed 
that ''all the work of cutting the [railjroad, and perhaps 
capturing the city, can be accomplished in one day." Re- 
fusing even to consider the suggestion. General Butler, the 
same evening, returned a reply beginning as follows : — 

"Generals, — While I regret an infirmity of purpose which did 
not permit you to state to me, when I was personally present, the 
suggestion which you made in your written note, but left me to 
go to my headquarters under the impression that another and 
far different purpose was advised by you, I shall not yield to the 
written suggestions, which imply a change of plan made within 
thirty minutes after I left you. Military affairs cannot be carried 
on, in my judgment, with this sort of vacillation. The informa- 
tion I have received from the Army of the Potomac convinces me 
that our demonstration should be toward Richmond, and I shall 
in no way order a crossing of the Appomattox for the purpose 
suggested in your note." '• 

The date of this correspondence (May 9) is important. 
The battle of the Wilderness had been fought on May 5 
and 6, that of Spottsylvania was to begin on May 10, and 
not until the 12th was the famous assault made on Lee's 
salient. The Confederate army was hard pressed. To 
what extent at just this juncture would sudden tidings of 
the capture of Petersburg, and the consequent severing of 
his line of southern sea-coast communication, have affected 
Lee's mind and the entire strategic situation? And it was 

1 War Records, Serial No. 68, p. 35. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 273 

just then that Butler, contemptuously and insolently ignor- 
ing the recommendations of his two subordinates, allowed 
Beauregard to establish himself at Petersburg, while the 
Army of the James made ''a demonstration" toward Rich- 
mond ! In his official report of the whole campaign Grant 
subsequently said of this '^ demonstration" that "the time 
thus consumed lost to us the benefit of the surprise and 
capture of Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, 
Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North and South 
Carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places."^ 
The occasion was great, and Beauregard showed himself 
equal to it. Rapidly concentrating his scattered and scanty 
command, he, on the 15th, assumed the offensive. The 
next day (IGth) he attacked Butler at Drewry's Bluff. 
''Butler's army was driven back, hemmed in, and reduced 
to comparative impotency, though not captured. The 
danger threatening Richmond was, for the time being, 
averted." ^ 

The Army of the Potomac was at that juncture fighting at 
Spottsylvania fiercely and futilely, and not until June 3, a 
fortnight later, did the slaughter of Cold Harbor occur. The 
great opportunity of May 9, pointed out to Butler by his 
lieutenants, had been allowed wholly to escape; Lee's rear 
and communications were secure ; Butler was safely ''bottled 
up"; the Army of the Potomac, sorely crippled, had sus- 
tained losses as heavy as they were unnecessary; Grant's 
whole plan of campaign had gone to pieces. Had Butler on 
May 9, correctly taking in the military situation, complied 
with the suggestion of his two corps commanders, Petersburg 
must have fallen into his hands; Lee would perforce have 
been compelled to fall back on Richmond ; the Cold Harbor 

^ War Records, Serial No. 95, p. 19. 
2 Roman, Beauregard, Vol. II, p. 209. 



274 MILITARY STUDIES 

assaults would not have occurred ; and all subsequent opera- 
tions would have been other than they were. 

Prior to this, May 7, General Butler had written a letter 
marked ''Confidential " to Senator Wilson of Massachusetts, 
then on the Senate Military Committee, beginning thus : 
''My Dear Sir: — I must take the responsibility of asking 
you to bring before the Senate at once the name of General 
Gillmore, and have his name rejected by your body." Nomi- 
nated for promotion to the rank of Major-General, the nomi- 
nation of General Gillmore was then pending/ Under such 
circumstances the state of affairs in the Army of the James 
not unnaturally became in May so unsatisfactory that Gen- 
eral Halleck at the request of General Grant sent (May 21) 
Generals Meigs and Barnard to investigate. On the 24th 
they gave it as their opinion that "an officer of military ex- 
perience and knowledge [should be placed] in command. 
. . . General Butler . . . has not experience and training to 
enable him to direct and control movements in battle. . . . 
General Butler evidently desires to retain command in the 
field. If his desires must be gratified, withdraw Gillmore, 
place Smith in command of both corps under the supreme 
command of Butler. . . . You will thus have a command 
which will be a unit, and General Butler will probably be 
guided by Smith, and leave to him the suggestions and prac- 
tical execution of army movements ordered. Success would 
be more certain were Smith in command untrammelled, and 
General Butler remanded to the administrative duties of the 
departments." ^ Difficulties naturally suggested themselves 
to the adoption of the course thus recommended. General 
Gillmore was relieved of his command early in June,^ and 

^Butler's Book, pp. 644, 1065. 

2 War Records, Serial No. 69, p. 178. 

5 Butler's Book, p. 679. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 275 

the ill-feeling between Butler and Smith culminated, June 
21, in a characteristic and extremely sharp correspondence,^ 
as a result of which General Smith requested to be relieved of 
the command of the Eighteenth Corps. Then followed one 
of the most extraordinary and inexplicable episodes of the 
war. Grant wrote (July 1) to Halleck, advising him of the 
situation. He said: "I regret the necessity of asking for a 
change of commanders here, but General Butler, not being a 
soldier by education or experience, is in the hands of his sub- 
ordinates in the execution of all orders military." Grant, 
however, hesitated ''to recommend his [Butler's] retire- 
ment." ^ This brought out a most suggestive reply (July 3) 
from Halleck. In it he said : ''It was foreseen from the first 
that you would eventually find it necessary to relieve Gen- 
eral B. on account of his total unfitness to command in the 
field, and his generally quarrelsome character." ^ The Chief 
of Staff then w^ent on to discuss the several dispositions which 
might be made of Butler, significantly pointing out the dan- 
ger to be apprehended from "his talent at political intrigue, 
and his facilities for newspaper abuse." He finally suggested, 
"Why not leave General Butler in the local command of his 
department, including North Carolina, Norfolk, Fort Monroe, 
Yorktown, &c., and make a new army corps of the part of the 
Eighteenth under Smith." The letter closed with a sen- 
tence indicative of the personal apprehension General Butler 
seemed to excite in the breasts of those put in any position 
antagonistic to him. The official Chief of Staff said: "As 
General Butler claims to rank me, I shall give him no orders 
wherever he may go, without the special direction of yourself 
or the Secretary of War." Three days later, July 6, Grant 

1 War Records, Serial No. 81, pp. 299-301 ; From Chattanooga to Peters- 
burg, pp. 28, 155, 186-188. 

2 War Records, Serial No. 81, p. 559. 3 jifid, p, 598. 



276 MILITARY STUDIES 

wrote to Halleck: '^Please obtain an order assigning- the 
troops of the Department of Virginia and Nortli Carolina 
serving in the field to the command of Major-General W. F. 
Smith, and order Major-General Butler, commanding depart- 
ment, to his headquarters, Fortress Monroe." This request 
was simply a reversion, after the mischief had been done, to 
Grant's original plan of operations ; and, in accordance with 
it General Order No. 225 was at once issued. Curiously- 
enough, the original order, forwarded both to Butler and 
Smith,* read that '^Maj. Gen. Smith is assigned by the Presi- 
dent to the command of the corps," etc. ; in the order as for- 
mally made public the words ' ' by the President " do not appear. 
A presidential canvass was now in progress, and, appar- 
ently, Lincoln did not care to invite further complications 
by any act of direct interposition which would make him 
the objective of Butler's "talent at political intrigue, and his 
facilities for newspaper abuse." Under the circumstances, 
the omission of the words specified was probably judicious. 
The order, though in conformity with the recommendation 
of Generals Meigs and Barnard of six weeks before (May 24), 
was, of course, highly objectionable to General Butler. Im- 
mediately on receipt of it at Bermuda Hundred he rode 
over to the headquarters of General Grant, and asked if 
''this was his act and his desire." Grant replied: ''But, 
I don't want this." Colonel Mordecai afterwards wrote, 
"Gen'l Butler returned to camp about dusk, as I recall it, 
and, as he dismounted from his horse, remarked to a number 
of his staff officers who were near him, 'Gentlemen, the order 
will be revoked to-morrow.' " ^ Not only was the order 
revoked, but General Butler's field command was extended so 
as to include the Nineteenth Corps, while General Smith was 

^ Butler's Book, p. 695 ; From Chattanooga to Petersburg, p. 33. 
^ Chattanooga to Petersburg, p. 189. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 277 

''relieved from the command of the Eighteenth Army Corps, 
and [directed to] proceed to New York, and await further 
orders." ^ 

As respects the details of what transpired at the interview 
above referred to, General James H. Wilson, whose relations 
at the time and subsequently were intimate with both Gen- 
eral Grant and Smith, wrote in 1904 as follows: — 

"It must be confessed that Grant's explanations of his later 
attitude towards Smith, and of the reasons for relieving him and 
restoring Butler to command, were neither full nor always stated 
in the same terms. He ignores the subject entirely in his memoirs, 
but it so happens that Mr. Dana, then Assistant Secretary of War, 
was sitting with General Grant when Butler, clad in full uniform, 
called at headquarters, and was admitted. Dana describes Butler 
as entering the General's presence with a flushed face and a haughty 
air, holding out the order reheving him from command in the field, 
and asking : ' General Grant, did j^ou issue this order ? ' To which 
Grant in a hesitating manner replied: 'No, not in that form.' 
Dana, perceiving at this point that the subject under discussion 
was an embarrassing one, and that the interview was likely to 
be unpleasant, if not stormy, at once took his leave, but the im- 
pression made upon his mind by what he saw while present was 
that Butler had in some measure 'cowed' his commanding officer. 
What further took place neither General Grant nor Mr. Dana has 
ever said. Butler^s Book, however, contains what purports to be 
a full account of the interview, but it is to be observed that it 
signally fails to recite any circumstance of an overbearing nature." ^ 

The disposition of commands made in Special Order No. 62, 
above referred to, continued in force until the Wilmington 
expedition and the famous powder-boat explosion of the fol- 
lowing December. During the months intervening much had 
happened. July, 1864, came about during one of the most 
depressing, if not the most depressing, period of the whole 

1 Special Order No. 62, July 19, 1864 ; Butler's Book, p. 1087. 

2 Life and Services of W. F. Smith, pp. 112, 113. 



278 MILITARY STUDIES 

struggle. Grant's movement against Richmond and Lee's 
army had failed, after excessive loss of life ; Sherman's move- 
ment against Atlanta had not yet succeeded ; Washington 
was threatened from the valley of the Shenandoah ; a presi- 
dential election was immediately impending ; the country at 
large, in deepest mourning because of losses in the field, 
was also in a state of extreme discouragement; the ad- 
ministration and the Union generals in the field stood in 
manifest fear of Butler. Six months later the whole aspect 
of affairs had undergone a complete and, indeed, almost 
magical change. Grant, it is true, was still held in firm check 
before Petersburg: but Sherman had marched through 
Georgia and captured Savannah; Sheridan had won his 
victories in the valley ; Lincoln had been reelected ; the 
Confederacy was believed to be in extremities. Under these 
circumstances that might safely be done which in July had 
seemed to involve a political risk. Accordingly, on January 
4, 1865, Grant wrote to the Secretary of War: ''I am con- 
strained to request the removal of Maj. Gen. B. F. Butler 
from the command of the Department of Virginia and 
North Carolina. I do this with reluctance, but the good 
of the service requires it. In my absence General Butler 
necessarily commands, and there is a lack of confidence 
felt in his military ability, making him an unsafe com- 
mander for a large army. His administration of the 
affairs of his department is also objectionable." ^ Three 
days later (January 7) the following was issued from the 
War Department : — 

"General Order No. 1. 

"I. By direction of the President of the United States, Maj. 
Gen. Benjamin F. Butler is relieved from the command of the 
Department of North Carolina and Virginia. . . . 
1 War Records, Serial No. 96, p. 29. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 279 

"II. Major-General Butler on being relieved will repair to 
Lowell, Mass., and report by letter to the Adjutant-General of the 
Army." 

Of General Butler as a field officer in active military service 
General W. F. Smith wrote to General Grant, after asking to 
be relieved from further service in the Department of Virginia 
and North Carolina, — ''I want simply ... to ask you how you 
can place a man in command of two army corps, who is as 
helpless as a child on the field of battle and as visionary as 
an opium-eater in council ?" ^ Of the same commander. Ad- 
miral David D. Porter wrote to the Secretary of the Navy, 
December 29, 1864, immediately after the withdrawal of 
the first expedition against Wilmington, subsequently to the 
powder-boat fiasco of December 24: ''If this temporary 
failure succeeds in sending General Butler into private life, it 
is not to be regretted." ^ 

Such is the military record. In his narrative Mr. Rhodes 
fails to develop it. He deals with Benjamin F. Butler 
judicially, but as a man and an official ; he does not deal with 
him as a senior major-general standing in presence of a 
court of military inquiry. Judicially, the sentence he passes 
is severe; and the more severe because carefully restrained 
in expression. But it is confined to questions of mere lucre, 
— ''beyond reasonable doubt," Mr. Rhodes says, "he [Butler] 
was making money [illicitly] out of his country's life struggle." 
That is bad ; but, however bad it may be, it may not unfairly 
be held the rendering on a very minor count in the long in- 
dictment to which Massachusetts' senior major-general of 
the Civil War should be made to answer. His departmental 
dishonesty can be measured in dollars and cents ; his head- 
quarters incompetence cost blood and grief both unmeasured 

1 Chattanooga to Petersburg, p. 37 ; War Records, Serial No. 81, p. 595. 

2 Butler's Book, p. 1123. 



280 MILITARY STUDIES 

and immeasurable. Who was responsible for the greater part 
of that awful loss of life and limb, which in May and June, 
1864, littered the soil of eastern Virginia with dead, and 
caused the hospitals to be choked with those mutilated, — 
a loss in killed and maimed numerically nearly equal to 
the entire army Napoleon had on the field at Waterloo? 
Primarily, it was that commander of the Army of the James 
who so utterly failed in doing the work he had himself in- 
sisted should be assigned him to do ; ^ and, secondarily, to the 
commander-in-chief who left a charlatan and an incompetent 
in the place to which he should have designated his trustiest 
lieutenant. It was a parallel case to that of Grouchy, — the 
fatal mistake of the man at the head in the choice of a tool. 
In the early days of July, 1894, it was my fortune to visit 
Waterloo in company with the late John C. Ropes. That Mr. 
Ropes was, both in this country and in Europe, an acknowl- 
edged authority on problems of strategy, is very generally 
known ; he had also made a special study of the campaign 
of 1815. As respects it and its incidents, the information 
of no one was more exact. Viewing the field of battle from 
the position held by Wellington's army, we looked across 
toward Planchenoit, where the Prussians, first doubling back 
Napoleon's right, finally broke in, deciding the day. We 
then again discussed, as frequently before and afterwards, 
what turn other than that now recorded might have been 
given to the momentous 15th of June, 1815, had Davout, 
instead of being at the time Minister of War and in Paris, 
been, as he should have been, in command of Napoleon's 
right wing. It hardly admits of question that the victor 
of Auerstadt and Eckmiihl, instinctively taking in the strate- 

1 Yet in his farewell order to the Army of the James of January 8, 1865, 
Butler boasted : "The wasted blood of my men does not stain my gar- 
ments." — War Records, Serial No. 96, p. 71. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 281 

gic situation, would, during the critical hours immediately 
following Blticher's disaster at Ligny and subsequent move- 
ment to the rear, have kept in close touch with the Emperor, 
and that the Prussians would two days later have found the 
road from Wavre to AVaterloo effectually blocked. Napoleon's 
right arm would not then have been j^aralyzed ; he would 
have been free to throw his whole weight on Wellington's 
flank and rear. Fortunately for Wellington, Grouchy, and 
not Davout, was that day in command of Napoleon's de- 
tached wing. Butler's command and mission in the Virginia 
campaign of 1864 were almost exactly similar to the com- 
mand and mission of Grouchy in the Waterloo campaign 
of 1815 ; and now to discuss the operations of the Army of 
the Potomac in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania without 
constant reference to what the Army of the James was on 
those days doing east and south of Richmond is a treatment 
no less defective than it would be to try to explain what 
took place at Waterloo without giving any consideration to 
Grouchy's blundering march from Gembloux to Wavre. 
Butler, like Grouchy, was left by the commander-in-chief to 
act, under general instructions, as the conditions of time and 
place, and the movements of the enemy in his front, might 
make more expedient, the plan of campaign and general 
strategic situation being always clearly in mind. Both failed, 
and failed utterly. In each case incalculable disaster en- 
sued; but in the narrative of Mr. Rhodes, Butler does not 
figure as the Grouchy of the Wilderness. 



282 MILITARY STUDIES 

NOTES 
Supra, 239, n. 

In his contribution (Chapter II of Part V) entitled "The South 
in the War for Southern Independence" (Vol. IV, pp. 499-519) in 
the recent publication. The South in the Building of the Nation (12 
vols.. Southern Historical Publication Society, Richmond, Va., 
1909), President L. G. Tyler, of Wilham and Mary College, refers 
(p. 496, n.) to the statement in the text. He then says: "In 
round numbers the South had on her muster rolls from first to last 
about 600,000 men, and in this list the South had all it could 
muster ; for at last it had enlisted in its armies all men between 
sixteen and sixty years." 

This statement is not in accord with other statements relating 
to the same subject elsewhere contained in the same publication. 
The Border Slave States, so-called, those never members of the 
Confederacy, furnished according to President Tyler (Vol. IV, 
504) approximately 316,424 men to the Federal army. In The 
South it is elsewhere stated that the same States contributed as 
follows to the army of the Confederacy : — 

Kentucky, Vol. I, 295 30,000 

Maryland, Vol. I, 205 20,000 

Missouri, Vol. Ill, 236 60,000 

West Virginia, Vol. I, 385 (minimum) 7,000 

Total from Border States 117,000 

That the States named, sympathizing, as at the time all Southern 
authorities claimed, most deeply with the Confederacy, should 
have furnished over 316,000 recruits to the Federal army, and only 
117,000 to that of the Confederacy, is, to say the least, deserving 
of remark. It calls for explanation. The figures are, however, 
those given in The South, and, for present purposes, are to be 
accepted. 

Deducting the 117,000 men from the Border States from the 
asserted total (600,000) on the Confederate muster-rolls, 483,000 
would remain as the whole number of men supplied by the eleven 
States constituting the Confederacy. 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 283 

Turning now to The South, the numbers enrolled from the several 
States named are given as follows : — 

Alabama, Vol. II, 290 (minimum) , . . . . 90,000 

Arkansas, Vol. Ill, 308 50,000 

Mississippi, Vol. II, 422 70,000 

North Carolina, Vol. I, 485 120,000 

South Carolina, Vol. II, 86 (minimum) 75,000 

Tennessee, Vol. II, 517 115,000 

Texas, Vol. Ill, 504 (minimum) 50,000 

Virginia, Vol. I, 121 175,000 

Total from eight States 745,000 

Those enrolled from three States of the Confederacy — Georgia, 
Louisiana, and Florida — are not given even approximately in The 
South. They can, however, be supplied with sufficient accuracy 
from other Confederate sources. 

Georgia, Avery, p. 221 . . . . "i j20 000 

Jones, Georgia in the War, p. 71 . / 

Louisiana, Confederate Military History, ed. by Gen. C. A. 

Evans ; John Dimitry, Louisiana 55,000 

Florida, Rebellion Record, Series IV, Vol. 2, pp. 648, 839 .. . 15,000 

Total from three States 190,000 

The figures thus furnished by Confederate authorities, or to 
The South would then stand as follows : — 

Eight States of Confederacy, minimum as given in The South . 745,000 

Four Border States, as given in same 117,000 

Three States of Confederacy, numbers given by Confederate 

authorities 190,000 

Total enrolments 1,052,000 

There is obviously a wide discrepancy between the results thus 
arrived at elsewhere from The South, and those given by Presi- 
dent Tyler in the passage above quoted from his contribution to 
that publication. The aggregate reached from the separate State 
returns is, however, not only more creditable to Confederate man- 
hood, but much more in consonance with the figures of the census 
than the summarized statement of President Tyler. 

In the census of 1860 the eleven States composing the Con- 
federacy reported an aggregate white population of 5,067,051; 
the same States reported in 1870 a similar population of 5,548,355; 



284 MILITARY STUDIES 

and this notwithstanding the losses incurred during the Civil 
War (1861-1865) and the discouragements, industrial and political, 
incident to the period of reconstruction. The arms-bearing effec- 
tives in any community — males between 18 and 45 years of age 
— • are roughly estimated at one in five of the population ; or, 
allowing for exempts from all causes, at one in six. President 
Tyler asserts that " at last [the Confederacy] had enhsted in its 
armies all men between sixteen and sixty years." There is every 
reason to believe that this statement is not exaggerated ; though 
the extreme age limits fixed by Confederate conscription acts 
(February 17, 1864) were 17 and 50. No man capable of doing 
duty was, however, refused permission to bear arms on the ground 
that he was not yet 17 or was over 50. Accepting for present 
purposes the statements of President Tyler, the census tables are not 
so arranged as to make possible any exact statement of the num- 
ber of additional men between the ages of 16 and 18, at one end, 
and 45 and 60 at the other end, thus brought within the age 
of service ; but it is well known that after the age of 45 the 
proportion of those capable of doing military service diminishes 
rapidly. Computations based on the census returns tend, how- 
ever, to show that at the very lowest estimate the increase of time 
of military service would represent an increase of at least 30 per 
cent in effectives. The effectives of the Confederacy during the 
entire war period — May, 1861 to May, 1865 — would then, at the 
lowest computation, and allowing for no increase of population 
after 1860, have contained the original one million returned in 
1860 as then between 18 and 45. To those must be added a further 
30 per cent (300,000) composed of those between 16 and 18 and 
between 45 and 60. As the census of 1870 showed must have 
been the case, a further number also, equal to three per cent of 
the whole each year matured, and became military effectives dur- 
ing the continuance of the struggle (1861-1865) — a total of 12 
per cent (150,000) additional. The figures would then stand as 
follows : 1,000,000 original (1860), effectives of 18 to 45 years of 
age; 300,000 of those less then 18 and over 45; 150,000 who 
reached the age of 16 between May, 1861 and May, 1865; or a 
total aggregate Confederate arms-bearing population of 1,450,000. 
From this aggregate 20 per cent is to be deducted as representing 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 285 

exempts of every description and all classes. There would then 
remain a minimum of 1,160,000 effectives. To these in the case 
of the Confederacy are to be added the contingent (117,000) from 
the Border States. The aggregate thus reached is a total Con- 
federate enrolment of 1,277,000. The actual minimum total of 
separate State aggregates, given in The South, as above, is 1,052,000. 
The figures are those of the census ; the result reached is by com- 
putations based on the statement of President Tyler. 

A not dissimilar result is reached through another and wholly 
different process of computation. The three States of Georgia, 
North CaroHna and Virginia contained, in 1860, according to the 
census of that year, an arms-bearing population — ■ that is, whites 
between the ages of 18 and 45 — ■ aggregating 343,000 in round 
numbers — for exact figures are in such cases a delusion; West 
Virginia is excluded. Allowing, as in the previous computations, 
an increase of 30 per cent to cover the extension of the arms-bear- 
ing period, and a further increase of 12 per cent of the aggregate 
thus reached to represent the maturing of effectives, the number 
of possible enrolments in the States named would be increased to 
500,000. The number reported as actually enrolled from these 
States was 415,000, or 84 per cent of the possible enrolment. 
Applying this standard to the entire Confederacy, a possible enrol- 
ment of 1,450,000 would result, 84 per cent of which would make 
an actual enrolment of 1,223,000; to which must be added the 
117,000 admitted to have been enrolled from the Border States. 
The aggi-egate arrived at through this process of computation 
would be, in round numbers, 1,340,000. 

No matter, therefore, on what basis a result is arrived at, 
whether from computations covering the whole Confederacy, or 
computations based on returns of certain States used as a basis 
for the whole, or from an analysis of the censuses of 1860 and 
1870, the figures given in The South, as above, for enrolments 
from the several Confederate States are much more than con- 
firmed not only as being substantially correct, but also as being, 
approximately, what would naturally and reasonably have been 
anticipated under the conditions then existing. In any event, the 
result so reached is not open to the charge of exaggeration. 

On the other hand, the statement of President Tyler that the 



286 MILITARY STUDIES 

Confederacy had from first to last " about 600,000 men " on its 
muster-rolls leads, when analyzed, to results difficult of accept- 
ance. As already pointed out, deducting the 117,000 enrolments 
from the so-called Border States, there would remain 483,000 as 
the entire muster from the eleven States composing the Confed- 
eracy. Those States were returned in the Census of 1860 as con- 
taining, exclusive of West Virginia, almost exactly one million 
men of military age, — 18 to 45, — but a trifle in excess thereof. 
Allowing, as before, for extension of age of military service, and 
the maturing of effectives, and duly deducting the proportion of 
exempts, there would remain from this total a minimum of over 
1,200,000 men available for miUtary service. If then only 483,000 
were actually enrolled, it would follow that, computed on the 
most favorable basis, and after every possible allowance had been 
made, and assuming also no double enrolments, less than one-half 
of the available effectives in the Confederacy ever bore arms in its 
defence. To be exact, those who bore arms were only forty out of 
each hundred capable of so doing. In view of the prolonged and 
desperate character of the conflict, and the acknowledged bravery 
and devotion of the people of the Confederacy, such a result, 
arithmetically arrived at from figures the essential correctness of 
which does not admit of question, cannot be considered otherwise 
than a reductio ad absurdum. 

Thus, approached from any direction and reached under any 
conceivable method of computation, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the actual enrolments of the Confederate army 
during the entire four years of the conflict exceeded 1,100,000 
rather than fell short of that number. The figures given by 
President Tyler, opposed to all reasonable assumption and un- 
supported by documentary evidence, are based on assertion only. 

In certain discussions of this subject much emphasis is also laid 
by writers with Confederate sympathies on the large number of 
deserters, etc., from the armies in the field, owing to lack of proper 
clothing, sustenance, etc. It is difficult, however, to see how this 
affects the question of enrolment. To desert, a man must pre- 
viously have been enrolled, and enumerated as such. Desertion, 
moreover, was by no means peculiar to the army of the Con- 
federacy ; and the deserters from the Union army are not excepted 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 287 

by Confederate authorities from the total of Federal enlist- 
ments. 

The genesis of the 600,000 legend of Confederacy mihtary en- 
rolments, and the basis of evidence on which it rests, have been 
discussed and set forth by Colonel T. L. Livermore, in a paper 
printed in Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings (Second Series, XVIII, 432- 
435), and also in The South in the Building of the Nation, IV, 503. 



Supra, 266, n. 

"Thursday, September 8, 1870. — The Chancellor gives a great 
dinner, the guests including the Hereditary Grand Duke of Meck- 
lenburg-Schwerin, Herr Stephan, the Chief Director of the Post 
Office, and the three Americans. Amongst other matters men- 
tioned at table were the various reports as to the affair at Bazeilles. 
The Minister said that peasants could not be permitted to take 
part in the defence of a position. Not being in uniform, they 
could not be recognized as combatants — they were able to throw 
away their arms unnoticed. The chances must be equal for both 
sides. Abeken considered that Bazeilles was hardly treated, and 
thought the war ought to be conducted in a more humane manner. 
Sheridan, to whom MacLean has translated these remarks, is 
of a different opinion. He considers that in war it is expedient, 
even from the political point of view, to treat the population with 
the utmost rigour also. He expressed himself roughly as follows : 
'The proper strategy consists in the first place in inflicting as telling 
blows as possible upon the enemy's army, and then in causing the 
inhabitants so much suffering that they must long for peace, and 
force their Government to demand it. The people must be left 
nothing but their eyes to weep with over the war.' Somewhat 
heartless it seems to me, but perhaps worthy of consideration." — 
Busch, Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History, II, 127. 

To the same effect General Sherman subsequently declared : 
"I resolved to stop the game of guarding their cities, and to 
destroy their cities. We were determined to produce results, 
and now what were those results ? To make every man, woman 
and child in the South feel that if they dared to rebel against the 
flag of their country they must die or submit." 



288 MILITARY STUDIES 

The subsequent influence on the American army of General 
Sherman's famous "War is Hell" aphorism, and its illustration in 
his campaigns in Georgia and the Carolinas, are deserving of notice. 

Lieutenant-General S. B. M. Young spoke to the same effect as 
General Sheridan, at Prince Bismarck's table, at a public dinner 
given by the New York Chamber of Commerce at the Arlington 
Hotel, Washington, in honor of the representatives of certain 
foreign commercial bodies then in America, November 13, 1902. 
General Young then pronounced "all the army's defamers densely 
ignorant of what constitutes the laws of war;" and added, "To 
carry on war, disguise it as we may, is to be cruel, it is to kill and 
burn, burn and kill, and again kill and burn." If the word 
"humane" could be applied to war, he would define it as one 
"fast and furious and bloody from the beginning." He added, 
"When war has been decided on by our nation I agree with the 
German Emperor's sentiments, and beheve that the American 
army should leave such an impression that future generations 
would know we had been there." — New York Tribune, November 
14, 1902. 

The utterance of the German Emperor here referred to was his 
famous speech at Bremerhaven, July 27, 1900, to the first con- 
tingent of his army then embarking for China. He said : "When 
you meet the foe you will defeat them. No quarter will be given ; 
no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your mercy be 
at your mercy. Just as the Huns a thousand years ago, under the 
leadership of Attila, gained a reputation in virtue of which they 
still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany be- 
come known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will 
ever again dare to look askance at a German." 

At a court-martial convened in Manila twenty-one months after 
this utterance, Brigadier-General Jacob H. Smith declared that in 
operations conducted by him as general in command he had in- 
structed a subordinate "not to burden himself with prisoners"; 
that he told him "that he wanted him to kill and burn in the in- 
terior and hostile country; and did also instruct him that 'The 
interior of Samar must be made a howling wilderness'; and did 
further instruct him that he wanted all persons killed who were 
capable of bearing arms and were actively engaged in hostilities 



SOME PHASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 289 

against the United States; and that he did designate the age 
limit of ten years." 

The court in this case found General Smith guilty of "conduct to 
the prejudice 'of good order and mihtary disciphne," and sentenced 
him to be admonished by the revie^ving authority. The court 
declared itself thus lenient "in view of the undisputed evidence 
that the accused did not mean everything that his unexplained 
language implied ; that his subordinates did not gather such a 
meaning ; and that theorders were never executed in such sense." — 
57th Congress, 2d Session, Senate Document No. 213. 

Historical!}^, however, it is noticeable that the instructions given 
by General Smith were in strict accordance with the "War is Hell" 
principles on which operations in a hostile country should be con- 
ducted as laid down on the occasion specified, b}^ Lieutenant- 
General Sheridan, September 8, 1870, by the German Emperor, July 
27, 1900, and by Lieutenant-General Young, November 13, 1902. 

In his work entitled Ohio in the War (1868), Mr. Whitelaw Reid 
says of the burning of Columbia, "It was the most monstrous 
barbarity of the barbarous march. There is no reason to think 
that General Sherman knew anything of the purpose to burn the 
cit}', which had been freely talked about among the soldiers 
through the afternoon. But there is reason to think that he knew 
well enough who did it, that he never rebuked it, and made no 
effort to punish it. . . . He did not seek to ferret out and punish 
the offending parties. He did not make his army understand that 
he regarded this barbarit\" as a crime. He did not seek to repress 
their lawless course. On the contrary, they came to understand 
that the leader, whom they idolized, regarded their actions as a 
good joke, chuckled over them in secret, and winked at them in 
public. ... In both campaigns [that from Atlanta to Savannah, 
and from Savannah to Goldsboro'] great bodies of men were 
moved over States and groups of States wath the accuracy and 
precision of mechanism. In neither was any effort to preserve 
discipline apparent, save only so far as was needful for keeping 
up the march. 

"Here, indeed, is the single stain on the brilliant record. Before 
his movement began. General Sherman begged permission to turn 
his army loose in South Carolina and devastate it. He used this 



290 MILITARY STUDIES 

permission to the full. He protested that he did not wage war 
on women and children. But, under the operation of his orders 
the last morsel of food was taken from hundreds of destitute 
families, that his soldiers might feast in needless and riotous 
abundance. Before his eyes rose, day after day, the mournful 
clouds of smoke on every side, that told of old people and their 
grandchildren driven, in midwinter, from the only roofs there were 
to shelter them, by the flames which the wantonness of his soldiers 
had kindled. With his full knowledge and tacit approval, too 
great a portion of his advance resolved itself into bands of jewelry- 
thieves and plate-closet burglars. Yet, if a single soldier was 
punished for a single outrage or theft during that entire move- 
ment, we have found no mention of it in all the voluminous records 
of the march. He did indeed say that he 'would not protect' them 
in stealing 'women's apparel or jewelry.' But even this, with no 
whisper of punishment attached, he said, not in general orders, nor 
in approval of the findings of some righteously severe court-martial, 
but incidentally — in a letter to one of his officers, which never 
saw the light till two years after the close of the war. He rebuked 
no one for such outrages ; the soldiers understood that they pleased 
him. Was not South Carohna to be properly punished? 

"This was not war. It was not even the revenge of a wrathful 
soldiery, for it was practised, not upon the enemy, but upon the 
defenceless 'feeble folk' he had left at home. There was indeed 
one excuse for it — an excuse which chivalric soldiers might be 
slow to plead. It injured the enemy — not by open fight, where 
a million would have been thought full match for less than a 
hundred thousand, but by frightening his men about the situation 
of their wives and children !" — Ohio in the War, I, 475-479. 



VIII 
LEE'S CENTENNIAL^ 

Having occasion once to refer in discussion to certain of the 
founders of our Massachusetts Commonwealth, I made the 
assertion that their force ''lay in character"; and I added 
that in saying this I paid, and meant to pay, the highest trib- 
ute which in my judgment could be paid to a community 
or to its typical men. Quite a number of years have passed 
since I so expressed myself, and in those years I have grown 
older — materially older ; but I now repeat, even more con- 
fidently than I then uttered them, these other words: ''The 
older I have grown and the more I have studied and seen, the 
greater in my esteem, as an element of strength in a people, 
has Character become, and the less in the conduct of human 
affairs have I thought of mere capacity or even genius. With 
Character a race will become great, even though as stolid 
and unassimilating as the Romans ; without Character, any 
race will in the long run prove a failure, though it may num- 
ber in it individuals having all the brilliancy of the Jews, 
crowned with the genius of Napoleon." ^ We are here to-day 
to commemorate the birth of Robert Edward Lee, — essen- 
tially a Man of Character. That he was such all, I think, 

1 This address was delivered on the invitation of the president and 
faculty of Washington and Lee University at Lexington, Va., Satur- 
day, January 19, 1907, the centennial anniversary of the birth of General 
Robert E. Lee. Having been subjected to no general revision, it is here 
reproduced in almost the exact form of its original publication. 

^ Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, Second Series, VIII, 408. 

291 



292 MILITARY STUDIES 

recognize; for, having so impressed himself throughout life 
on his contemporaries, he stands forth distinctly as a man 
of character on the page of the historian. Yet it is not easy 
to put in words exactly what is meant when we agree in at- 
tributing character to this man or to that, or withholding it 
from another ; — conceding it, for instance, to Epaminondas, 
Cato and Wellington, but withholding it from Themis- 
tocles, Caesar or Napoleon. Though we can illustrate what 
we mean by examples which all wUl accept, we cannot define. 
Emerson in his later years (1866) wrote a paper on '^ Charac- 
ter"; but in it he makes no effort at a definition. ''Char- 
acter," he said, ''denotes habitual self-possession, habitual re- 
gard to interior and constitutional motives, a balance not to be 
overset or easily disturbed by outward events and opinion, and 
by implication points to the source of right motive. We some- 
times employ the word to express the strong and consistent 
will of men of mixed motive; but, when used with em- 
phasis, it points to what no events can change, that is, a 
wUl buUt of the reason of things." The more matter-of-fact 
lexicographer defines Character as "the sum of the inherited 
and acquired ethical traits which give to a person his moral 
individuality." To pursue further the definition of what is 
generally understood would be wearisome, so I will content 
myself with quoting this simile from a disciple of Emerson: 
"The virtues of a superior man are like the wind; the vir- 
tues of a common man are like the grass ; the grass, when 
the wind passes over it, bends." ^ 

That America has been rich in these men of superior vir- 
tues before whom the virtues of the common man have bent, 
is matter of history. It has also been our making as a com- 
munity. Such in New England was John Winthrop, whose 

1 Thoreau, Walden, Chap. VIII ; taken from the Analects of Confu- 
cius. See Mass. Hist. Soe. Proceedings, XLIII, 473-477. 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 293 

lofty example still influences the community whose infancy 
he fathered. Such, in New York, was John Jay. Such, 
further south, w^as John Caldwell Calhoun, essentially a 
man of exalted character and representative of his commu- 
nity, quite irrespective of his teachings and their outcome. 
Such unquestionably, in Virginia, were George Washington 
and John Marshall ; and, more recently, Robert Edward Lee. 
A stock, of which those three were the consummate flower, 
by its fruits is known. 

Here to commemorate the centennial of the birth of Lee, I 
do not propose to enter into any eulogium of the man, to re- 
count the well-known events of his career, or to estimate the 
final place to be assigned him among great military charac- 
ters. All this has been sufficiently done by others far better 
qualified for the task. Eschewing superlatives also, I shall 
institute no comparisons. One of a community which then 
looked upon Lee as a renegade from the flag he had sworn to 
serve, and a traitor to the nation which had nurtured him, 
in my subordinate place I directly confronted Lee throughout 
the larger portion of the War of Secession. During all those 
years there was not a day in which my heart would not 
have been gladdened had I heard that his also had been the 
fate which at Chancellorsville befell his great lieutenant ; 
and yet more glad had it been the fortune of the command 
in which I served to visit that fate upon him. Forty more 
years have since gone. Their close finds me here to-day — 
certainly a much older, and, in my own belief at least, a 
wiser man. Nay, more ! A distinguished representative of 
Massachusetts, speaking in the Senate of the United States 
shortly after Lee's death upon the question of a return to 
Lee's family of the ancestral estate of Arlington, used these 
words: "Eloquent Senators have already characterized the 
proposition and the traitor it seeks to commemorate. I am 



294 MILITARY STUDIES 

not disposed to speak of General Lee. It is enough to say he 
stands high in the catalogue of those who have imbrued their 
hands in their country's blood. I hand him over to the aveng- 
ing pen of History." It so chances that not only am I also 
from the State of Massachusetts, but, for more than a dozen 
years, I have been the chosen head of its typical historical 
society, — the society chartered under the name and seal of 
the Commonwealth considerably more than a century ago, — 
the parent of all similar societies. By no means would I on 
that account seem to ascribe to myself any representative 
character as respects the employment of History's pen, 
whether avenging or otherwise ; ^ nor do I appear here as repre- 
sentative of the Massachusetts Historical Society : but, a 
whole generation having passed away since Charles Sumner 
uttered the Avords I have quoted, I do, on your invitation, 
chance to stand here to-day, as I have said, both a Massa- 
chusetts man and the head of the Massachusetts Historical 
Society, to pass judgment upon General Lee. The situation 
is thus to a degree dramatic. 

Though in what I am about to say I shall confine myself 
to a few points only, to them I have given no little study, and 
on them have much reflected. Let me, however, once for all, 
and with emphasis, in advance say I am not here to instruct 
Virginians either in the history of their State or the principles 
of Constitutional Law; nor do I make any pretence to pro- 
fundity whether of thought or insight. On the contrary, I 
shall attempt nothing more than the elaboration of what has 
already been said by others as well as by me, such value or 

1 Possibly, and more properly, this attribute might be considered as 
pertaining rather to James Ford Rhodes, also a member of the society re- 
ferred to, and at present (1907) a vice-president of it. Mr. Rhodes's char- 
acterization of General Lee, and consequent verdict on the course pursued 
by him at the time under discussion, can be found on reference to his 
History of the United States, III, 413. 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 295 

novelty as may belong to my share in the occasion being at- 
tributable solely to the point of view of the speaker. In that 
respect, I submit, the situation is not without novelty; for, 
so far as I am aware, never until now has one born and nur- 
tured in Massachusetts — a typical bred-in-the-bone Yankee, 
if you please — addressed at its invitation a Virginian audi- 
ence, on topics relating to the War of Secession and its fore- 
most Confederate military character. 

Coming directly to my subject, my own observation tells 
me that the charge still most commonly made against Lee in 
that section of the common country to which I belong and 
with which I sympathize is that, in plain language, he was 
false to his flag, — educated at the national academy, an 
officer of the United States Army, he abjured his allegiance 
and bore arms against the government he had sworn to 
uphold. In other words, he was a military traitor. I state 
the charge in the tersest language possible ; and the facts are 
as stated. Having done so, and, for the purposes of the 
present occasion, admitting the facts, I add as the result of 
much patient study and most mature reflection, that under 
similar conditions I would myself have done exactly what 
Lee did. In fact, I do not see how I, placed as he was placed, 
could have done otherwise. 

And now fairly entered on the first phase of my theme, I 
must hurry on; for I have much ground to traverse, and 
scant time in which to cover it. I must be concise, but must 
not fail to be explicit. And first as to the right or wrong of 
secession, this theoretically; then, practically, as to what 
secession in the year of grace 1861 necessarily involved. 

If ever a subject had been thoroughly thrashed out, — so 
thrashed out, in fact, as to offer no possible gleaning of nov- 
elty, — it might be inferred that this was that subject. Yet 
I venture the opinion that such is not altogether the case. I 



296 MILITARY STUDIES 

do so, moreover, not without weighing words. The difficulty 
with the discussion has to my mind been that throughout 
it has in essence been too abstract, legal and technical, and 
not sufficiently historical, sociological and human. It has 
turned on the wording of instruments, in themselves not 
explicit, and has paid far too little regard to traditions and 
local ties. As matter of fact, however, actual men as they 
live, move and have their being in this world, caring little for 
parchments or theory, are the creatures of heredity and local 
attachments. Coming directly to the point, I maintain that 
every man in the eleven States seceding from the Union had in 
1861, whether he would or no, to decide for himself whether to 
adhere to his State or to the Nation ; and I finally assert that, 
whichever way he decided, if only he decided honestly, put- 
ting self-interest behind him, he decided right. 

Paradoxical as it sounds, I contend, moreover, that this 
was indisputably so. It was a question of sovereignty — 
State or National ; and from a decision of that question there 
was in a seceded State escape for no man. Yet when the 
national Constitution was framed and adopted that question 
was confessedly left undecided; and intentionally so left. 
Even more, the Federal Constitution was theoretically and 
avowedly based on the idea of a divided sovereignty, in utter 
disregard of the fact that, when a final issue is presented, 
sovereignty does not admit of division.^ 

Yet even this last proposition, basic as it is, I have heard 
denied. I have frequently had it replied that, as matter of 
fact, sovereignty is frequently divided, — divided in domestic 
life, — divided in the apportionment of the functions of gov- 
ernment. Those thus arguing, however, do so confusedly. 
They confound sovereignty with an agreed, but artificial, 
modus Vivendi."^ The original constitution of the United States 
1 Supra, 210-221. ^ j^id. 218. 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 297 

Vy-as, in fact, in this important respect just that, — a modus 
Vivendi : — under the circumstances a most happy and ingen- 
ious expedient for overcoming an obstacle in the way of na- 
tionality, otherv/ise insurmountable. To accomplish the end 
they had in view, the framers had recourse to a metaphysical 
abstraction, under which it was left to time and the individual 
to decide, when the final issue should arise, if it ever did arise 
— and they all devoutly hoped it never would arise — 
where sovereignty lay. There is nothing in connection 
with the history of our development more interesting from 
the historical point of view than the growth, the gradual 
development of the spirit of nationality, carrying with it sov- 
ereignty. It has usually been treated as a purely legal ques- 
tion to be settled on the verbal construction of the instru- 
ments: ''We, the People," etc. Webster so treated it. In 
all confidence I maintain that it is not a legal question ; it is 
purely an historical question. As such, furthermore, it has 
been decided, and correctly decided, both ways at different 
times in different sections, and at different times in opposite 
ways in the same section. 

And this was necessarily and naturally so ; for, as develop- 
ment progressed along various lines and in different localities, 
the sense of allegiance shifted. Two whole generations 
passed away between the adoption of the Federal Constitu- 
tion and the War of Secession. When that war broke out in 
18G1, the last of the framers had been a score of years in his 
grave ; but evidence is conclusive that until the decennium 
between 1830 and 1840 the belief was nearly universal that in 
case of a final, unavoidable issue, sovereignty resided in the 
State, and to it allegiance was due. The law was so laid 
down in the Kentucky resolves of 1798; and to the law as 
thus laid down Webster assented. Chancellor Rawle so 
propounded the law; and such was the understanding of 



298 MILITARY STUDIES 

so unprejudiced and acute a foreign observer as Tocque- 
ville/ 

The technical argument — the logic of the proposition — 
seems plain, and, to my thought, unanswerable. The original 
sovereignty was indisputably in the State ; in order to estab- 
lish a nationality certain attributes of sovereignty were ceded 
by the States to a common central organization; all attri- 
butes not thus specifically conceded were reserved to the 
States, and no attributes of moment were to be construed as 
conceded by implication. There is no attribute of sovereignty 
so important as allegiance, — citizenship. So far all is 
elementary. Now we come to the crux of the proposition. 
Not only was allegiance — the right to define and establish 
citizenship — not among the attributes specifically conceded 
by the several States to the central nationality, but, on the 
contrary, it was explicitly reserved, the instrument declaring 
that ''the citizens of each State" should be entitled to "all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." 
Ultimate allegiance was, therefore, due to the State which 
defined and created citizenship, and not to the central or- 
ganization which accepted as citizens whomever the States 
pronounced to be such.^ 

Thus far I have never been able to see where room was 
left for doubt. Citizenship was an attribute recognized by 
the Constitution as originating with, and of course belonging 
to, the several States. But, speaking historically and in 
a philosophical rather than in a legal spirit, it is little more 
than a commonplace to assert that one great safeguard of 

* See note, infra, 339. 

^ See W. H. Fleming, Slavery and the Race Problem at the South, pp. 19, 
20. An authoritative definition of United States citizenship, as distinct 
from the citizenship of a State, was first given in the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment to the Federal Constitution, ratified in 1868. See J. S. Wise, A 
Treatise on American Citizenship, pp. 6, 13, 31. 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 299 

the Anglo-Saxon race — what might almost be termed its 
political palladium — has ever been that hard, if at times 
illogical, common-sense, which, recognizing established 
custom as a binding rule of action, found its embodiment in 
what we are wont with pride to term the Common Law, 
Now, just as there can, I think, be no question as to the 
source of citizenship, and, consequently, as to sovereignty, 
when the Constitution was originally adopted, there can be 
equally little question that during the lives of the two suc- 
ceeding generations a custom of nationality grew up which be- 
came the accepted Common Law of the land, and practically 
binding as such. This was true in the South as well as the 
North, though the custom was more hardened into accepted 
law in the latter than in the former ; ^ but the growth and 
acceptance as law of the custom of nationality even in the 
South were incontrovertibly shown in the very act of secession, 
— the seceding States at once crystallizing into a Confed- 
eracy. Nationality was assumed as a thing of course. 

But the metaphysical abstraction of a divided sovereignty, 
none the less, bridged the chasm. As a modus vivendi it 
did its work. I have called it a metaphysical abstraction; 
but it was also a practical arrangement resulting in great 
advantages. It might be illogical, and fraught with possible 
disputes and consequent dangers ; but it was an institution. 
And so it naturally came to pass that in many of the States 
a generation grew up, dating from the War of 1812, who, 
gravitating steadily and more and more strongly to na- 
tionality, took a wholly different view of allegiance. For 
them Story laid down the law; Webster was their mouth- 
piece ; at one time it looked as if Jackson was to be their 
armed exponent. They were, moreover, wholly within their 
right. The sovereignty was confessedly divided; and it 

1 Suvra, 224-225. 



300 MILITARY STUDIES 

was for them to elect. The movements of both science and 
civilization were behind the nationalists. The railroad 
obliterated State lines, while it unified the nation. What 
did the foreign immigrants, now swarming across the ocean, 
care for States ? They knew only the nation. Brought up 
in Europe, the talk of State sovereignty was to them foolish- 
ness. Its alphabet was incomprehensible. In a word, it 
too '^was caviare to the general." 

Then the inevitable issue arose ; and it arose over African 
slavery ; and slavery was sectional. The States south of 
a given line were arrayed against the States north of that 
line. Owing largely to slavery, and the practical exclusion 
of immigrants because thereof, the States of the South had 
never undergone nationalization at all to the extent those 
of the North had undergone it. The growing influence and 
power of the national government, the sentiment inspired 
by the wars in which we had been engaged, the rapidly im- 
proving means of communication and intercourse, had 
produced their effects in the South ; but in degree far less 
than in the North. Thus the curious result was brought 
about that, when, at last, the long-deferred issue confronted 
the country, and the modus Vivendi of two generations was 
brought to a close, those who believed in national sovereignty 
constituted the conservative majority, striving for the pres- 
ervation of what then was, — the existing nineteenth- 
century nation, — while those who passionately adhered 
to State sovereignty, treading in the footsteps of the fathers, 
had become eighteenth-century reactionists. Legally, each 
had right on his side. The theory of a divided sovereignty 
had worked itself out to its logical consequence. ''Under 
which King, Bezonian?" — and every man had to ''speak 
or die." 

In the North the situation was simple. State and Nation 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 301 

stood together. The question of allegiance did not present 
itself, for the two sovereignties merged. It was otherwise 
in the South ; and there the question became, not legal or 
constitutional, but practical. The life of the nation had 
endured so long, the ties and ligaments had become so nu- 
merous and interwoven, that, all theories to the contrary 
notwithstanding, a peaceable secession from the Union — 
a virtual exercise of State sovereignty — had become im- 
possible. If those composing the several dissatisfied com- 
munities would only keep their tempers under restraint, and 
exercise an almost unlimited patience, a theoretical divided 
sovereignty, maintained through the agency and inter- 
vention of the Supreme Court, — in other words, the per- 
petuation of the modus vivendi, — was altogether practi- 
cable ; and probably this was what the framers had in mind 
under such a contingency as had now arisen. But that, 
after seventy years of Union and nationalization, a peace- 
able and friendly taking to pieces was possible is now, as 
then it was, scarcely thinkable. Certainly, with a most 
vivid recollection of the state of sectional feeling which then 
existed, I do not believe there was a man in the United States 
— I am confident there was not a woman in the South — 
who fostered self-delusion to the extent of believing that the 
change was to come about without a recourse to force. In 
other words, practical Secession was revolution theoretically 
legal. Why waste time and breath in discussion ! The 
situation becomes manifestly impossible of continuance 
where the issue between heated men, with weapons handy, 
is over a metaphysical distinction involving vast material 
and moral consequences. Lee, with intuitive common- 
sense, struck the nail squarely on the head when amidst the 
Babel of discordant tongues he wrote to his son: "It is 
idle to talk of secession"; the national government as it 



302 MILITARY STUDIES 

then was ''can only be dissolved by revolution." That 
struggle of dissolution might be longer and fiercer, — as it 
was, — or shorter, and more wordy than blood-letting, — 
as the seceding States confidently believed would prove to 
be the case, — but a struggle there would be. 

Historically, such were the conditions to which natural 
processes of development had brought the common country 
at the mid-decennium of the century. People had to elect ; 
the modus vivendi was at an end. — Was the State sovereign ; 
or was the Nation sovereign ? And, with a shock of genuine 
surprise that any doubt should exist on that head, eleven 
States arrayed themselves on the side of the sovereignty of 
the State and claimed the unquestioning allegiance of their 
citizens ; and I think it not unsafe to assert that nowhere 
did the original spirit of State sovereignty and allegiance 
to the State then survive in greater intensity and more un- 
questioning form than in Virginia, — the ''Old Dominion," 

— the mother of States and of Presidents. And here I ap- 
proach a sociological factor in the problem more subtle and 
also more potent than any legal consideration. It has no 
standing in Court : but the historian may not ignore it ; while, 
with the biographer of Lee, it is crucial. Upon it judgment 
hinges. I have not time to consider how or why such a result 
came about, but of the fact there can, I hold, be no question, 

— State pride, a sense of individuality, has immemorially 
entered more largely and more intensely into Virginia and 
Virginians than into any other section or community of the 
country. Only in South Carolina and among Carolinians, 
on this continent, was a somewhat similar pride of locality 
and descent to be found. There was in it a flavor of the 
Hidalgo, — or of the pride which the Macgregors and Camp- 
bells took in their clan and country. In other words, the 
Virginian and the Carolinian had in the middle of the last 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 303 

century not undergone nationalization to any appreciable 
extent. 

But this, it will be replied, though true of the ordinary 
man and citizen, should not have been true of the graduate 
of the military academy, the officer of the Army of the United 
States. Winfield Scott and George H. Thomas did not so 
construe their allegiance; when the issue was presented, 
they remained true to their flag and to their oaths, Robert 
E. Lee, false to his oath and flag, was a renegade ! The 
answer is brief and to the point : the conditions in the 
several cases were not the same, — neither Scott nor Thomas 
was Lee. It was our Boston Dr. Holmes who long ago 
declared that the child's education begins about two hun- 
dred and fifty years before it is born; and it is quite im- 
possible to separate any man — least of all, perhaps, a full- 
blooded Virginian — from his prenatal traditions and living 
environment. From them he drew his being; in them he 
exists. Robert E. Lee was the embodiment of those condi- 
tions, the creature of that environment, — a Virginian of 
Virginians. His father was "Light Horse Harry" Lee, a 
devoted follower of Washington; but in January, 1792, 
"Light Horse Harry" wrote to Mr. Madison : "No considera- 
tion on earth could induce me to act a part, however gratify- 
ing to me, which could be construed into disregard of, or 
faithlessness to, this Commonwealth"; and later, when in 
1798 the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions were under dis- 
cussion, "Light Horse Harry" exclaimed in debate, "Vir- 
ginia is my country ; her will I obey, however lament- 
able the fate to which it may subject me." Born in this 
environment, nurtured in these traditions, to ask Lee to raise 
his hand against Virginia was like asking Montrose or the 
MacCallum More to head a force designed for the subjection 
of the Highlands and the destruction of the clans. Where 



304 MILITARY STUDIES 

such a stern election is forced upon a man as then confronted 
Lee, the single thing the fair-minded investigator has to take 
into account is the loyalty, the single-mindedness of the elec- 
tion. Was it devoid of selfishness, — was it free from any 
baser and more sordid worldly motive, — ambition, pride, 
jealousy, revenge or self-interest? To this question there 
can, in the case of Lee, be but one answer. When, after 
long and trying mental wrestling, he threw in his fate with 
Virginia, he knowingly sacrificed everything which man 
prizes most, — his dearly beloved home, his means of sup- 
port, his professional standing, his associates, a brilliant 
future assured to him. Born a slaveholder in a race of 
slaveholders, he was himself no defender, much less an ad- 
vocate of slavery ; on the contrary, he did not hesitate to 
pronounce it in his place "a moral and political evil." 
Later, he manumitted his slaves. He did not believe in 
secession ; as a right reserved under the Constitution he 
pronounced it "idle talk" : but, as a Virginian, he also added, 
''if the Government is disrupted, I shall return to my native 
State and share the miseries of my people, and save in de- 
fence will draw my sword on none." Next to his high 
sense of allegiance to Virginia was Lee's pride in his pro- 
fession. He was a soldier; as such rank, and the possibility 
of high command and great achievement, were very dear to 
him. His choice put rank and command behind him. He 
quietly and silently made the greatest sacrifice a soldier can 
be asked to make. With war plainly impending, the fore- 
most place in the army of which he was an officer was now 
tendered him; his answer was to lay down the commission 
he already held. Virginia had been drawn into the struggle ; 
and though he recognized no necessity for the state of affairs, 
"in my own person," he wrote, ''I had to meet the question 
whether I should take part against my native State ; I have 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 305 

not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against 
my relatives, my children, my home." It may have been 
treason to take this position ; the man who took it, uttering 
these words and sacrificing as he sacrificed, may have been 
technically a renegade to his flag, — if you please, false to 
his allegiance; but he stands awaiting sentence at the bar 
of history in very respectable company. Associated with 
him are, for instance, William of Orange, known as The Silent, 
John Plampden, the original Pater Patrice, Oliver Cromwell, 
the Protector of the English Commonwealth, Sir Henry Vane, 
once a governor of Massachusetts, and George Washington, 
a Virginian of note. In the throng of other offenders I am 
also gratified to observe certain of those from whom I not 
unproudly claim descent. They were, one and all, in the 
sense referred to, false to their oaths — forsworn. As to 
Robert E. Lee, individually, I can only repeat what I have 
already said, — if in all respects similarly circumstanced, 
I hope I should have been filial and unselfish enough to have 
done as Lee did.^ Such an utterance on my part may be 
"traitorous"; but I here render that homage. 

In Massachusetts, however, I could not even in 1861 have 
been so placed ; for, be it because of better or worse, Massa- 
chusetts was not Virginia ; — no more Virginia than England 
once was Scotland, or the Lowlands the Highlands. The 
environment, the ideals, were in no respect the same. In 
Virginia, Lee was Macgregor; and, where Macgregor sat, 
there was the head of the table. 

Into Lee's subsequent military career, there is no call here 
to enter; nor shall I undertake to compare him with other 
great military characters, whether contemporaneous or of 
all time. As I said when I began, the topic has been thor- 
oughly discussed by others ; and, moreover, the time limita- 
^ See Lee at Appomattox and Other Papers (2d ed.), pp. 414-417. 



306 MILITARY STUDIES 

tion here again confronts me. I must press on. Suffice it 
for me, as one of those then opposed in arms to Lee, however 
subordinate the capacity, to admit at once that, as a leader, 
he conducted operations on the highest plane. Whether 
acting on the defensive upon the soil of his native State, or 
leading his army into the enemy's country, he was humane, 
self-restrained and strictly observant of the most advanced 
rules of civilized warfare. He respected the non-comba- 
tant ; nor did he ever permit the wanton destruction of 
private property. His famous Chambersburg order was a 
model which any invading general would do well to make 
his own ; and I repeat now what I have heretofore had 
occasion to say, "I doubt if a hostile force of an equal 
size ever advanced into an enemy's country, or fell back 
from it in retreat, leaving behind less cause of hate and bitter- 
ness than did the Army of Northern Virginia in that memor- 
able campaign which culminated at Gettysburg." ^ 

And yet that Gettysburg campaign is an episode in Lee's 
military career which I am loath wholly to pass over ; for the 
views I entertain of it are not in all respects those generally 
held. Studied in the light of results, that campaign has been 
criticized ; the crucial attack of Gettysburg's third day has 
been pronounced a murderous persistence in a misconception ; 
and, among Confederate writers especially, the effort has been 
to relieve Lee of responsibility for final miscarriage, trans- 
ferring it to his lieutenants. As a result reached from par- 
ticipation in those events and subsequent study of them, 
briefly let me say I concur in none of these conclusions. 
Taking the necessary chances incident to all warfare on a 
large scale into consideration, the Gettysburg campaign 
was in my opinion timely, admirably designed, energetically 
executed, and brought to a close with consummate military 
1 War is Hell (Houghton, Mifflin and Co., Boston, 1903), 40 ; supra, 266. 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 307 

skill. A well-considered offensive thrust of the most deadly 
character, intelligently aimed at the opponent's heart, its 
failure was of the narrowest; and the disaster to the Con- 
federate side which that failure might readily have involved 
was no less skilfully than successfully averted. 

I cannot here and now enter into details. But I hold 
that credit, and the consequent measure of applause, in the 
outcome of that campaign belong to Lee's opponent, and not 
to him. All the chances were in Lee's favor, and he should 
have won a great victory ; and Meade should have sustained 
a decisive defeat. As it was, Meade triumphantly held his 
ground ; Lee suffered a terrible repulse, his deadly thrust was 
foiled, and his campaign was a failure. 

So far as Lee's general plan of operations, and the move- 
ments which culminated in the battle of Gettysburg, were 
concerned, be it always and ever remembered, a leader must, 
in war, take some chances, and mistakes will occur ; but the 
mistakes are rarely, if ever, all on one side. They tend to 
counterbalance each other; and, commanders and com- 
manded being at all equal, not unseldom it is the balance of 
misconceptions, shortcomings, miscarriages, and the generally 
unforeseen, and indeed unforeseeable, which tips the scale 
to victory or defeat. I have said that I proposed to avoid 
comparisons ; at best such are invidious, and, under present 
circumstances, might from me be considered as doubtful in 
matter of taste. I think, however, some things too obvious 
to admit of denial ; or, consequently, to suggest comparison. 
About every crisp military aphorism is as matter of course 
attributed to Napoleon; and so Napoleon is alleged first to 
have remarked that ''In war, men are nothing; a man 
is everything." ^ And, as formerly a soldier of the Army 
of the Potomac, I now stand appalled at the risk I uncon- 
^ "A la guerre les hommes ne sont rien, e'est un homme qui est tout.'* 



308 MILITARY STUDIES 

sciously ran anterior to July, 1863, when -confronting the 
Army of Northern Virginia, commanded as it then was and 
as we were. The situation was in fact as bad with us in the 
Army of the Potomac as it was with the Confederates in the 
southwest. There the unfortunate Pemberton simply was 
not in the same class as Grant and Sherman, to whom he 
found himself opposed. Results followed accordingly. So 
here, in Virginia, Lee and Jackson made an extraordinary, a 
most exceptional combination. They outclassed McClellan 
and Burnside, Pope and Hooker; outclassed them some- 
times terribly, sometimes ludicrously, always hopelessly: 
and results in that case also followed accordingly. That 
we were not utterly destroyed constitutes a fiat and final 
refutal of the truth of Napoleon's aphorism. If we did not 
realize the facts of the situation in this respect, our opponents 
did. Let me quote the words of one of them: ''There was, 
however, one point of great interest in [the rapid succession 
of the Federal commanders], and that was our amazement 
that an army could maintain even so much as its organiza- 
tion under the depressing strain of those successive appoint- 
ments and removals of its commanding generals. And to- 
day (1903) I, for one, regard the fact that it did preserve its 
cohesion and its fighting power under and in spite of such 
experiences, as furnishing impressive demonstration of the 
high character and intense loyalty of our historic foe, the 
Federal Army of the Potomac." ^ 

Notwithstanding the fact that until the death of Jackson 
and the Gettysburg campaign we were thus glaringly out- 
classed, and at a corresponding disadvantage in every re- 
spect save mere men and equipment, the one noticeable 
feature of the succession of Virginia campaigns, from that of 
1862 to that of 1864, was their obstinacy and indecisive 
^ Stiles, Four Years under Marse Robert, 21. 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 309 

character. The advantage would be sometimes on one side, 
sometimes on the other: but neither side could secure an 
indisputable supremacy. This was markedly the case at 
Gettysburg; and yet, judging by the Confederate accounts 
of that campaign which have met my eye, the inference would 
be that the Union forces labored under no serious disad- 
vantage, while Lee's plans and tactics were continually com- 
promised by untoward accident, or the precipitation or 
remissness of his subordinates. My study of what then 
took place leads me to a wholly opposite conclusion. Well 
conceived and vigorously carried out as that campaign w^as 
on the part of the Confederate leader, the preponderance 
of the accidental — the blunders, the unforeseeable, the 
misconceptions and the miscarriages — was distinctly in 
Lee's favor. On any fair weighing of chances, he should 
have won a decisive victory ; as a matter of actual outcome, 
he and his army ought to have been destroyed. As usual, 
on that theatre of war at the time, neither result came 
about. 

First as to the chapter of accidents, — the misconceptions, 
miscarriages and shortcomings. If, as has been alleged, 
an essential portion of Lee's force was at one time out of 
reach and touch, and if, at the critical moment, a lieutenant 
was not promptly in place at a given hour, on the Union side 
an unforeseen change of supreme command went into effect 
when battle was already joined, and the newly appointed 
commander had no organized staff; his army was not con- 
centrated ; his strongest corps was over thirty miles from 
the point of conflict; and the two corps immediately en- 
gaged should have been destroyed in detail before reen- 
forcements could have reached them. In addition to all this, 
— superadded thereto, — the most skilful general and per- 
haps the fiercest fighter on the Union side was killed at the 



310 MILITARY STUDIES 

outset, and, later, Meade's line of battle was almost fatally 
disordered by the misconception of a corps commander. 

The chapter of accidents thus reads all in Lee's favor. 
But, while Lee on any fair weighing of chances stands in my 
judgment more than justified both in his conception of the 
campaign and in every material strategic move made in it, 
he none the less fundamentally misconceived the situation, 
with consequences which should have been fatal both to him 
and to his command. Frederick did the same at Kuners- 
dorf; Napoleon, at Waterloo. In the first place, Lee had 
at that time supreme confidence in his command ; and he 
had grounds for it. As he himself then wrote : ''There 
never were such men in an army before. They will go any- 
where and do anything, if properly led." And, for myself, I 
do not think the estimate thus expressed was exaggerated ; 
speaking deliberately, having faced some portions of the 
Army of Northern Virginia at the time and having since 
reflected much on the occurrences of that momentous period, I 
do not believe that any more formidable or better organized 
and animated force was ever set in motion than that which 
Lee led across the Potomac in the early summer of 1863. It 
was essentially an army of fighters, — men who, individually 
or in the mass, could be depended on for any feat of arms in 
the power of mere mortals to accomplish. They would blanch 
at no danger. This, Lee from experience knew. He had 
tested them ; they had full confidence in him. He also 
thought he knew his opponent; and here too his recent ex- 
perience justified him. 

The disasters which had bef.allen the Confederates in the 
Southwest in the spring and early summer of 1863 had to 
find compensation in the East. The exigencies of warfare 
necessitated it. Some risk must be incurred. So Lee de- 
termined to strike at his opponent's heart. He had what he 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 311 

believed to be the better weapon; and he had reason for 
considering himself incomparably the superior swordsman. 
He was ; of that he had at Chancellorsville satisfied himself 
and the world. Then came the rapid, aggressive move; and 
the long, desperately contested struggle at Gettysburg, cul- 
minating in that historic charge of Pickett's Virginia division. 
Paradoxical as it may sound in view of the result, that 
charge — what those men did — justified Lee. True, those 
who made the charge did not accomplish the impossible; 
but towards it they did all that mortal men could do. But 
it is urged that Lee should have recognized the impossible 
when face to face confronted by it, and not have directed 
brave men to lay down their lives in the vain effort to do it. 
That is true ; and, as Lee is said to have once remarked in an- 
other connection, ''Even as poor a soldier as I am can gen- 
erally discover mistakes after it is all over." After Gettys- 
burg was over, like Frederick at Kunersdorf and Napoleon 
at Waterloo, Lee doubtless discovered his mistake. It was 
a very simple one : he undervalued his opponent. The 
temper of his own weapon he knew; he made no mistake 
there. His mistake lay in his estimate of his antagonist: 
but that estimate again was based on his own recent ex- 
perience, though in other fields. 

On the other hand, from the day I rode over the field of 
Gettysburg immediately following the fight to that which 
now is, I have fully and most potently believed that only 
some disorganized fragments of Lee's army should after that 
battle have found their way back to Virginia. The war 
should have collapsed within sixty days thereafter. For 
eighteen hours after the repulse of Pickett's division, I have 
always felt, and now feel, the fate of the Army of Virginia 
was as much in General Meade's hands as was the fate of 
the army led by Napoleon in the hands of Bliicher on the 



312 MILITARY STUDIES 

night of Waterloo. As an aggressive force, the Confederate 
army was fought out. It might yet put forth a fierce de- 
fensive effort ; it was sure to die game : but it was impotent 
for attack. Meade had one entire corps — perhaps his best, 
— the Sixth, commanded by Sedgwick — intact and in 
reserve. It lay there cold, idle, formidable. The true 
counter movement for the fourth day of continuous fighting 
would on Meade's part have been an exact reversal of Lee's 
own plan of battle for the third day. That plan, as described 
by Fitzhugh Lee, was simple. '^His [Lee's] purpose was to 
turn the enemy's left flank with his First Corps, and, after 
the work began there, to demonstrate against his lines with 
the others in* order to prevent the threatened flank from 
being reenforced, these demonstrations to be converted into 
a real attack as the flanking wave of battle rolled over the 
troops in their front." What Lee thus proposed for Meade's 
army on the third day, Meade should unquestionably have 
returned on Lee's army upon the fourth day. Sedgwick's 
corps should then have assailed Lee's right and rear. I once 
asked a leading Confederate general,^ who had been in the 
very thick of it at Gettysburg, what would have been the 
outcome had Meade, within two hours of the repulse of 
Pickett, ordered Sedgwick to move off to the left, and, 
occupying Lee's line of retreat, proceeded to envelop the Con- 
federate right, while, early the following morning, Meade had 
commanded a general advance. The answer I received was 
immediate: ''Without question we would have been de- 
stroyed. We all that night fully expected it ; and could not 
understand next day why we were unmolested. My ammuni- 
tion" — for he was an officer of artillery — ''was exhausted." 
But in all this, as in every speculation of the sort, — and 

1 General E. P. Alexander, Chief of Artillery of the corps commanded 
by General Longstreet. 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 313 

the history of warfare is replete with them, — the '^if" is 
much in evidence; as much in evidence, indeed, as it is in 
a certain familiar Shakespearian disquisition. I here in- 
troduce v/hat I have said on this topic simply to illustrate 
what may be described as the balance of miscarriages in- 
separable from warfare. On the other hand, the manner in 
which Lee met disaster at Gettysburg, and the combination 
of serene courage, and consequent skill, with which he ex- 
tricated his army from a most critical situation commands 
admiration. I would here say nothing depreciatory of 
General Meade. He was an accomplished officer as well as a 
brave soldier. Placed suddenly in a most trying position, — 
assigned to chief command when battle was already joined, 
— untried in his new sphere of action, and caught un- 
prepared, — he fought at Gettysburg a stubborn, gallant 
fight. With chances at the beginning heavily against him, 
he saved the day. Personally, I was later under deep obliga- 
tion to General Meade. He too had character. None the 
less, as I have already pointed out, I fully believe that on 
the fourth day at Gettysburg Meade had but firmly to close 
his hand, and the Army of Northern Virginia was crushed. 
Perhaps under all the circumstances it was too much to have 
expected of him; certainly it was not done. Then Lee in 
turn did avail himself of his opportunity. Skilfully, proudly 
though sullenly, preserving an unbroken front, he withdrew 
to Virginia. That withdrawal was masterly. 

Narrowly escaping destruction at Gettysburg, my next 
contention is that Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia 
never sustained defeat. Finally, it is true, succumbing to 
exhaustion, to the end they were not overthrown in fight. 
And here I approach a large topic, but one closely inter- 
woven with Lee's military career ; in fact, as I see it, the 
explanation of what finally occurred. What then was it 



314 MILITARY STUDIES 

that brought about the collapse of the Army of Northern 
Virginia, and the consequent downfall of the Confederacy? 
The literature of the War of Secession now constitutes a 
library in itself. Especially is this true of it in its military 
aspects. The shelves are crowded with memoirs and biog- 
raphies of its generals, the stories of its campaigns, the 
records and achievements of its armies, its army corps and 
its regiments. Yet I make bold to say that no well and 
philosophically considered narrative of the struggle has yet 
appeared ; nor has any satisfactory or comprehensive ex- 
planation been given of its extraordinary and unanticipated 
outcome. Let me briefly set it forth as I see it ; only by so 
doing can I explain what I mean. 

Tersely put, dealing only with outlines, the Southern com- 
munity in 1861 precipitated a conflict on the slavery issue, 
in implicit reliance on its own warlike capacity and resources, 
the extent and very defensible character of its territory, and, 
above all, on its complete control of cotton as the great 
staple textile fabric of modern civilization. That the seced- 
ing States fully believed in the justice of their cause, and 
confidently appealed to it, I do not question, much less deny. 
For present purposes let this be conceded in full. But, 
historically, it is equally clear that to vindicate the right, next 
to their own manhood and determination, they relied in all 
possible confidence on their apparently absolute control of 
one commercial staple. When, therefore, in 1858, with the 
shadow of the impending conflict darkening the horizon, 
a thoughtful senator from South Carolina, one on whom 
the mantle of Calhoun had fallen, declared that '^Cotton is 
King," that ''no power on earth dares to make war on it," 
that 'Svithout firing a gun, without drawing a sword," the cot- 
ton-producing South could, if war was declared upon it, bring 
''the whole world" to its feet, he only gave utterance to what 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 315 

was in the South accepted as a fundamental article of politi- 
cal and economical faith/ Suggesting the contingency that 
no cotton was forthcoming from the South for a period of 
three years, the same senator declared, — ''This is certain: 
England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized 
world with her, save the South. Who/' he then exclaimed, 
''that has looked on recent events, can doubt that cotton 
is supreme? " In case of conflict, cotton, if it went forth, was 
to supply the South with the sinews of warfare ; if it did not 
go forth, the lack of it would bring about European civil com- 
motion, and compel foreign intervention. In either case 
the South was secure. As to a maritime blockade of the 
South, shutting it up to die of inanition, the idea was chimeri- 
cal. No such feat of maritime force ever had been accom- 
plished, it was claimed ; nor was it possible of accomplish- 
ment. To "talk of putting up a wall of fire around eight 
hundred and fifty thousand square mUes" situated as the 
Confederacy was, with its twelve thousand miles of seacoast, 
was pronounced too "absurd" for serious discussion. And 
certainly, that no such thing had ever yet been done was 
undeniable. But, even supposing it were possible of ac- 
complishment, the doing it would but the more effectively 
play the Confederate game. It would compel intervention. 
As well shut off bread from the manufacturing centres of 
Europe as stop their supply of cotton. In any or either 
event, and in any contingency which might arise, the victory 
of the Confederac}^ was assured. And this theory of the 
situation and its outcome was accepted by the Southern 
community as indisputable. 

What occurred? In each case that which had been pro- 
nounced impossible of occurrence. On land the Confederacy 
had an ample force of men, they swarmed to the standards ; 

» Supra, 252. 



316 MILITARY STUDIES 

and no better or more reliable material was ever gathered 
together. Well and skilfully marshalled, the Confederate 
soldier did on the march and in battle all that needed to 
be done. Nor were the two sides unequally matched, so 
far as the land arrays were concerned. As Lee with his in- 
stinctive military sense put it, even in the closing stages of 
the struggle: ''The proportion of experienced troops is 
larger in our army than in that of the enemy, while his num- 
bers exceed our own." And in warfare, experience, com- 
bined with an advantageous defensive, counts for a great 
deal. This was so throughout the conflict; and yet the 
Confederate cause sank in failure. It did so to the com- 
plete surprise of a bewildered world ; for, in Europe, the ulti- 
mate success of the South was accepted as a foregone con- 
clusion. To such an extent was this the case that the wisest 
and most far-seeing of English public men did not hesitate 
to stake their reputation for foresight upon it as a result. 
How was the wholly unexpected actual outcome brought 
about ? The simple answer is : — The Confederacy collapsed 
from inanition ! Suffering such occasional reverses and 
defeats as are incidental to all warfare, it was never crushed 
in battle or on the field, until its strength was sapped away 
by want of food. It died of exhaustion, — starved and 
gasping ! 

Take a living organism, whatever it may be, place it in 
a vessel hermetically sealed, and attach to that vessel an 
air-pump : — You know what follows ! It is needless to de- 
scribe it. No matter how strong or fierce or self-confident 
it may be, the victim dies; growing weaker by degrees, it 
finally collapses. That was the exact condition and fate of 
the Confederacy. What had been confidently pronounced 
impossible was done. The Confederacy was sealed up within 
itself by the blockade ; and the complete exclusion of southern 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 317 

cotton from the manufacturing centres of Europe did not 
cause revolution there, nor compel intervention here. Man's 
foresight once more came to grief. As usual, the unex- 
pected occurred. 

Thus the two decisive defeats of the Confederacy, — those 
which really brought about its downfall and compelled Lee 
to lay down his arms, — were inflicted not before Vicksburg, 
nor yet in Virginia, — not in the field at all ; they were sus- 
tained, the one, almost by default, on the ocean ; the other, 
most fatal of all, after sharpest struggle in Lancashire. The 
story of that Lancashire Cotton Famine of 1861 to 1864 has 
never been adequately told in connection with our Civil 
War. Simply ignored by the standard historians, it was yet 
the Confederacy's fiercest fight, and its most decisive as well 
as most far-reaching defeat. A momentous conflict, the 
supremacy of the Union on the ocean hung on its issue ; 
and upon that supremacy depended every considerable 
land operation : the retention by the Confederacy of New 
Orleans, and the consequent control of the Mississippi; 
Sherman's march to the sea; the movement through the 
Carolinas; the operations before Petersburg; generally, 
the maintenance of the Confederate armies in the field. It 
is in fact no exaggeration to assert that both the conception 
and the carrying out of every large Union operation of the 
war without a single exception hinged and depended on 
complete national maritime supremacy. It is equally in- 
disputable that the struggle in Lancashire was decisive of 
that supremacy. As Lee himself admitted in the death 
agony of the Confederacy, he had never believed it could in 
the long run make good its independence ''unless Foreign 
Powers should, directly or indirectly, assist" it in so doing. 
Thus, strange as it sounds, it follows as a logical consequence 
that Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia were first re- 



318 MILITARY STUDIES 

duced to inanition, and finally compelled to succumb, as 
the result of events on the other side of the Atlantic, largely 
stimulated by a moral impulse over which they could exert 
no control. The great and loudly trumpeted cotton cam- 
paign of the Confederacy was its most signal failure; and 
that failure was decisive of the war. 

It is very curious, at times almost comical, to trace 
historical parallels. Plutarch is, of course, the standard 
exemplar of that sort of treatment. Among other great 
careers, Plutarch, as every college boy knows, tells the 
story of King Pyrrhus, the Epirot. A great captain, 
Pyrrhus devised a military formation which his opponents 
could not successfully face, and his career was consequently 
one of victory. But at last he met his fate. Assaulting 
the town of Argos, he became entangled in its streets ; and, 
fighting his way out, he was struck down, and killed, by a 
tile thrown from a house-top by an Argive woman. The 
Confederacy, and, through the Confederacy, Lee underwent 
a not dissimilar fate ; for, as an historical fact, it was a 
missile from a woman's hand which was decisive of that 
Lancashire conflict, and so doomed the Confederacy. A 
startling proposition ; but proof quite irrefutable of it exists 
in a publication to which as an authority no Southern writer 
at least wUl take exception, the organ established in London 
by the agents of the Confederacy in 1862. Sustained as 
long as the conflict continued from Confederate funds, with 
a view to influencing European public opinion, the Index, as 
it was called, collapsed with the Confederacy in July, 1865. 
Naturally those in charge of it watched with feverish interest 
the progress of the cotton famine. Not only was the British 
pocket nerve touched at its most sensitive point, but in 
Lancashire starvation emphasized financial distress. The 
pressure thus brought to bear on public opinion in Great 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 319 

Britain, and, through that public opinion, on the policy of 
Europe, was confidently counted on for results decisive of the 
American struggle. Ten years before Harriet Beecher 
Stowe had launched through the press her Uncle Tom's 
Cahin. Translated into every civilized tongue, it had soon 
become world literature. In Great Britain, and especially 
in Lancashire, it '' carried the new gospel to every cabin in 
the land." Whoever in those days read anything read 
Uncle Tom's Cabin. That it was a correct portrayal of 
conditions actually existing in the region wherein the inci- 
dents narrated were supposed to have occurred is not now 
to be considered. That Uncle Tom himself was a type of 
his race, or, indeed, even a possibility in it, few would now 
be disposed to contend.^ Ethically, he was a Christian 
martyr of the most advanced description, and, on the large 
class who accepted the work as a correct portrayal, the 
pathetic story and cruel fate of the colored saint, moralist 
and philosopher made an indelible impression. Indeed, 
that female and sentimentalist portrayal lent a force which 
has not yet spent itself to the contention that the only dif- 
ference between the Ethiopian and the Caucasian is epi- 
dermal ; the negro being in fact merely a white man — a 
Yankee, if you please — who, having a black skin, has never 
been given a chance. Nay, more ! if Uncle Tom and Legree 
were to be accepted as types, the black man was superior 
naturally to the white ; for Uncle Tom was a fully developed 
moralist, while Legree was a demon incarnate. And this 
presentation of life and manners, and this portrayal of 
typical racial characters were in Lancashire implicitly 

1 J. C. Read, The Brothers' War, pp. 194-198. There is in Mr. Read's 
book, published fifty years after the appearance of Mrs. Stowe's historic 
tale, and forty years after the Proclamation of Emancipation, a chapter 
(IX) entitled, " Uncle Tom's Cabin," in which are to be found the views of 
an observant and reflecting Georgian on the statement in the text. 



320 MILITARY STUDIES 

accepted as gospel truth ! Such indisputably was the fact ; 
and, when the final issue was joined, the fact told heavily 
against the Confederacy. In contemplation of it, — realiz- 
ing the handicap thus imposed, the burden of which at the 
moment the historian has since ignored, and few conse- 
quently now appreciate, — the writers for the Index fairly 
cried aloud in agony. Their wail, long repeated, has in it as 
now read an element of the comic. The patience of the 
victims of the cotton famine, they declared was the ex- 
traordinary feature of the foreign situation ; and the agents 
of the Confederacy noted with unconcealed dismay the 
absence of political demonstrations calculated to urge on a 
not unwilling Palmerston ministry '4ts duty to its suffering 
subjects." There was but one way of accounting for it. 
Uncle Tom and Legree were respectively doing their work. 
So it was that the Index despairingly at last declared ; 
''The emancipation of the negro from the slavery of Mrs. 
Beecher Stowe's heroes is the one idea of the millions of 
British who know no better and do not care to know." 
Like the Cherubim with the flaming sword, this sentiment 
stood between Lancashire and cotton ; and the inviolate 
blockade made possible the subjugation of the Confederacy. 
With Pyrrhus, it was the tile thrown by a woman from the 
house-top ; with Lee, it was a book by a woman issued from 
the printing-press ! The missiles were equally fatal. It 
was only a difference of time, and its changed conditions. 

Foreign intervention being thus withheld, and the control 
of the sea by the Union made absolute, the blockade was 
gradually perfected. The fateful process then went steadily 
on. Armies might be resisted in the field ; the working of 
the air-pump could not be stopped : and, day and night, 
season after season, the air-pump worked. So the atmos- 
phere of the Confederacy became more and more attenu- 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 321 

ated, respiration sensibly harder. Air-hole on air-hole was 
closed. First New Orleans fell ; then Vicksburg, and the 
Mississippi flowed free ; next Sherman, securely counting on 
the control of the sea as a base of new operations on land, 
penetrated the vitals of the Confederacy ; then, relying still 
on maritime cooperation, he pursued his almost unopposed 
way through the Carolinas ; while Grant, with his base 
secure upon the James and Fortress Monroe, beleaguered 
Richmond. Lee with his Army of Northern Virginia calmly, 
but watchfully and resolutely, confronted him. The Con- 
federate lines were long and thin, guarded by poorly clad 
and half-fed men. But, veterans, they held their assailants 
firmly at bay. As Lee, however, fully realized, it was only 
a question of time. The working of the air-pump was be- 
yond his sphere either of influence or operations. Nothing 
could stop it. 

As early as the close of 1863 Lee wrote of his men, — '^ Thou- 
sands are barefooted, a greater number partially shod, and 
nearly all without overcoats, blankets, or warm clothing"; 
and later, in the dead of winter, referring to the elementary 
necessities of any successful warfare, he said: '^The supply, 
by running the blockade, has become so precarious that I 
think we should turn our attention to our own resources, 
... as a further dependence upon those from abroad can 
result in nothing but increase of suffering and want." The 
conclusion here drawn, while necessary, was extremely 
suggestive. ''Our own resources!" — the Confederacy had 
always prided itself on being a purely agricultural com- 
munity. With institutions patriarchal in character, it 
had looked upon the people of the North as its agents and 
factors, and those of Europe as its skilled workmen and 
artisans ; and now that community, shut up within its own 
limits, under conditions of warfare active and severe, had 



322 MILITARY STUDIES 

only itself to rely upon for a supply of everything its de- 
fenders needed, from munitions to shoes, from blankets 
to medicines and even soap. Viewed in a half-century's 
perspective, the situation was simply and manifestly impos- 
sible of continuance. To it there could be but one outcome ; 
and when at last on the 16th of January, 1865, the telegraph 
announced the fall of Fort Fisher, the Confederacy felt itself 
hermetically sealed. Wilmington, its last breathing-hole, 
was closed. Still, not the less for that, the air-pump kept 
on its deadly, silent work. 

Three months later the long-delayed inevitable occurred. 
The collapse came. That under such conditions it should 
have been so long in coming is now the only legitimate cause 
of surprise. That adversity is the test of man is a common- 
place ; that Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia were 
during the long, dragging winter of 1864-1865 most dire- 
fully subjected to that test need not here be said ; any more 
than it is needful to say that they bore the test manfully. 
But the handwriting was on the wall.; the men were taxed 
beyond the limits of human endurance. And Lee knew it. 
'^Yesterday, the most inclement day of the winter," he 
reported on February 8, 1865, the right wing of his army 
''had to be retained in line of battle, having been in the same 
condition the two previous days and nights. . . . Under 
these circumstances, heightened by assaults and fire of the 
enemy, some of the men had been without meat for three 
days, and all were suffering from reduced rations and scant 
clothing, exposed to battle, cold, hail and sleet. . . . The 
physical strength of the men, if their courage survives, must 
fail under this treatment." If it was so with the men, with 
the animals it was even worse. ''Our cavalry," he added, 
''has to be dispersed for want of forage." Even thus Lee's 
army faced an opponent vastly superior in numbers, whose 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 323 

ranks were being constantly replenished ; a force armed, 
clothed, equipped, fed and sheltered as no similar force in 
the world's history had ever been before. I state only 
indisputable facts. Lee proved equal to even this occasion. 
Bearing a bold, confident front, he was serene and outwardly 
calm ; alert, resourceful, formidable to the last, individually 
he showed no sign of weakness, not even occasional petu- 
lance. Inspired by his example, the whole South seemed 
to lean up against him in implicit, loving reliance. It was 
a superlative tribute to Character. Finally, when in April 
the summons to conflict came, the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia, the single remaining considerable organized force of 
the Confederacy, seemed to stagger to its feet, and, gaunt 
and grim, shivering with cold and emaciated with hunger, 
worn down by hard, unceasing attrition, it faced its enemy, 
formidable still. As I have since studied that situation, 
listened to the accounts of Confederate officers active in the 
closing movements and read the letters written me by those 
of the rank and file, it has seemed as if Lee's command then 
cohered and moved by mere force of habit. Those compos- 
ing it failed to realize the utter hopelessness of the situation 
— the disparity of the conflict. I am sure Jefferson Davis 
failed to realize it ; so, I think, in less degree, did Lee. They 
talked, for instance, of recruits and of a levy in mass ; Lee 
counselled the arming of the slaves; and when, after Lee 
had surrendered, Davis on the 10th of April, 1865, held his 
last war conference at Greensboro', he was still confident he 
would in a few weeks have another army in the field, and 
did not hesitate to express his faith that ''we can whip the 
enemy yet, if our people will turn out." I have often pon- 
dered over what Davis had in mind when he ventured this 
opinion;^ or what led Lee to advocate the enlistment of 

1 Supra, 241. 



324 MILITARY STUDIES 

negroes. Both were soldiers ; and, besides being great in his 
profession, Lee was more familiar than any other man alive 
with actual conditions then existing in the Confederate 
camps. Both Davis and Lee, therefore, must have known 
that, in those final stages of the conflict, if the stamp of a 
foot upon the ground would have brought a million men 
into the field, the cause of the Confederacy would thereby 
have been in no wise strengthened ; on the contrary, what 
was already bad would have been made much worse. For, 
to be effective in warfare, men must be fed and clothed and 
armed. Organized in commands, they must have rations 
as well as ammunition, commissary and quartermaster 
trains, artillery horses and forage. In the closing months 
of the Civil War, both Lee and Davis knew perfectly well 
that they could not arm, nor feed, nor clothe, nor transport 
the forces already in the field ; they were themselves without 
money, and the soldiers most inadequately supplied with 
arms, clothing, quartermaster or medical supplies, com- 
missariat or ammunition. Notoriously, those then on the 
muster-rolls were going home, or deserting to the enemy, as 
the one alternative to death from privation — hunger 
and cold. If then, a million, or even only a poor hundred 
thousand fresh recruits had in answer to the summons 
swarmed to the lines around Richmond, how would it have 
bettered the situation? An organized army is a mighty 
consumer of food and material ; and food and material have 
to be served out to it every day. It must be fed as regu- 
larly as the sun rises and sets. And the organized resources 
of the Confederacy were exhausted ; its granaries — Georgia 
and the valley of the Shenandoah — were notoriously 
devastated and desolate; its lines of communication and 
supply were cut, or in the hands of the invader. 

Realizing this Lee, when the time was ripe, rose to the 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 325 

full height of the great occasion. The value of Character 
made itself felt. The service Lee now rendered to the 
common country, the obligation under which he placed us 
whether of the North or South, has not, I think, been always 
appreciated ; and to overstate it would be difficult. Again 
to put on record my estimate of it brings me here to-day. 

That the situation was to the last degree critical is matter 
of history. Further organized resistance on the part of the 
Confederacy was impossible. The means for it did not 
exist; could not be had. Cut off completely from the 
outer world, the South was consuming itself, — feeding on 
its own vitals. The single alternative to surrender was dis- 
bandment and irregular warfare. As General Johnston 
afterwards wrote, '^ without the means of purchasing supplies 
of any kind, or procuring or repairing arms, we could con- 
tinue the war only as robbers or guerillas."^ But that it 
should be so continued was wholly possible; nay more, it 
was in the line of precedent, — it had been done before ; 
and, more than once, it has since been done, notably in 
South Africa. It was, moreover, the course advocated by 
many Southern participants in the struggle as that proper 
to be pursued ; and that it would be pursued was accepted 
as of course by all foreign observers, and by the organ of the 
Confederacy in London. ''A strenuous resistance and not 
surrender," it was there declared, "was the unalterable 
determination of the Confederate authorities." Lee's own 
son, then in the Army of Northern Virginia, but by chance 
not included in the surrender, has since described how sur- 
prised and incredulous he was when news of it first reached 
him; and, ''not believing for an instant that our struggle 
was over," he made his way at once to Jefferson Davis, at 
Greensboro'. At the time of his capture Davis himself^ 

1 Supra, 243. 



326 MILITARY STUDIES 

wholly unsubdued in spirit, was moving in the direction of 
the Mississippi, intent on organizing resistance in Texas, — 
a resistance which the writers of the Index confidently 
predicted would ''be fierce, ferocious and of long duration," 
— ''a successful or at least a protracted resistance." 

Indeed, had the veil over the immediate future then been 
lifted, and the outrages, and humiliations worse than outrage, 
of the period of so-called reconstruction, but actual servile 
domination, now to ensue revealed itself, no room for doubt 
exists that the dread alternative would have been adopted. 
Even as it was, the scales hung trembling. Anything or 
everything was possible; even that mad pistol shot of the 
theatrical fool which five days later so irretrievably com- 
plicated a delicate and dangerous situation. None the less, 
what Lee and Grant had done at Appomattox on April 
9 could not be wholly undone even by the deed in Ford's 
theatre of April 14 ; much had been secured. Of Appo- 
mattox, and what there occurred, I do not care here to 
speak. I feel I could not speak adequately, or in words 
sufficiently simple; for, in my judgment, there is not in our 
whole history as a people any incident so creditable to our 
manhood, — so indicative of our racial possession of Char- 
acter. Marked throughout by a straightforward dignity of 
personal bearing and propriety in action, it was marred by 
no touch of the theatrical, no effort at posturing. I know 
not to which of the two leaders, there face to face, preference 
should be given. They were thoroughly typical ; the one of 
Illinois and the New West, the other of Virginia and the 
Old Dominion. Grant was considerate and magnanimous, 
— restrained in victory ; Lee, dignified in defeat, carried him- 
self with that sense of absolute fitness which compelled 
respect. Verily ! — ''he that ruleth his spirit is better than 
he that taketh a city!" 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 327 

The lead that day given by Lee proved decisive of the 
course to be pursued by his fellows with arms in their hands. 
At first, and for a brief space, there was in the Confederate 
councils much diversity of opinion as to what should or 
could be done. Calm and dignified in presence of over- 
whelming disaster, the voice of Jefferson Davis was that 
of Milton's ''scepter'd king": ''My sentence is for open 
war!" Lee was not there; none the less, Lee, absent, pre- 
vailed over Davis. The sober second thought satisfied all 
but the most extreme that what he had done they best might 
do. Thus the die was cast. And now, forty years and 
more after the event, it is appalling to reflect what in all 
human probability would have resulted had the choice then 
been other than it was, — had Lee's personality and char- 
acter not intervened. The struggle had lasted four full 
years ; the assassination of Lincoln was as oil on the Union 
fire. With a million men, inured to war, on the national 
muster rolls, men impatient of further resistance, accus- 
tomed to license and now educated up to a belief that War 
was Hell, and that the best way to bring it to a close was to 
intensify Hell, — with such a force as this to reckon with, 
made more reckless in brutality by the assassin's senseless 
shot, the Confederacy need have looked for no consideration, 
no mercy. Visited by the besom of destruction, it would 
have been harried out of existence. Fire and sword sweep- 
ing over it, what the sword spared the fire would have con- 
sumed. Whether such an outcome of a prolonged conflict 
— what was recently witnessed in South Africa — would in 
its result have been more morally injurious to the North 
than it would have been destructive materially to the South, 
is not now to be considered. It would, however, assuredly 
have come about. 

From that crown of sorrows Lee saved the common 



328 MILITARY STUDIES 

country. He was the one man in the Confederacy who 
could exercise decisive influence. It was the night of the 
8th of April, lacking ten days only of exactly four full years, 
— years very full for us who lived through them, — since 
that not dissimilar night when Lee had paced the floor at 
Arlington, communing with himself over the fateful issue, a 
decision on which was then forced upon him. A decision 
of even greater import was now to be reached, and reached 
by him. A commander of the usual cast would under 
such circumstances have sought advice — perhaps support ; 
at least, a divided responsibility. Even though himself 
by nature and habit a masterful man and one accustomed to 
direct, he would have called a council, and harkened to 
those composing it. This Lee did not do. A singularly 
self-poised man, he sought no external aid. Sitting before 
his bivouac fire at Appomattox, he reviewed the situation. 
Doing so, as before at Arlington, he reached his own conclu- 
sion. That conclusion he himself at the time expressed in 
words, brief, indeed, but vibrating with moral triumph : 
"The question is, is it right to surrender this army? If it is 
right, then I will take all the responsibility." The conclu- 
sion reached at Arlington in the April night of 1861 to some 
seems to have been wrong — inexcusable even ; all concur 
in that reached before the Appomattox camp-fire in the 
April vigils of 1865. He then a second time decided; and 
he decided right. 

His work was done ; but from failure he plucked triumph. 
Thenceforth Lee wore defeat as 'twere a laurel crown. A 
few days later a small group of horsemen appeared in the 
morning hours on the further side of the Richmond pon- 
toons across the James. By some strange intuition it be- 
came known that General Lee was of the party ; and, silent 
and uncovered, a crowd — Virginians all — gathered along 



,1^^ 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 329 

the route the horsemen would take. '^ There was no excite- 
ment, no hurrahing; but as the great chief passed, a deep, 
loving murmur, greater than these, rose from the very hearts 
of the crowd. Taking off his hat, and simply bowing his 
head, the man great in adversity passed silently to his own 
door ; it closed upon him ; and his people had seen him for 
the last time in his battle harness." 

From the day that he affixed his signature to the terms 
of surrender submitted to him by Grant at Appomattox to 
the day when he drew a dying breath at Lexington, Lee's 
subsequent course was consistent. In his case there was 
no vacillation, no regretful glances backward thrown. 
When, four months after the last hostile shot was fired, he 
was invited to assume the presidency of this college, though 
then under indictment in flagrant disregard of the immunity 
assured him when he gave his parole, he briefly set forth his 
views. ''I think it," he wrote, 'Hhe duty of every citizen, 
in the present condition of the country, to do all in his power 
to aid in the restoration of peace and harmony, and in no 
way to oppose the policy of the State or General Govern- 
ments directed to that object." And, four days later, writ- 
ing to the Confederate governor of Virginia, he said: 
''The duty of [Virginian] citizens appears to me too plain 
to admit of doubt. All should unite in honest efforts to 
obliterate the effects of war, and to restore the blessings of 
peace. They should remain if possible in the country; 
promote harmony and good feeling; qualify themselves to 
vote, and elect to the State and general legislatures wise and 
patriotic men, who will devote their abilities to the healing 
of all dissensions. I have," he added, ''invariably recom- 
mended this course since the cessation of hostilities, and 
have endeavored to practice it myself." Here was a com- 
plete exposition of duty, combined with abnegation of self; 



330 MILITARY STUDIES 

the purest patriotism, it was also the concentrated essence 
of statesmanship. He counselled with a wisdom not less 
profound because unconscious; and what he said evinced 
that underlying common-sense which in politics avails more 
than genius. 

Five years of life and active usefulness yet remained to 
General Lee — years in my judgment most creditable to 
himself, the most useful to his country of his whole life; 
for, during them, he set to Virginia and his own people a 
high example — an example of lofty character and simple 
bearing. Uttering no complaints, entering into no contro- 
versies, he was as one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing. 
His blood and judgment were well commingled ; and so it 
fell out that he accepted fortune's buffets and rewards with 
equal thanks. His record and appearance during those 
final years are pleasant to dwell upon, for they reflect honor 
on our American manhood. Turning his face courageously 
to the future, he uttered no word of repining over the past. 
Yet, like the noble Moor, his occupation also was gone — 

"The royal banner, and all quaUty, 
Pride, pomp and circumstance of glorious war !" 

But with Lee this did not imply : — 

"Farewell the tranquil mind ! farewell content !" 

Far from it ; for as the gates closed on the old occupation, 
they opened on a new. And it was an occupation through 
which he gave to his country, North and South, a priceless 
gift. 

Speaking advisedly and on full reflection, I say that of all 
the great characters of the Civil War — and it was productive 
of many whose names and deeds posterity will long bear in 
recollection — there was not one who passed away in the se- 
rene atmosphere and with the gracious bearing of Lee. From 



.s'N 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 331 

beginning to end those parting years of his will bear closest 
scrutiny. There was about them nothing venal, nothing 
querulous, nothing in any way sordid or disappointing. In 
his case there was no anti-climax; for those closing years 
were dignified, patient, useful ; sweet in domesticity, they 
in all things commanded respect. It is pleasant to catch 
glimpses of the erstwhile commander in that quiet Vir- 
ginia life. There is in the picture something altogether 
human — intensely sympathetic. ^'Traveller, " he would 
write, "is my only companion; I may also say my 
pleasure. He and I, whenever practicable, wander out in 
the mountains and enjoy sweet confidence." Or again we 
see him, always with Traveller, the famous old charger this 
time ''stepping very proudly" as his rider showed those two 
little sunbonneted daughters of a professor, astride of a plod- 
ding old horse, over a pleasant road quite unknown to them. 
Once more in imagination we may ride, his companions, 
through those mountain roads of his dearly loved Virginia, 
or seek shelter with him and his daughter from a thunder- 
shower in the log cabin, the inmates of which are stunned 
when too late they realize that the courtly, gracious intruder 
was no other than the idolized General Lee. Indifferent to 
wealth, he was scrupulous as respects those money dealings 
a carelessness in regard to which has embittered the lives 
of so many of our public men, as not infrequently it has tar- 
nished their fame. Lee's career will be scrutinized in vain for 
a suggestion even of the sordid, or of an obligation he failed 
to meet. He was nothing if not self-respecting. He once 
wrote to a member of his family '''vile dross' has never been 
a drug with me," yet his generosity as a giver from his nar- 
row means was limited only by his resources. Restricting his 
own wants to necessities, he contributed, to an extent which 
excites surprise, to both public calls and private needs. But 



332 MILITARY STUDIES 

the most priceless of those contributions were contained in 
the precepts he inculcated and in the unconscious example 
he set during those closing years. 

Lee was at the head of Washington College from October, 
1865, to October, 1870 ; a very insufficient time in which to 
accomplish any considerable work. A man of fast advancing 
years, he also then had sufficient cause to feel a sense of lassi- 
tude. He showed no signs of it. On the contrary, closely 
studied those years, and Lee's bearing in them, were in cer- 
tain respects the most remarkable as well as the most credit- 
able of his life; they impressed unmistakably upon it the 
stamp of true greatness. Unable to pass them wholly over, I 
shall deal very briefly with them. His own means of sub- 
sistence having been swept away by war, — the property of 
his wife as well as his own having been sequestered and con- 
fiscated in utter disregard not only of law, but — I add it 
regretfully — of decency, — a mere pittance, designated in 
courtesy "salary, " under his prudent management was made 
to suffice for the needs of an establishment the quiet dignity 
of which even exceeded its severe simplicity. Within five 
months of the downfall of the Confederacy, he addressed him- 
self to his new vocation. Coming to it from crushing defeat, 
about him there was nothing suggestive of disappointment ; 
and thereafter through public trials and private misfortunes 
— for it pleased Heaven to try him with afflictions — he bore 
himself with serene patience, and a mingled firmness and 
sweetness of temper to which mere words fail to do justice. 
More than that, becoming interested in his new work he 
evinced, it would seem, as the head of a college, a grasp of edu- 
cational problems not less clear and intelligent than he had 
previously shown of strategic conditions. It was indeed ex- 
traordinary that a man educated in a military school, first 
an engineer, then an officer of cavalry, and finally a general 



i"^ 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 333 

in charge of large field operations, should, when approaching 
his sixtieth year, have given proof of such mental activity 
and freshness. Fully realizing the needs and requirements 
of the present age, the former commandant of West Point 
was the ardent advocate of complete classical and literary 
culture. Utterly out of sympathy with the modern advo- 
cates of materialistic education, he yet recognized the fact 
that material well-being is, for a people, the condition of all 
high civilization; and, accordingly, sought to provide, in 
the institution of which he was the head, all means for the 
development of science and its practical application. With 
a large and correct conception, he planned, therefore, to con- 
nect all the departments of literary, scientific and professional 
education, and to consolidate them under a common or- 
ganization. He thus outlined a true university. So at an 
early day he called into existence, as adjuncts of the college 
he found prostrate and well-nigh moribund, schools of ap- 
plied mathematics, of engineering and of law; w^hile later 
he submitted to its Board of Trustees a matured scheme for 
the complete development of the scientific and professional 
departments. His death, just before he had yet reached the 
grand climacteric, prevented the full development of his 
great conception. None the less, he had shown himself fully 
equal to the new demand upon him. 

The most marked feature of his educational career was, 
however, the moral influence he exerted on the student body, 
— what has most fitly been described by one associated with 
him as ''the mighty influence of his personal character." 
Here, as in the Army of Northern Virginia, this was all- 
powerful. It was sorely needed, too, for the young men of 
the South were self-willed, and resented efforts at restraint. 
Grown up in an environment of warfare and consequent vio- 
lence, they were somewhat disposed to take matters into their 



334 MILITARY STUDIES 

own hands, — to be, in a word, a law unto themselves ; but, 
under Lee's presidency, the elevation of tone in this respect, 
and the consequent improvement in student conduct were, 
we are on good evidence assured, marked and rapid. Acts of 
disorder became infrequent ; and in the latter years of Lee's 
brief administration it is said that ''hardly a single case of 
serious discipline occurred." A Boston student of Washing- 
ton College in those years — sent there because of the feeling 
of profound respect for Lee entertained by his northern 
father — has since borne witness to me of the personal in- 
terest taken by Washington's president in the individual stu- 
dents. In close sympathy with the modern university spirit, 
the youth in question was, I have reason to suppose, far more 
addicted to athletics than to his text-books. ''This lack of 
proficiency in my studies," he has recently written me, "was, 
of course, a matter for which I was frequently called into 
the presence of General Lee; and I fully appreciate now, 
though I did not then, the difficulties under which he la- 
bored ; for, if he had expelled me, as under similar circum- 
stances he undoubtedly would have expelled any southern 
student, it would have been considered a factional matter. 
He would plead most earnestly with me always that I should 
attend more to my studies and less to athletics, and never 
a harsh word during the entire period. " 

It remains to assign due weight and value to these precepts 
and this great example at just that juncture and from just 
that man. And here, bearing in mind the common country, 
— the community to which I belong as well as that I now ad- 
dress, — I feel I tread on dangerous ground. What I must 
necessarily say will be very susceptible of misconstruction. 
Speaking, however, in the true historical spirit, as throughout 
I have sought to do, I must deal with this topic also as best I 
can. 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 335 

Because no blood flowed on the scaffold and no confisca- 
tions of houses or lands marked the close of our War of Seces- 
sion, it has always been assumed by us of the victorious party 
that extreme, indeed unprecedented, clemency was shown to 
the vanquished, and that subsequently they had no good 
ground of complaint or sufficient cause for restiveness. That 
history will accord assent to this somewhat self-complacent 
conviction is open to question. On the contrary, it may not 
unfairly be doubted whether a people prostrate after civil 
strife has often received severer measure than was inflicted 
on the so-called reconstructed Confederate States during the 
years immediately succeeding the close of strife. Adam 
Smith somewhere defined Rebels and Heretics as ''those un- 
lucky persons who, when things have come to a certain degree 
of violence, have the misfortune to be of the weaker party." 
Spoliation and physical suffering have immemorially been 
their lot. The Confederate, it is true, when he ceased to re- 
sist, escaped this visitation in its usual and time-approved 
form. Nevertheless, he was by no means exempt from it. 
In the matter of confiscation, it has been computed that the 
freeing of the slaves by act of war swept out of existence 
property valued at some two thousand millions ; while, over 
and above this, a system of simultaneous reconstruction sub- 
jected the disfranchised master to the rule of the enfran- 
chised bondsman. For a community conspicuously master- 
ful, and notoriously quick to resent affront, to be thus placed 
by alien force under the civil rule of those of a different and 
distinctly inferior race, only lately their property, is not 
physical torment, it is true, but that it is mild or considerate 
treatment can hardl}^ be contended. Yet this — slave con- 
fiscation, and reconstruction under African rule — was the 
war penalty imposed on the States of the Confederacy. 
That the policy inspired at the time a feeling of bitter resent- 



336 MILITARY STUDIES 

merit in the South was no cause for wonder. Upon it time 
has already recorded a verdict. Following the high prece- 
dent set at Appomattox, it was distinctly unworthy. Con- 
ceived in passion, it ignored both science and the philosophy 
of statesmanship ; worse yet, it was ungenerous. Lee, for 
instance, again setting the example, applied formally for 
amnesty and a restoration of civil rights within two months of 
his surrender. His application was silently ignored ; while he 
died "& prisoner on parole," the suffrage denied him was 
conferred on his manumitted slaves. Verily, it was not alone 
''the base Judian " of the olden time who ''threw a pearl 
away richer than all his tribe !" 

But on such a rejection and choice of material as this was 
the so-called reconstruction edifice based ; nor is it matter 
for wonder that it speedily crumbled away. It was under 
these conditions that Lee's bearing and example were of 
special national importance. The one political result 
the States of the Confederacy should ever have kept steadily 
in view after strife closed was the restoration of local self- 
government ; and that, under the traditions and political 
instincts of the American community, was sure to come. It 
was only a question of time ; and patience and self-restraint 
were the two qualities most sure to hasten the steps of time. 
*' We shall have to be patient, " Lee, in March, 1866, wrote to 
old companions in arms, "and suffer for a while at least ; . . . 
I hope, in time, peace will be restored to the country, and 
that the South may enjoy some measure of prosperity. I 
fear, however, much suffering is still in store for her, and that 
her people must be prepared to exercise fortitude and for- 
bearance." To those to whom it was addressed, no wiser or 
more tactful counsel could at that juncture (March, 1866) 
have been imparted ; for, while Lee himself possessed those 
virtues to a well-nigh unexampled degree, patience and self- 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 337 

restraint have not been generally accepted as most conspicu- 
ous among the many manly and ennobling qualities of the 
race to which Lee belonged. 

In the passage with which I began, it was observed by 
Emerson that ''Character denotes habitual self-possession, 
habitual regard to interior and constitutional motives, a 
balance not to be overset or easily disturbed by outward 
events and opinion. " To my knowledge I never saw General 
Lee ; I certainly never stood in his presence, nor exchanged 
a word with him. On the few occasions when I was a guest 
in his house, he chanced to be absent. Even that was long 
ago ; while he and his family still lived at Arlington. Thus I 
know him only by report, and through his letters. But, if 
the report of those who did know him well, and the evidence 
of what he wrote, may be relied on, ''habitual self-possession, 
habitual regard to interior and constitutional motives, a 
balance not to be overset or easily disturbed by outward 
events and opinion," were his to an eminent degree, — a de- 
gree which his harshest and most prejudiced critic could not 
ignore. That, himself a devout man and by conviction sin- 
cerely religious, he was neither ashamed nor afraid so pub- 
licly to profess himself, may be read in his repeated army 
orders ; or, to such as prefer there to look for it, in his family 
letters. What more expressive of a profound religious faith 
could be imagined than these words written in the very 
shadow of Gettysburg's disaster to the dying wife of his 
wounded and captured son? — "In his own good time He 
will relieve us, and make all things work together for our good, 
if we give Him our love and place in Him our trust." That 
his immediate family circle regarded him with the affection- 
ate devotion founded on respect which is the surest indication 
of those sterling and fundamental qualities which alone can 
cause a man to seem a hero to those near to him, — the confi.- 



338 MILITARY STUDIES 

dants of his privacy, — appears from those family letters and 
recollections which have been so freely published. That he 
impressed himself on those about him in his professional and 
public life to an uncommon extent, — that the soldiers of the 
Army of Northern Virginia as well as those of his staff and in 
high command felt not only implicit and unquestioning con- 
fidence in him, but to him a strong personal affection, is 
established by their concurrent testimony. He, too, might 
well have said with Brutus : — 

"My heart doth joy that yet in all my life 
I found no man but he was true to me. 
I shall have glory by this losing day." 

Finally, one who knew him well has written of him: ''He 
had the quiet bearing of a powerful yet harmonious nature. 
An unruffled calm upon his countenance betokened the con- 
centration and control of the whole being within. He was 
a kingly man, whom all men who came into his presence ex- 
pected to obey." That he was gifted in a prominent degree 
with the mens cequa in arduis of the Roman poet, none deny. 
And now, Virginians, a word with you in closing: ''Show 
me the man you honor; I know by that symptom, better 
than by any other, what kind of man you yourself are. For 
you show me then what your ideal of manhood is ; what kind 
of man you long possibly to be, and would thank the Gods, 
with your whole soul, for being if you could. Whom shall 
we consecrate and set apart as one of our sacred men? 
Sacred ; that all men may see him, be reminded of him, and, 
by new example added to old perpetual precept, be taught 
what is real worth in man. Whom do you wish to resemble ? 
Him you set on a high column, that all men, looking at it, 
may be continually apprised of the duty you expect from 
them."^ 

^ Carlyle, Latter-Day Pamphlets, " Hudson's Statue." 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 339 

''The virtues of a superior man are like the wind ; the 
virtues of a common man are like the grass ; the grass, when 
the wind passes over it, bends." 



In regard to the early utterances of Mr. Webster (supra, 297), 
the following is from a speech by him in the National House of 
Representatives, December 9, 1814. It should be borne in mind 
that this speech was delivered in the midst of the gloomiest period 
of the War of 1812-15, four months after the battle of Bladens- 
burg and the capture of Washington, and one month before the 
British were defeated below New Orleans. The speech was first 
pubhshed (1902) by C. H. Van Tyne, in his edition of the Letters 
of Daniel Webster (p. 67). 

"In my opinion [the law under consideration for compulsory 
army and military service] ought not to be carried into effect. 
The operation of measures thus unconstitutional and illegal ought 
to be prevented, by a resort to other measures which are both 
constitutional and legal. It will be the solemn duty of the State 
Governments to protect their own authority over their own Militia 
and to interpose between their citizens and arbitrary power. 
These are among the objects for which the State Governments 
exist ; and their highest obligations bind them to the preservation 
of their own rights and the liberties of their people. I express 
these sentiments here, Sir, because I shall express them to my 
constituents. Both they and myself live under a Constitution 
which teaches us, that Hhe doctrine of non-resistance against 
arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive 
of the good and happiness of mankind.' With the same earnest- 
ness with which I now exhort you to forbear from these measures, 
I shall exhort them to exercise their unquestionable right of pro- 
viding for the security of their own liberties." 

William Rawle was in his day an eminent Philadelphia lawyer, 
and chancellor of the Law Association of Philadelphia. The 
principal author of the revised code of Pennsylvania, he stood in 
the foremost rank of American legal luminaries in the first third 



340 MILITARY STUDIES 

of the nineteenth century. His instincts, sympathies and connec- 
tions were all national. His View of the Constitution, published 
in Philadelphia in 1825, was the standard text-book on the subject 
until the publication of Story's Commentaries, in 1833. It has 
been asserted that Rawle's View was used as a text-book for the 
instruction of the students at West Point until after the year 1840. 
(See prefatory matter to republication of paper entitled " Sectional 
Misunderstandings," by Robert Bingham, in North American 
Review of September, 1904; also the paper entitled "Was Seces- 
sion Taught at West Point," read at the meeting, May 5, 1909, of 
the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States Com- 
mandery of the State of Pennsylvania, by Lieut. Colonel James 
W. Latta.) 

"If a faction should attempt to subvert the government of a 
State for the purpose of destroying its republican form, the pater- 
nal power of the Union could thus be called forth to subdue it. 
Yet it is not to be understood that its interposition would be 
justifiable if the people of a State should determine to retire from 
the Union, whether they adopted another or retained the same form 
of government." (Page 289.) 

"The States, then, may wholly withdraw from the Union; 
but while they continue they must retain the character of repre- 
sentative repubhcs." (Page 290.) 

"The secession of a State from the Union depends on the will 
of the people of such State. The people alone, as we have already 
seen, hold the power to alter their constitution. The Constitution 
of the United States is, to a certain extent, incorporated into the 
constitutions of the several States by the act of the people. The 
State legislatures have only to perform certain organical opera- 
tions in respect to it. To withdraw from the Union comes not 
within the general scope of their delegated authority. There must 
be an express provision to that effect inserted in the State con- 
stitutions. This is not at present the case with any of them, and 
it would perhaps be impohtic to confide it to them. A matter so 
momentous ought not to be entrusted to those who would have 
it in their power to exercise it lightly and precipitately upon sudden 
dissatisfaction, or causeless jealousy, perhaps against the interests 
and the wishes of a majority of their constituents. 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 341 

''But in any manner by which a secession is to take place, 
nothing is more certain than that the act should be deUberate, 
clear, and unequivocal. The perspicuity and solemnity of the 
original obligation require correspondent quahties in its dissolu- 
tion. The powers of the general government cannot be defeated 
or impaired by an ambiguous or implied secession on the part of 
the State, although a secession may perhaps be conditional. The 
people of the State may have some reasons to complain in respect 
to acts of the general government ; they may in such cases invest 
some of their own officers with the power of negotiation, and may 
declare an absolute secession in case of their failure. Still, how- 
ever, the secession must in such case be distinctly and peremptorily 
declared to take place on that event ; and in such case, as in the 
case of an unconditional secession, the previous ligament with the 
Union would be legitimately and fairly destroyed. But in either 
case the people is the only moving power." (Pages 295, 296.) 

Tocqueville cannot, of course, be cited as an authority on 
American Constitutional Law. Nevertheless, an acute observer, 
his evidence carries great weight on the question of the views 
generally current on all constitutional questions at the time he 
collected the materials for his great work (1831-32). The follow- 
ing extracts bearing upon the topic under discussion are found 
in the translation of Democracy of America by Henry Reeve 
(London, 1889). 

"In America, each State has fewer opportunities of resistance 
and fewer temptations to non-compliance ; nor can such a design 
be put in execution (if indeed it be entertained) without an open 
violation of the laws of the Union, a direct interruption of the 
ordinary course of justice, and a bold declaration of revolt ; in a 
word, without taking a decisive step which men hesitate to adopt. 
. . . Here the term Federal government is clearly no longer 
applicable to a state of things which must be styled an incomplete 
national government : a form of government has been found out 
which is neither exactly national nor federal ; but no further prog- 
ress has been made, and the new word which will one day designate 
this novel invention does not yet exist." (Vol. I, pp. 156, 157.) 

"The Union is a vast body which presents no definite object 
to patriotic feeling. The forms and limits of the State are distinct 



342 MILITARY STUDIES 

and circumscribed ; since it represents a certain number of objects 
which are famihar to the citizens and beloved by all. It is identi- 
fied with the very soil, with the right of property and the domestic 
affections, with the recollections of the past, the labours of the 
present, and the hopes of the future. Patriotism, then, which is 
frequently a mere extension of individual egotism, is still directed 
to the State, and is not excited by the Union." (Vol. I, p. 394.) 

"The Federal Government is, therefore, notwithstanding the 
precautions of those who founded it, naturally so weak that it more 
peculiarly requires the free consent of the governed to enable it to 
subsist. 

"If the Union were to undertake to enforce the allegiance of 
the Confederate States by military means, it would be in a position 
very analogous to that of England at the time of the War of In- 
dependence." (Vol. I, 13. 395.) 

"The Union was formed by the voluntary agreement of the 
States; and, in uniting together, they have not forfeited their 
nationality, nor have they been reduced to the condition of one 
and the same people. If one of the States chose to withdraw its 
name from the contract, it would be difficult to disprove its right 
of doing so ; and the Federal Government would have no means 
of maintaining its claims directly, either by force or by right." 
(Vol. I, p. 396.) 

"It appears to me unquestionable that if any portion of the 
Union seriously desired to separate itself from the other States, 
they would not be able, nor indeed would they attempt, to prevent 
it; and that the present Union will only last as long as the States 
which compose it choose to continue members of the confedera- 
tion." (Vol. I, p. 397.) 

"The dangers which threaten the American Union do not orig- 
inate in the diversity of interests or of opinions, but in the various 
characters and passions of the Americans. The men who inhabit 
the vast territory of the United States are almost all the issue of 
a common stock ; but the effects of the climate, and more especially 
of slavery, have gradually introduced very striking differences 
between the British settler of the Southern States and the British 
settler of the North." (Vol. I, p. 402.) 

"I think that I have demonstrated that the existence of the 



LEE'S CENTENNIAL 343 

present confederation depends entirely on the continued assent of 
all the confederates; and, starting from this principle, I have 
inquired into the causes which may induce the several States to 
separate from the others. The Union may, however, perish in 
two different ways : one of the confederate States may choose 
to retire from the compact, and so forcibly to sever the Federal 
tie ; and it is to this supposition that most of the remarks that I 
have made apply : or the authority of the Federal Government 
may be progressively entrenched on by the simultaneous tendency 
of the united republics to resume their independence." (Vol. I, 
p. 412.) 

"The Constitution had not destroyed the distinct sovereignty 
of the States ; and all communities, of whatever nature they may 
be, are impelled by a secret propensity to assert their indepen- 
dence." (Vol. I, p. 415.) 

The most recent and elaborate discussion of this subject, from 
the historical point of view, is by Hannis Taylor, a Southerner by 
birth and residence, in the chapter (X) entitled " Sixty-one Years 
of Constitutional Growth " in his Origin and Growth of the Ameri- 
can Constitution (Boston, 1911). 



IX 

AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM* 

Some fifteen years ago the late Edward L. Pierce, the 
biographer of Charles Sumner, submitted to the Massachu- 
setts Historical Society an amusing as well as interesting and 
suggestive paper, entitled Recollections as a Source of History. 
Buried in the rarely consulted volumes of the Proceedings of 
the Society, this paper, never having attracted any consider- 
able notice, is now quite forgotten ; but none the less as a 
study based on a personal experience, both long and varied, 
its perusal will well repay the general reader, while for the 
historical investigator it hangs out a veritable danger signal. 
Naturally, as the indefatigable student of the Sumner period, 
Mr. Pierce drew his instances mainly from the '' Rebellion" 
literature, as he still designated it ; and towards the close of 
his paper he observed: "Of all reminiscences those concern- 
ing public men at Washington are the most untrustworthy. 
. . . Stories of public characters have somewhat the in- 
terest of fiction, and the mass of readers care little whether 
they are true or not. Managers of magazines are keen in 
their search for them ; and the result is a medley of tales, 
with little of truth in them, and that little of truth so com- 
pounded with falsehood as to be v/orse than falsehood entire. 
They obtain a credence with even intelligent people, who 

^ Originally prepared for submission to the Massachusetts Historical 
Society, at its October meeting, 1899, this paper is printed under the title 
The Laird Rams in the Proceedings of the Society (Second Series, XIII, 177- 
197). In its present form it has been recast, abbreviated in parts, and 
elsewhere developed by the use of new material since brought to light. 

344 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 345 

fancy that what is in type must be true. In ten, twenty or 
thirty years they are thought worthy of recognition as a 
source of history. Now and then a valuable contribution 
. . . appears, but generally reminiscences of Washington 
life and affairs should be dismissed without consideration by 
historians." ^ 

One of this ^'medley of tales " it is proposed now to con- 
sider. A dramatic and interesting specimen, an effort, on 
behalf of the future historian, will be made to extract from 
it what ''little of truth" may be therein. The story, as will 
be seen, was intimately connected with a very memorable 
episode ; and on its face it would seem to be entitled to 
absolute credence, coming as it did from a man of great 
respectability, one v/ho occupied long and with credit to 
himself a highly responsible government position affording 
him access to the most secret springs of action and sources 
of information. If this does not constitute a basis for "cre- 
dence," it is difficult to say what would ; and yet, in fact, 
the story merely supplies one more striking, almost con- 
clusive, illustration of the truth of Mr. Pierce's conclusion 
that ''reminiscences of Washington life and affairs should 
be dismissed without consideration by historians." 

During the administration of Abraham Lincoln, Mr. L. E. 
Chittenden was Register of the Treasury. Born in Vermont, 
in the year 1824, he was by profession a lawyer, though 
taking an active interest in politics. A member of the State 
Senate of Vermont between 1857 and 1859, in 1861 he was 
a delegate to the Peace Convention which met at Washington 
in February of that year. In April, 1861, he was appointed 
Register of the Treasury. Retiring from his position in 
1865, he removed to New York, where he engaged in the 
practice of the law, giving at the same time considerable at- 
* Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, Second Series, X, 483. 



346 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

tention to literary pursuits and historical study. In 1890 
he wrote out his recollections of what occurred, more or less 
within his own observation, during his connection with public 
affairs. The papers drawn, as he stated, from memoranda 
made by him at the time, first appeared in Harper^s Mag- 
azine, the series running through the year 1890 ; and in 
1891 these articles, revised by the author, were published in 
a volume by the firm of Harper and Brothers, under the title 
of Recollections of President Lincoln and his Administra- 
tion. The extraordinary story now about to be consid- 
ered was told in much detail and with great particularity in 
that volume, filling an entire chapter, eighteen pages in 
length ; and, at the time attracting much notice and com- 
ment, has since been the subject of constant inquiry and 
conjecture. Too long to quote in full, the narrative can for 
present purposes be briefly summarized. It is only necessary 
to premise that the events referred to occurred between the 
months of i\Iarch and September, 1863. This period would 
probably by common consent be agreed upon as that of 
acute crisis in the War of Secession, — it was the period 
following Burnside's Fredericksburg fiasco, that marked by 
the great battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, and by 
Grant's brilliant Vicksburg campaign. Taken altogether a 
gloomy stage of the struggle, its outcome was at the time 
indisputably doubtful. It must also be borne in mind that 
no Atlantic cable was then in operation, and communication 
by steam packet between America and Europe was slow and 
comparatively irregular. 

Greatly condensed, Mr. Chittenden's narrative reads as 
follows : — 

'^At about eleven o'clock on a certain well-remembered 
Friday morning, in 1862," as he asserts, but in reality in 
March, 1863, Mr. Chittenden was called upon to go to the 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 347 

White House ''without a moment's delay." Obeying the 
summons, he there found Secretaries Chase and Seward in 
anxious consultation with President Lincoln. They wished 
to know what was the shortest time within which ten millions 
in United States coupon five-twenty bonds could be prepared, 
signed and issued. With some circumlocution, the Register 
informed them. Both secretaries said that the time sug- 
gested could not be allowed. The bonds must be signed, 
and ready for use, before the following Monday, this, it will be 
remembered, being Friday. Moreover, there must be noth- 
ing on the face of the bonds thus signed to indicate that 
they were issued otherwise than in the regular course of 
business. Under the Act of Congress each bond issued 
had to be signed by the Register personally. He could not 
appoint a substitute. Only seventy hours were allowed, 
therefore, between the time of discussion and the time 
when the bonds must be on their way to New York. This 
extraordinary proceeding was necessitated by a special 
despatch received from Mr. Adams, the minister in Lon- 
don. Mr. Adams, it appeared, had for months been watch- 
ing the work in progress in the Laird yards, at Birkenhead, 
where two armored vessels were then being constructed for 
the Confederate government. In tonnage, arms and speed 
these vessels were reported to be superior to any which the 
United States had at its disposal. The country was, there- 
fore, face to face with a breaking of the blockade, and with 
that immediate recognition of the Confederacy by Great 
Britain which would unquestionably follow thereon. The 
question of arresting these vessels on the evidence submitted 
had, at the request of Mr. Adams, been referred by the British 
government to the Crown counsel ; and, in accordance with 
their opinion, a restraining order had been issued, which, 
however, could not be enforced against the vessels until any 



348 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

possible damages incurred by the builders because of the 
restraint had been provided for. To indemnify against 
possible damages, a cash deposit of £1,000,000 sterling was 
required. The situation was critical ; the more so because 
of the not unnatural supposition that the Crown lawyers, 
never for a moment supposing that the United States min- 
ister would anticipate their decision and provide himself 
with funds accordingly, in reality planned that the ships 
would not be delayed. Mr. Chittenden then goes on as 
follows : — 

"But the unexpected sometimes happens. The event which 
prevented these floating engines of destruction from entering 
upon their intended work was as unanticipated as a miracle. It 
constituted, possibly, the most signal service ever rendered by a 
citizen of one country to the government of another. It was all 
the more noble because it was intended to be anonymous. The 
eminently unselfish man who performed it made a positive con- 
dition that it should not be made public ; that not so much as his 
name should be disclosed, except to the officers of our govern- 
ment, whose cooperation was required, in order to transact the 
business in a proper manner and upon correct principles. So 
earnest was his injunction of secrecy that his identity will not 
even now be disclosed, although he has long since gone to his 
reward. 

"Within the hour after the Crown lawyers' decision, with its 
conditions, had been made known to Mr. Adams, and when he 
had given up all hope of arresting these vessels, a quiet gentleman 
called upon him and asked if he might be favored with the op- 
portunity of making the deposit of coin required by the order? 
He observed ' that it had occurred to him that, if the United States 
had that amount to its credit in London, some question of authority 
might arise, or Mr. Adams might otherwise be embarrassed in 
complying with the condition, especially as communication with 
his government might involve delay; so that the shortest way 
to avoid all difficulty would be for him to deposit the coin, which 
he was quite prepared to do.' 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 349 

" Had a messenger descended from the skies in a chariot of fire, 
with $5,000,000 in gold in his hands, and offered to leave it at the 
embassy without any security, Mr. Adams could not have been 
more profoundly surprised. He had accepted the condition as 
fatal to his efforts ; he had concluded that nothing short of a 
miracle could prevent the departure of the vessels ; and here, 
if not a miracle, was something much like one. He made no 
secret of the pleasure with which he accepted the munificent offer, 
provided some method of securing the liberal Englishman could 
be found. The latter seemed indisposed to make any suggestions 
on the subject. ' It might be proper, ' he said, ' that some obfigation 
should be entered into, showing that the American government 
recognized the deposit as made on its account ; beyond that he 
should leave the matter wholly in the hands of Mr. Adams.' " 

The narrative then goes on, stating that Mr. Adams 
thereupon proposed that $10,000,000 of the '^ five-twenties" 
should be delivered to this unnamed gentleman, to be re- 
turned when the order of arrest was discharged. The min- 
ister further volunteered the assurance that these bonds 
should be transmitted to London in the first steamer which 
left New York after his despatch concerning the transaction 
was received in the State Department. 

"It was this assurance of Mr. Adams which the President and 
both of the secretaries desired should be made good. They re- 
garded the faith of the government as pledged for its performance 
and that faith they proposed should not be violated. 

"All the details of this transaction were not then disclosed. 
They reached the government in private, confidential despatches 
from Mr. Adams, some of them long afterwards." 

Matters being thus arranged, it only remained to settle 
points of detail. Getting the bonds ready for immediate 
issue would involve the affixing of 12,500 signatures between 
twelve o'clock on Frida}^ noon and four A.M. of the fol- 
lowing Monday. Mr. Chittenden then goes on to describe 



350 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

the physical test to which he was subjected, in thus writing 
his name : — 

"It is unnecessary to describe all the details of the devices and 
means resorted to prevent sleep and to continue the work. Changes 
of position, violent exercise, going out into the open air and walk- 
ing rapidly for ten minutes, concentrated extracts, prepared food, 
stimulants more in kind and number than can now be recalled — 
every imaginable means was employed during the night of Satur- 
day. . . . 

"I have not had at any time since a very accurate memory of 
the events of that Sunday morning. That I could not remain in 
the same position for more than a few moments, that the bonds 
were carried from desk to table and from place to place to enable 
me to make ten signatures at a time, that my fingers and hand 
were twisted and drawn out of their natural shape — these and 
other facts are faintly remembered. The memory is more dis- 
tinct that at about twelve o'clock, noon, the last bond was reached 
and signed, and the work was finished, the last hundred bonds 
requiring more time than the first thousand. One fact I have 
special cause to remember. This abuse of muscular energy even- 
tually caused my resignation from the Treasury, and cost me several 
years of physical pain. ..." 

Finally, he says : — 

"The ability of Mr. Adams to comply with the condition and 
furnish the security was accepted as the end of the controversy. 
It is known that a few months later $6,000,000 of the $10,000,000 
of the bonds issued were returned to the Treasury in their original 
packages, with the seals of the Treasury unbroken. The remain- 
ing $4,000,000 were afterward sold for the benefit of the Treas- 
ury. . . . 

"Since the publication of the foregoing facts in Harper's Mag- 
azine for May, 1890, I have been solicited by many correspondents 
to give the name of the gentleman who offered to perform such a 
signal service to our country. It must be obvious that nothing 
could give me greater pleasure than to publish his name, and to 
secure for him the enduring gratitude of the American people. 
I have, however, a special reason for my present determination 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 351 

not to disclose it, nor to permit myself to speculate upon the con- 
sequences of the disclosure. When we were informed that the 
emergency had passed, it became necessary to make a change in 
the entries of this large amount upon the books of the Register. 
This was found to be a difficult matter, unless a plain statement 
of the issue, to the gentleman in question, and its purpose, was 
made with its subsequent cancellation. This course I proposed to 
Secretary Chase. He was decided in his opinion that the value of 
the service would not have been enhanced if an actual deposit of 
the money had been required, and that, as the gentleman himself 
had imposed the obligation, he was the only authority who could 
possibly release it. While I regarded his conclusion as incontro- 
vertible, I did suggest that our first duty was the official one, to 
our own obligation to conceal nothing, and to make our official 
records strictly conform to the fact. 

" ' We should have thought of that at the time,' said the secretary. 
'We might have declined his offer, coupled as it was with the 
obligation to conceal his name. But I do not remember that we 
considered that question. Do you?' 

" 'No,' I said. 'Nothing was discussed in my presence except 
the possibility of compliance with his conditions, to the letter.' 

" 'Then, I think, we must continue to keep his secret, whatever 
the consequences may be, until he releases us from the obligation,' 
was the final conclusion of the secretary. 

"I am, I believe, the only survivor of those to whom this gentle- 
man's name was known. I have hitherto declined to discuss the 
question of his name or its disclosure. I depart from my practice 
far enough to say that I do not believe he was interested in the 
price of cotton, or that he was moved in the slightest degree by 
pecuniary motives, in making his offer. More than this, at 
present, I do not think I have the moral right to say. If I should 
at any time hereafter see my way clear to a different conclusion, I 
shall leave his name to be communicated to the Secretary of the 
Treasury, who will determine for himself the propriety of its dis- 
closure." 

As a result of these very mysterious and somewhat oracular 
utterances, a good deal of curiosity was not unnaturally 



352 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

aroused as to the identity of the "quiet gentleman" in 
question, and frequent inquiries reached all those in any- 
way likely to be informed on the subject, or to have access 
to sources of information. Especially were these inquiries 
addressed to the custodians of the papers of ]\Ir. Adams, 
he having died some two years before Mr. Chittenden's dis- 
closure was made. In lack of a more definite identification, 
the process of guesswork through exclusion then began, and 
progressed until it seemed to centre on Mr. Joshua Bates as 
the one man who, in every sense of the expression, '^filled 
the bill." Mr. Bates, by birth a Massachusetts man, had 
then (1863) long been the senior partner in the great British 
commercial firm of Baring Brothers & Co. No man was 
better known on the Royal Exchange, and no man there 
stood higher. Then in his seventy-fifth year, Mr. Bates 
could, if he saw fit, at any time put a million sterling on 
deposit, and his assurance would have been held sufficient 
for almost any additional amount within reason. Writing in 
1890, Mr. Chittenden said of this unknown, "He has long 
since gone to his reward" ; Joshua Bates died in London in 
September, 18G4. Answering, with the less well informed, 
the requirements at every point, he must, it was argued, have 
been the individual whose identity Mr. Chittenden had not 
the "moral right" to disclose; nor, so far as known, did the 
whilom Register of the Treasury leave behind him any name, 
as he intimated he might, "to be communicated to a future 
Secretary" thereof. Indeed, as respects the solution of 
this mystery, it could be said of Mr. L. E. Chittenden, as of 
Shakespeare's Cardinal Beaufort, — "He dies, and makes no 
sign." 

Such was the story of the stoppage of the famous Birken- 
head rams of 1863, — its secret history as told by Mr. Lin- 
coln's Register of the Treasury, personally cognizant of the 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 353 

facts whereof he spoke, knowing even the name of the mys- 
terious stranger with the heavy bank account, who in this 
case proved indeed a Deus ex machina. 

Doubtless Mr. Chittenden when he wrote this story fully 
believed all he said. He, too, like the credible gentleman 
mentioned by Mr. Pierce, had told the tale so often that he 
had himself grown to a faith in every word of it. Repetition 
took the place of memory. On the other hand when, in conse- 
quence of Mr. Chittenden's revelations, inquiries poured in, 
Mr. Henry Adams, at the time in question his father's private 
secretary, and, as such, cognizant of everything that occurred, 
professed absolute ignorance of any transaction of the kind, or 
any even bearing a remote resemblance to it. He pronounced 
the whole statement a pure figment of Mr. Chittenden's im- 
agination. In this he was confirmed by Colonel Hay, Mr. 
Lincoln's biographer, who in the course of his investigations 
nowhere could find any trace of the incidents described. 
None existed certainly in the records of the State Depart- 
ment, nor among the Seward papers. Finally, an exami- 
nation of Mr. Adams's careful private diary brought no cor- 
roborative evidence to light. Not even an allusion was there 
found which by any possibility corroborated what could 
not have been other than the most startling as well as mem- 
orable event of a lifetime. Thus the enigma was dismissed 
as insoluble. It apparently only remained for Mr. Pierce's 
"ten, twenty, or thirty years" to pass away until the histo- 
rian of the future should deem the story "worthy of recog- 
nition." 

Eight of the first ten years actually had passed away, 
when the small residuum of historic fact at the basis of Mr. 
Chittenden's "yarn" — for it is entitled to no better name — 
was at last revealed. On the 12th of October, 1898, John M. 
Forbes, of r\lilton, Massachusetts, closed a long, and notice- 
2a 



354 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

ably active life. Immediately after his death there ap- 
peared in the papers an obituary notice of him, manifestly 
prepared by some exceptionally well-informed writer, in the 
course of which reference was made to a mysterious mission 
of Mr. Forbes and Mr. William H. Aspinwall to Europe in 
1863. It was clearly an unwritten Civil War episode. It 
appeared that the two gentlemen, hastily summoned to a 
conference in New York by Messrs. Chase and Welles, then 
respectively secretaries of the Treasury and the Navy, had 
been hurried off to England to prevent, if possible, the fit- 
ting out in British ports of Confederate cruisers, and more 
especially of the two iron-clads then well known to be in an 
advanced stage of construction at the yards of the Laird 
Brothers, at Birkenhead. Great Britain was in fact then 
being systematically utilized as a base from which Confed- 
erate naval operations could be conducted against the com- 
merce and ports of the United States, a nation with which 
Great Britain was professedly at peace. More effectually 
to put a stop to any such illicit operations, the two gentle- 
men were, it was stated, further authorized to purchase, if 
need be, any vessels in course of preparation, and for that 
purpose took out with them ''some millions of the new 5-20 
bonds." The writer of the notice added that, though Mr. 
Forbes failed to accomplish what he was sent out to do, 
''our minister, the Hon. Charles Francis Adams, did all he 
could to second their efforts." Here was an historical clue; 
a sudden sending to Europe of a large amount of 5-20 
bonds in connection with the Laird iron-clads. The follow- 
ing up of this clue was then made further possible through 
the publication of the Letters and Recollections of John 
Murray Forbes, by his daughter, Mrs. Hughes, in 1899. In 
the Forbes-Aspinwall mission of 1863 was to be found the 
residuum of truth at the bottom of the Chittenden legend. 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 355 

From the letters and memoranda in Mrs. Hughes's vol- 
umes it appears that, on the 14th of March, 1863, Mr. Forbes, 
being then unwell at his house in Milton, received a brief tele- 
gram from Secretary Chase, requesting him to meet the sender 
the next morning in New York at the Fifth Avenue Hotel. 
Mr. Forbes complied, and there found both Mr. Chase and 
Mr. Welles. Mr. Aspinwall also was present. The secretaries 
wished Mr. Forbes to go forthwith to England ; while Mr. 
Aspinwall was to follow immediately after, bringing with 
him S10,000,000 of that issue of United States bonds subse- 
quently well known as ''five-twenties," and so denominated 
because, maturing in twenty years from the date of issue, 
they could be redeemed at the option of the government 
at the end of five years from issue. Bearing interest payable 
in gold at the rate of 6 per cent, this issue had been 
recently authorized. Subsequently in great demand both 
at home and in Europe, the 5-20's were sold at par in cur- 
rency, gold then being quoted at a premium of some 40 per 
cent. The five-twenties, therefore, a few years later called 
in and paid off at par, in the summer of 1863 were selling at 
a fluctuating price in gold, varying from 60 per cent to 75 per 
cent of their face value, with absolutely no market for them on 
any European exchange. With $10,000,000 of these securi- 
ties at their disposal to enable them so to do, Messrs. Forbes 
and Aspinwall were, if possible, to stop the Confederate cruis- 
ers by purchase or otherwise. 

The meeting in New York between the two Secretaries 
and the proposed, and secretly accredited, emissaries took 
place apparently on Sunday ; and on Monday Mr. Forbes 
submitted a hastily drawn up letter of instructions, which 
Secretary Welles signed. The purchase of any vessels then 
being fitted out was the essential object in view. A formal 
open letter, in the nature of credentials, was also prepared 



356 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

and signed by Mr. Welles, enclosing another to Messrs. Baring 
Brothers, then the financial agents of the government in 
London, advising them that Messrs. Aspinwall and Forbes 
were authorized to arrange for a loan of a million sterling, 
on the security of $10,000,000 of 5-20 bonds in their hands. 
This was on Monday, the 16th, and Mr. Forbes sailed on 
the steamer of Wednesday; while, on the 17th, Mr. Welles 
noted in his diary that he '^returned last evening from 
a strictly confidential visit to New York." Mr. Aspinwall, 
bringing with him the $10,000,000 of bonds, must have 
followed Mr. Forbes a week later, on the 25th, for he was 
in London and called on Mr. Adams on Tuesday, the 7th 
of April. As Mr. Chittenden is particular in specifying 
that it was on a '^well remembered Friday morning" that 
he was summoned to the White House in the matter of 
these bonds, the morning in question must have been that 
of Friday, March 20 ; but March, 1863, and not, as he 
asserts in his recollections, 1862. He is a year out in his 
time ; nor is there any possible question on this point, in- 
asmuch as work had not been fairly begun on the Laird rams 
until the middle of July, 1862, and, under the contract for 
their construction, they were not to be ready for sea until 
March and May, 1863. Mr. Chittenden says that, when 
he received his directions in regard to signing the ten millions 
of bonds, a messenger from Mr. Adams had brought the 
startling intelligence that '^within three days the vessels were 
to sail." That Mr. Adams never sent such a messenger is 
immaterial ; the essential fact is that the statement fixes 
the year of the whole transaction as 1863, and not 1862, 
inasmuch as, owing to delays from various causes, the Laird 
iron-clads were not launched until July and August, 1863, 
nor were they ready for sea until early in the following 
October. As also only one lot of bonds of this magnitude 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 357 

was thus hurriedly signed and m3^steriously transmitted to 
Europe, Mrs. Hughes's book fixes the time of their prepa- 
ration as the week ending Tuesday, March 24, 1863, the 
Laird iron-clads being then still on the ways. 

Messrs. Forbes and Aspinwall reached England during the 
gloomiest period of the War of Secession, — that darkest 
hour before the slowly breaking dawn which immediately 
preceded the fall of Vicksburg and the repulse of Lee at Get- 
tysburg. In Europe, so far as the United States was con- 
cerned, the situation was at that time in the last degree 
critical. The Alabama was in the midst of her career 
of piratical depredation ; the Confederate cotton loan 
had been successfully negotiated ; the blockade-runner 
Peterhoff had just been captured under circumstances which 
deeply concerned English shipping interests ; the Alexandra, 
another cruiser contracted for by the agents of the Confed- 
eracy and then being made ready for sea at Liverpool, was 
about to be seized by order of the government, with a view 
to making of its seizure a test case on which to get a judicial 
construction of the British Foreign Enlistment Act; the 
Confederate iron-clads at Birkenhead were being rapidly 
pushed to completion. Mr. Adams, while preserving a firm 
outward front, now privately recorded his fear that ^'the 
peace will scarcely last six months"; while Mr. John Bige- 
low, coming over from Paris, expressed to him the opinion 
that war was ^'inevitable." The mission of Messrs. Forbes 
and Aspinwall was important, and the resources at their 
disposal were considerable ; any indiscretion on their part 
might involve serious consequences. They were there on 
behalf of the government to buy vessels not only to prevent 
their use by the rebels, but in certain cases for the use of the 
United States in the hostilities then going on; and this 
while Mr. Adams, the officially accredited representative 



358 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

of their country, was vehemently denying the legalit}^ of the 
construction or sale of such vessels for or to either bellig- 
erent. Seeking thus, under the exigencies of the situation, 
both to ''run with the hare and hunt with the hounds," the 
government not unnaturally instructed its emissaries to 
*^ endeavor to avoid establishing a precedent that may em- 
barrass our minister when urging the British government to 
stojo the sailing of vessels belonging to the rebels." ^ 

A sufficient account of this futile mission is given in Mrs. 
Hughes's volumes. A more judicious selection of agents 
could not have been made ; and Messrs, Forbes and Aspin- 
wall, while they did all that circumstances permitted, acted 
throughout wdth the utmost circumspection. This is made 
curiously, and sometimes amusingly, apparent through 
Mr. Adams's diary references to them and what they did. 
With Mr. Forbes he was of course well acquainted. Close 
neighbors at home, for they lived in adjoining towns, they 
had not only known each other long, but recently they had 
been in more or less active correspondence as representative 
and constituent during the troubled period which preceded 
the outbreak of the Civil War. Mr. Forbes says in his notes 
that immediately on reaching London, after seeing the Messrs. 
Baring, he called on Mr. Adams, who, he adds, ^'wanted to 
know only what was absolutely necessary of our mission, so 
that he might not be mixed up with our operations, which 
we knew might not be exactly what a diplomat would care to 
endorse." This was on the 31st of March ; and that day 
Mr. Adams wrote ''who should come in but Mr. John M. 
Forbes? He gave me some intimation of his errand, which 
is to investigate the practicability of obtaining contingents 
of troops from any quarter in Germany. I thought not; 
the only course was to engage the men. I did not doubt 
^ Forbes, Letters and Recollections, II, 6, 26. 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 359 

they might be had in abundance." Thus the resurrected 
memory of the revolutionary Hessians seems to have been 
evoked by Mr. Forbes as a means of averting suspicion. 
During the next few days Mr. Forbes dined with Mr. Adams, 
and saw him frequently ; and, on the 7th of April, Mr. Aspin- 
wall also called. Owing to the capture of the Peterhoff, the 
seizure of the Alexandra and the destruction of the Georgiana, 
one of the minor rebel cruisers, ''the city" was now in a condi- 
tion of ferment, both active and noisy. Movements initiated 
by Mr. Adams to stop vessels in process of preparation at 
numerous points had, as he wrote, roused ''the whole hive 
of sympathizers, as it was never stirred before." 

Immediately on the arrival of Mr. Aspinwall, the $10,000,- 
000 of bonds he brought with him in several small separate 
trunks were safely deposited in the vaults of Baring Brothers, 
and, on the security of a portion ($4,000,000) of them, 
£500,000 negotiated through Mr. Joshua Bates, was passed, 
as a loan, to the credit of Mr. Forbes. With that amount he 
began operations. Though he, of course, had no knowledge 
on that point, a million dollars out of the proceeds of the 
recently negotiated Cotton loan had been put at the control 
of the Confederate agents for the construction of the two 
Laird iron-clads, the contract price for which was £93,750 
each, apart from all armament and munitions.^ The purse 
of the United States emissaries was thus materially longer 
than that of the Confederate agents ; but the money was 
not at the disposal of Mr. Adams, nor did it come from the 
pocket of Mr. Chittenden's "quiet gentleman," nor was it, 
either in whole or in any part, used for the purposes Mr. 
Chittenden states. 

Three days after the arrival of Mr. Aspinwall, on the even- 
ing of Thursday, April 9, Mr. Forbes very sociably dropped 
1 Bulloch, Secret Service, I, 385, 386. 



360 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

in to see Mr. Adams, with a view doubtless to an incidental 
talk on the business in hand, the stoppage of the various 
vessels in regard to which he had by this time informed him- 
self. To those who knew Mr. Forbes, and understood his 
shrewd methods of working through indirections, Mr. 
Adams's comment on what took place is suggestive. ''I 
explained to him," he wrote, "all that I had done; but he 
seemed to think private action might effect more. Here is 
an instance of the opposite nature of British and American 
training. The former always thinking of nothing but gov- 
ernment action; the latter always underrating it." On 
the 17th Mr. Forbes again called, this time to report about 
the vessels over which he and Mr. Aspinwall were now 
exercising a joint private supervision, and Mr. Adams 
innocently wrote, *'he made much of doing nothing to 
embarrass me." The next entry was more amusing still. 
The drift of the mission was beginning to show itself, and 
there was almost a groan of despair perceptible through what 
the minister now wrote. Mr. Robert J. Walker, formerly 
Secretary of the Treasury in the Polk administration, had 
now also put in an appearance in London, in the capacity of 
special agent of the Treasury. He was sent out by Secretary 
Chase to acquaint European capitalists with the actual cir- 
cumstances and resources of the country ; and, if possible, 
to negotiate the sale of some government securities. Messrs. 
Forbes and Aspinwall did not deem it expedient to admit Mr. 
Walker into their confidence ; while Mr. Adams wrote : "He, 
as well as Messrs. Aspinwall and Forbes, are sent out from 
the Treasury to carry on operations of their own with which 
I have nothing to do. Of course, they will more or less, un- 
dertake to advise me, which I shall try to take in the best 
part. I feel sensibly that this mission is growing more and 
more difficult." Certainly a less conventionally diplomatic 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 361 

situation could hardly be conceived. The United States, 
in the midst of the most serious complications, was repre- 
sented in London by at least three different agencies, 
drawing their instructions from separate sources, and each 
operating in secrecy so far as the others were concerned. 
That, under such an ingeniously bad system, a catastrophe 
did not result, speaks volumes for the discretion of those 
concerned. 

On the 23d of April Mr. Forbes breakfasted with Mr. 
Adams, showing him "a, general review of all the ship-yards 
of the island, and a description of every suspicious vessel. 
The activity of these rogues," Mr. Adams WTote, "is greater 
than ever. I do not know that any anxiety I have is heavier 
than this." Then, on the 28th, Messrs. Forbes and Aspin- 
wall, feeling evidently that now they must face the real pur- 
pose of their errand, or they might compromise the minister, 
came to discuss the expediency of buying the ships then 
being built for the Confederacy. ''I think," wrote Mr. 
Adams, ''this is merely playing the game of the Englishmen. 
The competition for arms at the outset of the war raised 
their price more than double, and so it would be with 
steamers." 

The situation had its grotesque as well as critical side, and 
casuistry played a conspicuous part in the statements and 
asseverations then made. For example, Messrs. Forbes and 
Aspinwall, privately accredited by Secretary Welles, were in 
London trying surreptitiously to buy the very vessels then 
being built in the Laird yards. The Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy, G. V. Fox, was writing to Mr. Forbes: "You 
must stop them at all hazards. . . . Let us have them in 
the United States for our own purposes, without any more 
nonsense, and at any price." ^ Shortly after, Secretary 
» Hughes, Forbes, II, 23. 



362 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

Welles himself wrote to Mr. Forbes to the same effect, ''If 
we caught hold of any swift privateers which they are con- 
structing or fitting out, the great purpose of your mission will 
have been accomplished." Yet in the very same letter, while 
his agent is feeling his way towards the purchase of ships at 
that very time in course of construction in the yards of the 
Laird Brothers, the Secretary indignantly denounces the 
former senior member of the firm, then in Parliament, for 
there asserting "that propositions had been made to him to 
build vessels for the United States." He declared the state- 
ment "destitute of truth" and thought it might be "advis- 
able to expose Mr. Laird." ^ This he did in a letter to Mr. 
Sumner,^ sent May 19, which Mr. Sumner made public on the 
6th of the following August. In it he arraigned Mr. Laird 
as " a mercenary hypocrite without principle or honesty." 
It was certainly fortunate for all concerned, except Mr. Laird, 
that the purposes of the confidential mission of Messrs. 
Forbes and Aspinwall, and the methods pursued by them, 
were as yet undisclosed, as the distinction between build- 
ing ships and buying ships half built and on the stocks, 
might not have carried conviction to all minds. Mean- 
while, Messrs. Forbes and Aspinwall at about this time 
were settling down to the sensible conviction reached by Mr. 
Adams that "to offer to buy the iron-clads without success 
would only be to stimulate the builders to greater activity, 
and even to building new ones in the expectation of find- 
ing a market for them from one party or the other." 
And all this time on the other side, the agents and repre- 
sentatives of the Confederacy were protesting before high 
Heaven that they had no concern or interest in the Birken- 
head iron-clads; and were executing fraudulent papers "in 
proper legal forms " making them "the property of Messrs. 
' See also Welles, Diary, I, 291, 306, 394, 396. ^ Ibid. 292. 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 363 

Bravay and Co. of Paris, agents for the Pasha of 
Egypt." Altogether, it was a nicely complicated all- 
around case of fraud, deceit, duplicity, and double-dealing 
generally. 

Throughout the month of May, Messrs. Forbes and Aspin- 
wall remained in England, gradually reaching the conclusion 
that they could accomplish nothing. Meanwhile Mr. William 
M. Evarts had been added to the contingent of special gov- 
ernment emissaries, he being sent out to supervise the legal 
proceedings in the case of the Alexandra. ''It cannot be 
denied," wrote Mr. Adams, "that ever since I have been here 
the almost constant interference of government agents of 
all kinds has had the effect, however intended, of weakening 
the position of the minister. Most of all has it happened 
in the case of Mr. Evarts, whom the newspapers here have 
all insisted to have been sent here to superintend my office 
in all questions of international law. I doubt whether any 
minister has ever had so much of this kind of thing to con- 
tend with." 

It is instructive to know that it was not Mr. Adams alone 
who was at this time thus encumbered with aid. The Con- 
federate emissaries seem to have had similar cause of com- 
plaint; and in September, 1862, nine months before Mr. 
Adams made the foregoing entry in his diary. Captain Bulloch 
had written on this head as follows to the Confederate Sec- 
retary of the Navy: ''I do not hesitate to say that embar- 
rassment has already been occasioned by the number of 
persons from the South who represent themselves to be 
agents of the Confederate States Government. There are 
men so constituted as not to be able to conceal their connec- 
tion with any affairs which may by chance add to their impor- 
tance, and such persons are soon found out and drawn 
into confessions and statements by gossiping acquaintances, 



364 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

to the serious detriment of the service upon which they are 
engaged." ^ 

During the early years of Mr. Adams's mission, indeed 
until the autumn of 1863, when the government detained 
the Birkenhead iron-clads, Great Britain was, for reasons 
which at once suggest themselves, the special field of diplo- 
matic activity, and the minister at London was at last 
driven to active remonstrance. The emissaries were of four 
distinct types : (1) the roving diplomat, irregularly ac- 
credited by the State Department; (2) the poaching dip- 
lomat, regularly accredited to one government, but seeking a 
wider field of activity; (3) the volunteer diplomat, not ac- 
credited at all, but in his own belief divinely commissioned 
at that particular juncture to enlighten foreign nations 
generally, and Great Britain in particular; and (4) the 
special agent, sent out by some department of the govern- 
ment to accomplish, if possible, a particular object. 

As to these unassigned and peripatetic diplomats of the 
Civil War period, their name was legion, and they could only 
be dealt with in adequate fashion in a separate paper. To 
understand the system pursued it is necessary to begin with a 
reference to Secretary Seward's idiosyncrasies and political 
methods. When, in March, 1861, the ex-governor of New 
York, and the leading partner in the former firm of Seward, 
Weed & Greeley, then dissolved by the withdrawal of its 
junior member, — when Secretary Seward took charge 
(March, 1861) of the Department of State, he at once 
adopted a policy and inaugurated a system characteristic of 
New York politics. The country was face to face with 
what amounted to a revolution. The outcome was in large 
degree plainly dependent on the course of events in Europe, 

' Bulloch, Secret Service, I, 390 ; also Bigelow, Retrospections, I, 481 ; 
II, 137. 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 365 

and especially in Great Britain and France. That course 
of events was again necessarily much influenced by the 
public opinion in those countries prevailing; so, with a 
view to the situation, President Lincoln's foreign secretary 
arranged the machinery of his office on a plan peculiarly his 
own. He did not propose to depend altogether on the 
traditional accredited representatives of the country. He 
planned, on the contrary, to have his own private bureau 
of intelligence, and system of manikin wires. Accordingly, 
with a view to influencing, as he so considered, the European 
mind, while at the same time informing himself, he, first 
and last, precipitated on Europe a flight of generally ac- 
credited representatives and special agents, — men of 
eminence, dignitaries of the established churches, eminent 
evangelistic divines, journalists, lawyers and financiers, — 
whose province it was, besides educating and influencing 
benighted Europe, to keep him personally advised, much 
in the fashion of a newspaper press agency. Of those 
thus specially commissioned, Mr. John Bigelow was one of 
the more judiciously selected ; and, probably, distinctly the 
most efficient. Without any special qualification for the 
post, he was appointed consul-general at Paris ; with the 
clear further understanding that he was to use his journalistic 
experience acquired in the editorial rooms of the New York 
Evening Post to influence the press of continental Europe. 
The manipulation of the English press was at the same 
time entrusted to Mr. Thurlow Weed, the secretary's jour- 
nalistic and political fidus Achates. While the private and 
confidential communications with the Secretary of State 
of those gentlemen, as of others similarly commissioned, 
have never as yet to any large extent seen the light, they 
probably contained a varied assortment of information and 
gossip, the nature and value of which can onl}'' be surmised. 



366 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

The presence of this corps of international supernumeraries 
was well known abroad, and, naturally, not understood. 
By the foreign chancelleries, it was taken to indicate a lack 
of confidence in the regularly accredited representatives; 
and was not unskilfully manipulated to that end by the 
agents of the Confederacy. 

Of those of the class first specified, the generally accred- 
ited or roving diplomats, lay and church, it is unnecessary 
here to speak. The more discreet and better informed of 
those invited to go declined so to do ; of those who did go, 
Mr. Adams subsequently said they '^ failed entirely," while 
in so doing they ''worried" him more than they enlightened 
the English.^ Among the poaching brethren of the second 
class he especially mentioned Henry S. Sanford, and 
Cassius M. Clay, accredited respectively to Belgium and 
Russia. Of Mr. Sanford's private correspondence with 
the Secretary, nothing is known. It was probably largely 
made up of gossip and secret service information. Other- 
wise, Mr. Sanford's most active negotiation was conducted 
neither in Belgium nor in Great Britain, but in Italy ; and 
was in connection with a most ill-considered move to in- 
duce Garibaldi to go to America and there accept high mili- 
tary command. A commission as major-general was actu- 
ally offered him ; but the Italian insisted on a dictatorship, 
civil as well as military.^ So, most fortunately, Mr. San- 
ford's diplomatic activities proved altogether abortive. 

In view of the subsequent career of Mr. Cassius M. Clay, 
and his widely published domestic episodes, it is charitable 
to say as little as may be of his diplomatic experiences. 
They were, to say the least, the reverse of either conventional 
or happy. MeanwhUe, the late John Hay, then Lincoln's 

^ Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, Second Series, XVI, 465. 
2 Ibid. Third Series, I, 319-325. 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 367 

private secretary though himself Secretary of State thirty 
years afterwards, used to tell a story of Mr. Clay not only 
characteristic, but too entertaining to be lost. WhUe Mr. 
Clay was representing the country at St. Petersburg, Charles 
Sumner, then chairman of the Senate Committee of Foreign 
Affairs, greatly offended him by some utterance, whether 
on the floor of the Senate or elsewhere. Mr. Clay there- 
upon sat down and indited an official despatch to the Sec- 
retary of State, in which he dealt with the Massachusetts 
Senator quite, as the expression goes, without gloves, and 
certainly without mere}'. There w^ere, indeed, according 
to Mr. Hay, few possible animadversions of an offensive 
nature left unexpressed. Having thus relieved himself, 
Mr. Clay at the close of his fulmination dropped suddenly into 
the diplomatic style, ending, mutatis mutandis, with the 
regulation formula, ''You may read this despatch to Mr. 
Sumner, and should he request it you can give him 
a copy." 

But, if Mr. Adams was ''worried" by intrusions on his 
peculiar domain from without, if Secretary Welles can be 
depended on as an authority, the London situation was not 
wholly free from its domestic annoyances. When Mr. 
Adams assumed the duties of his mission, the Secretary ap- 
pointed Mr. Charles L. Wilson, of Chicago, as First Secretary 
Legation. Wholly without diplomatic experience or famil- 
iarity with foreign or official life, Mr. WUson was chief owner 
and editor of a Chicago daily newspaper of the western type 
of that period, which had been ardent in support of Mr. 
Seward in his presidential aspirations. He may have been 
in private communication with Mr. Seward, but Mr. Wilson 
certainly did not feel either at home or at ease amid his new 
surroundings. Accordingly, at the very time that Messrs. 
Forbes and Aspinwall were bestirring themselves in British 



368 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

shipping circles, Secretary Welles was making the following 
diary entry : ^ — 

"Sumner tells me of a queer interview he had with Seward. 
The first part of the conversation was harmonious and related 
chiefly to the shrewd and cautious policy and management of the 
British ministry, who carefully referred all complex questions 
to the law officers of Her Majesty's government. It might have 
been a hint to Seward to be more prudent and considerate, and 
to take legal advice instead of pushing on, wordy and slovenly, as 
is sometimes done. . . . Our Minister, Mr. Adams, was spoken 
of as too reserved and retiring for his own and the general good. 
Sumner said, in justification and by way of excuse for him, that it 
would be pleasanter and happier for him if he had a Secretary of 
Legation whose deportment, manner, and social position were 
different, — if he were more affable and courteous, in short more 
of a gentleman, ■ — for he could in that case make up for some of 
Mr. A.'s deficiencies. At this point Seward flew into a passion, 
and, in a high key, told Sumner he knew nothing of political 
(meaning party) claims and services, and accused him of a design 
to cut the throat of Charley Wilson, the Secretary of Lega- 
tion at London. Sumner wholly disclaimed any such design 
or any personal knowledge of the man, but said he had been in- 
formed, and had no doubt of the fact, that it was the daily prac- 
tice of Wilson to go to Morley's, seat himself in a conspicuous 
place, throw his legs upon the table, and, in coarse language, abuse 
England and the English. Whatever might be our grievances 
and wrong, this, Sumner thought, was not a happy method of 
correcting them, nor would such conduct on the part of the second 
officer of the legation bring about kinder feelings, or a better 
state of things, whereas a true gentleman could by suavity and 
dignity in such a position win respect, strengthen his principal, 
and benefit the country. These remarks only made Seward more 
violent, and louder in his declarations that Charley Wilson was a 
clever fellow and should be sustained." 

Perhaps the most unfortunate of the volunteer, as dis- 
tinguished from the roving, poaching, and special diplomats 
1 Welles, Diary, I, 300, 301. 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 369 

of that period, was Mr. Moncure D. Conway. In 1863 
Mr. Conway made his appearance in England, whither he 
had gone *'to enlighten the British public in regard to the 
causes of the war." He almost at once invited a correspond- 
ence with Mr. Mason, the Confederate envoy, the outcome 
of which was bewildering rather than either happy or signifi- 
cant. It is now an altogether forgotten incident, and at the 
moment was not material. It had, however, a certain 
interest as illustrating the dangers inseparable from volun- 
teer diplomacy in troublous times; and it led to some 
highly suggestive comments on the part of Mr. Adams, to 
be found in a despatch (No. 437) from that gentleman to 
Secretary Seward, under date of June 25, 1863.^ Any one 
curious to read the Conway-Mason correspondence in con- 
nection with the history of that period, can find it in full in 
the columns of the London Times of June 18, 1863 ; while 
Mr. Conway subsequently (1904) gave in detail his own 
account of it and its consequences to himself personally, 
entitling it, "The Mason Incident." ^ 

This divergence, though long perhaps, is still not without 
its interest and even value in connection with the diplomatic 
history of the Civil War period. It at least has the merit 
of novelty. But, returning now to the mission of Messrs. 
Forbes and Aspinwall, they, as also Mr. Evarts, were of the 
last description of the "accredited," — special agents sent 
out by some department for a particular purpose. They 
were men of energy, tact and discretion. Accordingly they 
had the good sense to confine themselves to the work they 
were there to do, and did not indulge in a pernicious, 
general activity. With his rare tact, shrewd judgment and 
quick insight into men, Thurlow Weed, a roving diplomat, 

1 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Part I, 318 ; also Seward to Adams, 
No. 654, ibid. 358. ^Autobiography, 1, 412-428. 

2b 



370 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

made himself of use both in Great Britain and on the Conti- 
nent, and relations of a friendly character grew up between 
him and Mr. Adams. Of others, roving, poaching or 
volunteer, Mr. Adams had grave and just cause of com- 
plaint; they were officious, they meddled, and they were 
to the last degree indiscreet. They were peculiarly addicted 
to the columns of the Times, in which their effusions ap- 
peared periodically : but not always did they confine them- 
selves to ill-considered letter-writing or mere idle talk. 

Meanwhile during the early months of 1863 the scrutiny 
exercised both at home and in Great Britain, be it through 
government officials. Union detectives or Confederate 
sympathizers, was altogether too close to enable men as 
active and prominent as Messrs. Forbes and Aspinwall to 
escape suspicion. The Confederate newspaper correspond- 
ents in New York almost at once got scent of their mission, 
and set to work to make trouble. One of them, signing him- 
self '^ Manchester," spoke of the two as 'delegates" about 
'Ho be followed by eight other men of note," one being 
Mr. W. M. Evarts, all of whom would ''regulate our affairs 
abroad, and Mr. Adams is ordered to be their mouthpiece." 
This correspondent then proceeds as follows: "[Mr. Evarts] 
is a particular friend of W. PI. Seward. The latter, it 
is well known, has lost all confidence in Mr. Adams, who, 
but for his name, would have been recalled long ago. Mr. 
Seward expresses himself on all occasions, early and late, 
that the real source of bad feeling in England towards the 
North has been caused by the extraordinary stupidity of 
Mr. Adams, our minister, and the really clever ability of all 
the rebel agents." This utterance seems to have caused 
Secretary Seward some annoyance, as the Treasury was in 
its turn now poaching on the domain of the State Depart- 
ment. Moreover, it did not require much time to satisfy 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 371 

Messrs. Forbes and Aspinwall that the Confederate agents 
were sufficiently in funds to '^ render it impossible to ap- 
proach the Messrs. Laird with an offer for the rams"; and, 
accordingly, they were forced to limit themselves to watching 
the effects of the legal proceedings initiated by Mr. Adams, in 
the hope that an opportunity would offer for "some negotia- 
tor to step in." In the interim, obviously to avert suspicion, 
it was thought expedient for Mr. Forbes to visit Germany, 
the land of Hessian mercenaries, while Mr. Aspinwall betook 
himself to France. They remained away until well into 
June ; and, on their return to London, satisfied of their in- 
ability to do anything towards stopping work on the Birken- 
head iron-clads, the first of which was then nearly ready to 
be launched, they decided to return to America. This action 
on their part was accelerated by the news from home ; for 
the crisis of the struggle was plainly at hand. It came, 
indeed, while they were on the ocean. For a man of Mr. 
Forbes's intense activity a longer absence at such a time 
was well-nigh impossible. Indeed, when, five weeks before, 
the details of the disaster at Chancellorsville reached London, 
he had been so much depressed by the news that, as he at 
the time told Mr. Adams, he had been strongly inclined to 
abandon his mission and start back to America that very 
day. 

To return to the $10,000,000 of 5-20 bonds brought out by 
Mr. Aspinwall, and placed in the keeping of Baring Brothers. 
As already stated, $4,000,000 had been pledged to that firm 
as security for the loan of £500,000. The remaining $6,000,- 
000 were now withdrawn, and taken back to America. The 
two commissioners landed in New York on the 12th of July, 
just before the breaking out of the draft riots of 1863. Mr. 
Forbes, though not until twenty-one years later, wrote down 
his own recollections of how he handled on the wharf his 



372 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

^'pile of trunks, which mcluded three containing six millions 
of 5-20 bonds"; and these, doubtless, were the bonds 
which Mr, Chittenden refers to as being a few days later 
'^ returned to the Treasury in the original packages, with 
the seals of the Treasury unbroken." 

Such is the residuum of authentic history at the bottom 
of this portion of Mr. Chittenden's recollections. Where 
his story was not a pure figment of the imagination, his 
memory deceived him at almost every point. The amount 
involved, and the number of bonds returned to the Treasury, 
together, probably, with the physical exertion he underwent 
in signing them, were alone accurately stated. It only re- 
mains to suggest some plausible theory through which to 
explain a deception so singular ; for, undoubtedly, Mr. Chit- 
tenden believed what he wrote. That explanation probably 
is not far to seek. The heads of department undeniably 
concerned in the mission were Secretaries Welles and Chase. 
Mr. Chittenden also asserts that the President and Secretary 
Seward were ''in anxious consultation " over it. This may or 
may not be so ; but, undoubtedly, they were cognizant of it. 
In any event, the utmost secrecy was necessary to the success 
of the scheme, and it was highly desirable that as few persons 
as possible should be in any way informed as to it. The 
whole proceeding was to the last degree irregular, and most 
suggestive as to the way in which government operations were 
then conducted. The Navy Department was that more 
immediately concerned. In it the scheme originated, and 
by it the agents were accredited. Yet not an allusion to 
it of any sort is to be found in the diary of Mr. Welles, 
beyond the brief mention of a ''strictly confidential visit to 
New York" on March 17, 1863. As to the Treasury, a query 
at once suggested itself as to how far those methods of pro- 
cedure were carried in other and not dissimilar cases. Ten 



AN HISTORICAL RESIDUUM 373 

millions of dollars is no inconsiderable sum. Five or six 
trunks full of government bonds are worth looking after. In 
this case ten millions of bonds were withdrawn from the 
vaults and their official custodians, and put in the hands 
of two private gentlemen to take out of the country, and 
dispose of pretty much as they saw fit ; and, so far as ap- 
pears, not a receipt even was filed to indicate what had be- 
come of them. The proceeding was wrapped in impenetrable 
mystery. Messrs. Forbes and Aspinwall were not officers 
of the government, or responsible to any one. Ten million 
dollars were simply put at their service, and the two secre- 
taries alone had cognizance of the transaction, knew where 
the securities were, what it was proposed to do with their 
proceeds, or who could account for them. To the heads of 
department during the Rebellion period, ''millions of money 
were as star distances to ordinary men, whether two or three 
hundred billions of miles, what difference?" 

Meanwhile, large and irregular as the Treasury operations 
then unquestionably were, the taking of ten millions of 
bonds from the Treasury and sending them in one body to 
Europe, vvhere it was notorious no market or demand then 
existed, could not but excite comment among the officials 
necessarily concerned. The Register of the Treasur}^, sud- 
denly called upon to authenticate this large issue by his 
own signature to each particular bond, might naturally be 
prompted to ask some explanation of a proceeding at once 
so large, so hasty, and so shrouded in mystery. The in- 
ference would be reasonable that the explanation given by 
Mr. Chittenden was in a general way concocted and agreed 
upon between the two secretaries, Chase and Welles, to be 
ready for use in case of emergency ; and they tried it on the 
Register. He accepted it in perfect good faith, and relig- 
iously preserved it for years as a state secret. Then, at 



374 . DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

last, througli a magazine of large circulation, he took the 
public into his confidence, verifying none of his facts or 
dates. Meanwhile he intimates that, at the time when he 
reduced his ''Recollections" to paper, he was actually in 
possession of the name of that mysterious and altogether 
mythical "quiet gentleman" who ''offered to perform such 
a signal service to our country." This is not impossible. 
He may have got it from Secretary Chase; and not im- 
possibly a gleam of suppressed humor lurked in the Secre- 
tary's eye, as, with a face otherwise wholly imperturbable, he 
invented a name very proper to complete the grave mystifi- 
cation of the Register. The mystification is, however, now 
cleared up, one more cock-and-bull historical fiction is dis- 
posed of, and a small residuum of truth has been precipi- 
tated. 



1 



X 

QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR^ 

On the 7th of February, 1901, the New York Chamber of 
Commerce took occasion at its monthly meeting to observe 
the recent death of Queen Victoria. Speeches were made 
and resolutions offered and passed. Among the speeches 
was one by Abram S. Hewitt, then in his seventy-ninth 
year, and perhaps fairly entitled to the designation of New 
York's first citizen. A man of large experience, who had 
held high public office, Mr. Hewitt's word, whether on matter 
of opinion or of fact, carried weight; for through a long 
life he had shown himself conscientious and truthful. Him- 
self conversant with the inside of affairs of state, he pre- 
sumably knew that whereof he spoke. As his eulogist not 
untruly said of him immediately after his death, " What 
he wrote or said in public addresses was weighty in the best 
sense. . . . He was absolutely free from the slovenly pro- 
fuseness in public speech with which many worthy men in 
American public life afflict their country." ^ 

On the occasion referred to, Mr. Hewitt, though, as he 
said, ''grown very reluctant to [speak] upon any public 

1 The substance of this study appeared originally in three separate 
papers submitted to the Massachusetts Historical Society at its meetings, 
respectively, of October, 1903, January, 1904, and November, 1906. (Pro- 
ceedings, Second Series, XVIT, 440-448 ; XVIII, 123-154 ; XX, 454-474.) 
These papers have for the present publication been revised, largely recast 
and materially added to, as well as compressed. For citations of author- 
ities, etc., when not given, recourse can be had to the Mass. Hist. Soc. 
Proceedings. 

2 E. M. Shepard in The American Monthly Review of Reviews for Feb- 
ruary, iQQ3, p. 164. 

375 



376 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

occasion," accepted the invitation so to do, and by request 
seconded the resolutions prepared and moved by Seth Low, 
then President of Columbia College, later Mayor of the city 
of New York. Not only did he speak, but he incorporated 
in what he said the following noteworthy personal remi- 
niscence and startling historical revelation : — 

"President Low has referred to the Trent affair. It is known 
to all of you. I shall take no time in elaborating the incident, 
but it was the first occasion when the Queen had to remember the 
reception which had been given [here in America the year before] 
to the Prince of Wales and the future King of England. We are 
told that with her own hand she modified the harsh and unfriendly 
language which would undoubtedly have made it impossible, if it 
had been published, for Mr. Seward to extricate himself from the 
unfortunate dilemma in which we were placed by the arrest of the 
Confederate envoys by Commodore Wilkes. But other occasions 
arose for the Queen to show her kindly feeling, and as to one of 
these, I am, I suppose, the only living witness, and this explains 
why I accepted the invitation of your President to appear here 
and do what I have grown very reluctant to do, — make an ad- 
dress upon any public occasion. It happened that in 1862 I was 
sent by the Government on a confidential mission to England and 
France. In the course of my work I had the most intimate re- 
lations with Minister Charles Francis Adams and with Judge 
Dayton, who was the Minister to France. One afternoon I re- 
ceived a message from Judge Dayton asking me to come to the 
Embassy, where he asked me if I could leave for London that night. 
I told him I could if the matter were important. He said a piece 
of information had just come to his notice which he could not 
trust to the telegraph or even to the post. That he wished a 
special messenger to go to Mr. Adams and report to him what had 
happened. I told him I would go, and he then said, 'I have just 
received information from a confidential source that the Emperor 
Napoleon III has proposed to the British Government to recog- 
nize the Confederacy at once. I am sure that Mr. Adams has no 
knowledge of the fact. I want you to proceed to London to-night, 
see him as early as possible in the morning, and communicate 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 377 

the information to him.' I went to London. I saw Mr. Adams 
very early the next morning, as soon as he was visible, and I told 
him what Judge Dayton had said. I found that Mr. Adams had 
already an intimation from some source that the recognition was 
impending. However, he said he would call upon Lord John 
Russell, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and ascertain what was 
proposed to be done. He made the call and I waited for his return. 
He told me that he had seen Lord John Russell and had asked 
him distinctly whether any proposition had been received for the 
recognition of the Confederacy. He received an evasive reply. 
It was evident to him that something of a very serious nature 
was on foot. But Lord John Russell declined to communicate 
any definite information on the subject. He told me that he then 
said to Lord John Russell, 'I desire an audience with the Queen.' 
Lord John Russell replied that it was not usual for Ministers to 
have an audience with the Queen ; that all communications must 
pass through the Foreign Office. I believe — perhaps General 
Wilson will correct me if I am wrong — that there is a usage by 
which only Ambassadors can demand an interview with the Sov- 
ereign, and that Ministers — at that time we had no Ambassadors 
— that Ministers had no such right, but that it might be accorded 
as a matter of courtesy. Mr. Adams said he told Lord John Russell 
that he hoped he would arrange it ; but at any rate he was going 
to Windsor that day in person, and would send a request, asking 
the Queen to hear him personally. He went to Windsor. Whether 
Lord John Russell made any communication or not, I do not 
know. Mr. Adams saw the Queen in the presence of Prince Albert ; 
told her why he had come, and he said to her : ' If there is any 
foundation for this information which I have received, I appeal to 
your Majesty to prevent so great a wrong, which will result in uni- 
versal war, for I can assure your Majesty that the American people 
are prepared to fight the whole world rather than give up the 
Union.' [Applause.] He said that the Queen, in the most gra- 
cious manner, replied, 'Mr. Adams, give yourself no concern. My 
Government will not recognize the Confederacy.' [Applause.] 

"Now, this may be a very inappropriate course of remark for 
this occasion, but I am anxious to have these facts preserved in 
the records of the Chamber of Commerce. I think it very likely 



378 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

that the despatch of Mr. Adams to Secretary Seward contains the 
information which I have given you here, but I have never seen 
it, and I do not know that it has ever been pubHshed." 

The extreme vagueness of this reminiscence cannot fail 
at once to attract notice. No details as respects either time 
or place are given, while the statements have no recognizable 
relation with established historical facts. Correspondence 
with Mr. Hewitt failed to elicit anything more specific, ex- 
cept that ''it must have been as early as the month of July," 
presumably of the year 1862.^ Indicating, as the proceed- 
ings did, an almost equal disregard of English constitutional 
methods and of Court etiquette, the story could have 
been precepted by no writer of even average care. Never- 
theless, coming directly from Mr. Hewitt in so public a 
way and in such a specific shape, it excited curiosity. Where, 
in this case, was the residuum of historic fact? Presum- 
ably there must be such a residuum, could it but be precipi- 
tated. 

In his paper, elsewhere referred to,^ on Recollections as a 
Source of History, Mr. Edward L. Pierce mentions one 
credible gentleman who had told a tale so often that he 
had himself grown to a faith in every word of it ; and 
another who had in early life heard the story of an event, 
and, frequently telling it, had at last come to believe that 
he had himself been a witness of what he described. It was 
probably so with Mr. Hewitt, and his Chamber of Commerce 
Victorian reminiscence ; but while in the previous case 
of Mr. Chittenden's ''Recollections," thanks to the publi- 
cation of Mrs. Hughes's Letters and Recollections of John 
M. Forbes, a residuum of historical fact was reached,^ in 
the case of Mr. Hewitt the most careful search among 

^ See Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, Second Series, XVII, 444. 
2 Supra, 344. » Supra, 374. 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 379 

papers and records brought nothing to light. It accord- 
ingly at last became apparent that in every part — scope 
as well as detail — the incident was imaginary — an octo- 
genarian's hallucination ! ^ 

So far as internal evidence and established facts afford 
basis for a conclusion, the incidents described by Mr. Hewitt 
must have occurred during the first four months of 1862. 
But it so chances Mr. Adams kept a detailed diary through- 
out his life, and especially during his mission to Great Britain. 
In that diary a record of no single day of the period in ques- 
tion is lacking; yet in it there is no mention of any dip- 
lomatic visit to Windsor, such as that described. And here 
the investigation narrows. In his reminiscence Mr. Hewitt 
says that '^Mr. Adams saw the Queen in presence of Prince 
Albert." But it so chances that Prince Albert had died on the 
14th of December of the previous year, 1861. Subsequently, 
as is perfectly well known, the Queen, prostrated by the 
death of the Prince Consort, became practically unsettled 
in mind. Completely secluding herself, she thereafter, 
for months and even years, saw no one but members of her 
household, her closest personal friends and her ministers. 
So far as Mr. Adams was concerned, as matter of fact he 
never during his long mission — May, 1861, to May, 1868 
— was officially at Windsor, except as a member of the 
diplomatic corps on the occasion of the marriage of the 
Prince of Wales. The Queen was not then visible from 
the place assigned to the American minister; and after the 
death of Prince Albert he did not again lay eyes on her 
Majesty until her reappearance on occasions of state at a 
''Court" held at Buckingham Palace on the 9th of April, 
1864, — the time of Grant's advance upon Richmond. 

This, the first function at which the Queen presided subse- 
1 Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, Second Series, XVIII, 124, 



380 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

quent to the death of the Prmce Consort, took place nearly 
twenty-eight months later. All thought of a European 
intervention in the American war had then been dismissed. 
In the interim, Mr. Adams had been under the same roof 
with the Queen once only, the occasion already mentioned, 
the marriage of the Prince of Wales. Mr. Hewitt's alleged 
Windsor interview, if it took place at all, must therefore 
have taken place, not in 1862, but in 1861. Moreover, if it 
took place in 1861, it must have been prior to November 25 
of that year, as on that day Mr. Adams left London to pay 
a visit to Lord Houghton at Frystone ; nor did he return 
to London until after the arrival of the news of the Trent 
affair, and the first development (December 1) of the fatal 
illness of the Prince. But, unfortunately, Mr. Hewitt says 
he himself was not sent to Europe until 1862. Even sup- 
posing he was mistaken in this, and was in London in the 
summer of 1861, the royal family were at Balmoral from 
August 31 to October 22 of that year, at which date they 
started to come up to Windsor. The interview could, there- 
fore, by any possibility have occurred only between October 
24, 1861, when they reached Windsor, and December 1, 
when the Prince sickened ; but during that brief space of 
time every day is fully accounted for in Mr. Adams's diary, 
and no such incident is mentioned. 

It is always difficult to prove a negative to demonstration. 
Especially is this so when the facts alleged, or something 
resembling them, may have taken place anywhere during a 
period of years. In the present instance, however, a com- 
plete negative is proved not only as above set forth, but 
by the additional and decisive fact that no mention what- 
ever of, nor even an allusion to, any such extraordinary per- 
formance as that described by Mr. Hewitt, is anywhere to be 
found in Mr. Adams's diary, corresiDondence or papers, 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 381 

much less in any public or private despatch of his to the Sec- 
retary of State. No accredited minister to any foreign 
country could, of course, have ventured on such an un- 
precedented and wholly irregular step without reporting 
it at once to his government. Mr. Adams, moreover, was 
of all men that one least likely to have had recourse to such 
a supreme effort at what could, perhaps, best be denomi- 
nated shirt-waist diplomacy. 

How, then, account for Mr. Hewitt's extraordinary state- 
ment ? On what basis of fact was it built up ? That Mr. 
Hewitt was in Europe during the Civil War is unquestionable. 
He was also in England, and saw more or less of Mr. Adams. 
That he interested himself greatly, and after his own en- 
ergetic fashion, in the efforts to detain the Confederate 
cruisers and to circumvent the plans of the agents of the 
Confederacy goes almost without saying. That he was 
also at one time sent over by Mr. Dayton to advise Mr. 
Adams of diplomatic moves then on foot, but which subse- 
quently failed to materialize, is altogether probable ; though 
curiously enough a fairly careful examination fails to reveal 
any allusion to him in such a capacity in Mr. Adams's 
papers. All this, though not important, is highly probable. 
But, admitting all this, and, if need be, much more, it does 
not seem possible to avoid the conclusion that the whole 
account of that extremely unconventional Windsor morning 
call, with its royal though somewhat autocratic if informal, 
assurance of peace and good-will, was a pure figment of the 
imagination, — ''such stuff as dreams are made on." In 
this case the most careful analysis yields positively no re- 
siduum whatever of historical fact. 

But the Hewitt reminiscence naturally leads up to an- 
other Civil War legend, — the accepted tradition, now be- 
come almost an article of American faith, that somehow and 



382 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

in some way the cause of the Union was in its hour of trial 
dear to Queen Victoria, and that we of the North were 
then under deep and peculiar obligation to her. 

It was on the 7th of February, 1901, that Mr. Hewitt put 
on formal record his recollection, based wholly on hearsay, 
of that apocryphal interview had between the American 
minister and Queen Victoria in the royal domesticity of 
Windsor, in which the latter took occasion to commit herself 
so unreservedly against any action of her constitutional ad- 
visers which might lead to hostilities between Great Britain 
and the United States. Almost exactly a year after the ex- 
Mayor of New York made this contribution to the diplo- 
matic history of our Civil War, her grandson, Prince Henry 
of Prussia, came to Boston in the course of a tour through 
the United States, and, on the 6th of March, 1902, an hon- 
orary degree was conferred upon him by Harvard Univer- 
sity. In a carefully prepared address delivered in Saunders 
Theatre by President Eliot, when conferring the degree, 
was the following : — 

"Universities have long memories. Forty years ago the Ameri- 
can Union was in deadly peril, and thousands of its young men 
were bleeding and dying for it. It is credibly reported that at a 
very critical moment the Queen of England said to her prime 
minister, 'My Lord, you must understand that I shall sign no 
paper which means war with the United States.' The grandson 
of that illustrious woman is sitting with us here." 

To much the same effect, though nearly thirty years 
earlier, Mr. Joseph H. Choate thus expressed himself at a 
reception tendered that very true friend of ours, the Right 
Hon. William E. Forster, at the Union League Club of New 
York City, December 14, 1874 : '^ We shall probably find 
out that we had [in Great Britain, during the War of 
Secession] more friends than we knew, both in Parliament 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 383 

and in the Government; and there is the best of reasons 
for believing that that gracious lady, the Queen herself, 
was from the first to the last an obstinately faithful 
ally of America, and was utterly averse to anything 
that might tend to a breach of the peace with her dearest 
ally/' 

Here in two instances, far removed from each other both 
in place and time, was Mr. Hewitt's story, appearing and 
reappearing in a slightly different form. Mr. Choate ad- 
duced in support of his statement a letter from Thurlow 
Weed, telling the familiar and to us pathetic story of Prince 
Albert's suggested modifications of Earl Russell's first 
draught of a despatch to Lord Lyons, in November, 1861, 
when news of the Mason-Slidell seizure on the Trent reached 
England. The somewhat carefully guarded statement of 
President Eliot was both more recent and more specific. 
The language quoted by him as that made use of by the 
Queen was substantially the same as that contained in 
the Hewitt reminiscence ; but it was, in this version, uttered 
to her minister and not to the representative of a foreign 
country, and that country the one directly involved. In 
so far the Eliot version bore an aspect of much greater prob- 
ability than the Hewitt version. The Eliot version was, hu- 
manly speaking, at least possible ; this can scarcely be said 
of the Hewitt version. In reply to a letter asking his 
authority for the statement thus made, if indeed he had 
any authority except Mr. Hewitt's then comparatively 
recent utterance. President Eliot wrote as follows : — 

''In 1874 I was at Oxford for a week. Dr. Acland, to whom I 
had a letter, procured for me an invitation to lunch with Prince 
Leopold, who was then living with a tutor in a small house at Ox- 
ford and going to some lectures. Dr. Acland went with me, and 
we were four at the table. In the course of luncheon the Prince 



384 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

told the story of the Queen's interview with Lord Russell, Dr. 
Acland prompting him to do so. He gave no authorities, and 
said nothing about the source of his information. He must have 
been a small boy at the time of this interview with the Queen. Dr. 
Acland spoke of the story as if he believed it. Naturally I re- 
membered the Prince's statement, but I do not know that I ever 
talked about it. Quite lately — that is, since last March — I 
heard somebody else attribute this statement to Prince Leopold, 
but I have now forgotten who that somebody else was.^ I have 
never seen any real authority for it, and that is the reason I used 
the expression ' credibly stated.'" 

It thus appears that President Eliot spoke from his own 
recollection of what he had twenty-seven years previously 
been told by a youth of twenty-one of an occurrence and 
conversation which must have taken place at least twelve 
3^ears before that, and when the youth in question was still 
a boy ; for Prince Leopold, born in April, 1853, was, in 1862, 
as yet a child of nine. Nevertheless, here is authority, such 
as it is. Sir Llenry Acland was in 1874 a man of fifty-nine. 
He had been in America, a member of the suite of the Prince 
of Wales during his memorable tour of 1860. In 1874 he 
was Regius Professor of Medicine at Oxford, and honorary 
physician to Prince Leopold, then an undergraduate. Thus a 
man very competent to form an opinion on such a point, and 
so situated as to have special sources of information thereon, 
intimated a belief in the story. This is corroborative evi- 
dence too strong to be lightly brushed aside. It indicates 
clearly and indisputably that an accepted tradition pre- 
vailed in the royal family and about Windsor Castle, that, 
at some period of crisis in the course of our Civil War, 
Queen Victoria did take a decided stand with the min- 
istry in opposition to anything calculated to provoke hostil- 

1 The person referred to was the late Prof. N. S. Shaler. See his Auto- 
biography, 264. 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 385 

ities with the United States. Accepted traditions are rarely 
without some foundation of fact. 

For this particular tradition, now welded into our Ameri- 
can popular belief, can any clearly established foundation 
in fact be found ? — and was the policy of the Palmerston- 
Russeil ministry, in power throughout our War of Secession, 
at any juncture of that war gravely influenced by the Queen ? 
To get at the probabilities in the case it is necessary to go 
far back, and obtain a correct understanding of the way in 
which, at the time in question, the Queen and her principal 
advisers viewed the situation of affairs and course of events, 
so far as the troubles in America were concerned. Nor 
in attempting this is it necessary to enter into any elaborate 
analysis of the character of Queen Victoria necessarily drawn 
from the most general sources of information. It is sufficient 
for present purposes to call attention to a very noticeable 
article, entitled ''The Character of Queen Victoria," which 
appeared in the Quarterly Review shortly after her death. ^ 

This article, the authorship of which, only surmised, has 
never been publicly avowed, was evidently prepared by a 
practised writer, probably in collaboration with some woman, 
presumably of rank, who enjoyed long and peculiar means 
of intimate observation of the royal family. From what 
is said in this paper, — v/hich at the time occasioned a 
great deal of talk in England, — several points of much sig- 
nificance in the present connection may safely be educed. 
Neither naturally, nor under the shaping influence of the 
Prince Consort, did the Queen have any bias towards 
democracy. It was Francis Joseph of Austria who on some 
occasion remarked, ''Royalty is my business"; and Queen 

* Referred to by Mr. Morley in his Life of Gladstone (Vol. II, p. 425) as 
"the remarkable article in the Quarterly Review," No. 386, April, 1901, 
p. 320. 

2c 



386 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

Victoria might well have so said. Throughout her entire life 
she bore herself in the spirit of the apothegm ; and towards 
democracy in all its aspects and wherever existing, she felt 
an instinctive aversion. An ingrained Jacobite, one of her 
'^ strongest traits was her partiality for the Stuarts; she 
forgave them all their faults. She used to say, ' I am 
far more proud of my Stuart than of my Hanoverian an- 
cestors'; and of the latter indeed she very seldom spoke." 
She would permit of no disparagement of even poor old 
James II ; and Dean Stanley used to say that, in character, 
she much resembled Queen Elizabeth, — whom by the 
way, she particularly disliked. ''When she faces you down 
with her 'It must be,' " the Dean declared, "I don't know 
whether it is Victoria or Elizabeth who is speaking." In 
the social life of the Palace, also, there was nothing of 
the bourgeois Queen about Victoria. She was insistent on 
Court etiquette; and the picture given in the article in the 
Quarterly of the German evenings at Windsor is extremely 
suggestive. "The Royalties stood together on the rug in 
front of the fire, a station which none durst hold but they ; 
and amusing incidents occurred in connection with this sacred 
object." Thus the Queen was utterly devoid of what may 
be termed sympathy for those democratic institutions of 
which the American Union was the great exponent among 
the nations, or for any movement in that direction. On the 
other hand, she had an instinctive dread of war, and of all 
foreign complications likely to result in war. Moreover, she 
had in 1860 been gratified, and even touched, by the warm 
welcome everywhere extended to the Prince of W^ales by 
the great English-speaking community across the Atlantic. 
The recollection of it was still fresh in memory when the 
issues of the Civil War presented themselves. A single 
thing more remains to be said. Queen Victoria was in one 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 387 

important respect the true grandchild of George III, our 
old revolutionary bete noir. To quote again, and for the 
last time, from the article in the Quarterly: "No one that 
knew her late Majesty well will be inclined to deny that her 
extraordinary pertinacity, her ingrained inability to drop 
an idea which she had fairly seized, might naturally have 
developed into obstinacy. By nature she certainly was what 
could only be called obstinate, but the extraordinary number 
of opposite objects upon which her will was incessantly ex- 
ercised saved her from the consequences of this defect." This 
final saving clause was of course naturally limited to normal 
conditions. It would be wholly safe, on the other hand, to 
surmise that the latent peculiarity of character here alluded 
to would, in her case as in the case of her grandfather, 
become morbidly active in presence of sufficiently exciting 
causes, or under an excessive nervous strain. 

Such was the Queen, a factor in the political conditions 
of her kingdom which no minister or combination of min- 
isters was, during her long reign, ever able to ignore or even 
override. The royal sphere might be limited, and closely 
hedged about; but it was there, and within it her Majesty 
was supreme. 

During the Civil War the so-called Palmerston-Russell 
ministry was in power. Formed in June, 1859, with an un- 
derstanding between the two chiefs that either who might 
be sent for would accept office under the other, it was 
''looked upon as the strongest administration ever formed, 
so far as the individual talents of its members were con- 
cerned." ^ And this fact of the individuality and character 
of those composing the ministry became subsequently of 
great importance in deciding the policy to be pursued at 
several very critical diplomatic junctures; for the Palmer- 
1 Ashley, Lord Palmerslon (ed. 1879), II, 364. 



388 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

ston-Russell ministry remained in the firm control of the 
government from June, 1859, until the death of Lord Palm- 
erston in October, 1865, following the collapse of the 
Confederacy. The three leading characters in it were Lord 
Palmerston, Premier, Lord John Russell, — created Earl 
Russell in July, 1861, — Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
and Mr. Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer. 

In the first place, as respects Lord Palmerston. It has 
always been assumed that, from the very commencement 
of our troubles, his sympathies were with the Confederates, 
and that his instincts as a member and representative of the 
British privileged classes were hostile to the more democratic 
North. There can be no question that this was so. Never- 
theless, during the earliest stages of the struggle, and before 
the Trent affair gave a decided adverse bent to the Premier's 
feelings, there was room for question. At first he seems to 
have regarded both parties to the quarrel with indifference, 
and, apparently, equal dislike. He cared not which whipped. 
Even as late as October 18, — only twenty-one days before 
the seizure of Mason and Slidell, — the Premier thus wrote 
to the Foreign Secretary: '^As to North America, our best 
and true policy seems to be to go on as we have begun, and 
to keep quite clear of the conflict between North and South. 
. . . The love of quarrelling and fighting is inherent in 
man, and to prevent its indulgence is to impose restraints 
on natural liberty. ... I quite agree with you that the 
wantof cotton would not justify such a proceeding. . . . The 
only thing to do seems to be to lie on our oars and to give 
no pretext to the Washingtonians to quarrel with us, while, 
on the other hand, we maintain our rights and those of 
our fellow countrymen." ^ 

Thus Palmerston was writing to Earl Russell, he then 
* Ashley, Palmerston, II, 411. 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 389 

being at Broadlands and the Foreign Secretary in attend- 
ance on the Queen, who was still at Balmoral. Meanwhile 
Mr. John Lothrop Motley was at that juncture in Great 
Britain. He had in August been appointed to the Austrian 
mission, and, on his way to Vienna, necessarily passed 
through England. Mr. Seward, newly installed in his office 
of Secretary of State, was then eager to inform himself 
through all possible channels ^ as to the state of affairs in 
Europe, and the views of our conflict held by public 
men, especially those of Great Britain and France. Mr. 
Motley's English acquaintance was exceptionally large; 
indeed, there were few persons he could not reach. Deeply 
interested in the Union cause, he now made frequent reports 
of a semi-official character to the Secretary of State. In 
them is the following account of interviews and conversations 
with Earl Russell and the Queen, and the writer's impressions 
as to the views and tendencies of Palmerston : — 

"I had addressed a note to Lord Russell (who, as I under- 
stood, was at his country house called Abergeldie in the north of 
Scotland) saying that I had just returned to this country from 
America and that, before I departed for Vienna, I should be glad 
to accept an invitation often made by him, that I should visit 
him in Scotland. The answer came by return of post, that he 
would be delighted to see me at once, and that he hoped I would 
stay as long as I could. 

"On the ninth of September I reached Abergeldie, where, how- 
ever, my engagements did not permit me to stay longer than a day 
and a half. During this time, I had many full conversations with 
him of several hours' duration. I believe that we discussed the 
American question in all its bearings, and he was frank and 
apparently sincere in his expressions of amity towards the United 
States, and in deprecation of a rupture or of serious misunder- 
standing. . . . 

"I spoke to him of the report alluded to by the editor of the 

1 Supra, 364-365. 



390 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

Spectator, that England would recognize the Confederacy in 
November. He smiled, and said that it was a pure fiction ; that 
no such purpose existed. He discussed this matter at considerable 
length and alluded to the practice of nations to recognize de facto 
governments, when they had become facts ; observing that such 
things went more rapidly in modern times than they did of old; 
but saying distinctly, and repeating it many times, that the gov- 
ernment were not thinking of recognizing the Southern Confed- 
eracy at present. . . . 

"... He did not wonder at our determination to put down the 
insurrection; but added that it was of so extensive a character, 
and was spread over so wide a surface, as to make our task seem a 
very formidable one. Five millions of people he thought hard to 
subdue, when fighting on their own soil ; but he had no disposition 
to prejudge the case. He admitted the possibility of our efforts 
being successful, but thought that the effect of the Bull's Run 
affair would be to encourage the Confederates. He spoke very 
reasonably of that event, and did not attribute any great con- 
sequence to the panic, because it was well known that this was not 
uncommon among raw levies and volunteers, who might after- 
wards become the best of soldiers. He thought that much less 
effect had been produced in England by the defeat and the rout, 
than by the circumstance of so many regiments leaving on the 
eve of active operations, because their term of enlistment had 
expired. . . . 

" Of course the subject of blockade was discussed. I said that in 
the Southern States there was the utmost confidence expressed 
that Great Britain would break our blockade, so soon as the cotton 
famine became imminent. It was notorious that the whole in- 
surrection had been founded upon the theory that Great Britain 
could not exist without American cotton, and that therefore she 
could be relied upon to come to their rescue, after the United States 
should have effectually blockaded the cotton ports. The South 
believes itself possessed of the power of life and death over England 
by means of this single product, and therefore felt sure of forcing 
her into an alliance and into hostility to the United States. On 
the other hand, there was doubtless great uneasiness on the sub- 
ject in the free states. To blockade the coast was one of the most 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 391 

indisputable of belligerent rights, and a forcible infringement by 
neutral governments of an effectual blockade was of course tanta- 
mount to a declaration of war. There was much anxiety therefore 
lest the stress of cotton should lead to war on the part of Great 
Britain. In this case, the consequences to humanity would be 
most disastrous. Without reference to the damage which each 
nation might inflict on the other, it was sufficient to intimate that 
the first effect of an infringement of the blockade and con- 
sequently of war made on the United States by Great Britain or 
by France, or by both united, would be a proclamation of universal 
emancipation of the slaves. ... 

"... He was well aware, he said, of the power which the South 
thought itself possessed of over foreign nations by means of their 
cotton, and he sympathized with the general impatience of England 
under this supposed monopoly. The government was doing, 
would do, what it could to foster the production of cotton in India 
and other countries, and he felt hopeful of the result. He alluded 
to the resolution taken by the South to forbid the exportation of 
cotton, and showed me a familiar note to himself from Lord Pal- 
merston on that subject, saying — 'We are up to that dodge.' . . . 

"On the morning after my arrival. Lord Russell mentioned to 
me at breakfast, that the Queen, then residing at Balmoral, about 
a mile and a half from Abergeldie, was aware that I was making 
him a brief visit and that I was to leave early next morning. She 
had accordingly sent to say that the Prince Consort as well as 
herself would be pleased if I would come to Balmoral that after- 
noon. . . . 

"In the afternoon he took me to Balmoral in the carriage, and 
we were received by the Prince Consort in the most informal and 
agreeable manner. The conversation was of some twenty min- 
utes' duration, and was strictly limited to commonplace subjects, 
without reference to politics ; but the Prince Consort took es- 
pecial pains, I thought, to be polite and friendly, and certainly 
produced a most pleasing impression upon me. While we were 
conversing, the door opened, and her Majesty walked, quite un- 
attended, into the room, dressed in plain, black morning costume. 
The Prince Consort presented me, and I was received with much 
affability; the Queen making a gracious observation in regard 



392 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

to myself, which I forbear to repeat, and then speaking at once, 
and with warmth, of the great pleasure which she had derived 
from the reception which the Prince of Wales had met with in 
America last year. The Prince Consort also expressed himself 
with eagerness on this subject, and alluded to the very great 
delight which the young Prince himself had experienced in his 
tour and in the friendly greeting which he had received from 
our nation. 

"Nothing else, worthy to be repeated, was said, but I thought 
it my duty to mention the incident ; for it seemed intended as a 
mark of respect and goodwill to the United States. . . . 

"On our way back, I observed to Lord Russell that the Queen 
and Prince Consort seemed carefully to have abstained from an 
allusion to politics. 

"He said — 'Yes — of course — for neither would choose to ap- 
pear as interfering with the constitutional advisers of the crown.' 
He added, however, that the Prince had asked him, on his coming 
into the room, a few minutes before I was introduced, 'well, what 
about recognition,' or something to that effect ; and that he had 
answered, 'no, we are not thinking of that at present; we are not 
prepared to recognize the Southern confederacy.' 'I suppose you 
mean,' said the Prince Consort, 'that you don't intend to pledge 
yourself for all time never to do it, whatever events might happen.' 
'Yes,' answered Lord Russell, *we can't look into all the future — 
but, for the present, we have no intention of recognizing them.' " 

The next letter from Mr. Motley was dated "Vienna, 
N0V./6I." In it he wrote: — 

"In the present administration and its supporters, I know that 
we have many warm friends, warmer in their sentiments towards 
us than it would be safe for them in the present state of parties to 
avow. Lord Palmerston is not one of these friends. He knows 
little of our politics or condition, and cares less for them ; and he 
is reckless of consequences should we give him good and popular 
cause of quarrel. But he is too adroit to place himself technically 
and flagrantly in the wrong ; and therefore all fears that there 
would be a forcible infringement of our blockade have always 
seemed to me quite groundless." 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 393 

It is important to note the date — September 9, 1861 — 
of the visit and conversations thus so graphically described. 
It was two months to a day before the occurrence of the 
Trent affair, and eight}^ days only before all England was 
set aflame by the arrival (November 27) of the news of that 
affair. The attitude towards things American of the British 
ministry at the earlier date was thus explicitly set forth. 
It certainly presented no grounds for complaint on our part. 
The glimpse given of the royal family is also suggestive. 

Up to this time (September, 1861), the recently appointed 
American minister, Mr. Adams, had met Lord Palmerston 
merely in an official capacity and in the most formal way. 
He had been in London nearly five months; but he had 
arrived when the season was already well advanced towards 
its later stages, and had seen the Premier only on state oc- 
casions, or from the gallery of the House of Commons. To- 
wards the end of September he had made a flying visit to 
Scotland at the invitation of Earl Russell, and had been 
the guest of the latter at Abergeldie Castle for a single 
day (September 25), occupied with official business. Mr. 
Motley had preceded him as a guest by about two weeks. 
While there he had seen nothing of the royal family. Sub- 
sequently, on the 9th of November, he had been one of the 
guests and speakers at the Lord Mayor's dinner, at which 
the Premier was a prominent figure. What the Premier says 
at the annual Guild-hall dinner is apt to be significant. On 
this occasion Mr. Adams listened with the keenest interest. 
The struggle in America was the issue then uppermost in 
all men's minds, the cotton market was excited, and it was 
not improbable that the policy of the government might be 
shadowed forth in anticipation of the meeting of Parliament. 
The impression left on Mr. Adams's mind was favorable. 
He referred to what Lord Palmerston said as being marked 



394 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

by his " customary shrewdness," adding, ^'He touched 
gently on our difficulties; and, at the same time, gave it 
clearly to be understood that there was to be no interference 
for the sake of cotton." This was on the 9th of Novem- 
ber; and, the very day before, the steamer Trent had been 
stopped in the Old Bahama Channel, some four thousand 
miles away, and Messrs. Mason and Slidell taken from her. 
Eighteen days later, on the 27th, the occurrence became 
known in England. On the 12th, three days after the oc- 
currence in the West Indian waters, and fifteen days before 
it was known in England, the first, as also the last, personal 
interview between Mr. Adams and Lord Palmerston took 
place. Of it, Mr. Adams immediately afterwards made the 
following diary record : — 

" Tuesday, 12th November, 1861 : — Received a familiar note 
from Lord Palmerston asking me to call at his house and see him 
between one and two o'clock. This took me by surprise, and I 
speculated on the cause for some time without any satisfaction. 
At one o'clock I drove from my house over to his, Cambridge 
House in Piccadilly. In a few minutes he saw me. His reception 
was very cordial and frank. He said he had been made anxious by 
a notice that a United States armed vessel had lately put into 
Southampton to get coal and supplies.^ It had been intimated to 
him that the object was to intercept the two men, Messrs. Slidell 

^The United States steamer James Adger, Commander John B. Mar- 
chand, had left New York October 16, under orders to intercept, if possible, 
the Confederate steamer Nashville, which ran the blockade at Charleston 
on the night of October 10, 1861, and was falsely reported to have Messrs. 
Mason and Slidell on board, presumably destined for some European port. 
The Confederate commissioners in fac-t left Charleston on the Theodora, 
also a Confederate vessel, two days later, on the night of October 12. The 
following day they arrived at Nassau, their immediate destination; and 
thence went to Cuba, still on the Theodora, landing at Cardenas. The 
orders under which Commander Marchand sailed were issued under an 
entire misapprehension of facts, and his instructions related exclusively 
to the Nashville. See Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies 
in the war of the Rebellion, I, 128, 224-227. 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 395 

and Mason, who were understood to be aboard the British West 
India steamer expected to arrive to-morrow or next day. He had 
been informed that the Captain, having got gloriously drunk on 
brandy on Sunday, had dropped down to the mouth of the river 
yesterday, as if on the watch. He did not pretend to judge abso- 
lutely of the question whether we had a right to stop a foreign 
vessel for such a purpose as was indicated. Even admitting that 
we might claim it, it was yet very doubtful whether the exercise 
of it in this way could lead to any good. The effect of it here 
would be unfavorable, as it would seem as if the vessel had come 
in here to be filled with coal and supplies, and the Captain had 
enjoyed the hospitality of the country in filling his stomach with 
brandy, only to rush out of the harbor and commit violence upon 
their flag. Neither did the object to be gained seem commen- 
surate with the risk. For it was surely of no consequence whether 
one or two more men were added to the two or three who had 
already been too long here. They would scarcely make a difference 
in the action of the government after once having made up its 
mind. He was then going on to another question, when I asked 
leave to interrupt him so far as to reply on this point. I would first 
venture to ask him if he would enlighten me as to the sources of in- 
formation upon which he imputed the intention of Captain Mar- 
chand to take such a step. His Lordship answered that he had no 
positive information, but that his belief rested on inferences of the 
motive for sending the vessel so far, and the coincidence in her 
time of departure. To this I remarked that Captain Marchand had 
been to see me, and had shown me the instructions under which 
he sailed. The object of the government had been, upon receiving 
information that the steamer Nashville from Charleston had suc- 
ceeded in breaking the blockade and was proceeding with these 
men on a voyage to Europe, to despatch vessels in several directions 
with the design of intercepting and capturing her. I presumed 
that no objection could exist to such a proceeding on our part. His 
Lordship assented, though he did not seem to have heard of the 
Nashville or to understand its destination. I then said that the 
James Adger had been sent in this direction, but finding no news 
of the Nashville, and learning that the two emissaries had stopped 
at the West Indies, Captain Marchand had written to me his in- 



396 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

tention to return to the United States. I would, however, remark 
that I had urged him to follow up a steamer called the Gladiator 
which had been fitted up and despatched from London with 
contraband of war for the insurgents. Though sailing under 
British colors, I advised him to seize her on the first symptom of 
destination to a harbor in the United States. His Lordship did 
not deny my right, but he intimated that the proof ought to 
be well established. I said that my government had no desire to 
open questions with this country. On the contrary I think they 
would do all in their power to avoid them. But I could not 
deny that these proceedings in England were excessively annoy- 
ing, and that there would spring up a strong desire to arrest 
them as decisively as possible. His Lordship then passed to the 
case of Mr. Bunch, the consul at Charleston. . . . We then 
passed into more general conversation, in the course of which I 
ventured to ask if it was to be presumed that the two governments 
of France and Great Britain were acting in concert in regard to 
the United States. He said. Yes. I then mentioned my having 
received in my latest despatch notice that M. Mercier had 
apprised my government that the French stood in need of cotton. 
Was I to understand that this was in concert too ? His Lordship 
said that he was aware of the French government having directed 
a suggestion to be made, that it would be glad to have cotton, 
but it was nothing more, and Lord Lyons had not any direction to 
join in it. I replied that I so understood it, but that I could not 
but regret such steps as they formed the only foundation upon 
which the insurgents rested their hopes of success. ^ Mr. Yancey 
in his speech at the fishmongers' dinner had sufficiently expressed 
it, but in point of fact I had reason to know that he and his associ- 
ates had been indefatigable in their representations of the certainty 
of interference in their behalf. It was this view of the subject 
which created the irritation in the United States. If we could be 
left entirely to ourselves, the issue would not be long doubtful. 
To this his Lordship made the common remark among his 
countrymen that we might perhaps coerce and subdue them, but 
that would not be restoring the Union. I answered that such 
was not our desire. What we expected to do was to give them 

* Supra, 255. 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 397 

an opportunity of making an unbiased decision. We believed 
that this was a conspiracy which had blown up a great rebellion. 
A short time would test the sense of the whole community. If 
the presence of a force adequate to protection did not develop 
a counter movement to return to the Union, I did not believe that 
pure coercion would be persevered in. I did not, however, add 
my conviction that slavery as a political element must be com- 
pletely expunged before there can be any hope of permanent 
peace. I then took my leave and returned home." ^ 

This record certainly shows Lord Palmerston in no at- 
titude of hostility to America. On the contrary, he dis- 
tinctly went out of his way to give a friendly intimation 
calculated to forestall and prevent the doing of something 
which was unfortunately already done, but which is now 
universally admitted to have been the super-zealous act of 
well-nigh incredible folly on the part of a highly indiscreet 
and ill-balanced naval officer. And Lord Palmerston did this, 
too, in a very kindly way. There was in his manner nothing 
either rough or brusque, or in any way offensive. On the 
contrary, it was marked by much characteristic bonhomie. 
Mr. Adams so accepted it, and even began to relax in his 
suspicions of the Premier. 

Meanwhile, Mr. Adams did not know that only the day 
before the Premier had been in solemn conference with 
Lord Chancellor Westbury, Dr. Lushington and the three 
official Law Officers of the Crown, to consider the very 
contingency he now suggested. And, furthermore, much 
to his regret as well as surprise, he had been then advised 
that, according to the principles of international law ac- 
cepted in English courts, and practised and enforced by 

1 Mr. Adams's official account of this highly significant interview is 
in a despatch to the Secretary of State, dated November 15, 1861. 
Never printed in the Diplomatic Correspondence, it is to be found 
almost in full in War Records, Serial No. 115, pp. 1078, 1079. 



398 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

Great Britain, a belligerent had a right to stop and search 
any neutral not being a ship of war suspected of carrying 
enemy's despatches. Consequently, either Commander Mar- 
chand or Captain Wilkes, on accepted English principles 
of law, might stop the Trent, search her, and if Messrs. 
Mason and Slidell, their despatches and credentials, were 
found on board, '^ either take them out, or seize the packet 
and carry her back to New York for trial." ^ The Premier, 
fully advised as to the law in the case, was thus doing his 
utmost to prevent the occurrence of that which, unknown 
to either himself or Mr. Adams, had already happened. 
The next glimpse we get of Palmerston, he appears in 
quite another character. It is from the recently published 
Memoirs of Sir Horace Rumbold. The Trent was stopped 
November 8 ; the interview between Mr. Adams and the 
Premier at Cambridge House was on the 12th; the news 
of what had taken place on the 8th reached London on the 
27th. Sir Horace Rumbold says:^ "As soon as the news 
reached England, a Cabinet CouncU was summoned, and I 
had it on the same day from Evelyn Ashley that Lord 
Palmerston, on entering the room where the Ministers met 
in Downing Street, threw his hat on the table, and at once 
commenced business by addressing his colleagues in the 
following words: *I don't know whether you are going to 
stand this, but I'll be d d if I do !' The ultimatum de- 
manding the surrender of the prisoners was decided upon 
there and then, and sent out within two days (on the fol- 
lowing Sunday)." 

Into what subsequently occurred in the so-called Trent 
affair it is not, for present purposes, necessary to enter. It 
is matter of history. The royal family was then at Windsor, 

1 Dasent, John Thadeus Delane, II, 36. 

2 Recollections of a Diplomatist, II, 83. 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 399 

having left Balmoral October 22. The Prince Consort began 
to sicken on the 1st of December; he died on December 14. 
As is well known, his very last public act was to soften 
down the asperities of the despatch to Lord Lyons as 
originally drawn up by the Foreign Secretary, and, 
according to usage, submitted to the Queen before trans- 
mission. Full details on this subject may be found in Sir 
Theodore Martin's Life of the Prince Consort. It is suffi- 
cient here to say — but to emphasize it is of importance 
in the matter under discussion — the last working hours of 
the Prince were anxiously devoted to an effort to preserve 
friendly relations between Great Britain and the United 
States. That might well have been considered his dying 
injunction to the Queen. The Prince was buried on the 
23d of December; and when, on the 9th of the following 
month. Lord Palmerston officially communicated to her 
Majesty the intelligence that the Trent affair was happily 
solved, she promptly reminded him of the fact that ''this 
peaceful issue of the American quarrel was greatly owing 
to her beloved Prince." ^ 

In America active military operations had then ceased, 
and the two parties to the conflict were preparing for a 
supreme trial of strength when the coming season should 
open. Europe was looking on ; a universal mourning for the 
Prince Consort overshadowed Great Britain ; the stoppage 
of cotton shipments by the Federal blockade was beginning 
to make itself felt in the manufacturing districts of both 
England and France; the combined French, Spanish and 
English movement on Mexico was in preparation ; the ex- 
pediency and consequent probability of a joint movement of 
European powers looking to a recognition of the Confed- 
eracy and their subsequent intervention in our Civil War 
^ Lee, Victoria, p. 382. 



400 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

was under discussion; no active movement to that end 
had, however, yet been initiated. The Queen herself, 
much broken by the death of her husband, and both men- 
tally and physically in a condition causing profound solici- 
tude, attended to her public duties and transacted business 
with her ministers as had been her habit, but naturally had 
to be treated by them with great consideration. Morbid 
excitement was feared, and anything which might in any 
way conduce thereto was carefully avoided. 

This condition of affairs lasted all through both the winter 
and spring of 1862, — the months immediately following the 
death of the Prince Consort. During that time there is no 
reason whatever to suppose that, as a question of policy, any 
issue growing out of the American difficulties was brought 
to the Queen's notice. She had no occasion to express 
herself; and, weighed down by domestic affliction, her 
mind was intent on other things. During those months, 
however, the cotton famine reached its worst stages both 
in Great Britain and France ; and, contemporaneously, the 
Union operations underwent severe reverses. As a natural 
result, the question of recognition, and consequent inter- 
vention, became urgent. The French Emperor publicly 
favored this course, repeatedly and persistently urging the 
British government to take the initiative, and signifying 
his readiness to cooperate.^ The struggle in America was 
the uppermost subject of interest throughout Europe, and 
especially in Great Britain, where the tide of sympathy ran 
strongly with the Confederates in what was looked upon 
as their gallant struggle for independence against over- 
whelming odds of men and resources. The condition of the 
Queen, though not discussed openly, was well understood 
in court circles. She was unequal to any nervous strain. 
1 Rhodes, United Stales, IV, 94, n., 346. 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 401 

This was recognized by the Confederate emissaries in London 
as a serious obstacle in the way of that recognition for which 
they were praying. They were also well informed on this 
point; probably far better informed than the American 
minister, for at least four out of five of the ministry and 
members of Parliament, and almost the entire court circle, 
were strong sympathizers with the Confederacy. Accord- 
ingly, on February 28, 1862, James M. Mason, the Confederate 
commissioner in London, wrote to Mr. Hunter, the Richmond 
Secretary of State: '^In political circles it is thought the 
condition of the Queen has much to do with the manifest 
reluctance of the Ministry to run any risk of war by inter- 
ference with the blockade. It is said that she is under 
great constitutional depression, and nervously sensitive to 
anything that looks like war. Indeed, much fear is enter- 
tained as to the condition of her health." And a few days 
later (March 11) to the same effect: '^Many causes concur 
[in bringing about a general support of the ministry in its 
policy of non-intervention]. First, the prevailing disinclina- 
tion in any way to disturb the mourning of the Queen. The 
loyalty of the English people to their present Sovereign is 
strongly mixed up with an affectionate devotion to her person. 
You find this feeling prevalent in all circles and classes." 
Finally, writing on the 31st of July following. Mason says: 
'^The Queen remains in great seclusion, and it is more than 
whispered that apprehension is entertained lest she lapse 
into insania." ^ 

That summer the Queen passed at Osborne, at Balmoral, 
and at Windsor ; but early in the autumn (September) she 
went over to Germany, and was for a short time at Gotha, 
returning to England October 26. Earl Russell was in 

^ 7^he Public Life and Diplomatic Correspondence of James M. Mason, 
264, 265, 315. 
2d 



402 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

attendance there upon her; and the crisis in American 
affairs, so far as European intervention was concerned, then 
occurred. 

It came about in this wise : — Referring to the outcome 
of the so-called Pope, or second Bull Run, campaign before 
Washington in August, 1862, Lord Palmerston wrote to 
Earl Russell, then (September 14) in attendance at Gotha, 
suggesting whether the time had not come ''for us to con- 
sider whether, in such a state of things, England and France 
might not address the contending parties and recommend an 
arrangement upon the basis of separation." This suggestion 
strongly commended itself to the Foreign Secretary, who 
replied on the 17th that he was decidedly of the same mind 
as the Premier: ''I agree with you that the time is come 
for offering mediation to the United States government, 
with a view to the recognition of the independence of the 
Confederates. I agree further that, in case of failure, we 
ought ourselves to recognize the Southern States as an in- 
dependent State. For the purpose of taking so important a 
step, I think we must have a meeting of the Cabinet. The 
23d or 20th would suit me for the meeting." To this very 
emphatic acquiescence in his views. Lord Palmerston six 
days later, on the 23d, wrote back: ''Your plan of proceed- 
ings . . . seems to be excellent. ... As to the time of 
making the offer [of mediation] if France and Russia 
agree — and France, we know, is quite ready and only 
waiting for our concurrence — events may be taking place 
which might render it desirable that the offer should be 
made before the middle of October." Lord Russell now 
left Gotha and returned to London, Lord Granville relieving 
him in attendance on the Queen. 

It has been surmised^ that it was at this juncture, if ever, 
^ Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, Second Series, XVIII, 145, 153. 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 403 

that the incident occurred of which Prince Leopold retained 
the boyish recollection upon which President Eliot based 
his "credibly reported" statement. A mystery did indeed 
hang over the outcome of events at that most curiously 
critical period — a mystery the American minister was 
unable at the time to penetrate, in fact never did pene- 
trate — but which admitted of an altogether natural ex- 
planation on the hypothesis that the incident narrated by 
Prince Leopold then occurred. It seemed not at all im- 
possible in view of the solicitude felt over her mental as 
well as physical condition, that the whole course of events 
might have turned on the individual attitude of the widow 
of Prince Albert. The surmise was erroneous. The Queen 
had nothing to do with that particular sequence of events. 
There is no evidence that she in any way concerned herself 
in it. On the contrary, in so far as she was not absorbed by 
her widow's grief, her mind was intent on other things much 
nearer home. The solution of the mystery, sought elsewhere, 
is found in Lord Granville's correspondence, as set forth in 
his recently (1905) published Life by Lord Edmond Fitz- 
maurice. 

The concurrence and course of events can be briefly stated. 
Throughout the months of July and August, 1862, the cause 
of the Union had sustained a series, almost unbroken, of 
reverses. The Confederacy had not only made good its right 
to be recognized as a belligerent, but it was a victorious bel- 
ligerent. The Mexican expedition of the French Emperor 
having overrun that country, he was urging upon the British 
Cabinet an aggressive attitude towards the United States 
which would inevitably have proved the first step toward 
a direct armed intervention, and the consequent breaking 
of the blockade. The great Lancashire cotton famine, 
necessarily incident to the blockade and confidently relied 



404 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

on throughout the Confederacy to compel intervention in 
its behalf, was at its height. If gold in New York stood at 
a premium of 50, cotton stood at one of 200 in Liverpool. 
The looms were idle, and a long and sustained wail of 
famine and pitiable agony went up from the most crowded 
districts of Great Britain. Whether the fact was realized 
in America or not, the hour of crisis was at hand ; and the 
issue was to be settled, not on the banks of the Potomac, 
as generally assumed, but in Downing Street, London. 

The two weeks after Lord Russell's return to Lon- 
don from Gotha were utilized by him in the preparation of 
an elaborate, though confidential. Cabinet circular in direct 
furtherance of the mediation programme. In this circular 
the question was plainly put to those composing the Cabinet, 
whether in the light of what had taken place in America 
and the condition of distress prevailing throughout the manu- 
facturing districts of England and France, it was not the 
duty of Europe 'Ho ask both parties, in the most friendly 
and conciliatory terms, to agree to a suspension of arms 
for the purpose of weighing calmly the advantages of peace" 
— and so forth and so on, in the somewhat unctuous par- 
lance usual with philanthropic, but interested, neutrals. 

Mr. Gladstone was at this time Chancellor of the Ex- 
chequer, and next to the Premier, Lord Palmerston, and the 
Foreign Secretary, Earl Russell, the most influential member 
of the Cabinet. He was now consulted as to the proposed 
programme, and gave his hearty approval to it. It entirely 
met the views he at that time entertained and did not hesi- 
tate to express. The cry of agony coming up from the 
cotton spinning districts appealed to his strong humanita- 
rian sympathies; he, like Lord Palmerston, was fully con- 
vinced that a reestablishment of the Union was impossible 
as well as undesirable ; finally, by that subtle process of 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 405 

reasoning always characteristic of him, he had persuaded 
himself that the victory of the slave-owner would result in 
the downfall of slavery. There was in Russell's attitude a 
certain coldness of political conviction, as in that of Pal- 
merston there was apparent an element of cynical hesita- 
tion; but Gladstone seems at this juncture to have thrown 
himself into the proposed movement with that fervor of 
sympathetic conviction always characteristic of him. Nor 
was he chary of utterance, as he afterwards, in the day of 
his sackcloth and ashes, had good cause to remember and 
admit. For instance, he thus a few weeks later, in reply to 
a letter, wrote to Cyrus W. Field in terms unmistakably 
Gladstonese setting forth ^'the heavy responsibility you 
[Americans of the North] incur in persevering with this 
destructive and hopeless war at the cost of such dangers 
and evils to yourselves, to say nothing of your adversaries, 
or of an amount of misery inflicted upon Europe such 
as no other civil war in the history of man has ever brought 
upon those beyond its immediate range." The writer then 
went on thus to set forth the wickedness of any further 
continuance of our efforts towards a reestablishment of the 
Union: ''The impossibility of success in a war of conquest 
of itself suffices to make it unjust. When that impossibility 
is reasonably proved, all the horror, all the bloodshed, all 
the evil passions, all the dangers to liberty and order, with 
which such a war abounds, come to lie at the door of the 
party which refuses to hold its hand and let its neighbor be. 
You know that in the opinion of Europe that impossibility 
has (in the present case) been proved." ^ 

The concurrence of Mr. Gladstone in the proposed pro- 
gramme rendered assurance doubly sure ; for, as Lord Gran- 

' Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, Second Series, XX, 470, n. ; Harper's 
Monthly Magazine (May, 1896), Vol. XCII, p. 847. 



406 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES ' 

ville had a few months before, and in another connection, 
written to Lord Canning: ''He [Gladstone], Johnny [Russell] 
and Pam [Palmerston] are a formidable phalanx when they are 
united in opposition to the whole Cabinet in foreign matters." 
And in the present case a large majority of the Cabinet were 
with ''the formidable phalanx." It was now that the wholly 
unforeseeable, the strangely unexpected, occurred. The meet- 
ing of the Cabinet was fixed for the 23d of October. Mr. 
Adams got an inkling of what was on foot, and was greatly 
disturbed. "For a fortnight," he wrote, "my mind has been 
running so strongly on all this night and day that it seems 
almost to threaten my life." He had good reason for 
his anxiety, however extreme. The tension was becoming 
strained to the extent that something, it would seem, 
must break, and that soon. For, weeks previously, ap- 
prehending just such an emergency as was now impending, 
Mr. Adams had written home asking for specific instructions 
for his guidance if what he apprehended should occur. 
Those instructions he had in due time received from 
Secretary Seward ; they were explicit. To make the 
narrative intelligible and fully set forth the extreme 
character of the crisis then impending, these instructions 
must be quoted at some length. Even at the interval of 
half a century they bear reading; for, carrying the stand- 
ard entrusted to him high and with a firm hand, the Sec- 
retary bore himself in a way of which his country had cause 
to be proud. The paper read in part as follows : — 

"If the British government shall in any way approach you 
directly or indirectly with propositions which assume or con- 
template an appeal to the President on the subject of our inter- 
nal affairs, whether it seems to imply a purpose to dictate, or to 
mediate, or to advise, or even to solicit or persuade, you will 
answer that you are forbidden to debate, to hear, or in any way 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 407 

receive, entertain, or transmit any communication of the kind. 
You will make the same answer whether the proposition comes 
from the British government in combination with any other 
power. 

"If you were asked an opinion what reception the President 
would give to such a proposition, if made here, you will reply 
that you are not instructed, but you have no reason for supposing 
that it would be entertained. 

"If contrary to our expectations the British government, either 
alone or in combination with any other government, should ac- 
knowledge the insurgents, while you are remaining without fur- 
ther instructions from this government concerning that event, 
you will immediately suspend the exercise of your functions, and 
give notice of that suspension to Earl Russell and to this depart- 
ment. I have now in behalf of the United States and by the 
authority of their chief executive magistrate performed an im- 
portant duty. Its possible consequences have been weighed, and 
its solemnity is therefore felt and freely acknowledged. This duty 
has brought us to meet and confront the danger of a war with 
Great Britain and other states allied with the insurgents who are 
in arms for the overthrow of the American Union. You will per- 
ceive that we have approached the contemplation of that crisis 
with the caution which great reluctance has inspired. But I 
trust that you will also have perceived that the crisis has not 
appalled us." 

It was with these ringing instructions before him that 
Mr. Adams, with such fortitude as he could command, now 
awaited the outcome he was powerless in any material 
way to affect. The special Cabinet meeting was called for 
the 23d of October; to all outward appearance and in all 
human probability that was the fateful day; the ordeal 
must then be faced. The programme for it was arranged. 

The day came; and passed. Upon it nothing happened. 
The wholly unexpected had again occurred. 

What had taken place ? Why was the carefully prepared 
programme, so world-momentous and far reaching, sud- 



408 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

denly, quietly abandoned ? It is a curious story ; in dip- 
lomatic annals scarce any more so. It was, it will be re- 
membered — for dates in this connection are all-important 
— the 23d of October that had been assigned for the special 
Cabinet meeting, and sixteen days before, on the 7th of 
that month, Mr. Gladstone delivered that famous Newcastle 
speech in which he declared that Jefferson Davis had '^made 
a nation," and that the independence of the Confederacy 
and dissolution of the American Union were as certain "as 
any event yet future and contingent could be." That 
speech, a marvel of indiscretion, — or, as Mr. Gladstone 
himself subsequently expressed it, '^a mistake of incredible 
grossness," — though at the moment it caused in the mind 
of Mr. Adams deep despair, in reality saved the situation. 
It was for the Union a large cash prize drawn in fortune's 
lottery. 

Speaking for himself, — 'Splaying off his own bat," as 
Lord Palmerston would have expressed it, — Mr. Glad- 
stone had foreshadowed a ministerial policy. The utterance 
was inspired ; in venturing on it Mr. Gladstone unquestion- 
ably supposed, as he had good cause to know, he spoke the 
minds of both Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell. In another 
connection the principle of the so-called "collectivity" of the 
British Cabinet is discussed by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice 
in his Granville (II, 322), and the point made that ministers 
are in nowise free to put forward each ''his own views at 
large public meetings and elsewhere." This Mr. Gladstone 
had now done. Moreover, it was notorious in ministerial 
circles that the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer were not in general harmony. On the con- 
trary, Lord Palmerston disliked and habitually thwarted 
Mr. Gladstone ; and Mr. Gladstone instinctively distrusted 
Lord Palmerston. A year before, the two had been ''in 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 409 

violent antagonism" on financial questions. ''For two 
months," Granville wrote, ''Gladstone has been on half- 
cock of resignation. . . . Palmerston has tried him hard 
once or twice by speeches and Cabinet minutes, and says that 
the only way to deal with him is to bully him a little ; and 
Palmerston appears to be in the right." 

A species of Cabinet modus Vivendi was then arrived at, 
and had since been more or less observed ; but the two men 
were by nature antagonistic. They instinctively disliked 
each other. Gladstone was plainly the coming man; but 
Palmerston, so to speak, held the fort, nor did he propose 
to vacate it in Gladstone's favor. It was a case of armed 
Cabinet observation. Under these circumstances the Chan- 
cellor of the Exchequer had in the autumn of 1862 gone on 
what proved to be a sort of triumphal progress through 
the northern counties. It amounted to a popular ova- 
tion; and, not unnaturally, his colleagues, especially his 
chief, took cognizance of it. Then came the Newcastle 
indiscretion. From his long subsequently published diary 
entries, it appears that what Mr. Gladstone then said was no 
hasty, impromptu utterance, but had been well and repeat- 
edly considered. The inference is unavoidable. Distrust- 
ing the stability of the Premier's purpose, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer intended to force his hand, thus clinching 
the thing. In so purposing, Mr. Gladstone had, as a mem- 
ber of the government, committed an offence against official 
propriety. Apparently it did not take the Premier long 
to make up his mind that the offender must be disci- 
plined, and that severely ; so he proceeded at once to in- 
timate to Sir George Cornewall Lewis, also a member of the 
Cabinet and Gladstone's parliamentary rival as the coming 
man, that if he (Lewis) did not take this function on him- 
self, it must devolve on the head of the government in 



410 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

person. On the 14th of October, therefore, Sir George Lewis, 
speaking at Hereford as the unrecognized mouthpiece of 
the Premier, very pointedly controverted the position taken 
by his colleague one week before at Newcastle. The hand 
of the Premier was on the Cabinet lever. The blind goddess 
had intervened for the preservation of the American Union ! 

The Cabinet meeting called for the 23d, the outcome of 
which had been settled in advance by the concurrence of the 
Premier, the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer — Palmerston, Russell and Gladstone — was 
for the nonce necessarily postponed, and never afterwards 
notified. Mr Gladstone had been ''called down," — had 
received a distinct intimation that he was neither the min- 
istry nor yet its accredited mouthpiece; and explanations 
were in order. None the less, as the secret working of the 
springs and wires which brought about the final result are 
now made apparent, the magnitude and imminence of the 
danger at that juncture threatening the cause of the Union 
are revealed. It was a case of touch and go ! 

Perhaps the most curious feature of the episode is, however, 
that Mr. Adams was at the moment altogether wrong in 
his understanding of the influences at work. He thought 
Palmerston the evil genius of the situation, and the source 
of hostile machinations ; in his belief. Earl Russell was, on 
the whole, America's friend. In reality it was, as we now 
know, the other way. At the critical moment Russell, dis- 
regarding Gladstone's indiscreet disclosures, was disposed 
to go forward in the policy of recognition and intervention ; 
it was Palmerston who hesitated and called a halt. The 
Premier was not disposed to forego the opportunity of disci- 
plining an indiscreet colleague whom he thoroughly disliked, 
even though by so doing the recognition of the Confederacy 
was postponed. In the event, that postponement proved 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 411 

final. Then and there the dice had unknowingly been cast. 
Nearly three years later, when the Confederacy was in its 
death agony, General Robert E. Lee mournfully confessed 
that he had never believed it could in the long run make 
good its independence ''unless foreign powers should directly 
or indirectly assist it in so doing." 

Recurring, however, to what may not inappropriately 
be termed the Victorian legend in this connection, there is 
nothing whatever to indicate that the Queen ever felt any 
personal interest in the American struggle, or, after the 
Prince Consort's death (December, 1861) sought to influ- 
ence in the slightest the policy of the ministry in regard to it. 
On this point the Life of Lord Granville affords conclusive 
evidence. Had she evinced such interest, or exerted any 
influence on the ministry, it would have been through Lord 
Granville; for in all such contingencies "Lord Granville was 
her mainstay in the Cabinet. On him the Queen relied, and 
she did not rely in vain." ^ The personal correspondence 
which took place between the Queen and Granville at about 
this time is as curious as it is conclusive on the point under 
discussion. On her part it is touching in its outbursts, — 
its appeals for sympathy and aid. For instance, on one 
occasion during the Schleswig-Holstein complications of 
1864, writing from Balmoral, she refers to certain "danger- 
ous steps which Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell would on 
several occasions have plunged us into," and authorizes Lord 
Granville to show her letter and enclosures "to any of his 
colleagues (excepting Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell) 
whom he thinks it useful to communicate them to " ; and 
then in closing the Queen breaks out: "Oh, how fearful it is 
to be suspected — uncheered — unguided and unadvised — 
and how alone the poor Queen feels ! Her friends must 
1 Fitzmaurice, I, 477. 



412 DIPLOMATIC STUDIES 

defend her." And again: ^'Alone and unaided . . . she 
writes to Lord Granville as a faithful friend and not as a 
minister, to hear from him his opinion." Finally, in a letter 
from Osborne: ^'The Queen suffers much, and her nerves 
are more and more easily shattered, and her rest broken. . . . 
If Lord Granville only reflects, he will understand how 
terrible her position is ! But though all this anxiety is wear- 
ing her out, it will not shake her in her firm purpose of resist- 
ing any attempt to involve this country in a mad and useless 
combat." Such were her relations with Lord Granville in 
1864, when really interested in the successive issues raised by 
the gradual development of Bismarck's plans ; but any indi- 
cations or expressions of a similar character are wholly 
wanting as respects American affairs in September and 
October, 1862. Lord Granville was then in personal attend- 
ance upon her on the Continent; and there for the express 
purpose of communicating with her on questions of business. 
Lord Russell sent him notice of the Cabinet meeting called for 
October 23 ; and October 1 Granville wrote to his col- 
league, Lord Stanley of Alderley, — familiarly ''Ben," — 
that Palmerston had already broached the idea of an offer 
of mediation and subsequent recognition ; and he adds : 
''I have written to Johnny my reasons for thinking it de- 
cidedly premature. I, however, suspect you will settle to do 
so ! Pam [Palmerston], Johnny [Russell] and Gladstone 
would be in favour of it; and probably Newcastle. I do 
not know about the others. It appears to me a great mis- 
take." Here, in a familiar letter, is no reference whatever 
to the Queen, her condition, her wishes or her views, — 
no intimation that she feels any interest in the question at 
issue, or the policy to be adopted. In a prior official letter 
to Lord Russell, of September 27, 1862, Granville had dis- 
cussed the question of intervention at length and in detail, 



QUEEN VICTORIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 413 

but in it also there was no reference to the Queen. This 
silence is conclusive, so far as negative evidence can ever 
be accepted as conclusive. Apparently, another and very 
pleasing tradition must be dismissed from history as, at best, 
unauthenticated. 



INDEX 



Abeken, on Bazeilles, 287. 

Ability, military, 1777, 115. 

Aboukir, 57. 

Aciand, Sir Henry, 383. 

Adair, John, 189. 

Adams, Chiarles Francis, money needed 
for rams, 347 ; fears war, 357 ; meet- 
ings with Forbes, 358 ; on Evarts' 
mission, 363 ; and Queen Victoria, 
377, 379, 381 ; criticised, 368, 370 ; 
on diplomatic agents, 366, 370 ; 
message from Dayton, 376 ; visits 
Lord Russell, 393 ; relations with 
Palmerston, 393 ; interview, 394 ; in- 
structions on mediation and recog- 
nition, 406 ; mentioned, 256, 354. 

Adams, Henry, 197 n., 353. 

Adams, John, on cavalry, 75 ; describes 
a hussar, 82. 

Adams, John Quincy, on separation, 225. 

Africanism and the South, 230. 

Agents, diplomatic, in Europe, 360, 364. 

Alabama, 248, 357. 

Albany, N.Y., 117, 134, 144. 

Albert, Prince Consort, death of, 379 ; 
modifies Lord Russell's despatch, 383, 
399; sees Motley, 391; on recogni- 
tion, 392. 

Alexander, Edward Porter, 312. 

Alexandra, 357, 359, 363. 

Allegiance, to State or nation, 208, 211, 
212, 214, 215, 296, 298. 

Alva, Duke of, 173. 

Anson, George, 182. 

Appomattox, surrender at, 326. 

Arget, d', 1. 

Army, continental, at New York, 25, 28 
parade through Philadelphia, 75, 136 
cavalry, 83 n.; at Morristown, 123 
marching of, 160; British, evacuates 
Boston, 25 ; at New York, 28 ; on 
Long Island, 29. Strength of, 243. 
Of the Potomac, position of danger, 
308; of Northern Virginia, 313; last 
days, 323, 326. See Confederacy. 

Arnold, Benedict, 63, 71, 87. 

Artillery on Long Island, 56. 

Ashford, Conn., 2. 

Ashley, Evelyn, 398. 



Aspinwall, William H., mission to Eu- 
rope, 354, 356. 

Bacon, Francis, on posterity and foreign 

nations, 244. 
Bagehot, Walter, on Washington, 166. 
Balancing of blunders, 2, 23, 119, 123, 

128, 151. 
Bancroft, George, on Bunker Hill, 20 ; 

on Pulaski, 83 ; mentioned, 208 n. 
Baring Brothers and Company, 352, 356 ; 

deposit of bonds, 359, 371. 
Barnard, John Gross, 274. 
Barren Hill, 94. 
Baskingridge, 69. 
Bates, Joshua. 352, 359. 
Batteries at New York, 28. 
Baylor, George, 75, 79. 
Bayonet, dislike of, 92 n. 
Bazeilles, 287. 
Beauregard, Pierre Gustave Toutant, 

in Virginia campaign, 268, 271, 273. 
Belknap, Jeremy, on Bunker Hill, 19. 
Belle Isle, 57. 
Bennington, Vt., 91, 135. 
Berlin, 142. 

Bigelow, John, 357. 365. 
Bingham. Robert, 340. 
Birkenhead, see Laird rams. 
Birmingham, 78. 
Bismarck, Otto, fiirst von, 287. 
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 244, 

263. 
Bladensburg, battle of, 175, 176; in- 
fluence at New Orleans, 186, 188. 
Blake, Robert, 57. 
Bland, Theodorick, 75, 79. 
Blockade, in Revolution, 121 n., 153; 

in Civil War, 246 ; Hammond on. 250 ; 

cotton and, 257 ; believed impossible, 

315 ; effective, 316, 320 ; Lord Russell 

on, 390. 
Bloomingdale. N.Y., 30. 
Blilcher, Gebhard Leberecht. von. 281. 
Blunders, balancing of, 2, 119, 123, 128. 

151. 
Boats, concentration at New York, 42. 
Boers, cavalry. 93. 98 ; area, population 

and fighting force, 239. 



415 



416 



INDEX 



Bonds, five-twenties, 355, 371. 

Boston, council of war, 5 ; evacuation, 
24. 

Box, — , major, 34. 

Braddock, Edward, 63. 

Brandywine, battle of the, 72, 78, 87, 
140, 146. 

Bravay and Co., 363. 

Breastworks, as defences, 15. 

Breed's Hill, 3, 7. 

Breslau, 143. 

Brooklyn, interior lines, 29 ; defence of, 
26, 32 ; cavalry of service, 65. 

Buckle, Henry Thomas, 219 n. 

Buford, Abraham, 104. 

Bugeaud, Marshal, on English infantry, 
190. 

Bull Run, effect of, 390. 

Bulloch, James Dunwoody, 363. 

Bummers, Sherman's, 266, 289. 

Bunch, Robert, consul, 255, 396. 

Bunker Hill, British plan, 3, 5, 18; 
position of Americans, 3, 4 ; American 
plan, 5, 6, 13 ; consequences of defeat, 
6 ; commander, 7 ; favorable to 
Americans, 11 ; Howe's conduct criti- 
cised, 18 ; strategy discussed, 19 ; 
results, 13 ; effect on Washington, 56. 

Burgoyne, John, 144 ; army, 119 ; moves 
from Canada, 73, 124; situation of, 
131 ; crushing of, 131, 133, 135; spoils 
of, 136. 

Burnside, Ambrose Everett, 268, 308. 

Burrard, Sir Harry, 100. 

Busaco, 174. 

Butler, Benjamin Franklin, in Virginia 
campaign, 267 ; instructions to, 269 ; 
takes command, 270 ; fails at Walthall 
Junction, 271 ; rejects advice, 272 ; 
driven from Drewry's Bluff, 273 ; op- 
poses Gillmore, 274 ; recommendations 
upon, 274, 275, 278 ; quarrels with 
Smith, 275; cowes Grant, 276; re- 
lieved, 278 ; measure of service, 279. 

Butt-head, 10. 

Cabinet, British, collectivity, 408. 

Csesar, 14. 

Calhoun, John Caldwell, 222, 293. 

Cambridge, Mass., 6, 10. 

Camp, Continental, sanitary condition, 
135, 145. 

Carlyle, Thomas, 1. 143 n. 

Carolinas, campaign in, 103. 

Carrington, Henry Beebee, 20, 41, 42, 43. 

Cavalry, in Revolution, 59 ; favorable 
field, 62, 74; in colonies, 63; at 
Brooklyn, 65 ; results of a want of, 



70 ; volunteer, 70 n. ; in Continental 
army, 75, 83 n. ; Continental Congress, 
82 ; requirements to command, 86 ; 
Clinton's march, 97 ; cost, 92, 99 ; 
British advantage, 105 ; delay in 
using, 108. 

Census of 1860, 235. 

Chamberlain, Daniel Henry, 205, 207. 

Chancellorsville, 78. 

Character, influence of, 291 ; defined, 
292. 

Charlatan, Lee a, 58. 

Charles, Prince, 142. 

Charleston, S. C, 203 ; address in, 227 ; 
misfortunes, 228. 

Charlestown, Mass., 2, 3, 5. 

Charlestown Neck, 7, 18. 

Chase, Salmon Portland, 208 n.; meets 
Chittenden, 347 ; mission of Forbes, 
354, 355 ; mystifies Chittenden, 373. 

Chatrian, Alexandre, 163. 

Chesapeake Bay, 76. 

Chittenden, Lucius E., career, 345 ; 
story of the bonds, 346, 371 ; time of 
incident, 356 ; disproved, 372. 

Choate, Joseph Hodges, 382. 

Citizenship, question of, 298. 

City Point, Va., 269. 

Clay, Cassius Marcellus, 366. 

Clinton, Sir Henry, 102 ; advises Gage, 
5, 9 ; Howe, 10 ; lands on Long 
Island, 29, 55 ; supersedes Howe, 94, 
96 ; moves to New York, 95 ; up the 
Hudson, 124 ; on Howe's movements, 
126 n.; at New York, 50, 131, 134, 
144. 

Clive, Robert, 101, 102. 

Cochrane, Alexander Forester Inglis, at 
New Orleans, 196 ; on Ross, 200. 

Coddington, William, 204. 

Codrington, Edward, 195, 197. 

Cold Harbor, 273. 

Collectivity of British Cabinet, 408. 

Collier, Sir George, on Howe, 52. 

Common law, 299. 

Concord, effect on Howes, 56. 

"Conda" navy, 250. 

Confederacy, Southern, cavalry, 93; 
arguments for, 204 ; causes of fall, 234, 
244, 314 ; fighting force, 237, 241, 282 ; 
conscription, 284 ; supplies, 324 ; 
agents in Europe, 363 ; on Forbes 
mission, 370; recognition, 390, 392, 
399, 400, 403. 

Confederation, States under, 209. 

Confidence of South, 259. 

Confucius, 292 n. 

Congress, Continental, 82, 138. 



INDEX 



417 



Connecticut light horse, 64, 92. 

Conscript de 181S, 163. 

Conscription, in South, 284 ; Webster 
on, 339. 

Constitution, divided sovereignty, 210. 

"Contemporary Opinion of the Howes," 
110. 

Conway, Moncure Daniel, 369. 

Copenhagen, 57. 

Cornwallis, Charles, Earl, 105, 126 n., 
148 n.; flanks Washington, 78; at 
the Brandywine, 101 ; retreat, 150. 

Corunna campaign, 114. 

Cotton, as king, 252, 254, 255, 256, 314 ; 
blockade, 257 ; dependence of South, 
314, 319 ; Lancashire famine, 317, 
403 ; intervention and, 394 ; defeated, 
258, 260 ; loan, 359 ; need in France, 
396. 

Councils of war, 6, 138, 164. 

Cowpens, 92, 106. 

Craufurd, Robert, march of, 110, 141. 

Cromwell, Oliver, 14, 63, 72, 113, 115. 

Dana, Charles Anderson, 277. 

Daun, Leopold Joseph Maria, Count 

von, 143. 
Davis, Jefferson, Gladstone on, 234 ; at 

Greensboro, 241, 323, 327. 
Davout, Louis-Nicolas, 280. 
Dayton, William Lewis, 256, 376. 
Delaware, defences, 156, 157. 
Democracy and history, 111. 
Desertion in Confederacy, 286. 
Deveng, Richard, 20. 
Digging by soldiers, 16. 
Dilatoriness of Howe, 34, 36, 38, 45. 
Diplomats, classified, 364. 
Dorchester Heights, 56. 
Dragoons in Europe, 82. 
Drewry's Bluff, 273. 
Dunbar, battle of, 163. 
Dupont, Samuel Francis, 257 n. 
Du Portail, Louis Le Begue, 147. 

Edinburgh Magazine, Blackwood's, 244, 

263. 
Eliot, Charles William, 382, 383. 
Elizabeth, Queen, 386. 
Elkton, 76, 144. 
Elson's History, 206 n. 
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 292, 337. 
Erekmann, Emile, 163. 
Europe, change of opinion, 263. 
Eutaw Springs, 108. 
Evarts, William Maxwell, mission of, 

363, 370. 
Everett, William, 2. 
2e 



Fabius and Fabian tactics, 49, 71, 74. 

Farragut, David Glasgow, 248, 249. 

Ferguson, Patrick, at King's Mountain, 
107 n.; invents breech-loading rifle, 
107 n. 

Field, Cyrus West, 405. 

First Troop of Philadelphia, 75. 

Firth, Charles Harding, 164 n. 

Fisher, Sydney George, 62, 95 ; on 
American history, 110; on authorities, 
118 n.; on Lee's plan, 121. 

Fiske, John, 211 n.; on Bunker Hill, 20; 
retreat from Long Island, 41 ; on 
Washington, 61. 

Fitchett, W. H., 129, 180. 

Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmund, 403. 

Flanking movements, 77, 79 n. 

Flatbush, L. I., 29. 

Fleet, British, 36, 44, 47, 57, 121. 

Forage, abundant, 65. 

Forbes, John Murray, 353 ; mission to 
Europe, 354 ; meets Chase and Welles, 
355 ; interviews with C. F. Adams, 
358; returns, 371. 

Foreigners, condescension of, 262. 

Formby, John, 90 n. 

Forrest, Nathan Bedford, 70, 90 n.; on 
strategy, 115. 

Forster, William Edward, 382. 

Fort Du Quesne, 86; Edward, 132; 
Fisher, 322; Mifflin, 141, 157 ; Mont- 
gomery, 50 ; Moultrie, 22, 56, 57. 

Fortescue, John William, 127 n. 

"Fortifications," 198. 

Fox, Gustavus Vasa, 361. 

France, alliance with, 1778, 152 ; recog- 
nition of Confederacy, 400, 403. 

Franklin, Benjamin, on Pulaski, 83 n.; 
on capture of Philadelphia, 149. 

Frederick the Great, 14, 98, 139, 140; 
on cavalry, 68, 72 ; on Princeton, 
72 n. ; rapidity of movement, 142 ; 
after Saratoga, 154. 

Frothingham, Richard, 20. 

Gage, Thomas, 102 ; operations, 6 ; re- 
jects Clinton's advice, 9 ; character, 
10, 14 ; at Bunker Hill, 16. 

Galloway, Joseph, on blockade, 121 n.; 
on Howe, 147. 

Garibaldi, Giuseppe, commission for, 
366. 

Gates, Horatio, 53 ; in Saratoga cam- 
paign, 74, 133 ; cavalry, 102. 

Generals, sacrifice of, 246. 

Generalship, 177. 

Genius, military, 14. 

George III, 387. 



418 



INDEX 



Georgiana, 359. 

Germain, George Sackville, on Howe, 
148. 

Germantown, 72, 88. 

Germany, Hessians, 358, 371. 

Gettysburg, 141 n.; Lee at, 306, 312. 

Ghent, treaty of, 196. 

Gilbert-town, 106. 

Gillmore, Quincy Adams, in Virginia 
campaign, 269 ; urges Butler to attack, 
272 ; relieved of command, 274. 

Gladiator, 376. 

Gladstone, William Ewart, 388 ; on 
American constitution, 213 ; predicts 
success of South, 235 ; approves medi- 
ation, 404; letter to Field, 405; 
rivalry with Palmerston, 408. 

Gleig, George Robert, 179. 

Glover, John, 39, 48. 

Gorlitz, 143. 

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang, 267. 

Gordon, William, 20. 

Gordy, John Pancoast, 211 n., 214. 

Government, centralized, fear of, 209. 

Gowanus Cove, 32. 

Grant, James, 94. 

Grant, Ulysses Simpson, 126 n., 308 ; 
Virginia campaign, 267, 273 ; Butler's 
relations, 275, 276, 277, 278; at Ap- 
pomattox, 326. 

Granville, Lord, 403 ; relations to Queen 
Victoria, 411 ; on mediation, 412. 

Gravesend, L. I., 29, 31. 

Graydon, Alexander, 61. 

Great Britain, recognition of Con- 
federacy, 390, 392. 

Greene, George Washington, 167. 

Greene, Nathanael, 76, 149 ; illness on 
Long Island, 31, 55; plan of defence, 
32 ; advises evacuation of Manhattan, 
49, 51 ; on militia, 52 ; cavalry, 93, 
105, 108 ; horses, 96 ; Southern cam- 
paign, 102; on Howe, 159; on Phila- 
delphia, 164 ; on Washington, 167 ; 
character of, 171. 

Greensboro conference, 241, 323. 

Grey, Charles, at Paoli, 81. 

Grouchy, Emmanuel, 280. 

Guilford Court House, 108, 150. 

Gun, magazine, 16. 

Gustavus, Adolphus, 14. 

Hagood, Johnson, 271. 

Halleck, Henry Wager, 274, 275. 276. 

Hamilton, Alexander, on cavalry, 90 n.; 
on Revolution, 111; on Washington, 
112; on blockade, 122 n.; and Con- 
stitution, 212. 



Hammond, James Henry, on cotton is 
King, 252, 314 ; on blockade, 250. 

Hampton Roads, 121, 153. 

Hannibal, 14. 

Harcourt, William, 69. 

Harlem Heights, death of Knowlton, 2. 

Hartford Convention, 212, 221 n. 

Hatteras Inlet, 248. 

Haverswerda, 72. 

Hawkes, Edward, 57. 

Hay, John, 353, 366. 

Health of soldiers, 135. 

Heath, William, on mounted patrols, 65. 

Henry, of Prussia, 72, 143. 

Henry, Prince, 382. 

Hero worship, 113. 

Hewitt, Abram Stevens, character of, 
375 ; on Queen Victoria and the 
United States, 376. 

Highlands on Hudson, 118. 

History, accuracy of relations, 179 ; per- 
spective, 233. 

Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 303. 

Hood, John Bell, 261. 

Hooker, Joseph, 78, 308. 

Horry, Peter, 71. 

Horses in colonies, 62, 96. 

Houghton, Richard Monckton Milnes, 
Lord, 380. 

Houston, David Franklin, 223 n. 

Howe, Richard, Lord, 25, 27, 44, 148 n. 

Howe, Sir William, at Bunker Hill, 10, 
18 ; on Staten Island, 25, 27, 56 ; dila- 
tory movements, 10, 34, 45, 52, 147; 
strategy, 53 n.; southern move, 54, 
73, 125, 148 n.; in New Jersey, 74; 
at the Brandywine, 77, 80, 101 ; in 
Philadelphia, 87, 94, 127, 140, 159; 
cavalry, 100; at New York, 117, 123; 
neglect of blockade, 122 n.; plan of 
campaign, 119, 120, 124, 131; Bur- 
goyne and, 127 ; on Washington, 133 ; 
character of, 168. 

Hudson River, 50, 64, 121. 

Huger, Isaac, 184 n. 

Hughes, Sarah Forbes, 354. 

Hussar, German, 82. 

Immigrants, army and factories, 245 ; 
naturalization, 221. 

Index, Confederate organ, 318 ; on 
Uncle Tom's Cabin, 320 ; on contin- 
uance of war, 326. 

India, cotton production, 391. 

Infantry, British, at New Orleans, 190. 

Intelligence, British, on Long Island, 28. 

Intervention, foreign, in Civil War, 246, 
315, 320. See Recognition. 



INDEX 



419 



Intrenchments, Breed's Hill, 14 ; in war, 
15 ; at New York, 26 ; on Long Island, 
35. 

Iredell, James, 214 n. 

Irving, Washington, 61, 139, 165. 

Jackson, Andrew, at New Orleans, 176, 
185, 187, 192. 

Jackson, Thomas Jonathan, 78, 308. 

Jiigers, 92 n. 

Jamaica Road, Long Island, 33, 55, 65, 
66. 

James II, 386. 

James Adger, 394 n., 395. 

Jay, John, 293 ; advises desolation of 
New York, 49, 50 ; on Charles Lee, 58. 

Johnson, Bradley Tyler, on Southern 
confidence, 251. 

Johnston, Joseph Eggleston, on employ- 
ing negroes, 239 n.; on end of war, 
241, 243, 325. 

Jones, J. William, 206 n. 

Joseph [Bonaparte], King, 134. 

Jourdan, Jean Baptiste, 134. 

Junot, Andoche, 100. 

Kearsarge, 248. 

Kentucky resolves of 1798, 220, 297. 
King's Mountain, 89, 92, 93, 106. 
Kips Bay, N. Y., 30, 51, 67. 
Knowlton, Thomas, 2, 8. 
Kutuzoff, Michael Larivonovitch Go- 
lenitchef, 145. 

Lafayette, Marquis de, 76 ; at Barren 
Hill, 94 ; at the Brandywine, 147 ; on 
Washington, 168. 

Laird rams, 347 ; time of delivery, 356 ; 
Confederate funds, 359 ; denounced by 
Welles, 362. 

Lambert, John, at New Orleans, 194. 

Lancashire cotton famine, 258, 317, 319, 
403. 

Latour, Arsfene Lacarri^re, 200 n. 

Latta, James W., 340. 

Lawyers on Constitution, 209. 

Lee, Charles, "plan" of campaign, 21. 
151 ; on repulse of Parker, 22 ; sent 
to New York, 24 ; on abandoning New 
York, 50, 54 ; acclaimed, 58 ; cap- 
tured, 68; on cavalry, 68 n. ; at 
Monmouth, 98 ; on authority of Wash- 
ington, 134 ; importance of Philadel- 
phia, 149 ; on Howe's campaign, 152 ; 
on Howe, 170 n. 

Lee, Henry, 61, 82, 105 ; on Camden, 
102 : at Cowpens, 107 ; on loyalty to 
State, 303. 



Lee's legion, 89, 96, 99. 

Lee, Robert Edward, 16, 308; order 
No. 73, 266, 306 ; a man of character, 
292; charge of traitor, 295, 303; 
manumits slaves, 304 ; on secession, 
301, 304; military ability, 306; at 
Gettysburg, 306, 310, 312; successful 
retreat, 313; quality of army, 316; 
its needs, 321, 322; recognizes the 
end, 325, 327, 329; at Appomattox, 
326 ; decides for self, 328 ; college 
president, 332 ; under reconstruction, 
336 ; in family, 337 ; on foreign in- 
tervention, 411. 

Legion, Lee's, 89. 

Le Marchant, — , 182. 

Leopold, Prince, on Queen Victoria, 383, 
403. 

Leuthen, 142. 

Lever, Charles, on Civil War, 263. 

Lewis, George Cornewall, 409. 

Lexington, Mass., 91. 

Light horse, 66 n., 70. 

Ligny, 12. 

Lincoln, Abraham, order on Butler, 276 ; 
assassinated, 326, 327. 

Lincoln, Benjamin, 135. 

Lines of communication, interior, 122, 
138, 144, 162. 

Little Round Top, 141 n. 

Livermore, Thomas Leonard, estimates 
of Confederate army, 238 n., 287. 

Lodge, Henry Cabot, on Union, 205, 215. 

London Chronicle, 18. 

Long Island, battle of, 22 ; strategy, 29 ; 
sufferings of Continental army, 37 ; 
storm and rain, 37, 38, 45 ; retreat 
from, 41 ; merits of, 48. 

Longstreet, James, 141 n. 

Louis XIV, 267. 

Low, Seth, 376. 

Lowell, James Russell, 262. 

Luck in war, 1. 

Lunch hour, result, 52. 

Lushington, Stephen, 397. 

Liitzen, Pinto's description, 163. 

Maclean, W. Neil, 19. 
McClellan, George B., 246, 308. 
McCrady, Edward, 104, 105. 
McLane, Allan 97, 99. 
McMahon, Marie E.-P.-M., 16. 
Madison, James, on Constitution, 212, 

215 n. ; on divided interests, 217. 
Mahon, Stanhope Philip Henry, Lord, 

101. 
Marblehead, Mass., regiment, 39, 48. 
Marchand, John B., 394 n., 395, 398. 



420 



INDEX 



March to sea, Sherman's, effect upon 
Europe, 262 ; vandalism, 265. 

Marching, influence upon army, 135 ; 
Morgan's, 140 ; Continental army, 160. 

Marion, Francis, 71, 105. 

Marlborough, John Churchill, Duke of, 
14, 98. 

Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, at Sala- 
manca, 178, 181. 

Marshall, John, 293 ; on Brandywine 
affair, 146 ; on Delaware defences, 
156; influence on Union, 219 n., 220. 

Martin, Sir Theodore, 399. 

Mason, James Murray, Conway and, 
369 ; taken from Trent, 394, 398 ; on 
Queen Victoria, 401. 

Massachusetts, differences in, 1639, 203. 

"Massacre" at Paoli, 80, 92 n. 

Massena, Andre, 178 n. 

Maucune, — , 179, 181. 

Mauduit, Israel, on Howe, 18. 

Maxwell, Sir Herbert, on Salamanca, 180, 
181. 

Meade, George Gordon, 72, 268 ; against 
cavalry, 73 ; in Virginia campaign, 
269 ; at Gettysburg, 307, 309, 313. 

Mediation, Seward's instructions to 
Adams, 406. See France and Great 
Britain. 

Meigs, Montgomery Cunningham, 274. 

Men, influence of, 218. 

Mercier, — , 396. 

Me.Kico, European ambitions in, 399, 
403. 

MifiBin, Thomas, 38. 39, 65, 66 n. 

Militia, unreliability of, 35, 37, 51, 132, 
189. 

Mississippi River, importance of, 185 ; 
west bank, 187. 

Mobile, 249. 

MoUwitz, 68. 

Moltke, Helmuth, 16. 263. 

Monmouth Court House, 98. 

Montaigne, Michel, on force of laws, 
203. 

Montgomery, Richard, 63. 

Moore, George Henry, Lee's plan, 121 n. 

Moore, Sir John, 114. 

Mordecai, Alfred, 276. 

Morgan, Daniel, 71, 85, 87, 99; in- 
fluence, 89 ; on cavalry. 100 n. ; at 
Cowpens, 107 ; sent northward, 139, 
140, 145. 

Morgan, David, 188. 

Morris, Gouverneur, 50. 

Morristown, N. J., 117. 

Moscow, abandoned by Russians, 145. 

Motley, John Lothrop, visits Lord Rus- 



sell, 389 ; sees the Queen, 391 ; on 

Palmerston, 392. 
Moylan, Stephen, 75, 79. 
Murray, Mrs., 52 n. 

Napier, Charles, on Busaco, 174 ; on 
Pakenham, 175, 195. 

Napier, Sir William Francis Patrick, 
114; on Scott's error, 61; on Crau- 
furd's march, 141 n.; on great cap- 
tains, 142 ; Peninsular War, 143 n. ; 
on Salamanca, 178, 181. 

Napoleon, 14, 16, 139, 140, 154; at 
Ligny, 12; sayings, 107, 243, 307; 
in 1812-1813, 120; Russian campaign, 
129 ; on rapidity of movement, 147 ; 
at Elba, 183 ; at Waterloo, 12, 280. 

Napoleon III, and the South, 376, 400. 

Nashville, 394 n., 395. 

Nationality, growth of, 214, 216, 221, 
227, 297, 299. 

Navy, Rhodes on service of, 247. 

Negroes and the South, 230 ; in Con- 
federacy, 239 ; enlistment of, 323. 

Nelson, Horatio, 57. 

Newcastle speech of Gladstone, 408. 

New Jersey, Howe in, 74. 

New Orleans, battle of, 174 ; tactics, 
185 ; influence of Bladensburg, 186, 
188 ; effect in Europe, 196 ; capture 
of, 248. 

New York, campaign in 1776, 22 ; 
strategic centre, 24, 116; commanded 
by sea, 24, 25 ; prevailing winds, 36 ; 
meteorological condition, 44 ; should 
not be held, 49 ; devastation of, 50 ; 
Clinton's force at, 131. 

North, nationalization of, 221 ; clemency 
to South, 335. 

Officers, British, character of, 177. 
Olney, Stephen, 33. 
Opinion, contemporary, 244. 

Pacificator of Europe, Frederick the 
Great, 1. 

Pakenham, Sir Edward, at Busaco, 175 
record of, 176 ; at Salamanca, 178 
chosen for American campaign, 184 
Wellington on, 183 : Smith on, 184 
bravery, 184 ; plan of action, 187 
error, 188, 193 ; influence against, 195. 

Palmerston, Henry John Temple, Vis- 
count, criticised by Index, 320 ; 
ministry, 387; death, 388; attitude 
towards the North, 388, 392, 396 ; on 
Marchand, 394 ; interview with 
Adams, 394 ; on Trent affair, 398 ; on 



INDEX 



421 



intervention, 402, 410 ; dislike of 
Gladstone, 40S. 

Paoli "massacre," 80, 92 n. 

Parker, Sir Peter, 22, 36, 57, 126. 

Parthian tactics, 71, 92, 98. 

Parton, James, on British officers, 177. 

Patriotism, 113. 

Patrol, mounted, 65, 66 ; need of, 79. 

Patterson, David T., at New Orleans, 
188. 

Peasants in arms, 287. 

Pemberton, John Clifford, 308. 

Perkins, James Breck, 161 n., 165 n. 

Peterhoff, 357, 359. 

Philadelphia, first troop of, 75 ; Howe's 
objective, 75, 126, 128; occupied, 
87, 140; strategic position, 117, 129, 
149, 162. 

Pickens, Andrew, 71, 105. 

Pickens, Francis Wilkinson, 254 n. 

Pickering, Timothy, 47 n., 90 n.; on 
Washington, 112, 167. 

Pickett's charge, Gettysburg, 311. 

Picton's division, 178. 

Pierce, Edward Lillie, on recollections 
as history, 344, 378. 

Plevna, 18. 

Plowed Hill, 7. 

Plutarch, on King Pyrrhus, 318. 

Pontgibaud, Count de More, 122 n. 

Pope, Alexander, 207. 

Pope, John, 308. 

Port Royal, 248. 

Porter, David Dixon, 249 ; on Butler, 
279. 

Posterity and foreign nations, 244. 

Prescott, William, 2, 7, 9, 11, 14. 

Princeton, 67. 

Progress, Stephen on, 229. 

Prospect Hill, 7, 8. 

Providence defined, 217. 

Pulaski, Casimir, statue, 59 ; not known 
to Washington, 60 ; Washington and 
Franklin on, 83 n.; character, 85; at 
the Brandywine, 83 ; demands rank, 
83 n.; on cavalry, 84 n., 87; at Ger- 
man town, 88. 

Putnam, Israel, at Bunker Hill, 8, 10; 
on the Yankee, 17 ; at New York, 25, 
52 ; in Brooklyn, 55 ; in the High- 
lands, 118; incompetence, 141. 

Pyrrhus, death of, 318. 

Quatre Bras, 15. 

Ragusa, Due de, see Marmont. 

Rainbow, 52. 

Ranger, American, 91, 92 n., 99. 



Rapalye's negro, 48. 

Rashness of ignorance, 6. 

Rawdon, Francis, Lord, 105. 

Rawle, William, 297, 340. 

Read, J. C, on Uncle Tom's Cabin, 319. 

Recognition, Seward's instructions to 
Adams, 407. 

Recollections, as source of history, 344. 

Reconnoitring extraordinary, 76. 

Reconstruction, evil period of, 326, 335. 

Red Hook, 36, 39. 

Reed, Joseph, 39, 40. 

Reid, Whitelaw, on Sherman's march, 
289. 

"Remarks upon General Howe's Ac- 
count," 18. 

Renegades to flag, some historical, 305. 

Retreat from Long Island, 41. 

Revere, Paul, 63. 

Revolution, history of, 110, 111. 

Rhett, Edmund, 256. 

Rhode Island, 204, 224. 

Rhodes, James Ford. History, 232; on 
success of North, 234 ; neglects sea 
power, 247 ; on Sherman's march, 
265 ; on Grant's Virginia campaign, 
268 ; on Butler, 279 ; on Lee, 294 n. 

Rifle and riflemen, 89, 91, 92 n. 

Ropes, John Codman, at Waterloo, 280. 

Rosebery, Lord, 113. 

Ross, Robert, 175, 183, 200. 

Rossbach, 142. 

Royalists in States, 103. 

Rumbold, Sir Horace, 398. 

Rupert, Prince, 03, 70, 92. 

Russell, Lord John, Earl, alleged inter- 
view with Adams, 377 ; despatch 
modified by Prince Albert, 383, 399 ; 
conversation with Motley, 389 ; on 
recognition, 392 ; on mediation, 402, 
410 ; circular on, 404. 

Russell, William Howard, Southern 
opinion of Yankees, 251 n.; on 
Southerners, 253. 

Rutledge, Edward, 50. 

Sadowa, 78. 

St. Clair, Arthur, 118. 

Salamanca, battle of, 178. 

Salt, price at Philadelphia, 121 n. 

Sandy Hook, 25. 

Sanford, Henry Shelton, 366. 

Santa Cruz de Teneriffe, 57, 

Saratoga, 73. 

Savannah, Ga., 104. 

Schiller, Johann C. F., 267. 

Schofield, John McAllister, 261. 

Schuyler, Philip, 133, 135, 144. 



422 



INDEX 



Scott, John Morin, 58. 

Scott, Walter, Napoleon, 61. 

Scott, Winfield, 73, 303. 

Sea power, 247. 

Secession, ethics of, 203 ; right of, 216, 
295, 340; peaceable, 224, 301. 

Sedan, 15. 

Sedgwick's corps, 141 n., 312. 

Seward, William Henry, meets Chitten- 
den, 347 ; organizes intelligence ser- 
vice, 364 ; defends Wilson, 368 ; Mot- 
ley's reports, 389 ; instructions on 
mediation, 406. 

Seydlitz, Friedrich Wilhelm von, 68. 

Shaler, Nathaniel Southgate, 384 n. 

Sheldon, Elisha, 75, 79. 

Sheridan, Philip Henry, on cavalry, 73, 
90 n.; on war, 287. 

Sherman, William Tecumseh, 72, 308; 
march to sea, 261 ; effect in Europe, 
262 ; Reid on, 289 ; on war, 289. 

Shoe leather in war, 134. 

Slavery, African, 300 ; influence on 
nationalization, 217. 

Slidell, John, taken from Trent, 394, 398. 

Sloane, William Milligan, 129. 

Smith, Adam, on rebels and heretics, 
335. 

Smith, Goldwin, on American Union, 
205, 215. 

Smith, Sir Harry, on Pakenham, 184, 
187 ; at New Orleans, 194. 

Smith, Jacob Hurd, orders to devastate, 
288. 

Smith, William Farrar, in Virginia cam- 
paign, 268 ; Grant's opinion of, 270 ; 
urges Butler to attack, 272 ; recom- 
mendations upon, 274, 276 ; relieved, 
276 ; on Butler, 279. 

Smith, Zachary Frederick, 199 n. 

Soldier, British, character, 70. 

South, the nationalization, 217, 221 ; 
negro and, 230 ; strength of army, 236 ; 
self-conscious, 250, 257 ; idea of the 
North, 251, 254 ; confidence in cotton, 
314. 

South Africa, cavalry, 63 ; war, 93, 98, 
104, 325. 

Sovereignty, where found under Con- 
stitution, 208, 220, 224 ; divided, 210, 
299 ; question of, 296, 302. 

Spottsylvania, battle of, 272. 

Squadron, 61. 

Staff, general, 119, 171. 

Stanley, Arthur Penrhyn, on Queen 
Victoria, 386. 

Stanley, Edward John, Baron, 412. 

Stark, John, 135. 



State, right to withdraw from Union, 

205, 226; under Confederation, 209; 

sovereignty, 209, 226, 297 ; allegiance, 

213 ; citizenship, 298. 
Staten Island, 25, 27. 
Stedman, Charles, 61, 95; on Bunker 

Hill, 20 ; criticises Howe, 53, 124, 168 ; 

on Long Island, 66 n.; on King's 

Mountain, 106. 
Stephen, Leslie, on progress, 229. 
Stephens, Alexander Hamilton, on cotton, 

260. 
Steuben, Baron, on Washington, 112. 
Stiles, — , 308. 

Stirling, Lord, captured, 33, 46. 
Stowe, Harriet Beecher, and book, 319. 
Stragglers to Sherman's army, 265, 289. 
Strategy, defined, 115; new system 

developed, 14, 64, 122; of British, 

120; of Americans, 122; at New 

Orleans, 185, 192. 
Stuart, Gilbert, 91. 
Sullivan, John, on Long Island, 31, 55; 

captured, 33, 66 ; pays for patrols, 66, 

79. 
Sumner, Charles, 362 ; assault on, 255 ; 

denunciation of Lee, 293 ; criticised 

by Clay, 367 ; on Wilson, 368. 
Sumter, Thomas, 71, 105. 
Sylla, on vicissitudes of war, 114. 
Symmetry, 20. 
Sympathizers in Confederate army, 238. 

Tactics, at New Orleans, 185, 192, 193. 

Tappan Sea, 27. 

Tarleton, Banastre, 61, 82; at capture 

of Lee, 69, 71 ; cavalry of, 103 n.; at 

Waxhaws, 104 ; in southern campaign, 

108. 
Taylor, Hannis, 343. 
Tennyson, Alfred, Lord, 207. 
Texas, as refuge for Confederacy, 242, 

326. 
Theodora, 394 n. 

Thomas, George Henry, 71, 303. 
Thomiferes, 181. 
Thoreau, Henry David, 292 n. 
Thornton, William, 201. 
Ticonderoga, 118, 131. 
Tilly, John Tzerklaes von, 267. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 213, 298, 34L 
Tolstoi, 145. 
Torres Vedras, 17. 
Tower, Charlemagne, 95. 
"Traveller," Lee's horse, 331. 
Treasury, loose methods, 372. 
Trent affair, 380, 383, 394 ; Hewitt on, 

376 ; right of, 397. 



INDEX 



423 



Trenton, 67. 

Trescot, William Henry, 256. 

Trevelyan, George Otto, 62 ; on retreat 
from Long Island, 10 ; on weather at 
New York, 44 ; on the Brandywine, 
78; on Paoli, 81, 92 n.; on campaign 
of 1777, 88 ; on cavalry, 89 ; on Clin- 
ton's withdrawal from Philadelphia, 96, 
97, 98 ; on history of Revolution, 109 ; 
on Howe, 168. 

Trumbull, Jonathan, sends mounted 
men, 64. 

Trumbull Jonathan, Jr., 221 n. 

Trumbull, Joseph, 153. 

Tryon, William, 28, 81. 

Tucker, Josiah, on American Union, 218. 

Tyler, Lion Gardiner, 216 ; on Con- 
federate forces, 282. 

Ulm, 136. 

Uncle Tom's Cabin, in England, 319. 

Union, dissoluble, 205. 

Urban, d', 182. 

Valley Forge, 88, 146, 149. 

Valori, Count de, 1. 

Van Tyne, Claude Halstead, 339. 

Victoria, Queen, intervention, 376; alleged 
assurance to Adams, 377 ; character, 
385 ; unsympathetic for democracy, 
385 ; obstinacy, 385 ; unable to 
transact public business, 379, 400, 
403 ; sees Motley, 391 ; on the con- 
tinent, 401 ; relations with Granville, 
411 ; no proof of interest in America, 
412. 

" View of Evidence," 18. 

Vimeiro, Wellington at, 100. 

Virginia, intrenchments in, 15 ; horses, 
96; sovereignty, 210; resolves, 1798, 
220, 221 n.; states rights, 302. 

Vittoria, 134. 

Wales, Prince of (Edward VI), visit to 
America, 376, 386. 

Walker, Leroy Pope, boast of, 251. 

Walker, Robert John, 560. 

Wallabout Bay, 32. 

War, luck in, 1 ; use of intrenchments, 
15 ; in colonies, 63 ; is hell, 265, 288, 
327 ; defined, 287. 

Ward, Artemas, 8, 14. 

Warren, James, 82. 

Washington, George, on Long Island, 14, 
22, 31 ; takes command at New York, 
25 ; problems of defence, 25 ; des- 
perate situation on Long Island, 34, 
38, 40; responsible for strategy, 41, 



55 ; motives, 54 ; in command on 
Long Island, 55 ; on militia, 55, 132 ; 
prestige in danger, 57 ; idea of organi- 
zation, 60 ; refuses to employ horse- 
men, 64, 92 ; military career, 71 ; 
want of alertness, 72 ; moves south- 
ward, 75 ; reconnoitres, 76 ; on 
cavalry and Pulaski, 83 n. ; failure 
to value cavalry, 87 ; Congress and 
cavalry, 89 n.; interest in horses, 91 ; 
learns caution, 95 ; at Monmouth, 99 ; 
at Yorktown, 100 ; character of, 51, 
112; at Morristown, 117, 123; failure 
to grasp Howe's strategy, 128, 129, 
132, 137, 154 ; authority of, 133, 163, 
164 n.; Northern department and, 
138; errors in strategy, 145; after 
Saratoga, 154 ; on Delaware defences, 
156 ; learns strategy, 161 ; councils of 
war, 164 ; cult, 166 ; Pickering's 
opinion of, 167 ; characterized, 170 ; on 
States, 209 n.; influence on Union, 
219 n., 220. 

Washington, William, 102, 105. 

" Washington and Cavalry," 110. 

Washington College, Lee as president, 
332. 

Washington reminiscences, unhistorical, 
344. 

Waterloo, battle of, 12, 280; absence of 
intrenchments, 15. 

Waxhaws, affair at, 104. 

Wayne, Anthony, at Paoli, 80. 

Weather conditions at New York, 44. 

Webster, Daniel, on sovereignty, 221 n., 
297 339. 

Weed,' Thurlow, 365, 369, 383. 

Weems, Mason Locke, 166. 

"Weems Dispensation," 110. 

Wehla, 143. 

Welles, Gideon, sends Forbes and Aspin- 
wall to England, 354, 355, 372; on 
buying ships, 362. 

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, 
15, 140 ; at Torres Vedras, 17, 49 ; at 
Vimeiro, 100 ; allowance of shoes, 134 ; 
at Salamanca, 178 ; on war corre- 
spondents, 180 ; on Pakenham, 183 ; 
to be sent to America, 184 ; had he 
been at New Orleans, 201. 

Westbury, Richard Bethell, Baron, 397. 

West Point, 340. 

White, Anthony Walton, 102. 

White's Tavern, 69. 

Wigfall, Louis Trezevant, on assault on 
Sumner, 255. 

Wilderness, battle of, 272. 

Wilkes, Charles, 398. 



424 



INDEX 



William of Orange. 112, 172. 

William II, on war, 288. 

Wilmington, Del., 121, 127, 153. 

Wilmington, N. C, fall of, 249, 322. 

Wilson, Charles L., 367. 

Wilson, Henry, 274. 

Wilson, James Harrison, 277. 

Windsor, home life of Queen Victoria, 

386. 
Winter Hill, 7. 
Winthrop, John, 203, 292. 



Winthrop, Robert Charles, 226. 
Wolfe, James, 72, 169. 
Woodward, P. Henry, 8 n. 

Yancey, William Lowndes, on cotton, 260, 

396. 
Young, Pierce Manning Butler, on war, 

288. 
Yorktown, Va., 113, 150, 161. 

Ziethen, Johann Joachim von, 68. 



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